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The Drama of the Commons (2002)

Chapter: Index

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Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Index

A

AAQS. See Ambient Air Quality Standards

ABC. See Allowable biological catch

Absentee landlords, 210

Access conditions, de facto open, 11

Acid Rain Program, 204, 217

Actor-focused ecology, and the economics of flexibility, in common-pool resource studies, 375–378

Actors

calculating the numbers of, 23

generally correct understanding of, 459

rational, dominance of model of, 4

utility of, 159

Adaptation

to change in social and environmental conditions, 466

of institutions, 472

Adaptive management

in cross-scale interactions, 311–313

in design of tradable permits, 205–206

integrating uncertainty into decision-making, 311

Adaptive systems. See Complex systems

Adequacy, challenges to theoretical, 11

Administrative factors, 131

AEPS. See Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy

Aggregate limits, defining, in design of tradable permits, 206–207

Agreements, ability to build, 5

Agroforestry, 73n

Air pollution, 23

success in controlling, 221

Alaska, Native land claims in, 268

Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 286n

Allocation of resources, 108n

initial, in design of tradable permits, 207–209

intrahousehold, 73n

relationship to maintenance levels, 102

Allowable biological catch (ABC), 207, 224n

Ambient Air Quality Standards (AAQS), 206– 207

Antarctica, 278

Anticipation, of future interactions, 5

Antisocial impulses, controlling, 5

Antitrust prosecution, 203

Apocalyptical beliefs, 431

Appropriate linkages, among institutions, establishing, 465–466

Appropriating the commons. See also Harvesters, Users

comparison of public goods, 176–178

contributions to the public good with and without punishment, 177

a theoretical explanation, 157–191

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

theoretical models of reciprocity and fairness, 159–163

theoretical predictions, 163–176

Arctic Council, 308

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), 280

Artisanal practices, 266

Assurance game, 12, 28n

Asymmetric equilibria, with inequity-averse subjects, 168, 188–190

Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, 343

Atmosphere, global, 19

greenhouse gases released into, 3, 24

Authority rules, 98

B

Baland, facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 54–55

Bandwidth, broadcasting, 22–23

Bangladesh Department of Fisheries, 305–306

Barbed wire, example of exclusion, 57

Barents Sea, 281–282

Bargaining power, of users, 15

Baseline issue, in design of tradable permits, 204

Behavior

explanation of, 38

prediction of, 37–38

Beneficiaries, impossibility of excluding, 19–20

Benefits, unfair distribution of, 66

Bering Sea, 275–276, 281–283

doughnut hole, 287n

Fishery Conservation Zone in, 275

Bering Sea Community Development Program, 210

Beverly-Qamanirjuaq Caribou Co-Management Board (Canada), 301, 303

Biases, in cultural evolution, 410

Biodiversity

loss of, 24

threats to, 23

Biological species, as resources, 22

Biophysical environment, as a sink, 29n

Biosphere, concern with, 28n

Boundary rules, 98

British North America Act, 267

Broadcasting bandwidth, 22–23

Bush, President George W., 73n

Bycatch, 213

Bycatch discard, 213

C

CAFF. See Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna

California water shortage, 131, 138, 203

CAMPFIRE program (Zimbabwe), 251

Canadian North, fur trade in, 297–298

Canal networks, 99–100

Capacity, in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 276–279

Case study research, roles of, 467

Cattle herds, 56

Causal analysis, 67–68, 447–451

knowledge about processes and mechanisms, 458–459

links for institutional sustainability, illustrative sets of, 69–70

paths describing hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on the maintenance of common-pool resources, 448

Causal models

development and testing of, 468

specifying carefully, 66

Causation

contingent and multiple, 67

of perceptual factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 137–139

proximate, 408

in situated rational choice, determining, 367–369

ultimate, 408

CBMRs. See Community-based management regimes

CFCs. See Chlorofluorocarbons

Change

demographic, 477

global social, 476–477

in social and environmental conditions, adapting to, 466

technological, 477

Cheating, 143, 174, 388

Checkers, and learning in complex adaptive systems, 337–340

Chicken, game of, 12, 28n

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Chile, water resources in, 203

Chimpanzees, conditionally cooperative enforcers among, 181n

Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 264

Choice

building on existing institutions, 370–372

determining effects in, 367–369

and the emergence of institutions for the commons, 363–375

horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374

muddling through, 374–375

situated rational, 363–375

step-wise model of, 365–370

Circumpolar Protected Areas Network (CPAN), 279–281

Citizen science, cross-scale linkages in, 307

Clean Air Act, 205, 217

Climate change, 3, 24

global, 23

Closed-form solutions, 38

Co-management arrangements, 260–261, 284

between communities and governments, 301–304

cross-scale linkages in, 304–307

of environmental resources, 222

Coalition formation, 130

Coastal states, jurisdiction claimed by, 272– 273

Coercive dominance, 416–418

Coherence, social, 108n

Collaborative research, that enables cross-scale linkages, 308–310

Collaborative research centers, 16, 76n

Collective action, 73n

by small groups, 59–60

Collective efficacy, 132–133

Collective learning

in complex adaptive systems, 340–351

organizational question, 341–347

organizations, rights, and incentives, 347–351

Colonization, 295–296

Comedy of the commons model, 4

Commerce in resources, 247–250

Commitments, motives for follow-up on, 135

Common management, of irrigation systems, 47–49

Common-pool resource game, equilibria with sanctioning possibilities, 169–172, 190–191

Common-pool resource studies, 16, 26, 28n

actor-focused ecology and the economics of flexibility, 375–378

being specific and critical about community, 384–387

bibliography of, 6

deliberation and discourse, 383–384

embeddedness, 381–384

old and new directions in, 375–387

political ecology, 378–381

problems with, 45

Common-pool resources (CPRs), 3, 15, 17–18, 87–112.

See also Common resources, Commons

causal paths describing hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on maintenance of, 448

as collective goods, 93

cost of measurement, 24

governance of, 26

need for extending insights to a broader array of, 472–474

renewable or nonrenewable, 22–23

scale of, 23–24

sustainable management of, 46–54

Common-Pool Resources database, 5, 28n

Common-pool sinks, 19

Common property regimes, 15, 17–18, 27, 41– 85.

See also Community-based management regimes

designations given to, 253n

in Ethopia, 13

in the Swiss Alps, 13

in Upper Burma, 13

vs. open access conditions, 51

Common Property Resource Digest, The, 17– 18

Common resources, 17–18, 233–257.

See also Common-pool resources, Commons

addressing problems of method, 63–70

analyses of sustainable management of common-pool resources, 46–54

and CBMR and TEA regimes as management institutions, 237–253

critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons, 62– 63

facilitating conditions identified by Wade, 48

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

facilitating successful governance of the commons, from Baland and Platteau, 52

illustrative sets of causal links in commons research, 69–70

and institutional sustainability, 41–85

Ostrom’s design principles, 50

Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 14–17

supplementing the set of substantive factors, 54–63

synthesis of facilitating conditions identified by Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau , 54–55

Commons, 18.

See also Common-pool resources;

Common property;

Common resources

early formal analyses by resource economists, 9–11

early work on, 8

future of research in, 17

Hardin’s model and its limitations, 11–14

heterogenity in, 88–96

ideal test bed for social sciences, 5

in Switzerland, 72n

large-n studies of, 96–102

large-scale multivariate research, 87–112

management questions, 426–432

theoretical explanation of appropriating, 157–191

tradable permits approach to protecting, 197–232

Commons dilemma, 114

factors influencing cooperation in, 113– 156

scale of, 146–147

Commons literature, 118–144

on the decision structure of the task, 122–127

functional classification of variables from, 455

intellectual history of, 6–17

on individual differences, 118–121

on perceptual factors, 137–144

on the social structure of the task, 128– 137

Communication, 5, 12

coordination of 173–175

in commons dilemmas, 134–137

directionality in, 136

impact of, 172–176

rational, 384

as a sanctioning device, 175–176

Communism, 8

Communities, 72n

being specific and critical about, in common-pool resource studies, 384–387

cross-scale linkages and co-management arrangements with, 301–304

epistemic, 307–308

imagined, 421

social identification with, 131

Communities for a Better Environment, 224n, 226n

Community-based management regimes (CBMRs), 27

and commerce in resources, 247–250

compared with TEAs, 233–257

extraction vs. pollution in, 245–247

as management institutions, 237–253

nested, 238–239

and resource complexity, 240–245

and resource size, 237–240

rights structures in, 248–249

synthesis in, 250–253

varying solutions under varying conditions, 237–253

Comparative methods, 467

Compatibility, in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 276–279

Competence, in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 276–279

Competitive individuals, 161

Complex systems, 327–359

collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351

conditional view of uncertainty, 332–334

example from the New England fisheries, 328–329

learning in complex adaptive systems, 335–340

response to uncertainty, 329–332

uncertainty in complex adaptive systems, 334–335

Complexity, 312

of human motivation, 3

a problem in commons management, 426–427

of resources, 240–245

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Compliance with rules, by users, and monitoring the resource, 462–463

Conceptual categories

challenges to, 11

inproving, 468–469

Conceptual developments, 17–26

cost of measurement of common-pool resources, 24

free-rider problem, 19–21

institutional attributes, 21

problem of overuse, 18–19

renewable or nonrenewable common-pool resources, 22–23

scale of common-pool resources, 23–24

search for effective institutions, 24–26

Conceptual framework, 452–454

Conceptual models, general, 458

Concern

with the biosphere, 28n

with ecosystems, 28n

with the welfare of other humans, 28n

with the welfare of species, 28n

Conditional conservation, by users, 92

Conditional generalizations, 458

Conditional preferences, 145

Conditional view, of uncertainty, 332–334

Conditionally cooperative enforcers (CCEs), 170–171, 190–191

among chimpanzees, 181n

Conditions, for emergence of self-organized organizations, 456

Conference on Common Property Resource Management, 300

Conference on Environment and Development, 282

Conflict management, 471–472

Conflicting values and interests, reconciling, 464

Conformance, in rules, 98, 100

Confucian system, 417

Consequentialism, 391

Conservation

indigenous, 370–371

by users, conditional, 92

Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), 280–281, 287n

Consumption

jointness of, or rivalness of, 19

problem of overconsumption, 123

Contingencies, 453, 455

Contingent causation, 67

Contingent generalizations, 446–447

Contingent hypotheses, expanded use of multicase comparative methods for investigating, 467

Contingent relationships, 131

empirically supported, between group heterogeneity and institutional performance, 447

Contributions to the public good, with and without punishment, 177

Controls, of egotistical and antisocial impulses, 5

Cooperation, 404–406

contingent on many things, 405

cross-disciplinary, 39

effect of numbers of actors on, 23

heterogeneity inducing, 24

human proneness to, 404

uncertainty reducing, 126

Cooperation in commons dilemmas

experimental primer, 117–118

factors influencing, 113–156

framework, 115–117

historical roots of experimental research on commons dilemmas, 114–115

recent findings in the experimental literature, 118–144

a review of experimental psychological research, 113–156

synthesis, 144–148

Cooperative individuals, 120, 161

Cooperative institutions

evolution of, 412–425

segmentary hierarchy, 418–425

tribal social instincts hypothesis, 413– 415

work-around hypothesis, 415–418

Cooperative Resource Management Committees (CRMCs), 424, 428

Coordination, in appropriating the commons, 173–175

Correlations, identifying, 14

Corruption, in public officials, 13–14

Costly exclusions, 21

Costly punishment, 176–178

Costs. See also Low-cost enforcement of rules

of fishing effort, 9–10

of measuring common-pool resources, 24

of monitoring and enforcement, 450

of sanctioning systems, 169

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

CPR. See Common Property Resource Digest, The

CPRs. See Common-pool resources

Credit trading, 204

CRMCs. See Cooperative Resource Management Committees

Cross-disciplinary cooperation, 39

Cross-scale institutional linkages

adaptive management of, 311–313

characteristics of some institutional forms that enhance, 302

in citizen science, 307

and co-management arrangements between communities and governments, 301–304

collaborative research and management that enable, 308–310

in development and empowerment arrangements, 304–307

and dynamic interactions, 259–321

dynamics of, 310–315

effects of higher level institutions on local institutions, 295–300

environmental consequences of, 263–291

examples of multistakeholder bodies, 305

and institutional interplay, 263–291

between multistakeholder bodies, 304

perspectives from the bottom up, 293– 321

policy communities and social movement networks, 307–308

promising institutions for, 301–310

research and management approaches that enable cross-scale linkages, 309

resilience, 313–315

strategies from a project in Bangladesh, 306

strengthening local-level institutions for cross-scale interaction, 299

Cultural evolution, 406, 410–411

biases in, 410

natural selection in, 410–411

nonrandom variation in, 410

pace of in modern world, 430

small-scale, as problem or resource in commons management, 430–432

Cultural heterogeneity, 89

Cultural theory, 368

Cultural variation, processes that shape heritable, through time, 407–408

Culture, coevolving with genes, 413, 415

D

Data-driven research, vs. theory-driven, 39

Decision making. See also Framing deliberative processes in, 469–471

Decision structure of the task, 122–127

payoff structure, 122–125

uncertainty, 125–127

Defections, by users, 95, 127

Deforestation, in Senegal, 95

Deliberative processes

in common-pool resource studies, 383–384

in decision making, 469–471

Demographic changes, 477

Density, of institutions, 263

Dependent variables, 455

Descent of Man, 403

Design considerations for tradable permits, 202–216

adaptive management, 205–206

baseline issue, 204

defining the aggregate limits, 206–207

enforcement, 215–216

governance structures, 202–204

initial allocation method, 207–209

legal nature of the entitlement, 205

monitoring, 212–215

the temporal dimension, 211–212

transferability rules, 209–211

Design of common-pool institutions, 327–359

collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351

conditional view of uncertainty, 332–334

example from the New England fisheries, 328–329

learning in complex adaptive systems, 335–340

response to uncertainty, 329–332

uncertainty in complex adaptive systems, 334–335

Design principles, 390

Ostrom’s, for institutional sustainability, 50

for resource institutions, 16

robust, 25

Developing countries, poverty in, 12

Development arrangements, cross-scale linkages in, 304–307

Dictator game, 136

Dirección General de Aguas, 203

Directionality, in communication, 136

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Discourse, in common-pool resource studies, 383–384

Dispute settlement, 15

Distribution of benefits, unfair, 66

Diversity, a problem in commons management, 426–427

Diversity of human cooperation, 404–406

cooperation contingent on many things, 405

human proneness to cooperation, even with strangers, 404

in institutions, 405

institutions as product of evolution, 405

Dominance, coercive, 416–418

Donors, international, needing to understand property rights impacts, 15

Doughnut hole, 287n

Drop-through mechanism, 206

Drosophilia melanogaster, 409

ideal experimental organism, 5, 28n

Dynamics in cross-scale interactions, 310–315

adaptive management, 311–313

the environmental consequences of, and institutional interplay, 263–291

resilience, 313–315

Dynamics of resource management institutions, 469–472

conflict management, 471–472

deliberative processes in decision making, 469–471

emergence, adaptation, and evolution of institutions, 472

institutional learning, 471

E

Ecology

actor-focused, and the economics of flexibility, 375–378

event, 389, 393n

political, in common-pool resource studies, 363, 378–381

Economic heterogeneity, 37

Economic theory of tradable permits, 27, 199– 202

approach to optimal resource management, 199–200

comparing with environmental taxes, 201–202

Economists, resource, early formal analyses of the commons by, 9–11

Ecosystems

concern with, 28n

and learning in complex adaptive systems, 338–340

oceanic, fish harvested from, 3

EEZs. See Exclusive economic zones;

Extended economic zones

Effectiveness, of sanctioning systems, 124–125

Efficacy, 146

collective, 132–133

illusions of, 133

Efficiency issues, 93, 165–169, 193, 224n

Egotistical impulses

controlling, 5

studying, 130

Embeddedness, in common-pool resource studies, 381–384

Emergence, 337

Emergence of other-regarding behavior, 144– 146

Emergence of institutions for the commons

contexts, situations, and events, 361–402

directions in common-pool resource studies, 375–387

question-driven research on, 387–392

rapidity of, 429–430

situated rational choice in, 363–375

social constructionism in, 387–392

specifying the commons in, 392–393

Emergence of self-organized organizations, conditions for, 456

Emergency situations, response patterns in, 148n

Emissions Trading Program, 204

Empirical validity, questions of, 11, 16

Empowerment arrangements, cross-scale linkages in, 304–307

Enabling conditions, critical, for sustainability on the commons, 62–63

Endowment of resources

heterogeneity of, 60

initial, of users, 15

Enforcement

costs of, 450

in design of tradable permits, 215–216

of limits on environmental effects, 218– 219

of norms, 172

English Commons, 42

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Entitlements, legal nature of, in design considerations for tradable permits, 205–206

Environmental conditions

adapting to change in, 466

external, of resource management institutions, 489

Environmental consequences, of cross-scale interactions, 263–291

Environmental degradation, in relation to population growth, 56

Environmental effects, 28n, 217–220

enforcing the limits, 218–219

in evaluating tradable permits, 217–220

meeting the limits, 218

on the resource, 219–220

setting the limits, 218

Environmental nongovernmental organizations, 274, 280, 282–283, 307, 366

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 202, 424

Environmental regulation, 235

Environmental resources, co-management of, 222

Environmental taxes, comparing tradable permits with, 201–202

Environmental uncertainty, 148

EPA. See Environmental Protection Agency

Epistemic communities, 307–308

Equal individual risks, 199

Equilibria, 224n.

See also Nonequilibrium thinking;

Selfish Nash Equilibrium

asymmetric, with inequity-averse subjects, 168, 188–190

choosing among, 181n

multiple, 174

Nash, 157, 163, 174

with sanctioning possibilities, 170–172, 190–191

symmetric, with inequity-averse subjects, 167–168, 186–188

Equity

preferences for, 158–159

problems exacerbated by heterogeneity, 15

problems with, 25–26

Escherichia coli, ideal experimental organism, 28n

Essentialism, 368

Ethiopia, common property in, 13

Ethnic heterogeneity, 89, 96

in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101

Ethnographic analysis, 42, 72n, 75n

Evaluation criteria for tradable permits, 216– 223

economic effects, 220–221

environmental effects, 217–220

implementation feasibility, 216–217

Event ecology, 389, 393n

Evolution

of institutions, 472

institutions as product of, 405

Evolution as multilevel. See Multilevel evolution

Evolution of cooperative institutions, 412–425

segmentary hierarchy, 418–425

tribal social instincts hypothesis, 413– 415

work-around hypothesis, 415–418

Evolution of culture. See Cultural evolution

Evolutionary models

accounting for the processes that shape heritable genetic and cultural variation through time, 407–408

consistency with a wide variety of theories, 411–412

explaining the nature of preferences and institutions, 406–407

recursiveness of, 407

use in the social sciences, 412

Evolutionary theory of commons management, 4, 403–442

evolution of cooperative institutions, 412–425

outstanding questions, 426–432

testing hypotheses, 425–426

theories of cooperation, 404–412

Exclusion, 29n, 74n

of beneficiaries, impossibility of, 19–20

costly, 21

example of barbed wire, 57

Exclusive economic zones (EEZs), 266, 273, 281–282

Exit options, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 94, 100

Experimental literature on commons dilemmas, 118–144

decision structure of the task, 122–127

functional classification of variables from, 455

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

individual differences, 118–121

perceptual factors, 137–144

social structure of the task, 128–137

Experimental psychological research, 113–156

on cooperation in commons dilemmas, 113–156

elements influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 116

experimental primer, 117–118

framework, 115–117

historical roots of, 114–115

recent findings in, 118–144

synthesis of, 144–148

Explicit incentive devices, 172

Exploitation

of resources, 7

of symbolic systems, 420–423

Extended economic zones (EEZs), 371

External environment, of resource management institutions, 157, 489

Extraction, vs. pollution, 245–247

F

Facilitating conditions

for institutional sustainability, from Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau, 48, 54–55

for successful governance of the commons, from Baland and Platteau, 52

Fairness

procedural, 159

questions of, 63–64, 66, 131, 179–180

theoretical models of, 159–163

FCZ. See Fishery Conservation Zone

Feasibility, of implementation, in evaluating tradable permits, 193, 216–217

Federal Central Valley Project, 424

Federalist Papers, 354

Fish, harvested from oceanic ecosystems, 3

Fisheries, 27, 95, 293

declines of, 23

example from New England, 328–329

governance structures for, 202–206

inshore, 16

relationships among effort, cost, and revenue, 9–10

South Texas shrimp, 93

understanding, 73n

Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 353n

Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ), 275

Fishing technology, destructiveness of modern, 22

Flexibility

of cooperative institutions in commons management, 427–428

economics of, and actor-focused ecology in common-pool resource studies, 375–378

Ford Foundation, conference sponsored by, 28n

Forests

timber harvested from, 3

understanding, 22, 73n

Framing

in perceptual factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 140–144

of property rights, 142

in social dilemmas, 140

Free-rider problem, 4, 19–21, 177

in the context of the village, 12

solving, 122, 374

Functional interplay, 260

Functionalist theory, 4

Fungibility, 212

Fur trade, in the Canadian North, 297–298

G

Gadus morhua, 391

Game of chicken, 12, 28n

Game theory, 12, 37, 89, 174, 452

repeated, 107n

Games

coordination, 181n

one-shot, 163–164

GEF. See Global Environment Facility

Gender differences, 107n, 121

Generalizability, challenges to, 11

Generalizations

conditional, 458

contingent, 446–447

Genes, coevolving with culture, 413, 415

Genetic variation

between groups, factors limiting, 434n

processes that shape heritable, through time, 407–408

Georges Bank, 349

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

German General Staff, lessons from, 432

Gini coefficients, 99, 108n

Global climate change, 23

Global Environment Facility (GEF), 265

Global social changes, 476–477

Globalization syndrome, 74n, 475–476

Golden rule, 124

Gordon-Schaefer model, 9–10

Governance of the commons, 26, 44

facilitating conditions for successful, from Baland and Platteau, 52

Governance structures, 393n

in design of tradable permits, 202–204

for fisheries, 202–206

Governments

cross-scale linkages and co-management arrangements with, 301–304

ownership by, 9, 21

Grandfathering approach, 202, 208, 216

Grasslands, 367

Grazing lands, 55, 73n

Greenhouse gases, released into the global atmosphere, 3, 24, 264

Greenland Home Rule, 268

Groundnut farming, 95

Group characteristics, of resource management institutions, 488–489

Group exchange condition, 122

Group heterogeneity, empirically supported contingent relationship with institutional performance, 447

Group selection, in multilevel evolution, 409

Group size, 65

in commons dilemmas, 132–134

effect on performance of institutional arrangements, 15

and likelihood of collective action, 59–60

Groups

self-efficacious, 132

symbolically marked, 422

Guarantors of property rights, 58

Gujarat, irrigation systems in, 92

H

Hardin’s model, of the commons, limitations of, 11–14

Harvesters. See also Users

behavior of, 9, 20, 56–57, 95, 117, 126– 127, 367

poor monitoring of, 11

Head-end differences, vs. tail-end, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 88, 99–100

Herding

in Mali, 95

in Mauritania, 95

Heritable genetic and cultural variation, processes that shape through time, 407–408

Heterogeneity, 26

cultural, 89

economic, 37

of endowment of resources, 60

ethnic, 89, 96

ethnic and social, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101

four types of, 29n

group, empirically supported contingent relationship with institutional performance, 447

of individual preferences, 161

inducing cooperation, 24

of interests, 60

intragroup, 60

large-n studies of, 96–102

in large-scale multivariate research, 87– 112

social, 146

spatial and temporal, 15

summary of empirical studies, 104–105

Heuristic classifications, 480n

Highgrading, 213, 243

Historical context, 474–477

globalization syndrome, 475–476

major demographic changes, 477

other global social changes, 476–477

technological change, 477

Hoarding, 210

Homo economicus, perspective of, 170

Horizontal interplay, 260

Horizontal linkages, in institutions for the commons, 293, 372–374

How Institutions Think, 387

Human cooperation. See also Cooperation

contingent on many things, 405

extent and diversity of, 404–406

human proneness to, even with strangers, 404

in institutions, 405

institutions as product of evolution, 405

Human ecological arguments, 4

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Human motivation. See Motivation

Humans, concern with the welfare of other, 28n

Hunter-gatherer societies, 414, 427

Hydraulic economies, poor, 88

Hypotheses. See also Contingent hypotheses

empirically supported causal, 468

proposed, about resource management institutions, 487–489

for research, 446–447

I

IASCP. See International Association for the Study of Common Property

ICC. See Inuit Circumpolar Conference

ICNAF. See International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Identification, social, with communities, 131

IFRI. See International Forestry Resources and Institutions

IGOs. See Intergovernmental organizations

Illusions of efficacy, 133

Imagined communities, 421

Imperfect knowledge, managing resources with, 464–465

Implementation feasibility, in evaluating tradable permits, 193, 216–217

Incentives, 72n.

See also Economic theory of tradable permits

explicit devices for, 172

of institutions, 347–351

problems of, 18, 22

Income inequality, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 98–99

Independent variables, 455

India

irrigation systems in, 97

Joint Forest Management in, 301

management in, 73n

People’s Biodiversity Registers in, 307

Indigenous conservation, 370–371

Indigenous institutions, rejection of existing, 11

Indirect effects, 457

Individual characteristics, of resource management institutions, 488–489

Individual differences, 118–121

gender, 121

social motives, 118–121

Individual-level selection, in multilevel evolution, 408–409

Individual preferences, heterogeneity of, 161

Individual risks, lower vs. equal, 199

Individual transferable quotas (ITQs), 203, 210, 213–216, 218–221, 272, 274–275

Individualism, 8, 161

Indonesia, harvesting of tropical forests in, 270

Indulgences, sale of in the Middle Ages, 224n

Industrialization, effects of, 42

Inequalities, 75n

of income, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 98–99

of wealth

causal paths describing hypothesized effects on the maintenance of common-pool resources, 448

in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 99

Inequity-averse subjects, 37, 160–161

asymmetric equilibria with, 168, 188–190

best response function of, 165

symmetric equilibria with, 167–168, 186–188

Information technology, 214

Infrastructure investments, in Pakistan, 97, 99

Initial allocation method, in design of tradable permits, 207–209

Initial endowment of resources, of users, 15

Institutional arrangements

defining performance of, 14

effect of group size on performance of, 15

in resource management institutions, 487–488

Institutional attributes, 21

Institutional design challenges, 27–28, 461–466

adapting to change in social and environmental conditions, 466

addressing negative externalities for other resources , 463

establishing appropriate linkages among institutions, 465–466

low-cost enforcement of rules, 462

managing resources with imperfect knowledge, 464–465

monitoring the resource and users’ compliance with rules, 462–463

reconciling conflicting values and interests, 464

refining understanding of, 469

Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 308

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
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Institutional dynamics, 316

Institutional forms, 316

Institutional interplay

between international and national environmental regimes, 276–283

between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 11, 266–276

environmental consequences of cross-scale interactions, 263–291

implications of, 283–285

need for study of, 477–479

Institutional performance, relationship with group heterogeneity, 447

Institutional rules, 45

Institutional supply, problem of, 90, 93

Institutional sustainability

addressing problems of method, 63–70

analyses of sustainable management of common-pool resources, 46–54

and common resources, 41–85

enabling conditions, 62–63

facilitating conditions identified by Wade, 48

facilitating successful governance of the commons, from Baland and Platteau, 52

illustrative sets of causal links in commons research, 69–70

Ostrom’s design principles, 50

substantive factors, 54–63

synthesis of facilitating conditions identified by Wade, Ostrom, and Baland and Platteau, 54–55

Institutions, 72n.

See also Institutional arrangements;

Cooperative institutions;

Self-organized organizations

building on existing, 370–372

defined, 21, 286n

density of, 263

effective, 24–26

emergence, adaptation, and evolution of, 363–375, 429–430, 472

establishing appropriate linkages among, 465–466

evolutionary models explaining the nature of, 406–407

flexibility of, 427–428

horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374

huge variation in, 405–406

importance of, 405

indigenous, 11

learning in, 471

legitimate, 423–425

legitimization of local-level, 299

muddling through, 374–375

as product of evolution, 405

rights and incentives of, 347–351

and step-wise model of situated rational choice, 365–370

viability of, to manage resources, 74n

village-level, 12

voting, 131

Integration, of research results, 451–452

Intellectual history of the commons, 6–17

early formal analyses of the commons by resource economists, 9–11

early work on the commons, 8

Hardin’s model and its limitations, 11–14

Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 14–17

point of departure, 6–8

Interactions

anticipation of future, 5

one-time, 4

in resource management institutions, 489

Interests

heterogeneity of, 60

reconciling conflicting, 464

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 269

Intermarriage patterns, 434n

Internalized personal commitment norms, 135– 136

International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP), 385

meetings of, 7

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), 328– 329, 353n

International conventions, 277

International donors, needing to understand property rights impacts, 15

International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI), 16, 76n

International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), 279–280

Year 2000 Objective, 280

Interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 260, 276– 283

competence, compatibility, and capacity, 276–279

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
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regimes for marine resources, 281–283

regimes for terrestrial resources, 279–281

Interplay between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 11, 266–276

systems of land tenure, 267–271

systems of sea tenure, 271–276

Intervening variables, 455

Interventions, 29n, 453, 455

Intragroup heterogeneity, 60

Intrahousehold allocation of resources, 73n

Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), 308

Irrigation systems, 16, 56, 96

commonly managed, 47–49

exceptionalism in, 103

in Gujarat, 92

in India, 97

in Mexico, 97

in Nepal, 97, 107n

in the Philippines, 97

unequal, and heterogeneity and commons management in large-scale multivariate research, 87–112

ITQs. See Individual transferable quotas

ITTA. See International Tropical Timber Agreement

J

James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (Canada), 300, 302–303

Joint Forest Management, in India, 301

Joint-stock company, 8

Jointness of consumption, 19

Juntas de vigilancia, 203

Just society, life in, as a public good, 20

Justice, local, 75n

K

Key terms, 17–26

effective institutions, 24–26

free-rider problem, 19–21

institutional attributes, 21

problem of overuse, 18–19

renewable or nonrenewable common-pool resources, 22–23

scale of common-pool resources, 23–24

Kin selection, in multilevel evolution, 409

Knowledge, scientific, as a public good, 5

Knowledge base, 26–27, 466–469

case study research role, 467

causal paths describing hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on maintenance of common-pool resources, 448

classification of variables from the commons literature, 455

costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450

development and testing of causal models, 468

directions for research, 466–479

improving conceptual categories, 468–469

lessons learned, 454–466

managing resources with imperfect, 464– 465

multicase comparative methods for investigating contingent hypotheses, 467

progress in the field, 445–454

proposed hypotheses about resource management institutions, 487–489

refining understanding of institutional design, 469

relationship between group heterogeneity and institutional performance, 447

roles of case study research, 467

systematic development of, 466–469

triangulation, 468

L

Lakes

exclusion in, 29n

pollution of, 23

Lamarckian effects, 408

Land tenure, in interplay between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 267–271

Large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 38, 68, 96–102

choosing rules, 101–102

ethnic and social heterogeneity, 101

exit options, 100

head-enders and tail-enders, 99–100

income inequality, 98–99

wealth inequality, 99

Large-scale multivariate research

on heterogeneity, 88–96

heterogeneity and commons management in, 87–112

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

large-n studies, 96–102

summary of empirical studies, 104–105

Leaders, 131, 415, 419

legitimacy of, 132

Learning, institutional, 471

Learning in complex adaptive systems, 335– 351

from checkers to ecosystems, 338–340

collective, 340–351

Legal nature of entitlement, in design of tradable permits, 205

Legitimacy

of institutions, 423–425

of leaders, 132

Legitimization, of local-level institutions, 299

Lessons learned, 221–224

about evaluation, 221–223

challenges of institutional design, 461– 466

practical value of research, 457–461

substantive lessons, 27, 456–457

unfulfilled theoretical expectations, 223– 224

Leviathans, 233, 236

kleptocratic, 417

Life in a just society, as a public good, 20

Limitations

aggregate, in design of tradable permits, 206–207

enforcing, 218–219

of Hardin’s model of the commons, 11– 14

meeting, 218

of privatization, 193–257

setting, 218

tradable permits approach to protecting the commons, 197–232

of the tragedy of the commons model, 456

on use of resources, 3

Linkages among institutions, 27

establishing appropriate, 465–466

Linking Social and Ecological Systems, 316

Literature, commons, 27, 72n, 118–144, 455

intellectual history, 6–17

Local justice, 75n

Local-level institutions, legitimization of, 299

Logic of Collective Action, The, 114

Low-cost enforcement of rules, 462

Lower individual risks, 199

Lumpiness, of monitoring, 75n, 107n

M

Magnuson-Stevens Act, 202, 227n

Maintenance, of common-pool resources. See also Resource management;

resource management institutions;

Sustainable management

hypothesized effects of wealth or wealth inequality on, 448

Maintenance levels, relationship of resource allocation to, 102

Malaysia, harvesting of tropical forests in, 270

Mali, herding in, 95

Management. See also Adaptive management;

Co-management;

Common management;

Resource management

in Africa, 73n

enabling cross-scale linkages, 308–310

in India, 73n

multilevel, 15

in the Philippines, 73n

successful, 73n, 106

Management institutions, CBMR and TEA regimes as, 237–253

Marginalization, of sheep flocks, 75–76n

Marine resources

in interplay between international and national environmental regimes, 281–283

regimes for, 281–283

Market forces, 72n, 416

effects of emerging and spreading, 42, 56

to implement policy, 193

Market integration, 57

Mating systems, 434n

Matrices, for payoff structure, 141

Mauritania, herding in, 95

Maximum economic yield (MEY), 241

Maximum sustainable yield, 10

Maximum use, sustainable yield (MUSY), 241

Measurement of common-pool resources, cost of, 24

Mediated effects, 457

Mediators, 453, 455

Mediterranean Action Plan, 308

Memes, 412

Meritocracies, 429

Methodology

in design of tradable permits, 207–209

for investigating contingent hypotheses, 467

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

problems of, 69

for researching institutional sustainability, 63–70

traditions of the social sciences, 5

Mexico, irrigation systems in, 97

MEY. See Maximum economic yield

Military organizations, 420

Mismanagement, 323

Mobility, 65

Model specification, 47

Moderator variables, 455

Modernist orientation, 380

Monitoring, 181n

costs of, 450

in design of tradable permits, 212–215

lumpiness of, 75n, 107n

of resource boundaries and harvesting practices, poor, 11

of resources, and users’ compliance with rules, 462–463

various forms of, 67

Moral suasion, 124

Motivation. See also Reciprocally motivated subjects

assumptions about, 3

complexity of, 3

diverse, 179

for follow-up on commitments, 135

individual differences in social, 118–121

prosocial vs. proself, 118–121

for willingness to tackle social dilemmas, 139

Multicase comparative methods, for investigating contingent hypotheses, 467

Multilevel evolution, 408–409

group selection, 409

individual-level selection, 408–409

kin selection, 409

Multilevel management, 15

Multiple causation, 67

Multiple equilibria, 174

Multistakeholder bodies

cross-scale linkages between, 304

examples of, 305

Multivariate research, large-scale, heterogeneity and commons management in, 87–112

MUSY. See Maximum use, sustainable yield

N

Nash equilibrium, 157, 163, 174.

See also Selfish Nash Equilibrium

National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 202, 225n, 329–331

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 353n

National practices, 266–267

National Research Council, 480n

Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 6–7, 14–17, 28n

National Science Foundation, 278

Natural selection, in cultural evolution, 410–411

Nature Conservancy, 373

Necessity, of sanctioning systems, 124–125

Negative externalities, 157

ignored by selfish subjects, 165

for resources, addressing, 463

Nepal, irrigation systems in, 97, 107n

Nested CBMRs, 238–239

New England fisheries, example from, 328–329

New England Fisheries Management Council, 332, 353n

New institutions, rapidity of the emergence and spread of, 429–430

NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations

NMFS. See National Marine Fisheries Service

NOAA. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Nonconvexities, in production technology, 91

Nonequilibrium thinking, 241

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 269, 304–306, 372

environmental, 274, 280, 282–283, 307, 366

Nonrandom variation, in cultural evolution, 410

Nonrenewable common-pool resources, 22–23

Norm enforcers, 172

Norms, 135–136

North Pole, control of the use of, 23

NOx budget air pollution control program, 224n

O

Ocean fisheries

declines of, 23

exclusion in, 29n

Oceanic ecosystems, 327

fish harvested from, 3

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Olson effects, 38, 90–93

One-shot games, 163–164

One-time interactions, 4, 489

Open access conditions, 234

de facto, 11

vs. common property arrangements, 51

Optimal resource management, economic approach to, 199–200

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 197, 211, 218–219, 227n

Origin of Man, 403

Ostrom

design principles for institutional sustainability, 50

facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 54–55

Other-regarding behavior, emergence of, 144– 146

Outcome framing, in social dilemmas, 140

Outcomes, 453, 455

Outer space, control of the use of, 23

Overuse, problem of, 3, 18–19, 126

Ownership

by governments, 9, 21

of resources, 21

Ozone depletion, 24

P

Pakistan, infrastructure investments in, 97, 99

Panel on Common Property Resource Management, 6–7, 14–17

sponsorship of, 28n

PAR. See Participatory Action Research

Participatory Action Research (PAR), 309–310

Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), 309–310

Path dependency, 353n

Payoff structure, 159–163

in decision structure of the task, 122– 125, 138

matrices for, 141

PD. See Prisoners’ dilemma

Peace. See World peace

People’s Biodiversity Registers (PBR), in India, 307

Perceptual factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 137–144

causes, 137–139

frames, 140–144

Philippines

harvesting of tropical forests in, 270

irrigation systems in, 97

management in, 73n

Plan of Pitic, 418

Platteau, facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 54–55

Play. See also Game theory protocols of, 127

Players. See Actors

Poaching wildlife, 123

Poles, control of the use of North and South, 23

Policy communities, and social movement networks, cross-scale linkages in, 307–308

Policy options, 61

analysis of, 25, 27

using markets to implement, 193

value-maximizing sustainable, 200

Policy target, identifying, 199

Political ecology, 363

in common-pool resource studies, 378– 381

Political interplay, 260

Pollution, 24

of air, 23

of rivers and lakes, 23

vs. extraction, 245–247

Population, role in resource management, 56

Postmodern critical theory and analysis, 368, 380

Poverty

in developing countries, 12

hydraulic economy in, 88

Power

bargaining, of users, 15

in commons dilemmas, 128–132

Powers, vesting, 27

PRA. See Participatory Rural Appraisal

Preconditions, for trading permits, 200–201

Prediction, of behavior, 37–38

Preferences

conditional, 145

evolutionary models explaining the nature of, 406–407

heterogeneity of individual, 161

of inequity aversion, 162

for reciprocity and equity, 158–159

for type of public good, 96

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Prisoners’ dilemma (PD), 4, 12, 118, 136, 174, 233, 404

overcoming, 238

Private goods, vs. public, 29n

Private property, in the Swiss Alps, 13

Privatization, 95

comparing community-based management to tradable environmental allowances, 233–257

and its limitations, 50–51, 193–257

tradable permits approach to protecting the commons, 197–232

Procedural fairness, 159

Processes, 27

deliberative, in decision making, 469–471

that shape heritable genetic and cultural variation through time, 407–408

Production technology, nonconvexities in, 91

Progress of the field, 445–454

causal analysis, 447–451

contingent generalizations, 446–447

development and differentiation of typologies, 446

integration of research results, 451–452

toward a conceptual framework, 452–454

Property, 15, 17–18, 27.

See also International Association for the Study of Common Property;

Panel on Common Property Resource Management

in Ethopia, 13

regulatory, 233–257

in the Swiss Alps, 13

in Upper Burma, 13

Property rights, 72n

framing of, 142

guarantors of, 58

international donors needing to understand impacts of, 15

Proself motives, 118–121

Prosocial motives, 118–121

Prospect theory, in social dilemmas, 140

Protocols of play, 127

Proximate causes, 408

Psychological research

on cooperation in commons dilemmas, 113–156

experimental, 113–156

framework for, 115–117

historical roots of, 114–115

primer of, 117–118

recent findings in, 118–144

synthesis of, 144–148

Public domain, 267–268

Public goods, 4, 93

comparing, 176–178

preferences for type of, 96

providing, 20

vs. private, 29n

Public officials, corruption in, 13–14

Public property, 267–268

Public radio stations, as a public good, 5

Pulse patterns, 244

Punishment, 124, 181n

contributions to the public good with and without, 177

costly, 176–178

Q

Question of the Commons, The, 386

R

Radon exposure, risks from, 364

Rational actor model

dominance of, 4

in game theory, 12

Rational choice, 160

building on existing institutions, 370–372

determining effects in, 367–369

and the emergence of institutions for the commons, 363–375

horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374

muddling through, 374–375

step-wise model of, 365–370

Rational communication, 384

Reciprocally motivated subjects, 175

Reciprocity, 180n

preferences for, 158–159

theoretical models of, 159–163

RECLAIM system, 202, 212, 217–219, 226n

Reconciliation, of conflicting values and interests, 464

Recursiveness, of evolutionary models, 407

Regimes

for marine resources, 281–283

for terrestrial resources, 279–281

Regulatory measures, traditional command and control, 200

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Regulatory property, 233–257

CBMR and TEA regimes as management institutions, 237–253

Reinforcement, 124

Renewable common-pool resources, in the drama of the commons, 22–23

Research. See also Lessons learned;

Psychological research;

Substantive lessons;

Understudied issues

case study, 467

collaborative, that enables cross-scale linkages, 308–310

conditional generalizations, 458

general conceptual models, 458

hypotheses, 446–447

integration of results, 451–452

knowledge about causal processes and mechanisms, 458–459

large-scale multivariate, heterogeneity and commons management, 87–112

practical value of, 4, 457–461

theory-driven vs. data-driven, 39

Research directions, 17, 28, 466–479

continuing the systematic development of knowledge, 466–469

Reservoirs, 56

Resilience, 261, 295

building into tradable permit systems, 207

in cross-scale interactions, 313–315

Resource allocation

initial, in design of tradable permits, 207–209

intrahousehold, 73n

relationship to maintenance levels, 102

Resource boundaries, poor monitoring of, 11

Resource complexity, 240–245

CBMRs and, 243–245

TEAs and, 241–243

Resource dilemma. See Commons dilemma

Resource economists, early formal analyses of the commons by, 9–11

Resource management. See also Maintenance;

Sustainable management

economic approach to optimal, 199–200

with imperfect knowledge, 464–465

role of population in, 56

Resource management institutions, 26

and costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450

design principles for, 16

external environment, 489

group and individual characteristics, 488–489

institutional arrangements, 487–488

interaction among factors, 489

proposed hypotheses about, 487–489

and resource system characteristics, 488

Resource size, 237–240

CBMRs and, 237–238

nested CBMRs and, 238–239

TEAs and, 239–240

Resource systems, 37–191

appropriating the commons, 157–191

and characteristics of resource management institutions, 488

common resources and institutional sustainability, 41–85

factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas, 113–156

heterogeneity and commons management in large-scale multivariate research, 87–112

and unequal irrigators, 87–112

Resource theft, 123

Resource users. See Users

Resources

addressing negative externalities for, 463

biological species as, 22, 55

characteristics of, and costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450

commerce in, 247–250

environmental effects on, 219–220

exploitation of, 7

heterogeneity of endowment of, 60

intrahousehold allocation of, 73n

managing with imperfect knowledge, 464–465

ownership of, 21

race to use, 11

regimes for marine, 281–283

regimes for terrestrial, 279–281

supplements to, 49

of users, initial endowment of, 15

value of, 129–130

viability of institutions to manage, 74n

Response function, best in inequity-averse subjects, 165

Result efficiency, 193

Revenue, from fishing effort, 10

Rewards, 124, 160, 180n

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Rights, 72n

bundled, 29n

in CBMRs, 248–249

of institutions, 347–351

Rio Declaration, 286n

Risks

individual, 199

from radon exposure, 364

Rivalness of consumption, 19

Rivers, pollution of, 23

Robust design principles, 25

Roman legal system, 417

Rule conformance, 98, 100

Rules

ability to build, 5

authority, 98

boundary, 98

choosing, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101–102

compliance with by users, and monitoring the resource, 462–463

difficulty of detecting breakers of, 47

institutional, 45

low-cost enforcement of, 462

as a public good, 20

for transferability, in design of tradable permits, 209–211

wide diversity of, 29n

S

Sanctioning possibilities

common-pool resource game with, 169– 172, 190–191

cost of, 169

value, necessity, and effectiveness of, 124–125

Santa Fe Institute, 312

Scale. See also Cross-scale institutional linkages

of common-pool resources, 23–24

of the commons dilemma, 146–147

Scale in cross-scale interactions, 27, 310–315

and adaptive management, 311–313

resilience of, 313–315

Scientific knowledge, as a public good, 5, 20

Scientific uncertainty, 327–359.

and collective learning in complex adaptive systems, 340–351

in complex adaptive systems, 334–335

conditional view of, 332–334

example from the New England fisheries, 328–329

and learning in complex adaptive systems, 335–340

response to, 329–332

Sea tenure, in interplay between (sub)national and local resource regimes, 271– 276

Segmentary hierarchy of cooperative institutions, 418–425

exploitation of symbolic systems, 420– 423

legitimate institutions, 423–425

Selection

group, in multilevel evolution, 409

individual-level, in multilevel evolution, 408–409

by kin, in multilevel evolution, 409

natural, in cultural evolution, 410–411

Self-efficacious groups, 132

Self-interest, 4, 28n

Self-organized organizations, emergence of, 456

Selfish Nash Equilibrium (SNE), 165–167, 185–186

Selfish subjects, 28n, 163–164

negative externalities ignored by, 165

Senegal, deforestation in, 95

Sequential protocol, 127

Setting limits, on environmental effects, 218

Settlement, of disputes, 15

Sheep flocks, 56

marginalization of, 75–76n

Shellfish, 55

Shrimp. See South Texas shrimp fisheries

Sierra Club, 425

Simple CPR game, without reciprocal preferences, 173–174

Sinks

biophysical environment as, 29n

common-pool, 19, 462

Situated rational choice, 361

building on existing institutions, 370–372

determining effects in, 367–369

and the emergence of institutions for the commons, 363–375

horizontal and vertical linkages, 372–374

muddling through, 374–375

step-wise model of, 365–370

Size, of resources, 237–240

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
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Small-scale cultural evolution, as problem or resource in commons management, 430–432

SNE. See Selfish Nash Equilibrium

Social changes, global, 476–477

Social coherence, 108n

Social context, 474–477

adapting to change in, 466

globalization syndrome, 475–476

historical context, 477

major demographic changes, 477

other global social changes, 476–477

technological change, 477

Social dilemma situations, 157–195

motives for willingness to tackle, 139

outcome framing in, 140

prospect theory in, 140

Social exchange condition, 122

Social heterogeneity, 146

in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 101

Social identification, with communities, 131

Social motives, individual differences in, 118– 121, 144

Social movement networks, in cross-scale linkages, 307–308

Social optimum, calculating, 186

Social sciences

methodological traditions of, 5

wide use of evolutionary models in, 412

Social structure of the task, 128–137

communication, 134–137

group size, 132–134

power and status, 128–132

Societies, of hunter-gatherers, 414, 427

South Coast Air Quality Management District, 217

South Pole, control of the use of, 23

South Texas shrimp fisheries, 93

Southeast Asian forests, 270

Space, control of the use of outer, 23

Spatial heterogeneity, 15

Species

biological, as resources, 22

concern with the welfare of, 28n

Spread of new institutions, rapidity of, 429–430

Stag hunt game, 28n

Stakeholders. See Multistakeholder bodies

Standard common-pool resource game, 164–169

asymmetric equilibria with inequity-averse subjects, 168, 188–190

Selfish Nash Equilibrium (SNE), 165– 167, 185–186

symmetric equilibria with inequity-averse subjects, 167–168, 186–188

State California Water Project, 424

State policies, 72n

Stationarity, 103

Status, in commons dilemmas, 128–132

Stealing, 123

Step-wise model of situated rational choice, 365–370

Stockholm Declaration, 286n

Storage, 103

Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, 282

Strangers, human proneness to cooperation with , 404

Strategy considerations, in situated rational choice, 369–370

Studies. See Case study research;

Common-pool resource studies;

Large-n studies of unequal irrigators;

Research;

Understudied issues

Subsistence practices, 266

Subtractability, 20–21, 29n

Successful management, 73n, 106

Supply, institutional, problem of, 90, 93

Sustainability, 313

on the commons, critical enabling conditions for, 62–63

institutional, and common resources, 41– 85

Sustainable management

best tool for, 25

of common-pool resources, 46–54

Sustainable policy instruments, value-maximizing, 200

Sustainable yield, maximum, 10

Switzerland

commons in, 72n

private and common property in, 13

Symbolic systems, exploitation of, 420–423

Symbolically marked groups, 422

Symmetric equilibria, with inequity-averse subjects, 167–168, 186–188

Synthesis in commons dilemmas, 144–148

emergence of other-regarding behavior, 144–146

environmental uncertainty, 148

scale of the dilemma, 146–147

social heterogeneity, 146

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Systems. See also Complex systems;

Resource systems;

Symbolic systems

of land tenure, 267–271

of sea tenure, 271–276

T

TAC. See Total allowable catch

Tail-end differences, vs. head-end, in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 88, 99–100

Tasks

decision structure of, 122–127

payoff structure of, 122–125

uncertainty concerning, 125–127

TEA. See Tradable environmental allowances regimes

Technology

pace of change in, 477

production, nonconvexities in, 91

Temporal dimension, in design of tradable permits, 211–212

Temporal heterogeneity, 15

Tenure systems

land, 267–271

sea, 271–276

Terrestrial resources, regimes for, 279–281

Territoriality, 124

Testing, of causal models, 468

Teutonic families, 8

Texas. See South Texas shrimp fisheries

Theoretical adequacy, challenges to, 11

Theoretical expectations, unfulfilled, in the tradable permits approach, 223–224

Theoretical explanations, of appropriating the commons, 157–191

Theoretical models of reciprocity and fairness

in appropriating the commons, 159–163

preferences of inequity aversion, 162

Theoretical predictions

about the common-pool resource game with sanctioning opportunities, 169–172

about the impact of communication, 172– 176

about the standard common-pool resource game, 164–169

Theories of cooperation, 404–412

consistency of evolutionary models with a wide variety of theories, 411–412

evolution as multilevel, 408–409

evolution of culture, 410–411

evolutionary models accounting for genetic and cultural variation through time, 407–408

evolutionary models explaining the nature of preferences and institutions, 406–407

extent and diversity of human cooperation, 404–406

huge variation in institutions, 405–406

wide use of evolutionary models in the social sciences, 412

Theory-driven research, vs. data-driven, 39

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 114

Theory of Moral Sentiments, 115

Third World Network, 308

Timber, harvested from forests, 3

Time preference, rate of, 89

Total allowable catch (TAC), 203, 205–206, 218, 272

Townships, 8

Tradable environmental allowances (TEA) regimes, 27, 193–194

commerce in resources, 247–250

compared with CBMRs, 233–257

extraction vs. pollution, 245–247

as management institutions, 247–250

resource complexity, 240–245

resource size, 237–240

synthesis, 250–253

varying solutions under varying conditions, 237–253

Tradable permits approach to protecting the commons, 197–232

the basic economic theory, 199–202

building resilience into tradable permit systems, 207

compared with CBMRS, 233–257

compared with environmental taxes, 201–202

design considerations, 202–216

economic effects, 220–221

environmental effects, 217–220

evaluation criteria, 216–221

implementation feasibility, 216–217

lessons learned, 221–224

Tragedy of the commons model, 6, 114, 157, 467

challenges to, 13

logic of, 3

major limitations of, 87, 456

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
×

Transfer payment condition, 133–134

Transferability rules, in design of tradable permits, 209–211

Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Act (New Zealand), 210

Triangulation, increased emphasis on, 468

Tribal social instincts hypothesis, for the evolution of cooperative institutions, 413–415

Trust, 5

Typologies, development and differentiation of, 446

U

Ultimate causes, 408

Uncertainty. See also Scientific uncertainty

in complex adaptive systems, 334–335

conditional view of, 332–334

in decision structure of the task, 125–127

defined, 333

environmental, 148

integrating into decision-making process, 311

reducing cooperation, 126

response to, 329–332

Understanding

of actors, generally correct, 459

of institutional design, refining, 469

Understudied issues, 27, 469–479

dynamics of resource management institutions, 469–472

effects of social and historical context, 474–477

extending insights to a broader array of common-pool resources, 472–474

institutional linkages, 477–479

Unequal irrigators

and commons management in large-scale multivariate research, 87–112

and heterogeneity, 88–96

large-n studies of, 96–102

summary of empirical studies, 104–105

Unfair distribution, of benefits, 66

Unfulfilled theoretical expectations, lessons on the tradable permits approach, 223– 224

United Nations, Conference on Environment and Development, 282

U.S. Agency for International Development, conference sponsored by, 28n

U.S. Constitution, 431

position on authority of international conventions, 277

Upper Burma, common property in, 13

Users, 26, 37–191.

See also Harvesters;

Overuse

bargaining power, initial endowment of resources, and shared values of, 15

calculating the numbers of, 23

characteristics of, and costs of monitoring and enforcement, 450

compliance with rules by, and monitoring the resource, 462–463

conditional conservation by, 92

defections by, 95

restraint by, 3, 43–44

of water resources, 38

V

Validity, questions of empirical, 11, 16

Value-maximizing policy instruments, sustainable, 200

Value of research, 457–461

conditional generalizations, 458

general conceptual models, 458

generally correct understanding of the actors, 459

knowledge about causal processes and mechanisms, 458–459

Values

reconciling conflicting, 464

of resources, 129–130

of sanctioning systems, 124–125

shared by users, 15

Variables, 59, 65

functional classification from the commons literature, 455

heritable genetic and cultural, processes that shape through time, 407–408

nonrandom, in cultural evolution, 410

Vertical interplay, 260

Vertical linkages, in institutions for the commons, 293, 372–374, 477–478

Vesting powers, 27

Viability of institutions, to manage resources, 74n

Village institutions, 12

free-rider problem in the context of, 12

Violations, 225n

Voting institutions, 131

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
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W

Wade, facilitating conditions for institutional sustainability identified by, 48, 54– 55

Water resources

in Chile, 203

instream uses of, 219–220

shortages in California, 131, 138, 203

users of, 38

Watercourses, 19

Wealth inequality

causal paths describing hypothesized effects on the maintenance of common-pool resources , 448

in large-n studies of unequal irrigators, 99

Welfare

of other humans, concern with, 28n

of species, concern with, 28n

WEO. See World Environment Organization

Wildlife resources, 55

poaching, 123

Work-around hypothesis of cooperative institutions, 413, 415–418

coercive dominance, 416–418

Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 74n

International Forestry Resources and Institutions Program, 76n

World Bank, 225n, 385

World Environment Organization (WEO), 265

World peace, as a public good, 5, 20

World Trade Organization (WTO), 265, 308

World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 385

World Wildlife Fund

Arctic Program, 287n

conference sponsored by, 28n

WTO. See World Trade Organization

WWF. See World Wide Fund for Nature

Y

Year 2000 Objective, 280

Yield, maximum sustainable, 10

Z

Zero-revenue auctions, 226n

Suggested Citation:"Index." National Research Council. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10287.
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The Drama of the Commons Get This Book
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The "tragedy of the commons" is a central concept in human ecology and the study of the environment. It has had tremendous value for stimulating research, but it only describes the reality of human-environment interactions in special situations. Research over the past thirty years has helped clarify how human motivations, rules governing access to resources, the structure of social organizations, and the resource systems themselves interact to determine whether or not the many dramas of the commons end happily. In this book, leaders in the field review the evidence from several disciplines and many lines of research and present a state-of-the-art assessment. They summarize lessons learned and identify the major challenges facing any system of governance for resource management. They also highlight the major challenges for the next decade: making knowledge development more systematic; understanding institutions dynamically; considering a broader range of resources (such as global and technological commons); and taking into account the effects of social and historical context. This book will be a valuable and accessible introduction to the field for students and a resource for advanced researchers.

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