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INTRODUCTION The Origins and Purpose of This Document Since 1955, the National Research Council (NRC) has been advising the U.S. government on technical matters related to the management of radioactive waste. Today, such review and advice is rendered by the Board on Radioactive Waste Management (BROOM or "the Board"), a permanent committee of the National Research Council. Over the past quarter century, the BROOM and its predecessors have acted as observer, critic, and adviser to the federal agencies responsible for the management of radioactive waste. In 1955, the National Research Council's Committee on Earth Sciences, the forerunner of the BROOM, first examined the problem of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and recommended the strategy of isolation in stable geological for- mations. That basic approach is the one still being pursued in the United States and throughout the world. In 1983, the Board published the report of its Waste Isolation Systems Panel, a technical document that supported the use of "performance assessment." This method, first employed by the Karnbranslesakerhet (KBS) in Sweden for judging the performance of high- level waste and its packaging in geological formations, makes it possible to evaluate the ability of a repository to contain waste for the very long term. Performance assessment has become the keystone of the policies and regu- lations guiding the planning of HLW disposal in the United States as well as other nations. Thus far, however, the technical programs carried out by government and industry in the United States have not led to a socially satisfactory resolution of the problem of HLW management and disposal. There are two reasons for this failure. The first is the controversy over nuclear energy and radioactive waste disposal as part of nuclear energy development. The Board takes no position on the use of nuclear energy. However, it notes that even if nuclear power in this country were discontinued tomorrow a highly unlikely event we would still need to dispose of nuclear waste from existing power plants and defense programs, and we would therefore still require a viable HLW dis- posal program. The second reason that radioactive waste management remains in trouble is the way in which the programs have been designed and carried out. That problem is the subject of this report: the Board believes that important scientific and technical issues concerning HLW have been widely misunderstood; the result is a set of programs that will not achieve their stated goals. Neither the technical nor the social problems of the waste materials already 10
11 in existence are being handled effectively. The Board believes that the safe and effective isolation of radioactive waste is feasible. Improvements to what is now being done are described below. These conclusions are the result of several years of discussions within the Board and are based on the decades of scientific and professional experience represented among the members of the BROOM. In July 1988 the Board convened a week-long study session in Santa Barbara, California, where the Board was joined by experts from the United States and abroad. The group divided its deliberations into four categories: (1) the limitations of analysis; (2) moral and value issues; (3) modeling and its validity; and (4) strategic planning. These categories also determine the structure of this position statement, although in the analysis here, as in the real world, there is no easy separation among them. Although this position statement is critical of present policies, it must be emphasized that the changes that need to be made are not restricted to the U.S. government. The nature of the risks and the government's responsibility to address them need to be presented and understood in terms different from those reflected in today's public policy. Doing so will not lead to less safety but to more. Yet achieving that result will require courage on the part of leaders in government and industry, as well as a willingness to rethink risks among the public at large and in the interest groups concerned with public policies for the management of risk. These questions touch on far more than radioactive waste, and the re- thinking they imply will be difficult to launch and to sustain. The Board believes, however, that this rethinking is essential and that radioactive waste management is a reasonable place to begin. This position statement is a step in that direction. High-Level Waste in Context At present, approximately 17 percent of the world's electricity is derived from about 400 nuclear power plants, although the percentage is as high as 70 percent in France and 50 percent in Sweden. The challenge of HLW disposal is dominated by the spent fuel from these nuclear power plants. Each 1,000-megawatt (MWE) nuclear power plant produces each year about 30 tons of spent fuel, which if reprocessed and vitrified could be reduced to between 4 and 11 cubic meters (m3) of highly radioactive glass. Some countries, including the United States, have chosen to dispose of commercial spent fuel directly. Each power plant also produces some 400 m3 of short- lived, low-level waste (LLW) each year. Fuel production would leave an- other 86,000 tons of mill tailings on the earth's surface for each reactor, per year.
12 Radioactive Waste Management Policy Because HEW must be isolated from the living environment for 10,000 years or more, all nations faced with the task of radioactive waste disposal have chosen underground repositories as the basic technical approach. In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) has been given the task of designing and eventually operating such a repository. Before operations begin, however, DOE must demonstrate to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) that the repository will perform to standards established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that limit the release of radionuclides to specific levels for 10,000 years after disposal. Before the USNRC will grant a license to operate a repository, DOE must present convincing data and analysis to the USNBC showing that the proposed facility can meet specified release limits. To develop such an assessment, it is necessary to examine all credible possibilities for the movement of radionuclides from the repository and into the accessible environment. In conducting these analyses, DOE has relied heavily on building computer models of the repository and surrounding geological environment, along with possible pathways of radionuclide transport. However, preparing quantitative predictions so far into the future pushes the boundaries of our understanding of geology, groundwater chemistry and movement, and their interactions with the emplaced material (radioactive waste package, backfill, sealants, and so on). Although the basic scientific principles are well known, quantitative estimates (no matter how they are obtained) must rely on many assumptions. The resulting estimates cover a range of outcomes. While continued scientific investigations should reduce the uncertainty, absolute certainty cannot be achieved. Indeed, a major theme of this position statement is the need for public policy to benefit from, and change in response to, accumulating experience.
