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Appendix C Previous Studies The following information is taken from a sampling of recent reporting on topics that are directly related to the overarching issues discussed in the main body of this report. This appendix provides the reader with additional background and context for the report. Defense Science Board Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply (2005) The following is reprinted from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technol- ogy, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply, February 2005, pp. 8-14. Available online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-02-HPMS_Report_Final. pdf. Last accessed on September 19, 2007. Recommendation: The Task Force recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD), directed by the Secretary and the Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, lead in guaranteeing its needs are supported by ensuring that the United States policy and industry together transform and enhance the United States (U.S.) position in onshore microelectronics. Providing for assured supplies by DOD contracts with todayâs trusted foundries helps solve the immediate problem, but is only a temporary measure; foundry agreements will not address the structural issue of funding research that will sustain our information superiority. Long term national security depends upon U.S.-based competitiveness in research, development, design and manufacturing. DOD should advocate that these are not only DOD objectives but also national priorities. . . . Recommendation: DOD must determine classes of [integrated circuits] ICs incorporated in its weapon systems and other key mission products that require trusted sources and how many such circuits are needed. This requires that DOD identify device and technology types of microelectronics devices that require trusted sources as well as the length of time it will need such special supply arrangements. This identification must include the full range of technologies needed for DOD as well as its suppliers. . . . 193
194 Nanophotonics Recommendation: Led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logis- tics (USD(AT&L)), DOD and its Military Departments/Agencies, working with their system suppliers, must develop a plan of action that encompasses both short- and long-term technology, acquisition and manufacturing capabilities needed to assure on-going availability of supplies of trusted microelectronic components. This plan of action requires both a steady-state vision and implementation plans for both standard and special technology components. . . . Recommendation: The Wassenaar Arrangement covering exports of sensitive, leading edge semiÂ conductor manufacturing equipment (SME) is not an effective tool for assuring that potential adversaries do not have access to leading edge design and wafer fabrication equipment, technology and cell libraries. The U.S. should act to strengthen export controls by: â¢ Negotiating bilateral agreements or understandings with Wassenaar members in which advanced SME and design tools are made with the objective of harmonizing export licensing practices and standards, â¢ Concluding a similar bilateral agreement or understanding with Taiwan, â¢ Giving the Department of Commerce a mandate and resources to compile an up-to-date catalogue of the global availability (including foreign availability) of state-of-the-art SME and design tools in designated foreign countries. . . . Recommendation: DOD must continue to support research and development of the special techÂ nologies it requires. This includes ongoing radiation hardened and electromagnetic pulse (EMP)-resistant component design and process development. The emergence of requirements for trustworthiness requires new efforts in technologies to embed, assure and protect component trust. The Department will require additional technology development efforts, including: â¢ Reducing barriers to radiation-tolerant âstandardâ designs, â¢ Increasing efforts to develop tamper protection technology, and â¢ Developing design and production techniques for disguising the true function of ICs. . . . Recommendation: Accurate characterization and assessment of adversariesâ âdirty tricksâ is essen- tial to develop an effective U.S. counter tamper strategy. The Task Force addressed many of these issues relative to the security challenges of information sharing, but opportunities, methods and threats change continuously. The Director, Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E) in conjunction with the Intel- ligence Community should develop risk mitigating technical approaches to support the risk management function. DDR&E should take the lead in defining the requirements and making the necessary investments to realize the needed security breakthroughs. Foreign Sources of Supply: Assessment of the United States Defense Industrial Base: Report Required by Section 812 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136) (2004) The following is reprinted from Office of the Secretary of Defense, Foreign Sources of Supply: Assessment of the United States Defense Industrial Base: Report Required by Section 812 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136), November 2004, p. 22. Available online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/812_report.pdf. Last accessed on September 19, 2007.
APPENDIX C 195 Conclusions The information presented in this report indicates that the Department [of Defense] employs foreign contractors and subcontractors judiciously, and in a manner consistent with national security requirements. Furthermore, an ongoing, comprehensive, forward-looking, DoD examination of the most important warfighting capabilities, critical supporting technologies, and associated industrial capabilities indicates that the U.S. industrial base is well positioned to maintain its world leadership position. The Department procures very few defense articles and components from foreign suppliers. In Fiscal Year 2003, DoD procurement actions totaled $209 billion. Of that amount, DoD contracts for defense articles and components totaled just over $65 billion. Of that $65 billion, the Department awarded con- tracts to foreign suppliers for defense articles and components totaling just over $1 billion. Therefore, DoD contracts for defense articles and components awarded to foreign suppliers represented less than one-half of one percent of all DoD contracts; and only about 1.5% of DoD contracts for defense articles and components. The top five recipient nations (by value) of DoD contracts (Canada, United Kingdom (UK), Israel, Germany, and Sweden) collectively received contracts totaling almost $821 million (about 81% of the total for all such contracts). All five nations are long-standing, reliable, trading partners of the United States. The January 2004, DoD report Study on Impact of Foreign Sourcing of Systems examined the extent and implications of foreign subcontractors for twelve operationally important defense systems. The report concluded that foreign suppliers provide limited amounts of materiel for the systems; and that using those foreign subcontractors does not impact long-term military readiness or the economic viability of the national technology and industrial base. For the systems studied, foreign subcontracts collectively represented about 4% of the total contract value and less than 10% of the value of all subcontracts. The Defense Industrial Base Capabilities Studies (DIBCS) series of assessments completed to date (Battlefield Awareness, Command and Control, and Force Application) highlight those warfighting capabilities most important to 21st century warfighting; where U.S. leadership over adversaries is most important; and where Department attention and resources should be focused. The United States has a lead in the vast majority of the most critical technologies and associated industrial capabilities. For the most part, there are sufficient U.S. suppliers available now, and projected to be available in the future, to preclude vulnerabilities resulting from foreign supplier dependencies. study on impact of foreign sourcing of systems (2004) The following is reprinted from Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, Study on Impact of Foreign Sourcing of Systems, January 2004, pp. iv-vi. Available online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/study_impact_foreign_sourcing_of_systems.pdf. Last accessed on Sep- tember 19, 2007. Conclusions Foreign sources provide limited amounts of materiel for the identified programs. For the twelve programs evaluated as part of this study of foreign sources in defense programs, the Department [of Defense] identified a total of 73 first, second, and third tier foreign subcontractors. The total value of the prime contracts totaled $2.23 billion. The total value of the subcontracted effort for the programs totaled $986 million; about $96.5 million of that amount was subcontracted to foreign sources. Collectively, foreign subcontracts represent about four percent of the total contract value and less than ten percent of the value of all subcontracts for these programs.
196 Nanophotonics Value of Foreign Value of Foreign Value of Foreign Subcontracts Subcontracts as a % # Foreign Subcontracts as a % of Total of Prime Contract Program Subcontractors ($M) Subcontracts Value JSLIST 8 $35.0 62.5% 12.5% PAC-3 25 $23.1 12.3% 6.2% F414 4 $19.1 10.9% 4.6% PREDATOR 5 $1.0 14.5% 3.3% WCMD 11 $2.0 4.3% 3.2% TACTICAL TOMAHAWK 3 $6.8 5.5% 2.8% SFW 4 $2.9 7.8% 2.5% GMLRS 3 $2.6 6.1% 2.3% SLAM-ER 5 $1.0 3.3% 1.6% ATACMS 3 $2.2 3.8% 1.5% PAVEWAY 1 $0.7 0.4% 0.2% JSOW 1 $0.1 0.1% 0.1% Subtotal without JSLIST 65 $61.5 6.6% 3.2% Total 73 $96.5 9.8% 4.3% The aggregate value of foreign subcontracts is skewed by the inclusion of the Joint Service Light- weight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) chemical protective suit. The JSLIST suit is unusual in that it is not a weapon system, nor a component of a weapon system. It is a piece of vital protective equipment; its cutting edge technology originates overseas; and the Department is bringing this cutting edge technol- ogy into the United States. The total value of program subcontracts, exclusive of JSLIST suits, awarded to foreign sources is significantly smaller ($61.5 million versus $96.5 million)âabout six percent of the total subcontract value and about three percent of the prime contract value. Utilization of these foreign sources for these programs does not impact long-term readiness. The use of foreign sources has not negatively impacted long-term readiness or national security. In fact the use of non-U.S. suppliers: (1) permits the Department to access state-of-the-art technologies and industrial capabilities; (2) promotes consistency and fairness in dealing with U.S. allies; (3) encourages development of interoperable weapons systems; (4) encourages development of mutually beneficial industrial linkages that enhance U.S. industryâs access to global markets; and (5) exposes U.S. industry to international competition, helping to ensure that U.S. firms remain innovative and efficient. Going forward, utilization of the identified foreign sources is not likely to impact the long-term readi- ness of the Armed Forces. The foreign sources are as likely to be able to meet program cost, performance, and delivery requirements as are domestic sources. Additionally, the identified foreign sources do not constitute a foreign vulnerability that poses a risk to national security. The vast majority of the foreign sources are from NATO nations or other nations with whom we have had enduring military and com- mercial relationships. Despite very public opposition of some of the firmâs host nations to U.S. actions during operations in Afghanistan or Iraq, at no time did the foreign suppliers (including twenty German and two French suppliers) restrict the provision or sale of these components to the Department because of U.S. military operations. Utilization of these foreign sources does not impact the economic viability of the national techÂnology and industrial base. The national technology and industrial base is not put at risk by the use of the foreign suppliers reflected within this study. The value of total program subcontracts, exclusive of JSLIST suits, awarded
APPENDIX C 197 to foreign sources is very limited (about $61.5 million). The vast majority of the total contract value, in excess of 95 percent, is retained domestically. In some cases the national technology and industrial base is being enhanced as domestic capabilities are being established for several key items now procured from foreign sources. In most cases, domestic suppliers are available for the parts, components, and materials provided by the foreign sources. The Department identified only four instances where domestic sources were not available to compete for items subcontracted to foreign suppliers. The Department generally does not mandate supplier selections to its contractors. The Department expects its contractors to select reliable, capable suppliers consistent with obtaining best value, encourag- ing effective competition, and meeting national security requirements. Although the sampled programs contained several instances of offsets and an international cooperative program (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System), generally, prime contractors and first and second tier suppliers indicated they selected foreign subcontractors for specific items because those subcontractors offered the best combination of price, performance, and delivery. The results of this study are consistent with recent related studies. An October 2001 Study on Impact of Foreign Sourcing of Systems (eight weapons systems, including several weapons platforms) identified a total of 86 first, second, and third tier foreign subcontractors. The value of the subcontracted effort for the programs totaled $4.07 billion; about $66 million of that amount was subcontracted to foreign sources. Collectively, foreign subcontracts represented less than two percent of the value of all subcontracts for the programs. An August 2003 report, Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2002 Purchases from Foreign Entities, reported that DoD prime contract procurement actions during Fiscal Year 2002 totaled $170.8 billion. Of that amount, approximately $7.0 billion (about four percent) was for contracts with a place of perfor- mance outside the United States. Of the $7 billion, about $1.6 billion (23 percent of foreign purchases and less than one percent of all procurements) was expended for military hardware. (The balance was for subsistence, fuel, construction services, and other miscellaneous items.) going global? u.s. government policy and the defense aerospace industry (2002) The following is reprinted from Mark A. Lorell, Julie Lowell, Richard M. Moore, Victoria Greenfield, and Katia Vlachos, Going Global? U.S. Government Policy and the Defense Aerospace Industry, 2002, pp. xxii-xxiv. Available online at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1537.pdf. Last accessed on September 19, 2007. Reprinted with permission from RAND Corp., Santa Monica, Calif. Conclusions The Response of U.S. Industry to Globalization â¢ Numerous innovative cross-border strategic market sector agreements initiated by U.S. and Âforeign companies are emerging. Leading U.S. aerospace prime contractors and subcontractors are aggres- sively seeking creative new forms of cross-border linkages in efforts to gain or maintain foreign market access. The most innovative of these linkages appear to be long-term strategic teaming or joint venture agreements aimed at entire market sectors rather than the more traditional approach focusing on specific projects or systems.
198 Nanophotonics â¢ U.S. aerospace firms are not significantly increasing their acquisition of wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign defense aerospace firms. There are few indications that U.S. defense aerospace firms have dramatically increased their interest in acquiring wholly owned foreign subsidiaries, although there seems to be some increase in U.S. mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity overseas in the defense industry as a whole. As noted above, the preferred industry-initiated cross-border business relationships appear to take the form of teams and joint ventures. â¢ Teaming and joint ventures with non-UK and non-Europe-based firms are increasing. Over the past several years, there has been an apparent increase in M&As, teaming, and joint ventures with non- UK-headquartered European companies as well as with non-European companies. This Ârepresents a shift from traditional U.S. practice, in which most direct investments and U.S.-Âinitiated cross-border investments involved UK firms. Implications of European Consolidation and Increased Aerospace Globalization â¢ U.S. industry collaboration with one countryâs firm increasingly means collaboration with many countriesâ firms. The consolidation that is taking place both with the European defense aerospace industry and with that of other important foreign industrial bases has made it increasingly prob- lematic for U.S. government policymakers and industry leaders to think in terms of bilateral col- laborative relationships between the United States and specific European or other foreign countries. As a result, the traditional U.S. government and U.S. industry approach of negotiating bilateral, country-specific agreements may have to be modified or adjusted. â¢ Consolidated European and other foreign firms mean potentially more equal partners as well as stronger competitors. The consolidation of the European defense aerospace industry is producing pan-European companies of roughly the same size and sales turnover as the leading U.S. firms in many product sectors. These new, consolidated pan-European firms are eager to offer European solutions for European and third-country weapon system requirements that are fully competitive with U.S. products. Similar consolidation trends are visible in other countries. â¢ European and other foreign firms seek U.S. market access but resent barriers. With an overall smaller market and smaller R&D funding base, the newly emerging pan-European firms and other foreign companies strongly desire greater access both to the U.S. market and to U.S. technology. However, European and other foreign firms are insisting with increasing aggressiveness on more equal business relationships with U.S. firms as well as on less restrictive U.S. policies regarding access to the U.S. market, technology transfer, and third-party sales of technology and products. â¢ European and other foreign firms view the acquisition of U.S. firms as the most effective means of penetrating the U.S. market. The most successful recent penetrations of the U.S. market by Euro- pean firms have been through acquisition of existing U.S. firms rather than through joint ventures or programs. To date, however, newly acquired foreign subsidiaries primarily service DoD and are often restricted with regard to technology flow back to Europe. Thus, such market penetration does not necessarily promote equipment standardization or interoperability or help close the capability gap with Europe. â¢ Non-European foreign firms are forming strategic relationships with European and U.S. firms, potentially enhancing competition but complicating standardization and interoperability objectives. The defense industries of some other important non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have been aggressively seeking U.S. and European market access through the forging of new business relationships based on strategic alliances. Israeli industry has been particularly active in this area. In many cases, these alliances have clearly increased competition in key niche product sectors within both the U.S. and European markets in a manner that would appear to be beneficial to the Air Force. In some cases, however, these relationships seem to have undermined U.S. attempts to promote equipment standardization if not interoperability.
APPENDIX C 199 â¢ The findings above suggest that European and other foreign industry consolidation present U.S. government and industry with unprecedented opportunities as well as risks. If new, mutually benefi- cial cross-border collaborative business relationships take hold, the consolidation of European and other foreign industries greatly increases the prospects for allied procurement of standardized or interoperable systems while potentially reducing system costs. On the other hand, the persistence of frictions over technology transfer and security issues as well as foreign direct investment, combined with the increased capabilities and competitiveness of European and other multinational defense industries, means that the Europeans and other allies may be tempted to move increasingly toward indigenous solutions and more widespread global competition with U.S. firms. Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security (1999) The following is reprinted from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Tech- nology, Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security, December 1999, pp. vii-xii. Available online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/globalization.pdf. Last accessed on September 19, 2007. Key Task Force Recommendations [Selected] DoD has not been aggressive in capturing the benefits of or mitigating the risks posed by globalization. Change has come slowly due to a range of factors, including cultural impediments, legal and regulatory obstacles, and restrictive and unclear policies. The Department needs to change the way it does business in a number of areas: The Department needs a new approach to maintaining military dominance. Globalization is irresistibly eroding the military advantage the U.S. has long sought to derive through technology controls. Accordingly, the more the United States depends on technology controls for maintain- ing the capability gap between its military forces and those of its competitors, the greater the likelihood that gap will narrow. To hedge against this risk, DoDâs strategy for achieving and maintaining military dominance must be rooted firmly in the awareness that technology controls ultimately will not succeed in denying its competitors access to militarily useful technology. DoD must shift its overall approach to military dominance from âprotectingâ military-relevant tech- nologiesâthe building blocks of military capabilityâto âpreservingâ in the face of globalization those military capabilities essential to meeting national military objectives. Protection would play a role in an overall strategy for preserving essential capabilities, but its primacy would be supplanted by three other strategy elements: direct capability enhancement, institutionalized vulnerability analysis and assessment, and risk mitigation efforts designed to ensure system integrity. To shift its approach from technology protection to essential capability preservation, the Task Force recommends that DoD: 1) establish a permanent process for determining a continuously-evolving âshort- listâ of essential military capabilities, and 2) develop strategies for preserving each essential capability. Both the list of essential military capabilities and the strategies for their preservation are needed to inform the development of: U.S. warfighting strategy and the forces to underpin that strategy (by identifying how and with what the U.S. will need to fight to remain dominant), DoD positions on technology and personnel security (by helping to identify those capabilities and/or constituent technologies which DoD should attempt to protect and how vigorously they should be protected); and DoD acquisition risk mitigation measures (by identifying those systems that should be the focus of intense efforts to ensure system integrity).
200 Nanophotonics DoD needs to change substantially its approach to technology security. The United States has a national approach to technology security, one in which the Departments of State and Defense both play essential roles. The Task Force does not challenge the propriety of the Department of Stateâs statutory obligation to evaluate proposed defense technology transfers against U.S. foreign policy objectives. That said, the leveling of the global military-technological playing field also necessitates a substantial shift in DoDâs approach to technology security, the principal objective of which is to help maintain the U.S. military-technical advantage. DoD should attempt to protect for the purposes of maintaining military advantage only those capabili- ties and technologies of which the U.S. is the sole possessor and whose protection is deemed necessary to preserve an essential military capability. Protection of capabilities and technologies Â readily avail- able on the world market is, at best, unhelpful to the maintenance of military dominance and, at worst, counterÂproductive (e.g., by undermining the industry upon which U.S. military-technological supremacy depends). Where there is foreign availability of technologies, a decision to transfer need only be made on foreign policy grounds by the Department of State. DoD should no longer review export license applications as part of its role in the arms transfer process when foreign availability has been established. This will allow the DoD licensing review to concentrate on cases where the availability of technology is exclusive to the United States. Moreover, military capability is created when widely available and/or defense-unique technologies are integrated into a defense system. Accordingly, DoD should give highest priority in its technology security efforts to technology integration capabilities and the resulting military capabilities themselves, and accordingly lower priority to the individual technologies of which they are comprised. For those items and/or information that DoD can and should protect, the Task Force believes security measures need improvement. The means for such an improvement might come from a redistribution of the current level of security resources/effort, whereby DoD relaxes security in less important areas and tightens up in those most critical. In short, DoD must put up higher walls around a much smaller group of capabilities and technologies. DoD must realize fully the potential of the commercial sector to meet its needs. To leverage fully the commercial sector, DoD must do more than simply acquire available commer- cial products and adopt commercial practices. In some cases, DoD must engage commercial industry in an effort to shape the development of new products and services to better meet its needs. In many cases, DoD must adapt its often-bloated system requirements to, and develop new concepts that fit, operation- ally acceptable commercial solutions. The Task Force makes two primary recommendations designed to help DoD meet this overarching objective. First, the Secretary of Defense should give commercial acquisition primacy and broader scope by establishing it as the modernization instrument of first resort. DoD should seek to meet its moderniza- tion needs, whenever possible, with commercial solutions (including integrated services, systems, subÂ systems, components and building-block technologies) acquired using commercial acquisition practices. The Secretary should grant waivers to the acquisition of commercial products and services only when program managers can demonstrate that either no commercial options exist or that available commercial options cannot meet all critical performance requirements. DoD should employ commercial Âacquisition practices in all cases. The Task Force recognizes that some integrated, military-specific systems (e.g., precision-guided munitions and combat aircraft) are not and will likely never be provided by the com- mercial sector. Even here, DoD should meet its needs, whenever possible, with commercial components and subsystems. DoD can and should tap the commercial market to support virtually all of its moderniza- tion requirements.
APPENDIX C 201 Second, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology should form and routinely employ âCommercial Acquisition Gold Teamsâ to provide and manage advocacy for expanded DoD leverage of the commercial sector. The Task Force believes that Gold Teams should be employed dur- ing the earliest stages of the acquisition process (the concept definition phase), where they will have the best opportunity to reduce both the time and cost of developing and fielding new systems. Gold Teams should be focused initially on the commercial industry sectors from which the Task Force believes DoD can derive immediate and profound benefit: air and sea transportation; logistics and sustainment; com- munications and information systems; space-based surveillance; and high-efficiency ground transporta- tion. The organizational character and composition of the Commercial Acquisition Gold Teams are best determined by the USD(A&T). Teams could be either standing or ad hoc in character. Personnel could be either in-house (i.e., DoD), drawn from the contractor/ Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) community, or a mix of the two. In addition to these two core recommendations, DoD must also: 1) engage proactively in commercial standards management; 2) conduct a comprehensive review of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS) with the intent of asking Congress to eliminate remaining statutory barriers to DoD procurement of commercial products and services and also commercial sector disincentives for doing business with DoD; and 3) field on the World Wide Web interactive âdistance-learningâ software that would allow commercial firms to quickly familiarize them- selves with the FAR/DFARS; rapidly determine which regulations apply to their specific contracts; and comply fully with those regulations. DoD should take the lead in establishing and maintaining a real-time, interagency database of globally available, militarily relevant technologies and capabilities. Such a database, which would facilitate rapid and authoritative determination of the foreign Âavailability of a particular technology or military capability, would serve two principal functions. First, it would allow those involved in the export licensing and arms transfer decision making process to determine which technologies and capabilities are available abroad and thus no longer U.S.-controllable. Second, it would facilitate enhanced access by U.S. government and industry weapons developers to the global technologi- cal marketplace by illuminating potential foreign sources and/or collaborators. DoD should facilitate transnational defense industrial collaboration and integration. Greater transnational, and particularly transatlantic, defense-industrial integration could potentially yield tremendous benefit to the United States and its allies. The Task Force, however, identified a range of factors working to inhibit foreign industrial interest in greater integration with their U.S. counterparts. These include insufficient clarity in DoD policy on cross-border defense industrial mergers and acquisi- tions, and an overly burdensome regulatory environment surrounding both foreign direct investment in the U.S. defense sector and the transfer of U.S. defense technology, products and services. The Task Force makes three principal recommendations to erode these barriers to effective defense sector globalization. First, DoD should publicly reaffirm, on a recurring basis, its willingness to consider a range of cross-border defense industrial linkages that enhance U.S. security, interoperability with potential coalition partners, and competition in defense markets. Special attention should be paid to illuminatingâto the extent practicableâDoDâs broad criteria for merger and acquisition approval, and DoDâs policy rationale (e.g., the national security benefits of cross-border defense consolidation). Second, the Depart- ment of Defense should engage the Department of State to jointly modernize the regulatory regime and associated administrative processes affecting the export of U.S. defense articles. Third, DoD should also modernize the administrative and regulatory processes associated with foreign direct investment (FDI) to facilitate FDI in the U.S. defense sector.
202 Nanophotonics The Task Force also recommends that DoD adapt existing bilateral industrial security arrangements to respond to the emergence of multinational foreign defense industrial organizations. The change in the structure of the defense industry raises a question about whether the existing security practices are appropriate to its inevitable globalization.