The Advanced Technology Program (ATP) was created to fund government-industry partnerships to support the development of new technologies with potential applications across the American economy. 1 Established in 1988 under the Reagan Administration and first funded under the Bush Administration, it represented one element of the U.S. government's efforts to restore and enhance the competitiveness of the U.S. economy. It provides cost-shared, competitive grants to industry to support R&D on high-risk, cutting-edge technologies with broad commercial potential and societal benefit. 2
Although the program began with substantial bipartisan support, in the mid-1990s it became embroiled in political controversy, partly as a result of its rapid expansion in the early years of the Clinton Administration. While new to the Advanced Technology Program, this controversy has long been an integral part of the American policy dialogue. Indeed, the appropriate role of government in the economy has been a source of debate in the United States from its very origins. The earliest articulation of the government's nurturing role with regard to the composition of the economy was Alexander Hamilton's 1791 Report on
1 This volume is the second in a series on the Advanced Technology Program. The first volume, National Research Council, The Advanced Technology Program: Challenges and Opportunities, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, was released in October 1999. These reviews are part of a broader study, carried out by the National Research Council Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy, on Government-Industry Partnerships for the Development of New Technologies, described below.
2 The grants are made in the form of cooperative agreement contracts. This is of key importance for it embodies a shared responsibility between the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the firms for the evolution of the project.
Manufactures, in which he urged an activist approach by the federal government. At the time Hamilton's views were controversial, although subsequent U.S. policy has largely reflected his belief in the need for an active federal role in the development of the American economy.
Driven by the exigencies of national defense and the requirements of transportation and communication across the American continent, the federal government has played an instrumental role in developing new production techniques and technologies. To do so, government has often turned to individual entrepreneurs with innovative ideas. For example, in 1798 the federal government laid the foundation for the first machine tool industry with a contract to the inventor, Eli Whitney, for interchangeable musket parts. 3 A few decades later, in 1842, a hesitant Congress appropriated funds to demonstrate the feasibility of Samuel Morse's telegraph. 4 Both Whitney and Morse fostered significant innovations that led to whole new industries. Indeed, Morse's innovation was the first step on the road toward today's networked planet.
The support for Morse's new invention was not an isolated case. The federal government increasingly saw economic development as central to its responsibilities. Examples of federal contributions to U.S. economic development abound. The government played a key role in the development of the U.S. railway network, the growth of agriculture through the Morrill Act (1862) and the creation of the agricultural extension service, and support of industry through the creation of the National Bureau of Standards in 1901. 5
3 Whitney missed his first delivery date for the arms and encountered substantial cost overruns, a set of events that is still familiar. However, his focus on the concept of interchangeable parts, and the machine tools to make them, was prescient. In David A. Hounshell's excellent analysis of the development of manufacturing technology in the United States, he suggests that Simeon North was ultimately the most successful in achieving interchangeability and the production of components by special-purpose machinery. See From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, p. 25-32. By the 1850s, the United States had begun to export specialized machine tools to the Enfield Arsenal in Great Britain. The British described the large-scale production of firearms, made with interchangeable parts, as “the American system of manufacturers.” See David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th Century America, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 6.
4 For a discussion of Samuel Morse's 1837 application for a grant and the congressional debate, see Irwin Lebow, Information Highways and Byways, New York: IEEE, 1995, pp. 9-12. For a more detailed account see Robert Luther Thompson, Wiring a Continent: The History of the Telegraph Industry in the United States 1823-1836, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947.
5 See Richard Bingham, Industrial Policy American Style: From Hamilton to HDTV, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, for a comprehensive review. In the case of the transcontinental railroad, Stephen Ambrose describes Abraham Lincoln as the “driving force” behind its development. Lincoln was intimately involved, helping to decide the project's route, financing, and even the gauge of the tracks: Nothing Like It in the World: The Men Who Built the Transcontinental Railroad, 1863-1869. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.
Throughout the 20th century, the federal government had an enormous impact on the structure and composition of the economy through regulation, procurement, and a vast array of policies to support industrial and agricultural development. Between World War I and World War II, these policies included support for the development of key industries, with commercial and military applications, such as radios and aircraft frames and engines. 6 The requirements of World War II generated a huge increase in government procurement and support for high-technology industries. At the industrial level, there were “major collaborative initiatives in pharmaceutical manufacturing, petrochemicals, synthetic rubber, and atomic weapons.” 7 An impressive array of weapons based on new technologies was developed during the war, ranging from radar and improved aircraft to missiles and, not least, the atomic bomb. Many of these military technologies found civilian applications after the war.
Both during and after the war, the government made unprecedented investments in computer technology. 8 During the war it played a central role in creating the first electronic digital computers, the ENIAC and the Colossus. 9 Following the war, the federal government began to fund basic research at universities on a significant scale, first through the Office of Naval Research and later through the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Public Health Service. 10 At the same time, the continued reluctance of commercial firms, such as IBM and NCR to invest large sums in what they considered to be risky research and development projects with uncertain markets, forced the government to continue sponsoring the development of the new technology now referred to as computers. 11 In this early phase, the National Bureau of Standards [the precursor of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)] made a significant contribution,
6 See the Introduction to this volume. 7 David Mowery, “Collaborative R&D: How Effective Is It?” Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1998, p. 37.
8 Kenneth Flamm, Creating the Computer, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988, Chapters 1-3.
9 For a detailed account of ENIAC's creation, see Scott McCartney, ENIAC: The Triumphs and Tragedies of the World's First Computer, New York: Walker and Company, 1999; and Flamm, Creating the Computer, op. cit., p. 39.
10 The National Science Foundation was initially seen as the agency that would fund basic scientific research at universities after World War II. However, disagreements over the degree of Executive Branch control over the NSF delayed passage of its authorizing legislation until 1950, even though the concept for the agency was first put forth in 1945 in Vannevar Bush's report, Science: The Endless Frontier. The Office of Naval Research bridged the gap in basic research funding during these years. For an account of the politics of the NSF's creation, see G. Paschal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century, New York: The Free Press, 1997, p. 231. See also Daniel Lee Kleinman, Politics on the Endless Frontier: Postwar Research Policy in the United States, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995. Computer science did not, however, mature as a separate academic discipline until the 1960s. In the interim, the military supported the fledgling computer industry on national security grounds.
11 Flamm, Creating the Computer, op. cit., p. 75.
through its SEAC machine, to the development of the modern computer. 12 Throughout the Cold War, the United States continued to emphasize technological superiority as a means of ensuring U.S. security. Government funds and cost-plus contracts helped to support systems and enabling technologies such as semiconductors and new materials, radar, jet engines, advanced computer hardware and software, and missiles.
In the post-Cold War period, the evolution of the American economy continues to be profoundly marked by government-funded research in areas such as microelectronics, robotics, biotechnology and the human genome, and through earlier investments in communications networks such as ARPANET—the fore-runner of today's Internet.
Some economic analysis suggests that high technology is often characterized
THE ROLE OF THE BOARD ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC POLICY
Since 1991 the National Research Council's Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy (STEP) has undertaken a program of activities to improve policy makers' understanding of the interconnections of science, technology, and economic policy and their importance for the American economy and its international competitive position. The Board's activities have corresponded with increased recognition by policy makers of the importance of technology to economic growth. The new economic growth theory emphasizes the role of technology creation, which is believed to be characterized by significant growth externalities. 13 A consequence of the renewed appreciation of growth externalities is recognition of the economic geography of economic development. With growth externalities coming about in part from the exchanges of knowledge among innovators, certain regions become centers for particular types of high-growth activities. 14
12 As Kenneth Flamm observes, besides being the first operational von-Neumann-type stored-program computer in the United States, the Bureau of Standards' SEAC, or Standards Eastern Automatic Computer, pioneered important technology concepts. All of the logic was implemented with newly developed germanium diodes (10,000 were used); the vacuum tubes within (750) were only for providing power and electrical pulse-shaping circuitry. The computer also used standardized, replaceable circuit modules, an innovation soon adopted throughout the industry. Thus the first computer to use solid state logic was also the first modern computer to be completed in the United States. Flamm, Creating the Computer, op. cit., p. 74.
13 Paul Romer, “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(5):71-102, 1990. See also Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993. 14 Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991, p. 23, points out how the British economist Alfred Marshall initially observed in his classic, Principles of Economics, how geographic clusters of specific economic activities arose from the exchange of “tacit” knowledge among businesses.
by increasing rather than decreasing returns, justifying to some the proposition that governments can capture permanent advantage in key industries by providing relatively small but potentially decisive support to bring national industries up the learning curve and down the cost curve. 15 In part, this is why the economic literature now recognizes the relationship between technology policy and trade policy. 16 Recognition of these linkages and the corresponding ability of governments to shift comparative advantage in favor of the national economy provides intellectual underpinning for government support for high-technology industry. 17 Another widely recognized rationale for government support for high technology exists in cases in which technology generates benefits beyond those that can be captured by innovating firms, often referred to as spillovers. 18 There are also cases in which the cost of a given technology may be prohibitive for individual companies, even though expected benefits to society are substantial and widespread. 19 Both of these propositions are central to the mission of the Advanced Technology Program.
The growth in government programs to support high-technology industry within national economies and their impact on international science and technology cooperation and on the multilateral trading system are of considerable interest worldwide. Accordingly, these topics were taken up by STEP in a study carried
15 Paul Krugman, Rethinking International Trade, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990.
16 In addition to Krugman, see J. A. Brander and B. J. Spencer, “International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,” Review of Economic Studies, 50(4):707-722, 1983, and “Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18(1-2):83-100, 1985. See also A. K. Dixit and A. S. Kyle, “The Use of Protection and Subsidies for Entry Promotion and Deterrence,” American Economic Review, 75(1):139-152, 1985, and P. Krugman and M. Obstfeldt, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 3rd ed., New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1994.
17 For a review of governments' efforts to capture new technologies and the industries they spawn for their national economies, see National Research Council, Conflict and Cooperation in National Competition for High-Technology Industry, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996, pp. 28-40. For a critique of these efforts see P. Krugman, Peddling Prosperity, New York: W. W. Norton Press, 1994.
18 See, for example, Martin N. Baily and A. Chakrabarti, Innovation and the Productivity Crisis, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1998; and Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
19 See Ishaq Nadiri, Innovations and Technological Spillovers, NBER Working Paper No. 4423, 1993; and Edwin Mansfield, “Academic research and industrial innovation,” Research Policy, 20(1):1-12, 1991. See also, Council of Economic Advisers, Supporting Research and Development to Promote Economic Growth: The Federal Government's Role, Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 1995.
out in conjunction with the Hamburg Institute for Economic Research (HWWA) and the Institute for World Economics (IFW) in Kiel. 20 One of the principal recommendations for further work emerging from that study was a call for an analysis of the principles of effective cooperation in technology development. These analyses would include lessons from national and international consortia, such as assessment mechanisms and modes of cooperation that might be developed to improve national and international cooperation in high-technology products. 21
To advance our understanding of the operation and performance of partnerships, the STEP Board has undertaken a major study of programs relying on public-private collaboration for the development of new technologies. The project's multidisciplinary Steering Committee 22 includes members from academia, high-technology industries, venture capital firms, and the realm of public policy. The intent of the study is not to address general questions of principle regarding the appropriateness of government involvement in partnerships. Instead, the Committee's charge is to take a pragmatic approach to address such issues as the rationale and organizing principles of governmentindustry cooperation to develop new technologies, current practices, sectoral differences, means of evaluation, the experience of foreign-based partnerships, and the roles of government laboratories, universities, and other non-profit research organizations.
As a program-based assessment of partnerships, focusing on best practices rather than issues of principle, the study has given particular attention to generic partnership programs such as the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) and ATP and the needs emerging from the growth in health-related fund
20 This study resulted in two National Research Council reports: Conflict and Cooperation, op. cit., and International Friction and Cooperation in High-Technology Development and Trade, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997. A third report was published by the German HWWA, Georg Koopmann and Hans-Eckart Scharrer, editors, The Economics of High-Technology Competition and Cooperation in Global Markets, Baden-Baden: HWWA (Institute for Economic Research), 1996.
21 The NRC report, Conflict and Cooperation, op. cit., recommends further analytical work concerning principles for effective cooperation in technology development (see Recommendation 24, p. 8). David Mowery of the University of California at Berkeley has recently noted the rapid expansion of collaborative activities and emphasized the need for comprehensive assessment. David Mowery, “Collaborative R&D: How Effective is it?” op. cit., p. 44. See also David Mowery, “Using Cooperative Research and Development Arrangements as S&T Indicators: What do We Have and What Would We Like?” Presentation before National Science Foundation conference, Workshop on Strategic Research Partnerships, 13 October 2000. Publication of proceedings pending.
22 For the Committee membership, see the front matter of this volume.
ing and the relative decline in R&D support in other areas such as information technologies. A series of intermediate reports on these programs and topics will contribute to the preparation of the Committee's final report. That report will recommend best practice principles of operation both for national programs and for international collaboration.
The Committee's analysis has included a significant but necessarily limited portion of the wide variety of cooperative activity that takes place between the government and the private sector. 23 The selection of specific programs to review has been conditioned by the Committee's desire to carry out an analysis of current partnerships directly relevant to contemporary policy making. The Committee also recognizes the importance of placing each of the studies in the broader context of U.S. technology policy, which continues to employ a wide variety of ad hoc mechanisms developed through the government's decentralized decision-making and management process.
The Committee's desire to ensure that its deliberations and analysis are directly relevant to current policy making has allowed it to be responsive to requests from the Executive Branch, and to requests by Congress, for an examination of various policies and programs of current policy relevance. These would include the White House and State Department request for an evaluation of opportunities for greater transatlantic cooperation as a result of the signature of the U.S.-E.U. Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation, the request by the Defense Department's Under Secretary for Technology and Acquisitions to review the Fast Track initiative in the SBIR program at the Department of Defense, and of course this assessment of the Advanced Technology Program, requested by NIST in compliance with Senate Report 105-235. 24 The Committee has also focused its attention on the emerging needs, synergies, and opportunities between the fields of biotechnology and computing, with special attention directed to the differences and similarities of government support for technology development in biotechnology and computing, the different uses of intellectual property in these sectors, and the need for balanced investments across disciplines. To meet its proposed objectives, the study has focused on the assessment of current and proposed programs, drawing on the experience of previous U.S. initiatives, foreign practice, and emerging areas (e.g., bioinformatics) resulting from U.S. investments in advanced technologies. A summary of the partnerships taken up by the study are included in Box A.
23 For example, DARPA's programs and contributions have not been reviewed. For an indication of the scope of cooperative activity, see C. Coburn and D. Berglund, Partnerships: A Compendium of State and Federal Cooperative Technology Programs, Columbus, OH: Battelle Press, 1995; and the RaDiUS database,
24 See Senate Report 105-235, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1999. Report from the Committee on Appropriations to accompany bill S. 2260, which included the Commerce Department FY1999 Appropriations Bill.
Box A. Partnerships Reviewed by the Government-Industry Partnerships Study
The NRC study of Government-Industry Partnerships for the Development of New Technologies has reviewed a wide range of partnerships. The study can be divided into four primary areas: analysis of current U.S. partnership programs, potential partnerships, industry-national laboratory partnerships, and international collaboration and benchmarking. The analysis of current U.S. partnerships has focused on the Small Business Innovation Research Program, the Advanced Technology Program, and partnerships in biotechnology and computing. The review of potential partnerships for specific technologies, based on the project's extensive generic partnerships analysis, has focused on needs in biotechnology and computing and opportunities for solid-state lighting. The industry-laboratory analysis reviewed the potential of science and technology parks at Sandia National Laboratories and NASA Ames Research Center. International collaboration and benchmarking studies have included outlining new opportunities resulting from the U.S.-E.U. Science and Technology Agreement and a review of regional and national programs to support the semiconductor industry, focusing on Japan, Europe, Taiwan, and the United States.
SUPPORT FOR ANALYSIS OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS
There is broad support for this type of objective analysis among federal agencies and the private sector. Government agencies supporting this analysis include the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, especially the National Cancer Institute and the National Institute of General Medical Sciences, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Office of Naval Research, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Sandia National Laboratories and the Electric Power Research Institute have also contributed. Private support is provided by a diverse group of private corporations. All sponsors are listed in the front matter.
COMMISSIONED RESEARCH, WORKSHOPS, SYMPOSIA, AND DISCUSSIONS
This assessment of the ATP is best understood in the context of the Committee's analysis of government-industry partnerships. This report is derived from a two-year study of a wide variety of partnerships that has informed the Committee's deliberations and allowed for comparative points of view on a range of partnership activities.
In carrying out its analysis of the ATP, and to complement its own substantial expertise, the Committee commissioned independent research and convened a series of fact-finding meetings in the form of workshops and symposia. The summary of the April 2000 symposium on the Advanced Technology Program, included in this volume, represents one element of this fact-finding effort. The symposium is the third in a series of fact-finding meetings on the ATP convened under the auspices of the project on Government-Industry Partnerships for the Development of New Technologies, 25 and under the direction of the Steering Committee, to provide the basis for a review of the operation of this relatively small yet high-profile partnership program. 26
The first conference brought together NIST officials, users (i.e., award winners), critics, and analysts. The report resulting from the conference provided valuable background information that provided a rare overview of the program in terms of its goals, operations, assessment, achievements, and challenges, while also providing an opportunity for well-known critics to voice their views. The second meeting was a workshop designed to provide a strategic assessment with regard to the program. The third conference focused more on operational improvements, the assessment program, issues such as “crowding out” and the relationship of the ATP to venture capital, the roles and needs of large companies in such a program, and feedback from users who have received other types of awards.
This report, which results from the third conference, provides substantial new information about the program and serves as a vehicle for the Committee's findings and recommendations. It includes descriptions of the policy context and study origins and an introduction that provides information about the program, a summary of the proceedings, and a summary of the analytical papers. The core of the report is the Committee's formal recommendations and findings on the operations of the ATP. The report also includes a summary of the proceedings from the third conference, which provides considerable tacit knowledge about the ATP. The inclusion of the discussion also permits convenient reference for the reader.25 The first meeting of this series resulted in the National Research Council report, The Advanced Technology Program: Challenges and Opportunities, op. cit. Publications of the government-industry partnerships project include: National Research Council, The Small Business Innovation Research Program: Challenges and Opportunities, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999; National Research Council, Industry-Laboratory Partnerships: A Review of the Sandia Science and Technology Park Initiative, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999; National Research Council, New Vistas in Transatlantic Science and Technology Cooperation, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999; National Research Council, The Small Business Innovation Research Program: An Assessment of the Department of Defense Fast Track Initiative, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000; National Research Council, A Review of the New Initiatives at the NASA Ames Research Center, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001.
26 In comparison, the SBIR program, for example, is five times larger. Funded through a 2.5% setaside on U.S. research agencies' budgets, SBIR is currently funded at approximately $1.2 billion per year. That amount will rise with expected increases in agency R&D budgets.
A collection of papers, which underscores the diversity of the research undertaken through the ATP assessment program, is included as is a bibliography for those interested in further information on this program and related topics.
A number of individuals deserve recognition for their contributions to the preparation of the report. On behalf of the STEP Board, we would like to express special recognition to NIST's Alan Balutis and Marc Stanley, the former and Acting Directors of the Advanced Technology Program, and Rosalie Ruegg, the former Director of the Office of Economic Assessment, now retired. Their interest and commitment to an objective review of this program are in the best tradition of federal service. They provided many valuable insights into the operation, assessment, and evolution of the program. We would also like to thank Johns Hopkins University's Maryann Feldman for her important contributions to our understanding of the operation of the Advanced Technology Program and Albert Link of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro for his analysis of the impact of a major joint venture and his many insights on partnerships. Among the STEP staff, particular recognition is due to Duncan Brown for his excellent work in preparing the draft symposium summary. Special recognition and thanks are owed to David Dierksheide and McAlister Clabaugh for their instrumental role in organizing the April 25th conference (amid several others) and their many contributions in assembling, editing—and editing again—the seven papers and the presentations of some 20 speakers. Without their energy, enthusiasm, and commitment this report could not have been completed in the requisite time frame. Their contributions are in the best tradition of the Academies.
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the NRC's Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Robert Archibald, College of William & Mary; David Audretsch, Indiana University; Lewis Branscomb, Harvard University; W. F. Brinkman, Bell Labs; Irwin Feller, Pennsylvania State University; Mary Good, Venture Capital Investors; Henry Kelly, Federation of American Scientists; Sam Kortum, Boston University; Charles Larson, Industrial Research Institute; Lori Nye, Moore Technologies; Ariel Pakes, Harvard Univer
sity; Henry Petronski, Duke University; James Serum, Viaken Systems; Scott Stern, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Robert White, Carnegie Mellon University; and Loren Yager, U.S. General Accounting Office.
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Gerald P. Dinneen, Honeywell, Inc. (retired); and Christopher A. Sims, Princeton University. Appointed by the National Research Council, they were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.
Given the quality and number of presentations at this second symposium, summarizing the proceedings was a challenge. Every effort was made to capture the main points made during presentations and ensuing discussions, within the constraints imposed by the nature of a symposium summary. We apologize in advance for inadvertent errors and omissions in the summary. We also take this opportunity to thank our speakers, participants, and researchers for making their experience and expertise available to the STEP Board's analysis of the Advanced Technology Program.
This volume is divided into five main chapters. These include the Preface, Introduction, and Findings and Recommendations, which are the collective responsibility of the Steering Committee; the conference proceedings, which summarize the views of the conference participants; and a series of seven papers prepared for this volume, which were subject to close editing but remain the responsibility of the authors. Several of the papers are summaries of substantially larger studies carried out under the auspices of the ATP's evaluation program.
The goal of this volume is to advance our understanding of the ATP, in particular the results of its assessment program, and the impact of its awards. Unlike the first volume in this series, in this report the Committee describes its findings concerning the operation of the program and makes specific recommendations concerning new initiatives and possible improvements. This analysis also represents an important stage in the Committee's review of government-industry partnerships and the means of their assessment. By reviewing the program objectives, its selection process, and the impact of its awards, we hope to further public understanding of the program's contribution and constraints in bringing the fruits of American research to the marketplace.
Gordon M. Moore
Charles W. Wessner