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An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology (2003)

Chapter: 2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons

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Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
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Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
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Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
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Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 28
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 29
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 30
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 31
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 32
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 33
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 34
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 35
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 36
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 37
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 38
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 39
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 40
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 41
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 42
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 43
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 44
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 45
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 46
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 47
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 48
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 49
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 50
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 51
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 52
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 53
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 54
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 55
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 56
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 57
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 58
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 59
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 60
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 61
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 62
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 63
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 64
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 65
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 66
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 67
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 68
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 69
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 70
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 71
Suggested Citation:"2. The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons." National Research Council. 2003. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10538.
×
Page 72

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The Current Status of Non-Lethal Weapons In assessing the full spectrum of effort and attention given to non-lethal weapons, the committee found the area to be broad but with significant interrela- tionships. To place in context the findings and recommendations presented in subsequent chapters, this chapter summarizes (1) the current status of non-lethal weapons technologies and effects on the health of personnel against whom the NLWs are used; (2) the progress of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, the focus of DOD's joint activity in NLWs; and (3) the activities in other areas that influence the understanding and use of these weapons, including Service and other agency development programs and operational experience, science and technology status, recent studies and assessments, and the legal environment within which the use of NLWs must be addressed. 2.1 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES .p There are numerous, very broad classes of technologies that have been consid- ered for non-lethal use. Several previous studies 2 3 4 have exhaustively cataloged potential technologies, systems, and mission areas. Different taxonomies, data- 1Jaycor. 1996. Mission Applications of Non-Lethal Weapons, San Diego, Calif., July 9. 2Jaycor. 1994. Non-Lethal Technologies Database for OASD-SOILIC, San Diego, Calif., June 21. 3Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. 2000. Report on Technology Options to Leverage Aero- space Power in Operations Other Than War, SAB-TR-99-11, Department of the Air Force, Wash- ington, D.C., February. Available online at <http://www.sab.hq.af.mil/archives/reports/index.htm>. 4Sauer, Maj Joel, USMC, "U.S. Marine Corps Non-Lethal Weapons Experimentation," briefing to the committee on March 6, 2001, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, Va. 23

.; 24 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY bases, and mission analyses have been completed as part of these studies. One of the most recent studies was the Joint Mission Area Analysis (JMAA) Conference spon- sored by the JNLWD.s This was a joint-Service evaluation that broadly reviewed potential non-lethal weapons technologies. Technologies were sorted by potential for application in more than 100 mission areas and by their perceived adaptability to different delivery modes. Of 45 potential technologies reviewed, the study identi- fied 12 candidate technologies for development: (1) millimeter wave, (2) chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL), (3) antitraction materials, (4) non-lethal delivery and deployment, (5) malodorants, (6) calmatives, (7) high-power microwave (HPM), (8) rigid foams, (9) tagging and tracking, (10) nanoparticles, (11) laser scattering obscuration, and (12) deuterium-fluoride/hydrogen-fluoride (DFIHF) lasers. The JMAA Conference and the studies cited provided the basis for the technologies considered in this study. The extensive list generated appears in Table B. 1 in Appendix B. The non-lethal-weapons technologies are grouped in six categories: (13 kinetic-energy technologies, (2) chemical and materials tech- nologies, (3) directed-energy technologies, (4) acoustic technologies' (5) electri- cal technologies, and (6) barriers and entanglements. Kinetic-energy NLWs include devices such as rubber bullets and stun grenades. Examples of chemical NLWs include malodorants and pepper spray for use against individuals, as well as fuel contaminants for disabling vehicles. Directed-energy non-lethal weapons systems include radio frequency (RF) trans- mitters for disrupting vehicle engines, as well as the familiar laser dazzler for use against individuals. Examples of acoustic non-lethal weapons systems are in- tense sirens and whistles for area denial. Electrical NLWs include lasers (stun guns) to incapacitate individuals. Finally, barrier non-lethal weapons technolo- gies include entanglement systems for stopping vehicles and sticky foams for use against individuals. Each category is discussed below in greater detail. Two additional technology areas not specifically included in the six catego- ries described above are essential to the success of NLWs; they are discussed as well. The two areas referred to as enabling technologies are delivery systems and sensor systems. Many NLWs, in order to be effective while remaining safe, require accurate delivery at long ranges. In addition, delivery systems with the flexibility to handle a variety of NEW payloads are desirable. Similarly, ad- vanced sensor systems are required to identify potential targets, to ensure accu- rate delivery of NLWs, and to assess their effects. Kinetic-Energy Technologies Most non-lethal kinetic-energy weapons derive from their lethal counter- parts. The rubber bullet for crowd dispersal is the classic example. Other kinetic sU.S. Special Operations Command. 2000. Joint Mission Area Analysis Conference, October 17-20.

; - THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 25 energy NLWs are concepts combined with other non-lethal techniques, such as non-lethal mines delivering smoke, electric shock, or pepper spray for area de- nial, and grenades for delivering anti-riot gas. Kinetic-energy NLWs were among the first non-lethal weapons developed, and they have been used extensively by police, troops, and security forces. Most non-lethal rounds and grenades are designed to be fired from existing weapons. The short range of many of these munitions, together with their deteriorating accuracy at range, limits their use to situations involving short standoff distances. For the most part, these weapons are well developed. Nevertheless, improvements are being pursued to broaden their applicability, extend their reach, and ensure their non-lethality. Table B. 1 in Appendix B identifies many kinetic-energy-based NLWs. Non- lethal projectiles of various kinds have been developed to stun, confuse, and disperse individuals and crowds. Rubber projectiles can be fired from standard- issue 1 2-gauge shotguns, either singly or in clusters of 12 balls, with a range of up to about 30 meters (m). The 40-millimeter (mm) Mkl9 grenade developed for shooting from M203 and M79 weapons dispenses rubber balls for dispersing large crowds and achieving site security. The 40-mm sponge grenade can knock down an individual at 50 m. The ring airfoil grenade launched by an M234 is an aerodynamically shaped, soft rubberlike ring that spins in flight and is accurate from 40 to 60 m. Stun guns in the form of air/water jets mounted on vehicles are designed for crowd control. For intercepting speeding boats, developmental work has been carried out on a 6.25-in.-diameter non-lethal torpedo capable of carrying a 50-lb payload. Control of trauma level from blunt projectiles remains a serious problem. At sufficiently close range, a rubber bullet can be lethal. Some effort has gone into designing a rifle system having an adjustable projectile muzzle velocity depend- ing on distance to the target (and possibly, seriousness of threat), thereby allow- ing control of blunt trauma effects. experience in using kinetic-energy non-lethal weapons for crowd control and dispersal. Through improved technology, the British, in particular, have been highly successful in limiting fatalities resulting from blunt projectiles. (See Section 2.7.) Knowledge of the level of blunt trauma from a given non-lethal weapon system is almost entirely empirical, gained largely from experience in the field and from limited tests on animals. The effects on a human can be highly variable, depending on factors such as target distance, strike location, and individual hu- man characteristics. At the present time, there exists neither a database nor calibrated models of the response of skin, tissue, and organs to blunt impact from which to assess human effects of non-lethal kinetic-energy weapons. The ab- sence of such data and models impedes development of new non-lethal weapons systems and makes it difficult to establish envelopes of safe use for existing systems. Although knowledge accumulated in research on blunt trauma in the automotive industry is useful, new knowledge is required regarding the human The British and Israelis have extensive

26 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY effects of kinetic-energy weapons, because the speeds are higher and the mass of the projectiles is lower in comparison with automotive crashes. Research on sports injuries is another area to be investigated for relevant effects data. Chemical and Materials Technologies A large array of chemicals and materials have been suggested as candidates for use as NLWs. They fall into two broad categories: (1) antipersonnel and (2) antimateriel. Chemical antipersonnel NLWs are intended to dissuade, tempo- rarily inhibit, incapacitate, or otherwise impede with no lasting side effects- individuals and crowds from taking certain actions. Chemical antimateriel NLWs are intended to disable, neutralize, or otherwise prevent the operation of electron- ics, engines, networks, and so on, in vehicles or infrastructure. The Army sup- ported much exploratory work over the past few decades and demonstrated some very promising ideas. Development activity by the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command (ECBC) on agents for NLWs has been markedly reduced in recent years, however, with the adoption of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Classes of compounds having potential as antimateriel NLWs that have been examined include combustion modifiers, anti-additives, fuel contaminants, lubri- cant contaminants, viscosity-enhancing agents, depolymerization agents, and abrasives that might be used against engines and vehicles. Corrosive agents, depolymerization agents, and embrittlement agents could be used against a wider . 6 range of infrastructure. Classes of compounds with potential for non-lethal antipersonnel use include riot control agents, malodorants, and calmatives. Riot control agents (RCAs) include chemicals that irritate mucous membranes and cause lacrimation, irrita- tion, or inflammation. RCAs produce rapid sensory irritation or disabling physi- cal effects that disappear within a short time following termination of exposure. They are well studied as a class, and many highly effective compounds with large safety margins have been identified. Most commonly known are oleoresin capsi- cum (OC), the active agent in hot peppers; chloroacetophenone (CN); and o- chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS), or tear gas. Because of its persistence after application, CS has largely been replaced by OC, which has had recent, publicized use by civilian police agencies. ECBC and other groups have studied malodorants, and many compounds with repulsive smells have been identified. Some of these materials are the active ingredients in the most disagreeable natural odors, and some are synthetic cre- ations. Tests have shown that the repulsiveness of a particular compound to a person depends largely on the cultural background of the test subject. For ex- ample, manure is used as a fuel in some countries so residents in those countries are desensitized to a smell that is repulsive in other cultures. In addition, the olfactory sensitivity to many malodorants lessens with extended exposure, and

i 6 THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 27 the degree of repugnance diminishes. Mixtures of malodorants, a mixture of a malodorant and an irritant, and/or concepts of operations that avoid successive use of the same malodorant within a specific time frame could circumvent these limitations. Calmatives6 represent a class of chemical substances that offer strong poten- tial as effective NLWs. Major research and development (R&D) issues involving the use of calmatives are (1) the quantification of the effectiveness and margin of safety for these materials and (2) the development of the method of delivery that can rapidly provide the appropriate dose. The physiological effects of all calmatives that have been examined occur as a result of depression of the central nervous system, accompanied by mood alteration and respiratory depression. A review of some potential calmatives was published in 2000.7 High concentrations of calmatives in the body can lead to extended loss of consciousness or, in extreme cases, death. Safe yet effective applications of NLWs should limit exposures to well below those levels. The generally desired ratio of exposure between an effective dose and death is on the order of 103 to 104. (By comparison, the margin of safety for exposure to RCAs such as the lacrimator CS is about 2,500 to 30,000 dose units.8) Research carried out 10 to 15 years ago at ECBC began to examine the use of additional chemicals ("antagonists" mixed with "agonists") that would reduce the effect of respiratory depression, leading to acceptable margins of safety. The principal effect was still unconsciousness, which is unacceptable under most interpretations of the CWC. The research was not extended to the concept of mood alteration short of uncon- sciousness. The use of calmatives had previously been envisioned in connection with hostage situations and for use with "unmanageable" prisoners, but not for riot situations in which incapacitated individuals might be trampled or crushed in the rioting. In fact, research on the use of calmatives for peacekeeping situations has been practically nonexistent. To elicit the desired level of mood alteration with- out causing a dangerous level of respiratory depression (i.e., calming while main- taining consciousness) requires a tight control on dose level. The time of onset of mood alteration depends markedly on the method of delivery as well as on the type of calmative used. Inhalation leads to the most rapid onset of symptoms- on the order of 1 minute after exposure for certain fentanyls. With other methods 6Primary sources of information: Ken Collins, Gene Olajos, and Larry Bickford of the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command, and Joseph A. Rutigliano Jr., International and Operational Law Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 7Lakoski, Joan M., W. Bosseau Murray, and John M. Kenny. 2000. The Advantages and Limita- tions of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique, College of Medicine, Hershey, Pa., and Applied Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University, State College, Pa., October 3. sin dose units: typically, with a respiratory agent exposure characterization of (ma - min)/m3, a dose unit multiplies this by an assumed inhalation of 20 liters of air in 1 minute.

i. 28 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY of delivery, such as absorption through the skin, 3 to 5 minutes is required for the onset of symptoms. However, a delivery method based on absorption through the skin could lead to contamination of U.S. personnel who come into contact with areas that have been exposed. Directed-Energy Technologies NLWs utilizing directed energy may be divided into three categories for the purposes of understanding applications and effects: (1) low-energy lasers and incandescent devices; (2) high-energy lasers; and (3) high-power millimeter- wave and microwave devices. Low-Energy Lasers and Incandescent Devices ,. The category of low-energy lasers and incandescent devices includes laser dazzlers and flash grenades that use intense visible light to temporarily blind or disorient a person. Laser dazzlers often use diode-laser sources of radiation at far-red wavelengths near 600 nanometers (nary) or solid-state lasers such as frequency-doubled neodymium:yttrium aluminum garnet (Nd:YAG), which pro- duces green light at 532-nm wavelength. Current models are handheld devices resembling flashlights, or rifle-mounted models designed to mount much like a telescopic sight. Following are some examples: The Saber 203 laser illuminator utilizes a diode-laser source that operates at red wavelengths and fits onto the grenade launcher attached to a rifle. It creates glare and flash-blinding that cause adversaries to protect their eyes and slow their advance. It was used in Somalia during the withdrawal of UN forces and has been effective largely because illuminated subjects believed that deadly force would follow the beam of light. Because of concerns over eye safety and mini- mal effectiveness during daylight, it has not been fielded for standard use. · The hinder adversaries with less-than-lethal technology (HALT) system, similar to the Saber 203 dazzler, also uses a 650-nm (red) wavelength diode source. HALT is designed to mount on an infantry rifle directly below the gun barrel so that either the laser dazzler or the rifle may be used. Future plans for HALT include the capability for dual red and blue wavelengths that flicker off and to mitigate filtering by single-wavelength goggles. · The Dissuader uses a laser-diode source similar to that of HALT, operat- ing at red wavelengths, and operates much like a handheld flashlight. A different approach to laser dazzlers, the proposed veiling glare system, would use a laser designed to produce violet light at 360 to 440 nm. At suffi- ciently high intensities, light at these wavelengths induces fluorescence in the human eye, which, in turn, produces diffuse, defocused light in the retina, appear- ing to the subject as omnidirectional. So far, this approach has been tested only

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 29 in cadaver lenses. Although the fluorescence effect is known and documented, the potential for optical damage to the retina or other portions of the eye remains uncertain. Unlike the veiling glare system, flash grenades produce a single intense burst of incandescent light, most often by the explosive combustion of some sort of fuel, and a significant pressure concussion accompanies the flash. An alternative approach utilizing a fuel-air mixture containing a metalized powder would re- duce the potential for unanticipated injury by reducing the concussion pressure by a factor of 100. High-Energy Lasers ~ . In this report, "high-energy laser" refers to a system with sufficient energy (and/or power) to ablate, melt, or burn material. Such systems can be lethal if directed against human beings. Their use as NLWs is intended for applications such as bursting automobile tires, rupturing fuel tanks, selectively cutting through electrical or communications lines, or setting fires. The advantage of such a system, if achievable, would be its capability for selective and precise targeting. A frequently cited example of such targeting involves a military convoy operated by armed soldiers holding civilian hostages. The laser system would rapidly sweep along the convoy, selectively targeting vehicle tires, tracks, and weapons, while avoiding injury to the hostages. The proposed approach to this type of system is the advanced tactical laser (ATL). Although still in the conceptual development stage, ATL would utilize a COIL. The laser, its chemical fuel, and laser beam director would be sized to fit on an aircraft platform such as an Osprey tilt-rotor craft or a C-130 transport. For the initial version of the ATL, the targets would be selected by a human operator who viewed the scene through a separate aperture co-aligned with the laser beam director. The operator would control the laser pointing using a manual designa- tor. In more advanced versions of ATL, target selection could also be accom- plished automatically using target-recognition and tracking software. Several issues associated with atmospheric propagation are likely to limit the effectiveness of ATL as currently envisioned. The first is atmospheric absorp- tion. At the COIL wavelength, atmospheric absorption will heat the column of air through which the beam passes; this heated air will defocus the beam, through a mechanism known as "thermal blooming," and will reduce the intensity on the target. Thermal blooming could be compensated for to some extent with adaptive optics, but that approach introduces significant complications to the system de- sign. The second issue concerns the ability of ATL to be pointed precisely. A limiting effect is atmospheric turbulence along the propagation path; this turbu- lence causes high-frequency beam "jitter," which reduces the intensity on the target. Vibration disturbances on the aircraft platform itself will also contribute to beam jitter, further reducing the intensity on the target. Finally, for ATL to

30 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY operate in the field, serious logistics issues would have to be addressed. The COIL fuel is composed of a number of caustic chemicals that require careful storage and handling. Although the technology to meet these requirements is available, they would be a concern for a system deployed to areas that lack proper handling systems. A second class of high-energy laser systems for antipersonnel application is designed not to cause damage directly, but rather to produce a kinetic shock through a laser-induced plasma. One such proposed system is the pulsed-energy projectile (PEP). PEP would utilize a pulsed deuterium-fluoride (DF) laser de- signed to produce an ionized plasma at the target surface. In turn, the plasma would produce an ultrasonic pressure wave that would pass into the body, stimu- lating the cutaneous nerves in the skin to produce pain and induce temporary paralysis. The proposed PEP system would accomplish this at extended ranges. Another proposed system is the pulsed impulsive kill laser (PIKL). PIKL is also at the feasibility-study level. High-Power Microwave and Millimeter-Wave Technology , ~ 5 This class of NLWs high-power microwave (HPM) and millimeter-wave technology can be grouped into two subcategories: (1) those designed to dis- rupt electronic systems, such as communications and computer networks; and (2) those designed to produce a physiological effect on an individual. Applications in the first category (electronic disruption) include the capabil- ity of disabling or destroying electronic equipment. All sensitive electronics- including computers, cell phones and radios, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, and engine ignition systems are potential targets. HPM systems would provide this capability without the accompanying blast effects, physical damage, or death to nearby personnel characteristic of explosive or other high- kinetic-energy devices. HPM systems designed to produce these effects would utilize conventional millimeter-wave and RF generators combined with a suitable transmitter, such as a microwave horn or antenna. Unconventional approaches to generating and delivering HPM include Marx banks or explosive devices that would produce a single, intense pulse; they are usually referred to as electromag- netic pulse (EMP) devices. Some systems designed to produce physiological effects operate at frequen- cies corresponding to millimeter waves in the range designed to be absorbed by the skin or at lower frequencies designed to produce resonance inside the body. VMADS is a system of the first type. It utilizes a microwave generator and an operator-steerable antenna designed to produce a narrow beam width beyond small arms range. The VMADS effect causes an intense but non-lethal burning sensation in a quick exposure. Potential applications are crowd control or perim- eter protection around an airfield or other sensitive area.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 31 One area of concern with millimeter-wave devices designed to induce bio- logical effects is the potential for ocular damage such as corneal lesions, as well as the inadvertent exposure of targets at close range, which could lead to severe burns or other injuries. To be effective, the NEW must operate at intensities sufficient to induce avoidance, but below the threshold for serious injury. Acoustic Technologies , ~ Acoustics have been considered as a non-lethal weapons technology to dis- perse crowds and to temporarily startle or incapacitate individuals. A wide variety of effects have been explored or proposed. Acoustical energy at audible frequencies (about 20 to 16,000 hertz (Hz)) strongly couples into the ear; continu- ous sound in this frequency range can cause pain at a threshold of approximately 135 dB. Other frequencies—ultrasound and infrasound have also been studied. Vortex ring generators have been investigated as well. Explosive flash bangs provide a short, high-intensity acoustic pulse. Coupling mechanisms into the body have been proposed: for example, mechanically coupling and vibrating internal organs with infrasound, utilizing resonances in the airway to entrain breathing, heating the skin ultrasonically, and bone conduction at very high acous- . . . . tic Intensities. The concept of acoustic NLWs has focused on acoustic generators projecting sound downrange to affect crowds, to provide area denial, or to clear facilities. Generators that have been explored for producing these high intensities include sirens, whistles, pulse jets, vortex generators, explosives, and fuel-air devices. For interior use, very high intensity acoustics (>170 dB) have been investigated as an access-delay technology for physical security systems.9 Development of acoustic technologies for non-lethal weapons applications in air has generally not been successful for several reasons. Most significant is that there are no demonstrated extra-aural bioeffects that significantly affect ad- versary behavior. Driving audible acoustic intensities to levels above the hearing pain threshold can be effective, but it can also permanently damage hearing or can be easily countered. Other issues with sonic generators include exposure of friendly forces to the energy, difficulties in focusing the energy downrange, the rapid decrease in intensity with range, and the power requirements to generate and maintain very high continuous acoustic intensities.~° Underwater applications present a potentially more promising scenario, however, due to the increased coupling of acoustic energy. Past investigations have considered the use of ship sonar against underwater threats. Also being 9Cutler, R.P. 1999. "Tests of High Power Acoustics Sources," Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., September 30. Music, John. 1997. "Technology Assessment of Acoustics as a Non-Lethal Weapon," U.S. Marine Corps Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico, Va., December.

i. 32 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY investigated are underwater acoustic sources as warning or non-lethal options against such threats. Unknowns include environmental effects on fish and ma- rine mammals. Electrical Technologies ., The non-lethal electrical methods identified in Table B. 1 (Appendix B) have been developed for tasks as diverse as stunning individuals, stopping engines of moving vehicles, and temporarily knocking out electrical grids and power gen- eration. The class of NLWs that injects electrical energy into a human at high voltage, high frequency, low current, and with very short pulses is generally known as the stun gun. There are approximately a dozen manufacturers of such weapons, and each uses slightly different pulse parameters. The stun gun inca- pacitates an individual by stimulating nerve cells proximate to the discharge region and temporarily overriding normal motor control signals, causing uncon- trollable muscular contractions. Complete recovery occurs within about 15 minutes after the stun gun is turned off. Off-the-shelf stun guns are widely used in law enforcement because of their high degree of effectiveness. Their safety has received a moderate amount of attention in safety documentation by manu- facturers, but little to no actual data are found in the peer-reviewed literature, and basic mechanisms are not well studied. The effectiveness of these systems is severely limited in military operations by the fact that they can only be used at arm's length. Somewhat greater standoff distance is afforded by newer stun gun munitions, which can be projected as darts (two per round with trailing wires) with an effective range of 12 to 15 m or "air" lasers with a range of about 20 m, although 90 to 100 m would be more useful for military applications. A more novel concept is a proposed cylindrical "dart mine," which, when triggered, would spew darts in all directions for area denial. Its effectiveness remains to be established. For stopping vehicles, pulsed-current devices have been employed to inject an electrical discharge from a capacitor into the electrical system of the engine of a moving vehicle, causing the engine to misfire and stop. Direct electrical con- tact of the device with the engine block must be achieved; this creates a require- ment for an effective delivery system. This approach works for vehicles with modern electrical systems, especially those utilizing a computer. In most cases, the computer/electrical system is temporarily interrupted, and the engine can be restarted. The approach does not work as well or at all on vintage vehicles or diesels. In law enforcement applications of vehicle stopping, two systems have been employed: (1) stationary contact points positioned to anticipate a passing vehicle, and (2) small delivery vehicles designed to overtake and make contact with an offending vehicle. If the route of a threatening or fleeing vehicle can be predetermined as for an entryway to a garage or a driveway to a building then

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 33 a strip containing the electric discharge system can be put in place ahead of time. When the route cannot be predetermined, the pulsed-current device must be launched in real time from a ground-based chase vehicle or helicopter. While there appear to be opportunities for the use of such devices in military applica- tions for example, missions geared to protecting U.S. embassies or operational airfields and docks the main impediment is the difficulty of delivery. In such cases, electrified fences may also prove useful. Barriers and Entanglements Barriers have been used as non-lethal weapons devices for many years by the Services, law enforcement and corrections, and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in physical security applications. Existing and potential non-lethal mis- sion uses of barriers and entanglements are extensive. Barriers can be used to form a line of demarcation, to separate adversaries from friendly forces, to delay adversaries from gaining access to an area, to secure facilities, to stop vehicles, to disable boats, and to serve in many other applications where delaying an adversary's action is required. Barriers encompass a broad range of devices, materials, and systems, ranging from simple devices, such as caltrops, to complex barrier sys- tems utilizing movable concertina blankets and portcullises. They can often be made more effective by combining technologies, for example, concertina used in combination with an obscurant as a barrier in an interior application. Barriers may also include materials applications for the purpose of delaying adversaries. Well-known examples are sticky foams and rigid foams for rapidly blocking areas or gluing other barriers in place. Low-coefficient-of-friction ma- terials can act as barriers against the transit of personnel or vehicles. High- expansion-ratio, high-strength materials are of particular utility for non-lethal use, because the transported volume of these materials is far less than the dis- pensed volume. Many effective barriers utilize high-strength materials (e.g., steel) and mass (e.g., concrete or earth) to effect a needed delay. A challenge in applying barriers and entanglements to non-lethal uses is to develop effective barriers with weights and stored volumes acceptable for staging and deploying the barrier. Re-use is desirable in many applications to reduce deployment costs of barriers and to . . . minimize storage volume. Rapid deployment is often the major challenge for effective barrier use. For vehicle barriers or entanglements, rapidly deployable systems are necessary for putting barriers in place before a vehicle can enter a secure zone or for allowing timely interdiction of moving land vehicles or watercraft. Precision delivery of barriers may be required. An example is the running gear entanglement system (RGES), which has proven to be effective in temporarily stopping small, fast watercraft. A challenge with a RGES is to integrate the barrier with capable delivery systems providing rapid and accurate delivery. The Coast Guard, with

34 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY assistance from the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), is developing helicopter-based deployment systems to accurately and safely emplace the ROES in order to stop fast boats. In some situations, remotely piloted watercraft would be the platform of choice in deploying RGES-like barriers. Such watercraft might also serve as barriers themselves, in much the same way that police use squad cars to channel, block, and/or ram suspect vehicles. Artillery has been used to deploy large capture nets in proof-of-concept demonstrations for the Army. Similar use of naval cannon to deploy entangling rope arrays near approaching boats, both to warn and to entangle running gear should a boat cross the deployed barrier might be envisioned. Enabling Technologies Technologies for Delivery of NLWs :+ 6 Important characteristics of delivery systems include range, payload capac- ity, payload flexibility, delivery accuracy, reusability, and specific applicability to allow deployment of a particular non-lethal weapons technology. By their nature, non-lethal weapons technologies often have limited range and some varia- tion in effects. This implies that non-lethal weapons delivery systems are par- ticularly important in order to maximize the effects of the weapon on target. Many different delivery system technologies have potential for supporting employment of non-lethal materials or weapons. At the low end of the spectrum are hand-held weapons for firing low-kinetic-energy munitions, chemical dis- pensers' and electrical stun devices. Effective ranges of these devices range from contact to scores of meters. Intermediate-range weapons include grenade launch- ers, mortars, and larger-caliber guns. These larger-caliber systems allow some additional volume for non-lethal payloads; however, the kinetic energy of the casings of these munitions can pose a significant personnel injury risk. Directed- energy antipersonnel platforms (e.g., VMADS and PEP) also fall into the cat- egory of delivery of hundreds of meters. Finally, there are systems that can deliver a non-lethal weapon technology a kilometer or more. These include large-caliber guns, naval cannon, watercraft, aircraft, and unmanned platforms. These delivery options have been identified and cataloged in other studies. For this review, delivery systems are highlighted (see Table 2.1) on the basis of their expected capability for providing deployment of an array of non-lethal materials or weapons. Extended range- a very important requirement for many NLWs, especially for naval expeditionary force missions is another important factor for including a particular delivery system. The options and their advertised capabilities are presented in Table 2.1. Delivery systems for NLWs sometimes require specific development and integration with the non-lethal technology to optimize the effectiveness of deliv- ery for particular use scenarios. Examples are mortar or large-caliber guns for

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36 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY . ... which non-lethal system packaging and collateral effects of fragmented casing would need to be considered. Systems that appear to provide offensive capability for delivery of non-lethal payloads are unmanned platforms for example, robotic platforms, UAVs, un- manned watercraft, and UUVs. Advantages of robotic platforms include reduced risk to operators, rapid response if the platforms are compact and high speed, and reduced manpower needs if the platforms are autonomous. UAVs provide capa- bilities for either ground or shipboard non-lethal munitions to be delivered accu- rately to a specific location. UAV technology is being developed for many other applications, and several non-lethal payload deployments have been demonstrated from UAVs. Non-lethal technology applications will not drive UAV develop- ment; instead, non-lethal payloads will be integrated into UAV platforms that provide the required functionality of payload capacity, range, and delivery mode. For Navy ship protection in particular, unmanned surface craft and UUVs could afford significant capability in enforcing the multilayered protection strat- egy for ships in port, at anchor, or even underway in littoral waters (see Section 1.2~. These craft could interrogate, assess, and warn of potential threats, deliver and apply a range of escalating non-lethal weapons technologies, and, ultimately, incorporate a lethal response. Smart buoys, teleoperated or autonomous robotic jet skis ("Roboskis"), or modified launches could also be envisioned as potential non-lethal delivery platforms in the Navy context. Autonomous robotics and cooperative robotics are more advanced technologies that can be incorporated into delivery platforms to enhance operator control and information management, assist with addressing multiple threats, and improve response times to incoming threats. Sensors and Non-Lethal Weapons Sensors have a major effect on the conduct of non-lethal warfare, but little has been done to develop sensor/NLW integration to a level comparable with that of the sensor/lethal weapon analogue. Sensor systems should play a role in nearly all aspects of NEW use. They can provide warning, localization, and tracking of potential enemy threats, as well as detecting and identifying adversar- ies to permit closed-loop tailoring of the desired effect of the NEW. Sensors embedded in the guidance and control systems allow for the precision engage- ment of hostile targets with NLWs. Although both lethal and non-lethal weapons depend on sensors for cueing, targeting, guidance, fusing, and/or effects assessment, NLWs can potentially benefit more for several reasons. Many NLWs have a more limited range within which they are effective, either because they must be released or activated near their target or because the range of safe and effective concentrations of some non- lethal weapons agents is relatively narrow. Sensors remotely placed near targets can also be used to provide real-time assessment of the application and effects of

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS ~7 is, NLWs, since visual observation alone may not determine if the desired and necessary effect has been achieved. One form of real-time feedback could be the rangefinder system on a rifle delivering a blunt-impact projectile. By using the output of the rangefinder system to adjust the propellant or gas pressure, blunt-impact projectiles could be delivered at the target with the same momentum regardless of distance to the target. Although more costly than today's rifle-fired NLWs, such a system could greatly reduce the number of unintended serious injuries and fatalities. Similarly, if a target is moving, small, disposable, passive or active sensors can be used to track an individual, a group, or vehicles (on land, sea, or under water) by affixing an appropriate marker or tag to the target. One could imagine several future scenarios that illustrate the usefulness of combining sensors with NLWs: . A suspicious boat continues on a course toward a U.S. Navy ship in a foreign port and crosses the perimeter of the outer security zone, arousing con- cern. A small UAV, which is loitering beyond the warning zone around the ship, is quickly maneuvered by the UAV operator and makes a low pass over the boat. Onboard, the UAV electro-optical imagers with telephoto lenses get a close look over the stern of the boat and into the cockpit. A red laser dissuader beam is activated on the UAV, painting the cockpit of the boat with a red warning glare. The boat operator responds and changes course away from the ship. · In a difficult crowd control situation, the decision is made to use calmatives, which must be applied within a specific range of concentrations. To ensure proper dosing, a small UAV is launched, dropping remote sensors containing chemical "laboratory" electronic chips that give chemical analysis feedback to adjust the release level of calmative agents in the target area. · In a humanitarian operation involving delivery of food to starving people, an unruly crowd forms. A VMADS unit is used to control the crowd surround- ing the convoy delivering supplies. To make sure that no one in the area is overexposed, small pre-placed microwave sensors continuously monitor the ex- posure level from several points in the area and provide real-time measurements of beam intensity in the target area to the VMADS operator. A vast amount of work has been done on sensors, especially those based on the electromagnetic spectrum. Much of that work, sponsored by DOD, is appli- cable to non-lethal weapons systems. Of particular interest are acoustic, ther- mal, imaging, microwave, explosives, and chemical detection sensors that can be remotely deployed or focused. Low-cost, expendable sensors that could be dispensed from small, low-flying, remotely piloted vehicles or robotic surface vessels would be useful for many types of non-lethal weapons missions. Most or all of the desired sensor operational features (day/night, all weather, antij em, and so on) to support lethal force application carry over to non-lethal use, but

: - 38 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ED TECHNOLOGY with the more stringent requirement for real-time fusion and feedback to enable the switch from non-lethal to lethal force when necessary. 2.2 HEALTH EFFECTS AND BIOSUSCEPTIBILITIES "Susceptibility" is used in this report to refer to specific responses of the human system to exposure to a form of energy or to a chemical. Knowledge of susceptibilities is important, because they form the biophysical/biochemical basis for developing antipersonnel NLWs. Susceptibilities are rarely known a priori but are discovered either by methodical evaluation of a biological system when it is exposed to an energy form or a chemical, or by accident. For example, it was generally known from fundamental physics that radio frequency exposures re- sulted in heating tissue. Once a biological susceptibility is discovered, the parameters of exposure and response can be explored to evaluate whether the susceptibility can be used as the basis for a new weapon. Likewise, once discovered, the susceptibility can be studied to determine the potential health-effects consequences of using the knowledge of this susceptibility to develop a weapon. In an ideal situation, a biological susceptibility can be exploited to produce an effective non-lethal weapon that results in low, reversible, and predictable levels of human harm. This section provides an abbreviated summary of the state of knowledge of health effects for non-lethal weapons phenomenologies. More detail for each area can be found in Appendix C. From Kinetic-Energy Sources While significant efforts have been made to understand basic principles of the trauma that can be caused by kinetic energy for example, in automobile collisions or sports injuries much of that work has involved masses and veloci- ties much different from those of non-lethal beanbags and rubber bullets. Some recent work consists of phenomenological observations of human surrogates- animals, cadavers, or physical models. The scientific basis for developing more effective but less harmful weapons does not now exist. A sound basis, proposed by the research community, can be developed using (1) modern computational techniques to create finite element models of humans and animals, and (2) de- tailed impact studies using animals for parametric pain evaluations and using cadavers for parametric tolerance evaluations. From Directed-Energy NLWs The first radio frequency non-lethal weapon, VMADS, is based on a biophysi- cal susceptibility known empirically for decades. More in-depth health effects studies were launched only after the decision was made to develop that capability

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 39 into a weapon. The heating action of RF signals is well understood and can be the basis for several additional directed-energy weapons. Leap-ahead non-lethal weap- ons technologies will probably be based on more subtle human/RF interactions in which the signal information within the RF exposure causes an effect other than simply heating: for example, stun, seizure, startle, and decreased spontaneous activ- ity. Recent developments in the technology are leading to ultrawideband, very high peak power, and ultrashort signal capabilities, suggesting that the phase space to be explored for subtle, yet potentially effective non-thermal biophysical susceptibilities is vast. Advances will require a dedicated effort to identify useful susceptibilities. Similarly, much is known about the effects of single-frequency commercial lasers on the human eye. However, new developments are leading to multiple- frequency lasers, as well as to ultrashort-pulsed systems; effects data are lacking for both. Identification of optimal non-lethal ocular effects will require a dedi- cated effort, not now being carried out, to explore the biophysical susceptibilities over the substantial phase space of both lasers and non-coherent systems. From Chemical NLWs ., \ Two materials, OC and CS, are currently classified as riot control agents (RCAs), although OC is not approved for Army use by the Army Surgeon Gen- eral. Empirically and in terms of mechanisms of action, RCA effects are reason- ably well understood, with margins of safety well established. The mechanisms of action of calmatives and malodorants are also generally understood, but no active program to optimize their use for treaty-compliant applications or to im- prove delivery means was identified by the committee. From Acoustics Traditional acoustic methods have not been successful in causing reliable non-lethal effects in any but highly restricted conditions (e.g., when flash bangs are used). This is true despite decades of anecdotal references describing debili- tating effects of certain low frequencies. No program is currently exploring more basic mechanisms for traditional acoustic susceptibilities. Two acoustic technologies might be useful as psychological weapons sys- tems. A technology, which is commercially available, operates by crossing two sonic beams at the location of the receptor to produce an audible voice. These technologies might be used with one another or with other non-lethal weapons technologies in synergistic ways to cause disorientation or psychological effects. From Electrical NLWs The open literature contains little discussion about the biophysical mecha- nisms by which widely used stun gun systems create their effect. Collectively,

40 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY the manufacturers of stun guns have sponsored investigations that provide a basis for improved safety and efficacy. It is estimated that approximately 2,000 volunteers have tested stun guns intended for human use without significant aftereffects. Psychological and Behavioral Effects The use of NLWs is intended to cause a desired change of behavior in the targeted group or individual. It is important to understand and characterize the likely types of behavior caused by the use of an NEW, especially in crowds or with repeated use. Knowing the range of psychological responses to a given NEW can also point to methods for enhancing the effective use of that system. The committee identified little direct effort supporting psychological understand- ing of NLWs. 2.3 JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS DIRECTORATE s it The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate functions as the DOD focal point for NLWs and is the organization through which the Services coordinate and integrate the development of all non-lethal weapons programs.! ~ The Comman- dant of the U.S. Marine Corps serves as the overall executive agent for non-lethal weapons, exercising oversight through an integrated product team that is chaired by a three-star Marine general and has members who are senior leaders from the other Services. When created in 1996, the JNLWD was under great pressure to produce tangible results as quickly as possible. The urgent need for NLWs by troops committed to existing operations drove the early activities of the organization. It engaged the problem of NLWs conservatively and focused on "the low-hanging fruit" that could be picked from relatively mature programs throughout DOD and within law enforcement, government laboratories, and defense industries. The JNLWD deserves praise for its accomplishments to date. Despite lim- ited resources,l2 it has moved since 1997 from starting with a zero-based budget to completing a Joint Mission Area Analysis in 2000 (results discussed in Sec- tions 2.1 and 2.9~. It evaluated all ongoing non-lethal weapons programs, moved many forward in the development process, and terminated those undeserving of 1 1As a result of Joint Service Memorandum of Agreement dated January 21, 1997, the directorate maintains sufficient contact for Service-unique systems specifically developed for strategic applica- tion and provides program insight rather than financial oversight. 12The entire annual budget for the directorate has been between $17 million and $25 million per year and is projected at $25 million to $35 million per year through the future year defense program (FYDP).

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 41 additional funding. Working with the Services, the directorate deployed to the field a number of non-lethal weapons capabilities, including munitions for crowd control, portable barriers for stopping vehicles, pepper spray, shields, and low- kinetic-energy bullets. Capability sets or kits of NLWs and training programs for their use have been developed for Marine and Army units. The JNLWD recognized the shortfalls in understanding the effects of NLWs on humans and established the Human Effects Review Board (HERB) and the Human Effects Center of Excellence (HECOE) at Brooks Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, to focus research in this area. It has engaged in many activi- ties- including modeling and simulation, war games, experiments, and concept exploration programs to investigate the potential of NLWs for applications to operational missions. It has supported a technology investment program to stimu- late new ideas. In addition, it has established information exchange relationships with countries that have had endemic problems of instability and substantial experience using NLWs, such as Great Britain and Israel. Legacy Programs Shortly after its establishment, the JNLWD led a review of all non-lethal weapons programs through a joint forum evaluation processes Following is a list of the programs constituting the legacy from non-lethal weapons programs at the time, with a synopsis of each program's current status: · 40-mm non-lethal crowd dispersal cartridge. Continues in development, with the U.S. Army as lead Service. · Acoustic bioe~ects and acoustic generators. Terminated in 1999 after a detailed technical review, which determined that there was a lack of demon- strated generator capability and of bioeffects. · Modular crowd control munitions. Provide a non-lethal derivative of the Claymore mine. A formal acquisition program was initiated, with the Army as the lead Service. These munitions have been delivered to the field. · Ground-vehicle stopper. Transferred to the Army for additional R&D when an independent technical review flagged issues of device size, variable target effects, and personnel safety. · Vessel stopper. Initial program on use of running gear entanglement system (ROES) started by Naval Undersea Warfare Center in 1994. A general mission needs statement was approved in April 1997, and a specific capstone requirements i3A reviewer of this report noted work in the early 199Os by the Defense Nuclear Agency, the predecessor of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which contributed to the formation of the JNLWD. This and presumably other early work was not briefed to or found by the committee in reviewing the history of the JNLWD. The JNLWD should find and review this earlier work to assess its relevance in light of the evolving security environment.

42 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY document (CRD) followed in August 1999. An assessment by the Fifth Fleet recommended further development of entanglements for small, fast boats. Exhaust stack blockers (ESBs) for large-displacement vessels were also of interest; however, after exploratory testing, these were terminated because of low operational utility. In contrast, the RGES successfully passed an independent technical review, and it continues to be developed by the Naval Surface Weapons Center and the U.S. Coast . Guard with JNLWD support. Another concept being explored is the use of RGES for perimeter ship protection (as discussed in Section 2.4~. · Portable vehicle-arresting barrier. Also called Speed Bump; provides a portable barrier that can be rapidly erected using a pop-up net. It is now in a formal acquisition program, with the Army as the lead Service; units are being delivered to the field. · Vehicle-mounted active denial system. Initially begun by the Air Force Research Laboratory to investigate active denial technologies for physical secu- rity applications using millimeter-wave technology. Even in its prototype stage, VMADS has stimulated considerable operational interest. The program has passed a series of assessments, including independent technical assessment, as- sessment by the Judge Advocate General, bioeffects assessment, and legal and policy reviews. It is being moved ahead to advanced concept development and demonstrations by the Air Force, and the Navy is exploring the concept for force protection applications. · 66-mm vehicle-launched grenade. U.S. Army program to produce a non- lethal grenade capable of being launched from a vehicle. It moved to formal acquisition and is now in production. · Bounding non-lethal munitions. M16A2 non-lethal mine variant, called the Bouncing Betty, terminated because of unacceptable development costs. · Canister-launched area denial system (CLAI:)S). Volcano-type launcher used for rapid deployment of non-lethal mines; terminated due to unacceptable develop- ment and procurement costs. The general concept is still under consideration. · Foam applications. Evolved into two separate programs: slippery foams and rigid foams. The former is in a concept exploration phase, and the latter is in . . . an acqulsltlon program. · Vortex ring gun. Investigated the use of the Mkl9-3 for vortex delivery of non-lethal materials. It was terminated in 1998 because of unpredictable vortices and limits on effective range. · Under-barrel tactical payload system. Pneumatic devices for delivery of various payloads from the M16A2 and M4 carbines. It was terminated because of limited interest by the Services. Technology Investment Program In 1998, the JNLWD established a technology investment program (TIP) with government laboratories, industry, and academia in order to generate new

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 43 technology concepts for NLWs. Projects in this program include studies, labora- tory tests, and field demonstrations. Those with potential are shifted into some appropriate phase of the acquisition process. Among the projects already com- pleted are the following: At, . 6 · Non-lethal electromagnetic purser. A study for using a man-portable non-lethal electromagnetic purser (NEMP) to disable vehicles. · Spider fiber. A technology assessment of spider fiber genetic research. · Taser munitions. A successful test of the ability to deliver high-voltage/ low-current, incapacitating electrical pulses through military clothing. Trans- ferred to a CEP for further investigation. · Overhead liquid dispenser. A successful demonstration of the ability to disperse liquids rapidly over large areas (13-m-diameter circles) up to 175 m away. Transferred to a CEP for further investigation. · Pulsed-energy projectile. A study on the use of a pulsed chemical laser to create a flash-bang effect on target. Recommended for a Pre-Milestone A acqui- sition program. · Combustible mortar. A study on the use of combustible materials to reduce the lethality of the mortar shell body. Recommended for a Pre-Milestone A acquisition program. · Biomaterials survey. A survey and documentation of biomaterials such as those derived from natural sources (e.g., use of high-strength fibers for immo- bilization of personnel or vehicles). · 81-mm non-lethal mortar. A successful development and demonstration of a composite-based mortar capable of delivering non-lethal payloads as far as 1.5 km while keeping the mortar shell itself non-lethal. Recommended for a Pre- Milestone A acquisition program. · Odorous substances. A report on human testing of several malodorants. Transferred to a CEP. · Advanced tactical laser. A feasibility study to determine the effective- ness of ATL in conducting non-lethal missions. Currently proposed for an ad- vanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) principally focused on lethal applications. (See discussion in Section 2.1.) · Non-lethal guided projectile. A study on the feasibility, design, and analysis of long-range delivery of non-lethal payloads. The JNLWD has several technology investment programs that are ongoing or are being initiated. They include the following: · Non-lethal loitering system. An assessment of an autonomous delivery system for non-lethal applications. · Microencapsulation. A demonstration of the ability to encapsulate non- lethal chemical payloads. · Front-end analysis. A series of workshops and analyses culminating in a

44 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY database of potential riot control agents and calmatives, with emphasis on tech- nology advances in the past 10 years. · Thermobaric technology.~4 A feasibility study to determine the useful- ness of thermobaric weapons to conduct non-lethal missions. Veiling glare laser. A study to demonstrate the ability of an ultraviolet laser to create a fluorescence-induced glare on excised human cadaver lenses. Other JNLWD Technology Initiatives In addition to the TIP, the JNLWD initiated other activities to evaluate and stimulate new technologies for non-lethal applications. The directorate estab- lished the Non-Lethal Technology Innovation Center at the University of New Hampshire in response to congressional direction. Over the next 2 years (2001 to 2003), the university will evaluate such areas as rigid foams and antitraction materials; foreign attitudes toward NLWs; and the applicability of nano- technology and microelectromechanical systems (MEMS). The directorate is working through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program with the U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command to explore a multisensory grenade and devices for tagging and tracking. Both initiatives have successfully been moved on for further investigation as part of a CEP for clearing facilities. The JNLWD is leveraging three special technology programs of DOE- those on (1) the variable thrust cartridge, (2) the disruption of voluntary motion, and (3) non-lethal airburst munitions with variable reverse thrust propulsion. The directorate also has a memorandum of understanding with the National Institute of Justice for cooperative non-lethal weapons development. Characterization and Assessment of Human Effects The JNLWD recognized early the importance of characterizing human ef- fects resulting from non-lethal weapons. These effects can include health expects on the weapon user, on human targets, and on humans near the target, as well as the effectiveness of the weapon in creating the intended response from the target. The understanding of health effects, while complex, is critical to the development and subsequent fielding of the weapons. Consequently, the directorate convened experts in different areas to address the need: . Human Elects Process Action Team (HEPATJ. A group of DOD medical research and acquisition experts assembled to review the process of characteriz- i4Thermobarics are explosive-like compounds that do not detonate but evolve their energy with significant thermal release over a relatively long time.

5 THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 45 ing non-lethal weapons human effects and to recommend changes to ensure full characterization of non-lethal weapons effects. The team was disbanded after recommending formation of the Human Effects Review Board and Human Ef- fects Center of Excellence. · Human Effects Review Board (HERB). A board consisting of one repre- sentative from each Service that reviews data on non-lethal weapons human effects specific points in the acquisition process and provides recommendations to the program manager. This board is analogous to the Navy's Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board (WSESRB) · Human Elects Center of Excellence (HECOE). An organization hosted by the Air Force Research Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, to provide exper- tise on human effects to non-lethal weapons developers. . Human Effects Advisory Panel (HEAP). An independent panel of experts formed by Pennsylvania State University to provide advice to the JNLWD on human effects issues. The activities and effectiveness of each of these bodies is discussed further in Section 3.1 as a part of the finding under "Programs for Effects Characterization." The JNLWD has also supported the modeling of the health effects of kinetic- energy weapons; included are an interim total body model, a three-rib model, effectiveness modeling, and advanced kinetic modeling. Non-Lethal Weapons Systems Effectiveness , ~ Beyond establishing effects on targets, the JNLWD must address the broader range of issues associated with establishing military acceptance for NLWs. The military Services' willingness to develop and field non-lethal weapons systems will be determined by the systems' effectiveness in performing military missions. Military commanders will embrace non-lethal weapons systems that help accom- plish missions with fewer casualties, increased speed, higher accuracy, reduced collateral damage, better cooperation from the local population, lower cost, smaller support requirements, or a greater overall probability of success. This statement, however, is deceptive in its simplicity. The "effectiveness" of any weapon system, lethal or non-lethal, has many dimensions. In an era of tight budgets and strained logistics systems, new weapon systems bear a particu- larly heavy burden in establishing their effectiveness. In terms of resources, new systems must demonstrate their effectiveness to compete favorably for develop- ment and procurement dollars. In terms of logistics, commanders must view them as essential deploying with a new weapon system could very well mean leaving an existing system behind. A lack of understanding of effectiveness has the potential of being a "show- stopper." While any weapon may fail to perform as predicted, well-established methods underlie its ultimate fielding and support the expectation of its perfor- mance: those methods include experiments and training to develop and refine the

46 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY concept of operations (CONOPS), tactics, and rules of engagement; logistics and maintenance; countermeasures assessment and development of counter-counter- measures; and so on. Of equal importance is an understanding of U.S. vulner- abilities should NLWs be used against the United States. In its brief existence, the JNLWD has achieved notable success in this con- text. Marine Corps expeditionary forces now routinely train and deploy with non-lethal weapons capability sets. The Army also has plans to procure non- lethal weapons capability sets. Limited budgets and the urgency to field non- lethal weapons systems has understandably led the directorate to focus on field- ing relatively simple weapons thus far: for example, non-lethal ammunition, flash-bang grenades, and riot control agents. Experimentation has been instrumental in gaining understanding and accep- tance of NLWs. The Marine Corps has had an active experimentation program for some time (Section 2.6), and wider awareness of the usefulness of NLWs is being accomplished through joint efforts supported by the JNLWD. For ex- ample, the Joint Forces Laboratory, a part of the Joint Experimentation Director- ate (J-9) of U.S. Joint Forces Command, recently conducted experiments on low- collateral-damage weapons. Many of the weapons used in the experiment, such as slippery foam, were found to be effective in several mixed combatant/non- combatant environments. In another effort to stimulate experimentation, the JNLWD has helped incorporate models of existing non-lethal weapons capability sets into the joint conflict and tactical simulation (JCATS), a defensewide model- ing and simulation program. The models have undergone verification and valida- tion, and JCATS is ready for use as an analytical tool for the non-lethal weapons capability sets. The Army is leading a joint effort to study the capability sets, with particular emphasis on urban terrain. The JNLWD recognizes the value of continuing to fund experimentation. The directorate's budgets indicate that it plans to continue experimentation efforts. The Services have also established a joint program to train users of the deployed non-lethal weapons capability sets. The inter-Service non-lethal, individual weap- ons instructor's course is offered several times a year at the U.S. Army Military Police School, which is located at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The course covers training in equipment use, doctrine, and tactics, and also addresses public affairs, crowd control dynamics, and communication skills. It is structured to "train the trainers." That is, graduates of the course return to their units to train other unit members. For example, Marine Corps expeditionary forces receive training on non- lethal weapons capability sets during their deployments. To support instructors in the field, the school makes course materials available over the Internet. The scope and location of the existing training program for NLWs are appro- priate under current conditions. The deployed non-lethal weapons capability sets contain equipment that is designed for close-in use against individuals and crowds. The practice of training instructors who can then train end users is an economical, effective use of training resources that works well for new but relatively simple weapons. ., .

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 47 As NLWs increase in complexity, however, the challenge of establishing their effectiveness increases even more dramatically. VMADS represents the first NLW with the potential for providing more than tactical, short-range capa- bilities for individual soldiers. Based on a new weapons principle, VMADS requires integration into an existing military vehicle and as an antipersonnel weapon must be understood in terms of its specific effects on the human body. For VMADS and other complex non-lethal weapons systems that could emerge in the future, the need to establish their effectiveness presents a far greater chal- lenge than that for the earlier generation of NLWs. Future Program Plans For all the right reasons, the JNLWD has followed a strategy of nurturing more mature technologies for non-lethal weapons systems. However, it is clearly at a crossroads in its ability to move new capability into the field. On its present course, the directorate will soon be out of well-founded ideas to push toward development for several reasons: limited investments in R&D, the gap in charac- terization of the human effects of NLWs across the board, and the lack of re- sources for developing full systems concepts and for establishing their military effectiveness. . 2.4 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS, FUTURE NAVAL CAPABILITIES, AND DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY S&T In 1998, the Department of the Navy reorganized the naval science and technology portfolio to focus more clearly and to engage users in the develop- ment of nearer-term capabilities through the future naval capabilities (FNC) pro- cess, while at the same time maintaining a balanced investment in less-mature, potentially high-payoff basic research managed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR). To enjoy the commitment of naval science and technology (S&T) funds, a technology must be approved in the FNC process or be deemed important for contributing to the elements of naval basic research (see Box 2.1~. NLWs appear explicitly in only a single enabling capability, "ability to win or avoid engage- ments by weapons/platforms, asymmetric threats, and non-lethal weapons/threats encountered in the littorals," within 1 of the 12 FNCs, Platform Protection. The list of supporting technologies within that enabling capability does not include an explicit non-lethal weapons program, although a few could contribute to some of the non-lethal weapons technologies recommended later in this report.~5 In addi- tion, there is no mention of NLWs in the enabling capability "defeat expedition- ary/urban warfare targets wit) naval fires" under the Time Critical Strike FNC, in spite of the recommendations in the Sea Strike concept quoted in Chapter 1 and i5Office of Naval Research. 2001. Future Naval Capabilities and Required Enabling Capabilities, Arlington, Va., November 3. Available online at ~https://www.onr.navy.mil/sci_tech/futurenaval.htm>.

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THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 49 Marine Corps stated priority needs. Very little investment in non-lethal-weap- ons-specific areas appears in the current basic research portfolio. The committee also received briefings on Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) programs address- ing directed-energy, advanced electronics, and chemical antimateriel techniques that hold promise for application to NLWs to meet naval needs. 2.5 CURRENT NAVY PROGRAMS RELEVANT TO DEVELOPMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY The Navy has had less involvement with NLWs than the other Services have. Standard procedures such as radio warnings, flashing lights, and signal flags or, if necessary, the traditional "shot across the bow" have served as a warning to any potential adversary and have been viewed historically as effec- tive "non-lethal actions" where other vessels are involved. Broader interest in NLWs is emerging, however. They could provide important capabilities in force protection (as discussed in Section 1.2 and Appendix A), strike operations in the littoral environment, and sanctions enforcement. The largest current effort to improve force protection within the Navy is in strengthening and modi- fying existing systems, tactics, and training to resolve ambiguous situations. Some NLWs unique to the Navy are under consideration and are being tested. Means of delivering both sensors and NLWs using modified surface craft are being pursued. The Navy, unlike the other Services, only recently organized an office in OPNAV N757, and assigned one person exclusive responsibility for following developments in NLWs. In response to the clearly manifested threat of terrorism involving small boats, swimmers, and small aircraft, the antiterrorism/force protection task force chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) was created by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) in October 2000; follow-on efforts to the work of the task force are expected to be carried out by an AT/FP council. The task force investigated many approaches to assessing a potential threat, such as a surface craft or an underwater attack on a vessel in port, and examined means of countering these threats. Foremost is a heightening of situational awareness through increased alert levels depending on world and regional conditions, or awareness of the likelihood of encounters with unknown watercraft, air vehicles, or underwater threats, and considering host nation port security capabilities. Current operations involve standard procedures for gaining attention and warning an oncoming craft to stay away or to maintain distance. New procedures and systems to strengthen the security of vessels, particularly those at anchor or in port, have been recommended. New tactics and training under development include non-lethal weapons procedures. The availability and use of standard issue items for this purpose are being emphasized. New non-lethal weapons systems are also under consideration. 6

50 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETTIAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY . ; - Table 2.2 presents programs or systems currently in place or under active consideration by the Navy for functions involving non-lethal weapons operations. Security systems are currently in place for base security. Upgrading the effectiveness of these systems is a natural place to improve security levels. Sys- tems such as badge control (electronic badge/access control system (EBACS)), monitoring of remote facilities by closed-circuit television, guard emplacements, secure communications, and electronic security systems are standard at most military installations. These materials and systems are relatively mature and inexpensive. Additional research will probably yield a relatively small improve- ment in performance, but improvements in sensors and data fusion should allow a reduction in manpower with a concomitant enhancement of sensing and warn- ing capabilities. The AT/FP task force has made recommendations for naval forces to pursue all of the steps in Table 2.2 as appropriate. In addition to the systems and methods presented in Table 2.2, programs to test and improve the understanding of non-lethal methods or weapons are out- lined in Table 2.3. These programs have a more limited commitment from the Navy. Activities outlined in Table 2.2 fall principally into the categories of detec- tion and command and control. Funding for these programs and systems is expected to come through current operational funds. Table 2.3 lists activities involving development and testing of concepts associated with non-lethal ac- tions. Plans to continue the programs in Table 2.3 represent future programs associated with non-lethal weapons concepts and systems. Table 2.4 indicates some of the systems that have been proposed but that are not currently funded or under investigation. Not discussed for classification reasons, but showing prom- ise, are HPM concepts applied to stopping small craft. 2.6 CURRENT MARINE CORPS PROGRAMS AND EXPERIENCE RELEVANT TO DEVELOPMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY Of all the Services, the U.S. Marine Corps has the most development and operational experience with NLWs. In addition to being the executive agent for non-lethal weapons for DOD, the Marine Corps has internal re- sponsibility for fielding those systems that accomplish the goals of expedi- tionary warfare. It has been involved in military operations, such as Restore Hope (1992-1993) and United Shield (1995) in Somalia and Uphold Democ- racy (1994-1995) in Haiti, in which NLWs were used. Recognizing the high probability of its involvement in similar operations in the future, the Marine Corps has conducted numerous experiments in the use of NLWs for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and for crowd control. Before the JNLWD was formed, the Marines began a research, development, and acqui- sition process that included technology transferred from the Army, commer-

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THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 53 cially available off-the-shelf items, and some systems from the national labo- ratories. After the JNLWD was formed, most of the non-lethal weapons R&D was transferred to sponsorship by the JNLWD, with the Marines funded to pursue R&D appropriate to Marine Corps interests and capabilities. These activities are delineated in Tables 2.5 (experiments) and 2.6 (R&D pro- grams) and expanded upon below. Lessons Learned in Somalia ; ., ; - The experience of the U.S. Marine Corps in Somalia helped shape its re- quirements for NLWs. The Marines entered Somalia with the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division in 1993; the mission was to distribute food to the large num- bers of civilians who were caught among the warlords competing for power by controlling food supplies and starving the populace. The need to control crowds was anticipated, but the only NLWs available were batons and OC (pepper) spray. Both had marginal effect. As the situation deteriorated and violence escalated, the military came to rely more regularly on lethal force. After a compromised operation to capture a warlord in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, in which a number of Rangers and Delta Force members were killed by the civilian population, U.S. policy toward Somalia changed. The U.S. troop engagement ended with the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the transfer of the mission to other UN forces. In 1995, with scant progress made, the UN decided to withdraw all military elements from Somalia. UN command recognized that the extraction of forces could become increasingly dangerous as fewer and fewer troops remained. The United States agreed to deploy a covering force that would assist in the safe evacuation of the UN forces. The mission was assigned to the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable. The operation was named United Shield. Under the command of LtGen Anthony Zinni, USMC, the unit trained and planned for the operation. For the first time, the United States announced the incorporation of non-lethal weapons systems into a fielded mission package. The announcement received high-level visibility, including television news reports describing the systems and how they might be employed. NLWs taken on United Shield were riot control agents, low-kinetic-energy rounds, caltrops, the Saber 203 dazzler, the battlefield optical surveillance system (BOSS), and sticky foam. The availability of these NLWs proved to be an effective deterrence. The BOSS, used in a mode to illuminate areas at night, dissuaded armed people from approaching. Sticky foam was employed as a barrier technology. Many Somalis followed the withdrawing troops, but the NLWs were sufficient to provide a safe distance between the troops and those quickly filling the voids. The mission was successful in that the UN forces completed their withdrawal without a shot being fired.

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THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 57 As a result of that experience, the Marine Corps led the effort to develop non-lethal weapons capability sets that could provide a significant non-lethal force tool kit for Marine expeditionary forces. These kits have evolved over the past several years to include a variety of kinetic-energy munitions, personnel protective equipment, riot control agents, and vehicle barriers (caltrops and the portable vehicle arresting system). More than 30 of these capability sets are planned for deployment with the U.S. Marine Corps and Army forces. Military Operations in Urban Terrain A. An important issue in conducting military operations in urban terrain is that of countering militia while minimizing injury or death to the non-combatant population that may be present. A number of situations have occurred in recent years in which capabilities to operate in urban areas were operationally tested. The experiences of the Russian Army in Grozny, Chechnya, demonstrated the difficulties that can be encountered when fighting a lesser-equipped force in the complex terrain of urban environments. That situation was comparable to the lessons learned by the Marines assigned the mission to recapture the Citadel in the ancient city of Hue, Vietnam, after the 1968 Tet Offensive by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces. In that battle, under restrictive rules of engagement imposed because of the cultural value of the area, the Marine battalion advanced only three city blocks in 10 days of fighting, while suffering higher than 50 percent casualties. The employment of an NEW finally broke the stalemate. A dispersion of large amounts of CS (tear gas) was used, and the Marines were able to advance through the remainder of the city nearly unopposed. More recent situations in which U.S. forces engaged adver- saries in cities include operations in Mogadishu, Somalia; Port-au-Prince, Haiti; and Pristina, Kosovo. The conduct of MOUT has been and will likely be complicated by restric- tions placed on the weapons systems that may be used. Clearing facilities should not destroy buildings, to avoid the problems of reconstruction. Seizing and controlling important infrastructure without destruction of facilities such as com- munications and municipal utilities (water, power, and so on) will also be impor- tant. Moreover, reducing a city to rubble may be counterproductive, as it pro- vides the adversary with many fortified positions from which to fight. In the MOUT challenge the Marines understand that they face many difficult problems, such as (1) defending against militia or insurgents hiding in structures, while not harming innocent residents; (2) clearing buildings of adversary fighting forces while minimizing injury to civilians; and (3) controlling crowds in which it may be necessary to separate militia from civilians used as shields, to stop or dissuade people from rioting, especially in humanitarian relief actions, to disengage from frightened civilians under protection who do not want the force to leave, and/or to circumvent or remove peaceful demonstrators. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has conducted a series of experi-

58 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY meets with NLWs and surrogate systems since 1998 to improve Marines' pre- paredness to deal with MOUT situations and, in particular, to assess the added capabilities that NLWs may afford. Some highlights of these experiments (also summarized in Tables 2.5 and 2.6) are as follows: · In 1998 the MCWL conducted tests of perceptions of NLWs. They also undertook a "Black Hawk Down" exercise based on the events in Mogadishu when two helicopters crashed in what became hostile territory in October 1993; this time the exercise was done with non-lethal weapons options. · In 1999 the Emerald Express experiment tested the use of light-generating weapons, including the BOSS and smaller dazzlers. Laser dazzlers were found to be effective only in some situations. In 2000, the OPTION device for delivery of OC (pepper spray) was explored with results suggesting a useful means of introducing this capability with little inconvenience or cost. . . With assistance from the Potomac Institute, MCWL conducted Project Lincolnia to hypothetically test the use of a directed-energy barrier system in MOUT operations. (At the time of this experiment, the VMADS system was still classified. The test coordinators postulated a system that had similar capabilities without revealing the technical aspects of the millimeter-wave system.) The results of these experiments indicated that systems tested had applicability in the scenarios explored. With VMADS in place, the number of casualties was signifi- cantly reduced, while the ability to control crowds was enhanced. An earlier experiment indicated that the presence of a non-lethal directed-energy system must be well protected to be effective, and that it may even require mobility while being used. The general conclusion was that significant operational potential exists for use of directed-energy systems. · War-gaming operations with the United Kingdom have shown the effec- tiveness of NLWs in MOUT, including their employment for disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, and countermateriel applications. These attempts to quantify the effectiveness of NLWs have served to gener- ate enthusiasm for their value among participants. . - Embassy and Base Protection Terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities around the world have increased in recent years and have been effective enough to change policy. In 1983, the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, was destroyed by a truck bomb. More recent were the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and in 1998 the near-simultaneous attacks on U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. All of these attacks resulted in extensive casualties. U.S. embassies in these and many other areas of the world are calling on U.S.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS ., 59 Marine Corps security forces to augment local security in high-threat environ- ments and to respond to crisis situations. In addition to embassy targets, U.S. military personnel themselves have become visible targets for terrorist attacks in many countries. Protection of base facilities and personnel has become a critical function for military security units as well. In most situations, the nature of the location, often surrounded by host nation populace, dictates strict rules of en- gagement regarding use of force. NLWs are viewed by the Marine Corps as providing options that may en- hance force protection at such sensitive sites. While there may be a need to obtain host country agreement for use of some systems, the following weapons could be available and are being considered for inclusion in base protection packages: · Dazzling light systems; · Low-kinetic-impact munitions, such as beanbag rounds (using a 12-gauge shotgun), polyurethane baton rounds, 40-mm crowd dispersal rounds, modular crowd control munitions (MCCMs); · Vehicle/vessel-stopping systems, such as the portable vehicle arresting barrier and the running gear entanglement systems; Riot control agents; Flash-bang distraction devices; Taser weapons; Foam weapons, such as rigid foams, aqueous foams, and slippery materials; Caltrops; Water cannons; and Obscurants. 2.7 OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE Besides the experiences in Somalia and Vietnam described in the previous section, others provide insights into the use of NLWs. United Kingdom British Army troops arriving in Northern Ireland in August 1969 were poorly prepared to deal with riots and street battles, being equipped only with wooden batons and small shields. After that encounter, an armory of riot and crowd control capabilities was quickly built up: it included tear gas, various impact weapons such as rubber and plastic bullets, and water cannons. Currently, the British Military and the Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland use a 37-mm multishot rifle-barrel launcher that fires spin-stabilized, "less-lethal" pro- jectiles. A cylindrical projectile that is very accurate has just been introduced.

~- 60 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ~D TECHNOLOGY Serious injuries with less-lethal projectiles have occurred but are uncommon. Several hundred such injuries have been reported in Northern Ireland since 1970 out of approximately 110,000 rounds fired. Deaths have been rare: 17 in North- ern Ireland and only 6 are documented in North America since 1970. Of greater note, no deaths have occurred since 1994, when new baton rounds and launchers were introduced. The British have also used high-intensity sound as a means of riot control in Northern Ireland, but it has met with mixed results and concerns about permanent injury. Laser-dazzle weapons are in service on British Royal Navy ships to harass enemy aircraft pilots. Vietnam In Vietnam, U.S. forces used two classes of NLWs most extensively- herbicides and CS gas. Herbicides do; The chemical 245T was originally used by the British Army in the late 1940s and early 1950s in Malaya against communist insurgents. The objectives were to deny the enemy cover and to destroy suspected guerilla food plantations. In Vietnam, U.S. forces adopted this approach as one of their strategies against the Vietcong, but on a broader scale. In November 1961, Operation Ranch Hand was launched, using U.S. Air Force transport planes specially converted for aerial herbicide spraying and capable of carrying 1,000 gallons per mission. The objec- tives, similar to those of the British in Malaya, were to deny cover and food. Huge tracts of jungle were sprayed between 1961 and May 1971, when the operation ended. It has been estimated that 64 million liters of herbicide were dispensed on 1.9 million hectares of forest, and 8 million liters were sprayed on 0.3 million hectares of agricultural land. In all, six different chemicals were used: designated Agents Green, Pink, Purple, White, Blue, and Orange. Agent Orange, which contained small amounts of highly toxic dioxin, is the most notorious. It is estimated that by the end of the campaign, almost 240 pounds (lb) of dioxin had been deposited over Vietnam; comparatively, a few ounces dispersed over New York City would create a seri- ous health hazard with the potential for thousands of deaths. CS (Tear Gas) In Vietnam, U.S. forces deployed CS (as well as diphenylamine arsenic chloride (CM) and chloroacetophenone (CN)) for warfighting purposes. CS was introduced into operations in Vietnam to establish barriers and to deny access to the enemy; to drive enemy combatants from deep caves, tunnels, and bunkers

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 61 when the Vietcong had infiltrated civilian areas; and to support hostage rescue. In many cases, the Vietcong developed simple countermeasures or did not seem to be seriously affected by the CS. DOD policy for NLWs allows their use in conjunction with lethal systems in order to enhance the latter's effectiveness and efficiency. U.S. use of CS in Vietnam illustrates the point. Large amounts of CS were used not to achieve casualty reductions (a more common use in riot control), but to get the enemy out of places of concealment for non-lethal engagement. In one instance, CS was dispensed from a helicopter, forcing the Vietcong out of a bunker; U.S. Air Force bombers then saturated the area with high explosives and cluster bombs, and ground troops followed to deal with remaining survivors. Such examples, however, can introduce a risk into the acceptance of NLWs for missions other than offensive warfighting- such as peacekeeping for force protection in for- eign ports. Bosnia/Kosovo When U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) became engaged in Bosnia, com- manders asked for an emergency procurement of non-lethal weapons commer- cial off-the-shelf (COTS) assets. They acquired many of the same capabilities as those in police departments, developed a theater training strategy (the first in the Army), and secured training from the Marine Detachment at the U.S. Army Military Police School. USAREUR trained approximately 60 soldiers and con- ducted leader orientations. NLWs were available in Bosnia for more than 2 years but did not have to be used. When the United States then became engaged in Kosovo, USAREUR again requested non-lethal weapons assets. The Army had begun initial development of non-lethal weapons capability sets, which USAREUR received. This time they were put to use. In April 2000, Task Force (TF) Falcon received a report of contraband weap- ons in the small village of Sevce, Kosovo. Responding to the report, a detach- ment of TF Falcon discovered and seized both the weapons and the alleged violator. As the detachment was leaving the scene, a crowd quickly formed and blocked the exit route. TF Falcon took immediate action and sent reinforcements armed with NLWs. The situation deteriorated despite negotiation attempts, and the team on the ground started being bombarded with rocks and large sticks. Several soldiers were injured, none seriously. The on-site commander decided that use of NLWs was appropriate, since the crowd included women and chil- dren, some being used as shields. NLWs immediately stripped away the shield, exposing the true agitators, who were also "attacked" with NLWs. The situation was brought to an end. No more injuries were sustained by U.S. soldiers, the crowd dissipated, and U.S. forces returned safely to their base camps. The best testimony to the use of NLWs came from the on-site commander, who stated, "The ability to use non-lethal weapons saved hundreds (possibly more) of lives

62 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY and prevented me from possibly being involved in the Boston massacre of 2000.-16 In February 2001, TF Falcon once again faced a tense situation. Soldiers from the task force encountered an illegal roadblock. As they tried to have the obstacle removed, a crowd quickly formed and the soldiers were confronted with a rock-throwing mob. The crowd wedged itself between the soldiers in the main force and their vehicles and blocked any movement. As the situation escalated, the soldiers decided to use NLWs. A first volley scattered the crowd, allowing the soldiers to move toward their vehicles. When it looked as if the crowd would reform, NLWs were employed again, dissipating the crowd and restoring order. In the incidents just described, both task forces had a full complement of conventional force at their disposal, but they chose to use NLWs instead and successfully accomplished their missions. While not a substitute for lethal force, the option provided an alternative before lethal force might have been employed. USAREUR's experience has been fed back to U.S. Army planners for purpose of improving equipment and tactics. Haiti ~ . f With the departure of Colonel Cedras in 1994, the U.S. invasion force con- verted to a peace support operation called Uphold Democracy. Some troops were provided with NLWs including OC (pepper spray), plastic baton rounds, and beanbag rounds for shotguns. Training for U.S. troops was provided in Haiti. A major obstacle in using NLWs was encountered because of an administrative blunder. Special permission for use of the particular NLWs deployed was re- quired, but it was granted only to the units initially involved in the operation. When units were rotated, the incoming forces found that they could not receive the transfer of NLWs from the departing unit, because authorization for use had not been extended to unit transfers. Panama/Cuba A large number of Haitian refugees were detained at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1994. The Haitians became disenchanted with their living conditions and began to riot in December 1994, threatening the guards. Troublemakers were identified and moved to more secure sites in Panama, where the rioting continued. A limited number of NLWs loudspeakers, clubs, and shields- were available. The use of these systems required that the troops be in close proximity to the rioters, and several rioters were injured. .' ALEC James Brown, USA, commander of the air assault and the ground forces involved in fighting the Sevce, Kosovo, riot, personal communication, April 11, 2001.

~ - THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS Garden Plot (Riots in the United States During the Vietnam War) 63 Because of the riots over opposition to U.S. participation in the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, the military conducted large-scale training of troops in riot control procedures. In general, the troops relied on a show of force and CS to disperse crowds. They retained their standard rifles and were at times armed with live ammunition. While this show of force was effective under some circum- stances, the times when it failed, such as in the fatal shootings at Kent State University, led to a national crisis. The weapons available were inadequate to carry out a mission that the military had reluctantly assumed. 2.8 PROGRAMS IN OTHER SERVICES AND AGENCIES U.S. Army Non-Lethal Weapons Programs The Army Research Laboratory, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, conducted a program in NLWs from 1991 to 1995. This program later integrated into the JNLWD included development efforts in the Bouncing Betty, a 60-mm ve- hicle-launched non-lethal weapons grenade, and the canister-launched area de- nial system, as described in Section 2.1. During the program, the Army supplied the Marine Corps with NLWs for Somalia and also fielded NLWs for the South- east Asia Support Organization's (SASO's) peacekeeping operations. The Army continues to develop Army-unique NLWs at a modest level. The focus is on developing extended-range NLWs, improving the certainty of results, and developing enhanced effects from these non-lethal weapons. Current activi- ties are undertaken as lead service for the JNLWD and include the development of a 20-mm NLW round for the objective individual combat weapon (OICW). This round is designed to provide an airburst, dispensing liquid aerosols or pow- ders of calmatives, lacrimators, or malodorants; antitraction chemicals; and/or markers to counter personnel or clear facilities. The range of this munition is 5 to 1,000 m. In addition, the Army is developing a frangible 81-mm NLW mortar round with a range of 200 to 2,000 m. Also under investigation is the use of the high-capacity artillery projectile (HICAP) fired round to carry NLWs to a target. The HICAP has a fiber composite case. Its volume is much larger and collateral effects minimal compared with those of a conventional artillery shell. Additional efforts include concepts for dispensing "nanoparticles" to create engine combus- tion disturbances; an explosively driven high-power microwave generator; and lasers (for electric stun). A malodorant study and methods for dispensing liquid chemicals overhead have received joint program TIP support. Another activity involves development of an aversive audible acoustic system to focus an annoy- ing acoustic wave at hostile personnel. A program to develop a standoff RF engine-stopping system was terminated. The Army also conducted R&D on mechanical personnel-control systems, such as automatically launched nets. A significant program was conducted at 5

64 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY Edgewood Arsenal, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, on a spectrum of chemical systems for antimateriel and antipersonnel NLWs, such as calmatives, lacrimators, and malodorants. Specific details remain classified. The program, after many years of Army R&D investment and the identification of promising technologies, was concluded with adoption of the Chemical Weapons Conven- tion in the early 1990s. U.S. Air Force Non-Lethal Weapons Programs Air Force missions that might utilize NLWs include humanitarian relief, non-combatant evacuation, airborne defense, and peacekeeping similar to mis- sions of the Army and the Marine Corps. In addition, the Air Force has the responsibility of maintaining the no-fly zone in Southeast Asia. The principal Air Force non-lethal weapons programs are in human effects at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, and in directed energy, through the Directed Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) at Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. In fact, the Air Force, under AFRL and JNLWD funding, has developed the leading capabilities among the Services in both non-lethal weapons effects testing and understanding and in directed-energy source development and system susceptibilities. A few examples of Air Force NEW R&D programs are Saber, HALT, and VMADS (discussed in Section 2.1~. The U.S. Coast Guard The U.S. Coast Guard, having both military and law enforcement responsi- bilities, is a fundamental component of the national military strategy. During peacetime, the 38,000-member active duty force operates under the Department of Transportation. Missions include maritime interdiction, security operations, counternarcotics operations, humanitarian assistance, migrant interdictions, and fisheries' enforcement. During wartime, as one of the Armed Services of the United States, the Coast Guard serves as part of the U.S. Navy, supporting a full spectrum of conflict in operations related to ports, coastlines, and other shallow waters. In exercising its daily law enforcement responsibilities, such as drug and migrant interdictions, the Coast Guard can and does use U.S. Navy resources and vessels. The Coast Guard currently uses NLWs in limited circumstances, but it is expanding the complement of weapons to support its maritime law enforcement mission.~7 Most Coast Guard operational scenarios are tactical, with small units operating in close range and in a shipboard environment. The Coast Guard needs ]7Jacobs, CAPT Brad, USCG, "U.S. Coast Guard Naval Studies Board Briefing," briefing to the committee on March 7, 2001, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters Support Command, Washington, D.C.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETlIAL WEAPONS 65 fixed or man-portable weapons to control non-hostile individuals or groups that are in the water within 30 m and hostile individuals or crowds within 100 m from their vessels, as well as weapons to nullify hostage situations. The Coast Guard also needs to be able to stop vessels when operating from its own cutters, helicop- ters, and fixed-wing aircraft. It must be able to intercept boats of various speeds and sizes within 100 m without capsizing them and risking serious injury to crew and passengers. The Coast Guard has proceeded on an evolutionary, but aggressive, path with NLWs, emphasizing careful development of operational concepts and sub- sequently deploying weapons to a limited extent for operational evaluation. Some dramatic successes resulted when the Coast Guard expanded its current suite of NLWs. It began Operation New Frontier in response to drug runners using go-fast speedboats equipped with counterintelligence radars and operating at night. l9 The initiative employed armed helicopters, high-speed boats (ver- sions of rubber hull inflatable boats), and a suite of NLWs that included sting ball grenades with flash bangs and rubber pellets, OC (pepper spray), and 40- mm foam batons fired from an M203 grenade launcher. It also tried an entangle- ment net deployed from the helicopter, a scenario that was minimally successful because deployment was difficult. In March 2000, the Coast Guard concluded Operation New Frontier and declared it a success. In contrast to its past record of limited apprehension of the go-fasts, the Coast Guard seized all six boats and their crews. The Coast Guard is enhancing its non-lethal weapons munitions and systems in coordination with the JNLWD. Today its M4/M203 provides both lethal and non-lethal capability in the same weapon and can fire a 40-mm foam baton as well as a sting ball round. While foam is both accurate and effective, the sting ball is adversely affected by the winds at sea. Therefore, a fin-stabilized round for a 12-gauge shotgun is being developed. Both copper slugs and ferret rounds have proven accurate. Riot control gear and large-capacity OC dispensers are promising for migrant interdictions, while individual OC dispensers are useful in one-to-one, close-range engagements. A version of the running gear entangle- ment system of interest to the Navy uses nets to entangle the propellers of high- speed, small vessels. It requires some adaptation to increase its effectiveness, since launching the nets manually is difficult. A surface-deployed compressed air launcher and an air-deployed canister system are being considered. A Coast Guard organizational initiative called Project Erickson will establish 18Thompson, Phillip. 2000. "A War Every Day: The Coast Guard's New Frontier in the War on Drugs," Seapower Magazine, Volume 44, No. 8, August, pp. 41-44. Available online at <www.navyleague.org/seapower/August 2000/thompson.htm>. 19Burgess, Richard R. 1999. "USCG to Go-Fasts: Not So Fast! Coast Guard Scores Aerial Hits Against Drug Runners," Seapower Magazine, Volume 42, No. 11, November, p. 52. Available online at cwww.navyleague.org/seapower/uscg_to_go.htm>.

~ - 66 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY a Non-Lethal Weapons Center of Excellence (NLW COE) at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, along with a Fast Boat Center of Excellence.20 These COEs will be co-located with the U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Unit Training Detachment. The NLW COE will provide a focal point for the R&D of NLWs and serve as a testing ground for Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C., and the Re- search and Development Center, Groton, Connecticut. Its primary function will be to identify, evaluate, and mature tactics, techniques, and procedures for all non-lethal weapons capabilities and to train personnel in their use. The NLW COE is conducting testing and evaluation of both the 12-gauge munitions and RGES at Camp Lejeune. The NLW COE also plans to strengthen relationships with the JNLWD, to maximize opportunities offered by non-lethal weapons developments managed by the directorate and other Services and governmental organizations. When new capabilities are required and do not exist within its own Service assets, the Coast Guard looks to the JNLWD, civilian law enforcement agencies, and even international sources to meet the requirement. In turn, the Coast Guard has frequently provided resources and information to the JNLWD. It has supplied substantial information about its operational experience with non-lethal muni- tions2l and has led several prototype evaluations. The Coast Guard has also provided detailed maritime scenarios that are relevant to the use of NLWs by naval forces and has supported the directorate's efforts to model and simulate non-lethal weapons capabilities. Today, Coast Guard units already equipped with NLWs include helicopter interdiction squadrons, over-the-horizon rubber hull inflatable boats, deployable pursuit boats, guardian patrol craft, and fast-rope teams.22 The intent is to move to year-round full operational capability with NLWs, commensurate with the results of their development and operational evaluations, and to provide appropri- ate non-lethal tools to all platforms, cutters, small boats, helicopters, port security units, and fixed-wing aircraft. While emphasis has been on the use of NLWs for drug interdiction, the Coast Guard anticipates a continuum of applications across a spectrum of missions. NLWs in Law Enforcement Non-lethal weapons technologies and tactics are an integral part of civilian law enforcement. Police are trained to employ a continuum of force, and in the vast majority of police arrests, firearms are not used. Many use-of-force situa- 20Stone, Sgt Arthur, USCG. 2001. "Coast Guard Unit Trains for New Role," The Globe, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, N.C., June 14; available online at <www.lejeune.usmc.mil/ 06140 1 coast.html>. 21Several of these munitions form part of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps non-lethal weapons capability sets. 22These teams use a vertical insertion technique of fast-roping to board vessels in adverse weather.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 67 lions encountered by police are sudden and in close contact with suspects, requir- ing immediate, instinctive response. Usually such a situation involves suspect arrest and requires hands-on physical restraint. Other instances may involve standoff situations with the time and opportunity to introduce NLWs. Most non- lethal use of force by the police involves weaponless tactics, such as grabbing and control holds. The use of force during pursuits is a significant issue, with ap- proximately one-quarter of all police vehicle pursuits resulting in collisions; spiked strips appear to be the most effective non-lethal weapons technology readily available.23 Correctional institutions have similar requirements for the use of non-lethal weapons. In the majority of cases, force is used in prisons and jails where inmates must be removed against their will from their cells. These extractions often result in injury to the inmate and sometimes to the officers. There are more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States with a potential need for NLWs. Many of these are small police or sheriff's departments with very limited procurement and training budgets. None of these agencies has R&D funding, although a number of departments have evaluated commercial NLWs for use.24 25 The central agency supporting R&D of NLWs for law enforcement is the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). Law Enforcement Experience i .¢ Police use of force in the United States occurs infrequently. Each year approximately 1 percent of those persons having direct contact with the police have force threatened or used against them. As pointed out in a 1999 NIJ report, a 1996 study of 7,5 12 arrests found that police use of force occurred in fewer than 20 percent of arrests and 80 percent of these instances involved weaponless tactics.26 Police use of firearms occurred in only 0.2 percent of all arrests. Between these extremes, however, police are increasingly using other NLWs to provide force continuum options. Suspects under the influence of alcohol or drugs are more prone to violence during arrests. OC and lasers have been effec- tive in subduing these individuals.2728 NLWs also have been successfully 23Bayless, Kenneth, and Robert Osborne. 1998. "Pursuit Management Task Force Report," Aerospace Corporation, September. 24Kimerer, Clark, et al. 2000. "A Less Lethal Options Program for Seattle Police Department: A Report with Recommendations," Force Options Research Group, September. 25Meyer, Sgt. Greg. 1992. "Non-Lethal Weapons vs. Conventional Police Tactics: Assessing Injuries and Liabilities," The Police Chief, August. 26National Institute of Justice and Bureau of Justice. 1999. Executive Summary and Chapter 4, "Measuring the Amount of Force Used By and Against the Policy in Six Jurisdictions," Use of Force By Police: Overview of National and Local Data, Research Report No. NCJ176330, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., October, pp. vii, 25-44. 27Meyer, Sgt. Greg. 1992. "Non-Lethal Weapons vs. Conventional Police Tactics: Assessing Injuries and Liabilities," The Police Chief, August. 28Bubay, David. 1995. "Oleoresin Capsicum and Pepper Sprays," Law and Order, April.

68 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ! .¢ employed in hostage situations, suicide attempts, and other situations in which suspects are threatening force or actions not involving firearms. Riot control with NLWs remains an important police function, as evidenced in the Los Angeles, California, riots in 1992 and more recently in Seattle, Washington, during World Trade Organization meetings. In the NIJ study referred to above, use of chemical agents (primarily OC) was involved in 1.2 percent of arrests and impact weapons (baton or flashlight) in 0.7 percent. Electrical stun devices were not specifically cited; however, indi- vidual police departments have had good success with these devices.29 Because of its high reported effectiveness, ranging from 85 to 95 percent, OC may be the NLWs of choice in law enforcement today.30 Vehicle pursuit by police is one important non-lethal application in need of improved technology and tactics. For the period from 1990 to 1994, 331 persons on average were killed annually in police pursuits, and there were significantly more injures and property damage. Approximately 20 percent of pursuit fatalities are pedestrians or persons in other vehicles. These statistics have led some departments to enact a no-pursuit policy or to restrict pursuits. Nearly 50 percent of pursuits end in less than 2 minutes, but approximately 50 percent of collisions occur in these short-duration pursuits. This implies that to be most effective, vehicle barriers or disablement devices must be available and deployed early in a pursuit. Current technology used by more than 90 percent of law enforcement agencies is pre-emplaced barriers or tire deflation systems. However, boxing, barricading, and ramming are also used by many agencies. Existing options for vehicle-disable- ment weapons must be deployed from police vehicles or helicopters, which is prob- lematic because most police vehicles are manned by a single officer. Technologies that do not affect pursuit vehicles are desirable. Advanced vehicle-disablement technologies of interest to police include advanced mechanical bakers, chemical engine disablement, and electrical disablement. Commercial firms and government laboratories have developed a number of mechanical and electrical direct-injection devices.3~ Disablement devices that require pre-emplacement beyond the tire defla- tion devices currently available are of limited utility. National Institute of Justice Program The National Institute of Justice, which is the R&D arm of the Department of Justice, has three major areas of responsibility: (1) behavioral research, (2) physi- cal sciences research, and (3) dissemination of information to law enforcement 29Meyer, Sgt. Greg. 1992. "Non-Lethal Weapons vs. Conventional Police Tactics: Assessing Injuries and Liabilities," The Police Chief, August. 30 Bubay, David. 1995. "Oleoresin Capsicum and Pepper Sprays," Law and Order, April. 3lNational Institute of Justice. 1996. "High-Speed Pursuit: New Technologies Around the Cor- ner," National Law Enforcement and Corrections Center, October.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 69 and corrections institutions. The development of non-lethal incapacitation tech- nology is one of 11 research priorities in the physical sciences program. Recent developments have included a sticky shocker, a green laser dazzler, modifica- tions to a ring airfoil projectile developed by the military, a capture net fired from a 37-mm launcher, and an OC projectile that can penetrate window glass before dispensing pepper spray. Past research has investigated sticky foam and aqueous foam materials applications,32 33 direct-injection devices for disabling vehicles, and the safe use of OC. The total research budget for non-lethal weapons devel- opment is modest, and the NIJ program has tended toward leveraging past R&D or modifying existing weapons to improve and extend effectiveness. The NIJ also participates in several joint programs investigating non-lethal weapons technologies. The NIJ maintains a memorandum of understanding with DOD and the JNLWD to cooperate in non-lethal weapons technology develop- ment and evaluation. The NIJ also participates with the interagency technical support working group (TSWG) in sponsoring development of a range of physi- cal security and infrastructure-protection technologies. A notable non-lethal weapons program recently supported by the NIJ and the TSWG was the sticky shocker, developed by Jaycor.34 2.9 MAJOR STUDIES OR CONFERENCES SINCE 1996 Papers, conference proceedings, and studies of NLWs have continued un- abated since the JNLWD was created. A few of these are highlighted below in chronological order. Council on Foreign Relations The creation of the JNLWD has been viewed by some as a direct result of the Council on Foreign Relations study in 1995, described in Section 1.2.35 In 1998, the CFR conducted a second study of NLWs aimed at a review of what had transpired since an official policy was written and formally adopted and the JNLWD was formed. The principal findings of the study and subsequent actions were as follows: 32Goolsby, T.D. 1994. "Sticky Foam Restraining Effectiveness Human Subject Tests," final report for proposal 96920617, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., July 22. 33Goolsby, T.D. 1996. "Aqueous Foam Physical Characteristics Testing in Mock Prison Cell," final report for National Institute of Justice project 94-IJ-R-025, Sandia National Laboratories, Albu- querque, N.M. January 19. 34A reviewer of this report suggested a taser that includes a substantial round with a soft front end and a couple of darts to shoot into the clothing and convey an electrical shock. The round could contain a capacitor charged before the round is fired. 35Weiner, Malcolm H. 1995. Report of an Independent Task Force on Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications, Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

70 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY · The report stated that there was a "high probability of major benefit from a large, urgent investment in non-lethal weapons and technologies." However, the JNLWD budget has not had any substantial increase. · The CFR also proposed that the JNLWD should "coordinate additional NEW programs within the Services." While coordination by the JNLWD has occurred, no significant independent non-lethal weapons development by the Services has taken place. · The CFR suggested that cognizance for NLWs should be at the National Security Council (NSC) level in order to provide NLWs a higher level of impor- tance and visibility within the administration. NSC attention to NLWs has been limited. Non-Lethal Defense Conference IV In March 2000 the National Defense Industrial Association hosted the Non- Lethal Defense Conference IV (NLD IV) co-sponsored by JNLWD, NIJ, and others. More than 400 people attended more than any in this series since NLD I, in 1993. NLD IV was the first conference held after the establishment of DOD policy on NLWs, formation of the JNLWD, and line item budgeting for these systems in the defense budget. The most significant change was in the attendance of representatives from major defense industries. Industrial attendees in previous sessions had been largely from small businesses that produced specific NLWs. NLD IV provided an overview of the status of NLWs and research. .. United States/United Kingdom War Games During 2000, a series of non-lethal weapons meetings and war games was conducted jointly with U.S. and United Kingdom units, facilitated by the JNLWD. The intent was to identify policy, requirements, and concepts of operations for NLWs. It was determined that NLWs had applicability across the spectrum, from operations other than war to major theater war. The recommendations were to field proven systems, educate the public about NLWs, develop training programs and establish logistic support, and work on organizational plans for use of NLWs. It appears that some effort has gone toward addressing those recommendations. It is too early to determine how effective the responses will be. Center for Strategic and International Studies The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted a study on non-lethal weapons national policy in 1999.36 It concluded that NLWs, if 36Swett, Charles, and Dan Goure. 1999. Non-Lethal Weapons Policy Study, Final Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., February 5.

: - THE CURRENT STATUS OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 71 technically viable, would be extremely useful as instruments of national policy, and it recommended that the DOD executive agent undertake an expanded S&T program to determine the technical viability of many non-lethal weapons con- cepts. The report estimated that the level of effort required to address issues identified in the study for the leading technologies would be $100 million per year for 3 years. Joint Mission Area Analysis Conference On December 23, 1999, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and executive agent for the joint non-lethal weapons program requested that a joint mission area analysis be conducted. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) en- dorsed the conduct of the NEW JMAA on March 6, 2000. The initial JMAA Warfighters Conference was held in Washington, D.C., on March 27-31, 2000. The JMAA In-Progress Review was held July 18-20, 2000. The final JMAA Conference was held at Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command, October 17-20, 2000. The following findings and conclusions were produced: . The joint non-lethal weapons program is stable and visionary. · The joint non-lethal weapons program recognizes the potential of NLWs across the spectrum of conflict and at all levels of war. · Using a "strategy to task" methodology, the JMAA called out capability deficiencies, identified operational and support tasks needed to meet mission objectives, and provided a master list of non-lethal weapons technologies. CINCs and Services JMAA working-group members concurred with re- spect to three core capabilities and eight subordinate functional areas for NLWs (see Box 2.2~. · JMAA working-group members reviewed and concurred with findings and recommendations of the JMAA and draft mission needs statement. · JMAA working-group members supported the draft of a capstone require- ment document for each non-lethal weapons functional area, as appropriate. ; . Air Force Scientific Advisory Board During 19999 the U.S. Air Force charged its Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) with conducting a summer study, titled "Technology Options to Leverage Aero- space Power in Operations Other Than Conventional War,"37 in which NLWs were one of the areas examined. As part of the study, an extensive survey of technologies that could be employed in current and future systems was under- 37Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. 2000. ``Technology Options to Leverage Aerospace Power in Operations Other Than Conventional war, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, SAB- TR-99-01, T. McMahan, chair, February.

i 72 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY # ~~C —C¢ntrol~cra ~ ~ ~ I. . I~=p~i~ —~~ny~-area —~CIOar ~facil~< ~Go~e~ :~_ Deny ar~ i: ~—Drably Co~nte~apa:l —Losable —-Deny w :: ~ ~ :~:~::~;:~.~.~OT~EX:~ Thatch i: :~::::: ::: :: ~ ~:~ : ::: : -I ~-~.~ ~~ ~~;~ I. -. ~~: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i.: ~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ . hi. ~ . ~. -~ - - Brews c¢~rca=~emen ,. ::: ~~ : :~ :~::: if:: :~ :: ~ ::~: i: ::: ::: ~ ~ : :::: ::: ::: :: ~~ ~~ ~~-~ :~ ~ ~ :~: :: : :: :: i::: ~ ::::: ~: i: : :: :: ~ i:: : ~ ~~ - i: taken. It was determined that NLWs did have applicability across the spectrum of conflict and that they would enhance warfighting capability, but that a compre- hensive strategy for the Air Force was needed. Non-lethal resources, the study said, should be a part of the campaign planning process as an integrated option. The need for a comprehensive Air Force acquisition strategy to develop, test, and procure NLWs was identified. In addition, the SAB recommended that the Air Force do the following: · Develop capabilities to assess, in real time, the effects of annlier1 non- lethal means on adversaries for planning and operations; ~ . . ~ . . . . .. ~ .. -err - · Expand the use of non-letha~ resources to the lull spectrum of conflict during participation in warfighting experiments and exercises; and · Undertake selected technology initiatives in high-power microwave sys- tems, lasers, and other forms of electronic and information warfare.

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Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) are designed to minimize fatalities and other undesired collateral damage when used. Events of the last few years including the attack on the USS Cole have raised ideas about the role NLWs can play in enhancing support to naval forces. In particular to what extent and in what areas should Department of the Navy (DoN) -sponsored science and technology (S&T) provide a research base for developing NLW capabilities? To assist with this question and to evaluate the current NLWs program, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) requested the National Research Council perform an assessment of NLWs science and technology. The report presents the results of that assessment. It discusses promising NLW S&T areas, development accomplishments and concerns about NLW, and series of recommendations about future NLW development and application.

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