IMPROVING THE ASSESSMENT OF THE
PROLIFERATION RISK OF NUCLEAR FUEL
CYCLES
Committee on Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of
Nuclear Fuel Cycles
Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board
Division on Earth and Life Studies
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Washington, D.C.
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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
This study was supported by Award No. DE-PI0000010/DE-DT0002373 between the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.
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Committee on Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles
ROBERT C. DYNES, Chair, University of California, San Diego
ALLEN G. CROFF, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (retired), St. Augustine, Florida
BART EBBINGHAUS, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California
B. JOHN GARRICK, Independent Consultant, Laguna Beach, California
CAROL E. KESSLER, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York
MILTON LEVENSON, Independent Consultant, Menlo Park, California
NANCY JO NICHOLAS, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico
ARIAN PREGRENZER, Sandia National Laboratories (retired), Albuquerque, New Mexico
SCOTT D. SAGAN, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California
AMY SANDS, Monterey Institute of International Studies, California
WILLIAM H. TOBEY, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
CHRIS G. WHIPPLE, ENVIRON, Lafayette, California
STAFF
JENNIFER HEIMBERG, Study Director, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board BENJAMIN RUSEK, Senior Program Officer, Committee on International Security and
Arms Control ERIN WINGO, Senior Program Assistant, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board
Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board
JAY C. DAVIS (chair), Hertz Foundation, Livermore, California
BARBARA J. MCNEIL (vice-chair), Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts
JOHN S. APPLEGATE, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington
DAVID J. BRENNER, Columbia University, New York
MARGARET S.Y. CHU, M.S. Chu & Associates, LLC, Albuquerque, New Mexico
MICHAEL L. CORRADINI, University of Wisconsin, Madison
PATRICIA J. CULLIGAN, Columbia University, New York
ROBERT C. DYNES, University of California, San Diego
HEDVIG HRICAK, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, New York
THOMAS H. ISAACS, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California
CAROL M. JANTZEN, Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken, South Carolina
ANNIE B. KERSTING, Glen T. Seaborg Institute, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Livermore, California
MARTHA S. LINET, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland
FRED A. METTLER, JR., New Mexico VA Health Care System, Albuquerque
BORIS F. MYASOEDOV, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
LAWRENCE T. PAPAY, PQR, LLC, La Jolla, California
DANIEL O. STRAM, University of Southern California, Los Angeles
RICHARD J. VETTER, Mayo Clinic (retired), Rochester, Minnesota
Staff
KEVIN D. CROWLEY, Director
JENNIFER HEIMBERG, Senior Program Officer
OURANIA KOSTI, Senior Program Officer
TONI GREENLEAF, Administrative and Financial Associate
LAURA D. LLANOS, Administrative and Financial Associate
DARLENE GROS, Senior Program Assistant
SHAUNTEÉ WHETSTONE, Senior Program Assistant
ERIN WINGO, Senior Program Assistant
PREFACE
This study originated from a joint request from the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security to understand the extent to which technical analysis of proliferation risk could be improved for policy makers. Phase 1 of this two-phase study was a workshop that focused on the first task of the study charge: identifying key policy questions that were capable of being answered by a technical assessment of host-state proliferation risk and the utility of these questions for informing nonproliferation policy decisions. The workshop, summarized by a rapporteur-authored report, brought together nonproliferation policy decision makers and key technical developers of proliferation assessment tools.
During our first committee meeting, we heard from DOE-NEa that it believed that the workshop adequately addressed the first task, whereas NNSA reported that the workshop did not.b This consensus report, which addresses the full statement of task, is the result of the second phase of the study.
When the committee and I began working on this study, we had long discussions on the meaning and motivation of the statement of task. We tried to better understand the individual tasks by dissecting them into components, and then by looking at them in total. We set off to gather information on “how the U.S. government makes nonproliferation policy decisions” searching for a well-defined process. At the same time, we began the significant work of “assessing the assessments.” Specifically, we reconsidered what key policy decisions could be answered by technical analysis of proliferation risk.
What we discovered throughout the study was that the task statement, although complex in its charge, can be reduced to asking how far technical analysis can go toward guiding nonproliferation policy-based decisions. How developed are the current technical methods? Do the policy makers need additional information that they are not getting?
We realized that the U.S. government does not follow a scripted process for every nonproliferation policy decision but that there are well-developed pathways to address the technical analysis that supports these decisions. I gained respect for the complexities of the issues faced by policy makers and the impact of the decisions that they make. It is clear that nonproliferation policy makers do make use of technical analyses when making decisions but also weigh many other factors.
aGriffith, A. 2012. DOE-NE Perspectives on the National Academies Proliferation Risk Assessment Project. Presentation to committee, January 16.
bLockwood, D. 2012. Proliferation Risk Assessments: A Policy-Maker’s Observations. Presentation to the committee, January 16.
The committee had lively discussions on the current limits of science-based approaches toward guiding these decisions. Ultimately, we determined that at the current time, science-based approaches for quantifying aspects of proliferation risk are best limited to engineering-based assessments (e.g., an assessment of proliferation resistance as opposed to the proliferation risk of a future fuel cycle). We did see that decision makers from other organizations found value in these approaches but only when they were actively involved in the process.
This complex study would not have been as interesting or enjoyable if not for the diverse and dedicated committee that supported it. The committee members came from different backgrounds and across many disciplines, spanning the usually vast chasm between technical and policy perspectives. For this committee, this division was not a problem. We all learned a great deal from each other and listened respectfully from divergent viewpoints on some issues.
Robert C. Dynes, Chair
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A number of individuals and organizations contributed to the successful completion of this report. The committee received many briefings that were necessary for the study’s success. Its questions were nearly always answered with clarity and candor. This report could not have been written without the support of the people listed below who made presentations to the committee. The information and cooperation that the committee received from these organizations and individuals were critical to the success of this study.
The committee would particularly like to acknowledge the excellent support it received from the project sponsors, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and Office of Nuclear Energy. The committee is especially grateful for the support it received from Dunbar Lockwood, Dan Vega, Karyn Durbin, Ed Wonder, and John Murphy.
The committee gratefully acknowledges the following people who provided presentations at its information-gathering sessions:
Robert Bari, Brookhaven National Laboratory
Jeff Bedell, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Kory Budlong-Sylvester, Los Alamos National Laboratory and current member of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI)
Tod Caldwell, NNSA Office of Nuclear Controls
William Charlton, Texas A&M University
Joyce Connery, National Security Council
Lisa Owens Davis, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Phillip Dolliff, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, Department of State
Chris Eldridge, IAEA Department of Safeguards
Matthew Ferguson, IAEA Department of Safeguards
Nancy Gallagher, University of Maryland
Erik Gartzke, University of California San Diego
Vladimir Georgevich, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Alex Glaser, Princeton University
Richard Goorevich, Senior Policy Advisor, National Nuclear Security Administration
Andrew Griffith, Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy
John Herczeg, Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy
Hank Jenkins-Smith, University of Oklahoma
David Johnson, ABS Consulting
Jeff Kaplaw, University of California San Diego
Donald Kerr, George Mason University
Susan Koch, Missouri State University
Warren "Pete" Miller, Bipartisan Policy Center
John Murphy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Mary Beth Nikitin, Congressional Research Service
Gordon Oehler, Potomac Institute University
Rafail Ostrovsky, University of California Los Angeles
Jon Phillips, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Joe Pilat, Los Alamos National Laboratory
M.V. Ramana, Princeton University
William Rhodes, NNSA Office of Nuclear Controls
Ray E. Richardson, Central Intelligence Agency
Gary Rochau, Sandia National Laboratories
Michael Rosenthal, past member of the IAEA’s SAGSI
James Smith, Los Alamos National Laboratory
James Sprinkle, IAEA Department of Safeguards
Sharon Squassoni, Center for Strategic and International Studies
John Steinbruner, University of Maryland
Richard J. K. Stratford, Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy Safety and Security, Department of State
Steven Streetman, Data Architecture Solutions, Inc.
David Sweeney, Texas A&M University
Lynn Timmons, NNSA, Office of Nuclear Controls (contractor)
Michael Uzzle, NNSA
Mary Beth Ward, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Christopher Way, Cornell University
Anatoli Welihozkiy, NNSA Office of Nuclear Controls
Ed Wonder, NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements
The committee would also like to thank the individuals that assisted in the logistical preparation at the sites the committee visited. Their assistance greatly aided the committee in their task. These include:
Reid Pauly, Stanford University
Jessica Groom, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Suzanne Cordoza, Sandia National Laboratories
Kathy Loeppky, Sandia National Laboratories
Peggy Desko, Sandia National Laboratories
Susan Washburn, Sandia National Laboratories
The committee extends special thanks to the staff of the National Research Council for supporting this study. Staff members who contributed to this effort include Jenny Heimberg (study director), Benjamin Rusek (staff member of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control), Kevin Crowley (director of the Nuclear and
Radiation Studies Board), Erin Wingo (senior program assistant), and Toni Greenleaf (financial and program associate).
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the Report Review Committee of the National Research Council. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Research Council in making its published report as sound as possible and will ensure that this report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of this report:
Robert Bari, Brookhaven National Laboratory
Steven Becker, Old Dominion University, School of Public Health
Matthew Bunn, Harvard University
Mona Dreicer, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Steve Fetter, University of Maryland
Alan Icenhour, Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Thomas Isaacs, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Sharon Squassoni, Center for Strategic and International Studies
John Steinbruner, University of Maryland
James Timbie, U.S. Department of State
Larry Turnbull, Riverside Research
Kevin Wood, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
Michael Zentner, U.S. Department of Energy
Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions and recommendations of this report, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Richard Meserve, Carnegie Institution for Science, and Granger Morgan, Carnegie Mellon University. Appointed by the National Research Council, Drs. Meserve and Morgan were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were considered carefully. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authorizing committee and the institution.
CONTENTS
1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
2. KEY PROLIFERATION POLICY QUESTIONS
3. UTILITY OF PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENTS
4. APPLICATION OF OTHER RISK METHODOLOGIES
5. IDENTIFICATION OF R&D FOR IMPROVING ASSESSMENTS
6. COMMUNICATION OF PROLIFERATION RISK
A: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members
B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks
