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~ - ~2 Principal Findings . Two top-level findings emerged in the deliberations of the Committee for an Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technology. The first observation not to be obscured by discussion in this chapter in which the committee expresses its concerns is this: The progress of the JNLWD, in light of its limited resources and authorities as a joint organization, coupled with the considerable pressure placed on it since its creation in 1996, has been nothing short of remarkable. The accomplishments of the directorate, highlighted in Section 2.3, are many, and they have had an impact on U.S. tactical warfighting capabilities. That said, the committee does have reservations in several areas about the utility and effectiveness of the directorate continuing in the current direction, as discussed in Section 3.1. The second observation concerns a broader institutional issue. The commit- teefinds a wide gap between the rhetoric on the importance of non-lethal weap- ons as expounded by senior leadership in the unified commands and the U.S. Marine Corps, and the limited attention in planning, assessment, R&D, and acquisition given to NLWs throughout DOD, in general, and the Department of the Navy, in particular. In spite of the Services' acceptance of responsibility for R&D and testing and evaluation (T&E) for NLWs to meet their own needs (see Box 1.2 in Chapter 1), there have been, at best, limited efforts to assess NLWs as an integral part of the force mix and to plan for their development and acquisi- tion. While the Marine Corps has been the most committed to NLWs and has placed this commitment among its top three or four priorities for enabling Marine Corps warfighting capabilities, even it has been unsuccessful in motivating sig- nificant naval R&D. The force protection demands emerging in the aftermath of the attack on the USS Cole may prove to be a vehicle for Navy interest, but the 73
74 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY committee finds that it is still too early to tell if that experience will result in a more visible program in the Department of the Navy. There are many shortcom- ings and ample opportunities in non-lethal weapons R&D, systems development, and organizational integration for better-focused and more-robust programs to address existing and emerging needs for the Navy and Marines. These areas are elaborated on in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. Summary statements of all of the committee's findings appear at the end of the chapter in Section 3.5. 3.1 JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS DIRECTORATE When established in 1996, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate was specifically chartered to stimulate and coordinate non-lethal weapons require- ments. Today, the directorate functions as the DOD focal point for NLWs and is the organization through which the Services coordinate and integrate the devel- opment of non-lethal weapons programs. The directorate has accomplished much since its establishment. With the Services, it accelerated the delivery of non-lethal weapons capability to opera- tional units in the field. It initiated a series of activities to stimulate the require- ments process. It began a technology investment program (TIP) to discover new ideas for non-lethal weapons capabilities. It also moved to establish a center of excellence to focus research to characterize the human effects of NLWs. (See Section 2.3.) The directorate is now poised to transition to a new mode of operation for the future at a crossroads. Having responded to immediate pressures for fielding systems, it has been unable under the current mode of operation to build a robust program for the future within the constraints of its budget and joint nature. There are few major non-lethal weapons capabilities in the acquisition pipelines of the Services; there are few and limited new S&T investments by either the director- ate or the Services. Furthermore, there is a significant shortfall in the character- ization of the human effects of NLWs. The committee has identified three major findings that indicate a need to alter the future course of the JNLWD: 1. The present JNLWD approach for developing and transitioning non-le- thal weapons capabilities to the field cannot be sustained into the future. 2. The JNLWD efforts to stimulate new ideas for non-lethal weapons must be substantially augmented cooperatively with the Services S&T programs. 3. The JNLWD plans and program to address the human and materiel effects of non-lethal weapons through the establishment of a single center of excellence are insufficient and will not meet the need. Without substantial change, the lack of effects characterization will be a "show-stopper" for deploying NLWs to the field. Each finding is elaborated on in a subsection below.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 75 Transition Challenges Finding: The present JNLWD approach for developing and transitioning non- lethal capabilities to the field cannot be sustained into the future. The committee's view is that the directorate's current approach for developing and transitioning non-lethal weapons to the field places the directorate in an unnatu- ral, and potentially unsustainable, position in the normal acquisition process. In that process the acquisition of new weapons systems proceeds through stages, beginning with research to establish the necessary S&T, into concept and technology develop- ment, and then proceeding through system development and demonstration before approval for procurement is granted. The "color" of the directorate's money, which is that of exploratory development, places the directorate's role between early S&T and procurement, both of which remain Service roles. Hence, it is not an acquisition organization, nor is it chartered or staffed to perform the role of an S&T organization. To effect any sort of reasonable end-to-end process in its current approach, the directorate must first rely on the "benevolent" investment of the Service S&T programs to feed its pipeline with new NEW concepts. As noted throughout this report, that pipeline has dried up and the Services have directed their own S&T investments elsewhere. On the other side of the process i.e., to transition JNLWD development products into acquisition the directorate has to work through an IPT that first approves a lead Service for execution of the exploratory development project funded by the directorate and then ensures through over- sight that at least one Service commits the concept to a properly phased POM cycle for procurement. The fact that any NLWs have been fielded is a credit to the directorate's hard work, but the approach, which has been successful in the past, will become stressed for more capable, more expensive, and more complex NEW systems. For future more complex NLWs the funding needed to mature it through exploratory development will likely be far out of scale with the size of the directorate's total program, much less the size of a single project. The committee believes that the directorate's current approach will likely be unsustainable for achieving transition of future NLWs into the Services' warfighting capabilities. End-to-end management of development and procurement activities within the Services is the normal process and should be adopted by the DOD for NLWs. The directorate would then be free to invest its full resources in other sorely needed areas such as effects and effectiveness characterization, which are critical for policy, acquisition, and operational decisions and cut across all Service interests and needs. Stimulating New Ideas for NLWs Finding: The JNLWD efforts to stimulate new ideas for non-lethal weapons must be substantially augmented cooperatively with the Services S&T programs.
76 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY . There is a lack of new ideas for NLWs. For all the right reasons, the JNLWD focused in its first few years on mature technologies in order to move non-lethal weapons capabilities into the field quickly. There were two notable exceptions: VMADS and PEP (although VMADS had enjoyed Air Force funding for some years prior to JNLWD investment). Because of very limited funding, there has been little exploration of advanced technologies that come with higher risk and longer time lines for development, but also with potentially higher returns. The current situation reflects the truism "You get what you pay for" with respect to the non-lethal weapons programs that are now in the pipeline. Few are technologically challenging or militarily exciting. On the other hand, the amount of money invested in non-lethal weapons R&D is currently too small to attract major S&T providers, such as defense contractors, national laboratories, and federally funded research and development centers. Without the probability of substantial sales of successful systems, defense contractors are unwilling or un- likely to use their own internal R&D funds to develop the innovative technolo- gies that can prime the pipeline. If smaller contractors with innovative ideas are identified, substantial financial support will be required at levels not available from currently projected budgets of the JNLWD and the Services to bring them along. Recognizing the issue, the JNLWD has already engaged in a series of activi- ties to stimulate new ideas and requirements for NLWs. Its technology invest- ment program was specifically initiated to generate new technology concepts through government laboratories, industry, and academia. However, there is still a minimal budget of $500,000 allocated for this program, a sum that is inadequate to attract the interest of the principal R&D institutions referred to here. The committee sees the need for an order-of-magnitude increase in these resources and an expanded and aggressive outreach to find new sources of ideas. Partner- ships should be explored cooperatively with government S&T. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the government laboratories are prime candidates. The directorate has also undertaken studies and analyses; initiated concept exploration programs; and used war games, modeling and simulation, and experi- ments to stimulate the requirements process. These activities have been produc- tive. Other, more immediate needs in the non-lethal weapons program have limited the number of such activities, however. While the JNLWD has mechanisms and programs in place to enable expan- sion, more are needed. Two CEPs are being used to address high-priority needs, one specifically focused on clearing facilities and the other on incapacitating personnel. More are in order, given the findings of the JMAA. Other examples are experiments and demonstrations, such as advanced concept technology dem- onstrations. Many opportunities in experiments and demonstrations are focused on operations and missions in which non-lethal weapons applications can play a role for example, in MOUT and in force protection. The directorate needs to
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 77 partner in many (not few) joint and Service experiments and in many (not few) ACTDs to evolve concept developments for non-lethal weapons applications. Substantial enhancement of the pace and scope of such activities is essential to move non-lethal weapons capabilities forward. Programs for Characterization of Effects Finding: The JNLWD plans and program to address the human and materiel effects of non-lethal weapons through the establishment of a single center of excellence are insufficient and will not meet the need. Without substantial change, the lack of elects characterization will be a "show-stopper" for deploying non- lethal weapons to the field. The JNLWD is using a variety of mechanisms to address the difficult issues relating to human effects of non-lethal weapons, as described in Section 2.3. Even so, the committee believes that the directorate's approach is unlikely to yield the knowledge base with respect to human effects that is required to support making non-lethal weapons options a pervasive operational reality. Based on the information presented to the committee, it appeared that the JNLWD was mostly leaving characterization of materiel effects to system developers. The JNLWD has made good use of the Human Effects Advisory Panel (HEAP) since its formation in 1998. The HEAP is an independent panel of experts formed by Pennsylvania State University, under contract with the JNLWD, to provide advice on human effects issues. The committee applauds this move and acknowledges the long-term usefulness of such an expert panel. The Human Effects Process Action Team was formed in 1999 at the request of the chair of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons IPT. HEPAT is a group of DOD medical research and acquisition experts assembled to review the characteriza- tion process of non-lethal weapons human effects and to recommend changes to ensure full characterization of non-lethal weapons effects. HEPAT made three broad recommendations, which are in various stages of implementation: Establish a Human Effects Review Board; HERB was established on October 5, 2000. · Establish a non-lethal weapons Human Effects Center of Excellence; the HECOE was established in the summer of 2000. · Adopt a non-lethal weapons risk assessment methodology; the HECOE held a workshop in May 2001 to begin developing a risk assessment framework. The committee endorses these recommendations, but views them as highly interdependent. Success in the acceptance and use of NLWs hinges on robust effects characterization. HERB is chartered to provide advice and recommenda- tions to program managers on human effects analysis and to provide the mile- stone decision authority with a judgment on the measure of risk in each program;
78 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY both require solid understanding of the effects. In turn, a risk assessment meth- odology must consider risk to targets, as well as uncertainties based on limita- tions of human effects models, again requiring understanding of effects. HECOE was envisioned by HEPAT as the centralized resource for conducting health effects analysis. As defined by HEPAT, HECOE would do the following: . Coordinate human effects modeling and research efforts, Ensure that models are peer reviewed and appropriately applied, · Help weapon designers optimize designs for effects, · Consult with weapon developers on technological issues, · Provide input to the concept exploration phase to ensure that human ef- fects are considered. · Analyze human effects for program managers, and · Assist in preparation of data packages for use by HERB. Under its charter, HECOE is not funded to perform fundamental research on human effects. In fact, there is no place in the human effects characterization process, as established, where that research is supported. The committee believes that while the scope of HECOE responsibilities defined by HEPAT is largely appropriate, the implementation falls short in failing to provide a research base and in providing insufficient resources for the program overall. The JNLWD established HECOE within the Air Force Research Laboratory's Human Effectiveness Directorate at Brooks Air Force Base. The current annual funding for HECOE is less than $1 million, and the JNLWD expects that within 2 years, HECOE will be largely funded by the program managers who require its services. The core technical expertise of HECOE is contributed by the Directed Energy Bioeffects Division of the Human Effectiveness Directorate. The committee found that HECOE is neither sized nor staffed to cover the diverse range of scientific disciplines required to accomplish its mission as de- fined by HEPAT. Furthermore, the committee believes that a true center of excellence demands a depth of scientific talent that can be sustained only through active engagement in research. ~ The committee also found insufficient resources dedicated to the creation of knowledge bases and models to capture research 1 The scope of research is both broad and diverse A non-lethal weapon is designed to deliver a "dose" (blunt trauma, dazzling light, microwave energy, and so on) at a level below that which would lead to permanent harm to an individual. The threshold at which permanent harm is imparted changes with the individual's age, weight, and so on. An active program to understand thresholds for the "dose" considered for any NEW is essential. Human susceptibility to various forms of directed energy and kinetic energy is largely unknown except for information leading to the definition of occupational exposure and public exposure limits. Without knowledge about mechanisms of addi- tional interaction, it is unlikely that advanced technologies will ever be developed. There is a need to address psychological effects as well as physiological effects. Modeling and simulation represent an interface between the basic science and applications. Contemporary modeling techniques have yet to be developed.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 79 results and lessons learned. While the committee agrees that program managers should be expected to fund system-specific activities, it also believes that sub- stantial shortfalls exist in the basic understanding of human effects and that these shortfalls will not be addressed by the current funding model. 3.2 ADVANCED NON-LETHAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES FOR NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES There has been little independent investment in non-lethal weapons S&T by the Department of the Navy since the formation of the JNLWD. In spite of that, a number of areas are well suited to meeting the needs of naval expeditionary forces and to contributing to future naval capabilities. As screened by the com- mittee, the highest-priority S&T elements for naval expeditionary forces are as follows: · Calmatives and malodorants for controlling crowds and clearing facili- ties, developed and applied in accordance with U.S. treaty obligations in the Chemical Weapons Convention; · Directed-energy systems beyond VMADS: HPM for stopping vehicles and enabling distance communications, and solid-state lasers for advanced non- lethal weapons applications; · Novel and rapidly deployable marine barrier systems; and · Adaptation of unmanned or remotely piloted platfo~s and targeting/ BDA sensors to non-lethal weapons applications. 6 A description of the process and criteria for screening, followed by discus- sion of earlier screened technology areas, is presented below. Process and Criteria for Screening A principal outcome of this study is the identification of S&T investment opportunities most applicable to naval expeditionary forces and appropriate for investment by the Office of Naval Research. Attention has also been given to the needs of the U.S. Coast Guard for non-lethal weapons technology, since these can overlap those of the U.S. Navy in selected mission capabilities required. The wide range of technologies and phenomena that have been proposed for use as NLWs exceeds by far the spectrum of phenomena in use by lethal systems today. This vast array of choices represents a challenge for a rational selection when resource limitations demand that only a few select efforts be chosen for emphasis and funding. The JNLWD has undertaken a complex process to priori- tize these choices and to give priority to an appropriate selection of systems that will be funded for development. This committee's focus was on the most prom- ising opportunities for naval S&T programs. Technologies were reviewed indi- vidually. In some cases, they were also considered in combination to determine
80 ~ ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY . .~ if complementary technologies could provide a broader spectrum of capabilities or synergistic effects. The process steps were as follows: · There was a review of all material presented to the committee augmented by documents, visits, and information gathered throughout the period of this study. This review allowed the committee to understand mission needs of naval expeditionary forces and to align those with the technologies under consider- ation. Technologies were screened and entered into the technologies table (Ap- pendix B). · Each technology, along with associated enabling systems, was discussed, related to mission needs, and grouped by common themes. · The selection criteria listed in Boxes 1.2 and 1.3 were then applied. This became the basis for selection of the technologies as potential S&T candidates. Further discussion among the committee distilled the potential candidates to the most promising ones highlighted in its findings. Most important, and emphasized in the committee's review, was the first technical characteristic in Box 1.1the effectiveness of the technology against the intended target. Effectiveness is a broad criterion; attributes such as predict- ability, repeatability, and significant effect are incorporated into it. Other factors on the list were used to judge the efficacy of non-lethal weapons technologies, but with no particular priority. These include applicability to one or more of the mission areas of the naval expeditionary forces that could benefit from NLWs. Also required are significant potential bioeffects with the expectation of a broad separation between effectiveness and irreversible injury thresholds. Robustness to countermeasures is considered as well. Rheostatic capability, that is, the ability to "dial an effect" from non-lethal to lethal, for a weapon or system of weapons is desirable, as is selective targeting. Standoff is an important criterion, with desirable delivery ranges of hundreds of meters or more. Delivery systems for non-lethal weapons technologies are considered to achieve these extended deployment ranges. Antimateriel applications also should have the potential to implement repeatable, effective capability to disable vehicles, ships, or other materiel. Finally, the logistical, training, and maintenance support required to field the technology should ideally present little to no added burden to the naval forces using it. Antipersonnel and Antimateriel Chemicals Finding: Development of chemicals for non-lethal weapons applications has re- ceived little attention since the adoption of the Chemical Weapons Convention. There are, however, riot control, arealfacility clearing, and vehicle-stopping situa- tions, as experienced in force protection, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assis- tance, for which non-lethal weapons chemical options other considerable advan- tages over alternatives.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 81 According to U.S. Marine Corps legal interpretation of purposes not prohib- ited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that were presented to the committee, the use of chemical NLWs appears to be allowable for riot control situations and antimateriel applications in certain circumstances. Moreover, chemicals that do not have an inherent toxic effect are apparently allowable. On the requirements side, the committee heard from the U.S. Marine Corps and the JNLWD about the pervasive need in order to avoid introducing panic in crowds for crowd control options more benign than those of firing rubber bullets or using OC. The need for and limitations of current vehicle-stopping systems were also evident. In that context, the committee found that calmatives and malodorants for antipersonnel applications and antimateriel vehicle stoppers have high potential as important future NLWs when tested against the criteria listed in Box 1.2. Some of the potential advantages of chemical NLWs are as follows: Chemicals offer the theoretical possibility of peacefully incapacitating combatants/agitators, reducing the need for the violence that is frequently associ- ated with many of the current methods. Chemical NLWs could effectively allow a commander to "cool off" a situation, separate the combatants from non-combat- ants, and then deal with the former appropriately. This may also be true for antimateriel compounds. Many current approaches to stopping a speeding ve- hicle involve abrupt and often violent actions, with undesired consequences. · Because chemicals can be tailored to elicit specific human effects through molecular design, they have potential for more precise bioeffects than do cur- rently used NLWs such as blunt munitions. ~ . · Chemicals may be easily dispersed to deliver effects to groups as well as to individuals. For example, a chemical crowd system could be deployed early in tactics, before the crowd has formed a closely packed array, to allow freedom of mobility and harmless escape. Research in the field of calmatives as NLWs has not advanced for a decade. Previous research had focused on understanding the margin of safety between effective incapacitation and death. Malodorants, which are not considered toxic chemicals, have a strong potential for controlling crowds, clearing facilities, and area denial. Issues in their effective use include delivery, persistence, and cleanup or neutralization. There has been recent, limited work characterizing the effectiveness of various malodorants. There also appears to be the possibility of combinations of malodorants to address cross- cultural differences in effectiveness. Almost as important as the nature of the chemicals themselves are the fea- tures that "weaponize" them in a manner that maintains both treaty compliance and effectiveness. Little has been done to meet the requirements for more accu- rate and precise delivery on target with enhanced levels of dispersion. Specific and special methods of delivery are required in a number of naval mission appli- cations. For example, the capability of injecting agents into the air intake of a
82 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY moving vehicle or boat is an unsolved problem that prevents several promising chemical agents from being considered. Directed Energy Finding: Some concepts for radio frequency and laser non-lethal weapons to meet force protection and area denial needs hold considerable promise; others raise serious issues that must be resolved before further significant investment is warranted. High-Power Microwave and Millimeter-Wave Systems High-power microwave and millimeter-wave systems offer several promis- ing non-lethal weapons capabilities. The most prominent is the VMADS, for area denial and possibly for crowd control. The VMADs effect near instanta- neous heating of an individual by the RF energy is well understood empirically, but much remains to be learned about the biological implications of such heating. A major investment will be needed to move beyond the current demonstration stage. Suggestions for shipboard deployment of VMADS to aid in port protec- tion have been made within OPNAV, but such applications will require careful assessment to establish their cost-effectiveness. The more traditional antimateriel applications for HPM have been sporadi- cally considered for non-lethal weapons applications. Most interesting are appli- cations for stopping engines and disabling electronic equipment. In general, however, the committee reconfirmed a long-standing concern about HPM re- search that although HPM has been studied and advocated for a quarter of a century, nearly all of the work consists of demonstrations of an effect, with little to no scientific work to determine the entry models) of the RF energy and the mechanisms of disruption or damage. One notable exception was found. A carefully structured scientific program is underway for some relevant targets. The program is classified and high risk, but if successful, it could substantially increase the efficiency and effectiveness of HPM weapons. Marx generator technologies represent an area of opportunity that could reduce the size of microwave power generators and make them more practical for expeditionary force operations. Lasers The promise of adjustable power levels (i.e., rheostatic capability) makes laser-based NLWs attractive. Current concepts rely on chemical lasers such as DF or COIL, but the disadvantages for expeditionary force applications are many. Chemical lasers require a significant and bulky chemical plant as a part of the system, which also results in a limited "magazine" because of the ability to carry
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 83 only a fixed quantity of chemicals. Complex logistics and handling, high cost, and unconvincing demonstrations to date further contribute to the unattractive- ness of chemical laser systems for non-lethal weapons applications. PEP and PIKL are cases in point. The DF laser fuel for these concepts is highly caustic and requires special storage and handling. Another concern is the lack of understanding of the physiological effect. As currently envisioned, both systems would deliver enough energy to the target surface (skin) to produce ionized plasma. In laboratory tests using a biosimulant gelatin for skin, the output of PEP was directed toward the target so that the plasma-induced pressure wave could be characterized. In some tests it appeared that the penetration depth was greater than expected. In other experiments dealing with the influence of clothing, it was found that clothing could be burned away by PEP radiation or by the plasma it produced. It was also determined that wet clothing could increase the pressure of the ultrasonic pulse delivered into the body. All of these observa- tions indicate a potential safety hazard and suggest that much more needs to be learned about the physiological effects of these lasers. Solid-state lasers, however, may offer significant advantages over chemical lasers with respect to environment, safety, logistics, and cost. Unburdened by the chemical storage and handling overhead of a chemical laser, a solid-state laser has the potential to be mounted on a reasonably sized vehicle such as a highly mobile multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and the engine of the vehicle can be its power source, provided the requirements for beam quality, power, and control can be met for non-lethal weapons applications. Achieving adequate power levels for both tactical and operational applica- tions is the major research challenge. In addition, very short pulse lasers, com- monly called femtosecond lasers, have intriguing potential in the materials area. For example, they might be able to cut materials precisely with minimum blowoff and no heating, making this type of laser viable for cutting explosives and toxic materials. Little is know about the human effects from femtosecond exposure to lasers, but experience with longer-pulsed systems suggests that useful but benign effects, such as psychological operations, might be realized. The committee reviewed some classified ongoing work involving lasers. The committee believes that this work, although highly speculative at the present time, holds considerable promise should it be reliably demonstrated. Barriers and Entanglements Finding: Marine entanglement systems have been successfully demonstrated in U.S. Coast Guard programs. Robust systems to meet naval needs, such as stopping go- fast boats or providing perimeter protection in port, needfurther development. On the basis of initial successful results with systems such as RGES by the Coast Guard, the committee recognized the usefulness of barriers and entangle-
84 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY meets to mitigate fast boat approaches in port and to assist with maritime inter- diction. The Coast Guard's needs are not as complex as those of the Navy, however. With the premium on volume and weight on any Navy vessel, pre- deployed barrier or entanglement systems must be compact and of low weight. As a system for force protection, barriers must integrate rapidly deployed and accurate delivery platforms with the assets for threat identification, warning, and response. Delivery concepts such as Roboski could allow for novel barrier types to be considered, including using the platform itself as a rapidly deployable barrier. ;¢ Enablers: Remotely Piloted or Unmanned Vehicles and Sensors Finding: The emergence of expanded missions for NLWs and more capable~nd complex~on-lethal weapons technologies will demand concept development and demonstration for the full system, including pla Jorm and sensor integration. To date, NLWs developed for fielding have been tactical, and they have been deployed with individuals or small units. The relatively greater sophistication and size of VMADS make it the first system demanding a more careful assess- ment of platform and sensor integration to transform it into a useful operational capability. With the pursuit of any of the technologies discussed in this section, the complexities of the weapon systems will be similar, with corresponding needs for full system integration, along with concept development and demonstration. Few efforts have been made in this direction.2 Remotely piloted or unmanned vehicles, especially small UAVs, surface vessels such as the prototype Roboski, and small UUVs, should play an increas- ingly important role in missions requiring NLWs. These delivery systems are lower cost, provide standoff capability, can carry a variety of sensors and NLWs, are more maneuverable, provide ways of getting sensors and weapons on target, and avoid risking the lives of sailors or Marines. As with their employment for lethal mission support, these vehicles should find use in both sensing and warn- ing, and in delivering NLWs on land and sea, pierside and outboard, and above and below the surface. This general area enjoys extensive R&D support in DOD for lethal applications. Adapting these vehicles for the delivery of NLWs may be more difficult, however, because of requirements for accuracy for effective non- lethal weapons use. Concept development and analysis are lacking and should be addressed. 2A reviewer of this report suggested as an additional possible R&D topic a slow round against stationary distant targets, investigating the possibilities offered by a tiny crude inertial mass and lift devices that would be integrated to control the transverse motion of the round to avoid displacement of the vertical mass.
s PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 85 Just as in lethal engagements, the successful use of NLWs also critically depends on the ability for accurate and timely target identification and localiza- tion. Because of the limited range of effect of many NLWs, however, accuracy and timeliness requirements for sensor targeting information may well be more demanding. Sensors must also provide real-time battle damage assessment, that is, feedback on the magnitude of the effect that NLWs have on the target, which is typically more subtle than the detection and assessment of the effects of a conventional explosive device. As with the work on deployment platforms re- ferred to above, adapting work on existing sensors to non-lethal weapons mis- sions is lacking and needed. In addition, the Navy has unique needs for defense against underwater attack, and investigations should be made of the use of NLWs for this purpose. . 3.3 NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT The principal finding in this area is that the effectiveness of non-lethal weap- ons is poorly understood in almost every dimension. This is not surprising in light of the limited scope of JNLWD investment in relatively simple, tactical capabilities and considering the pull-back of individual Service commitments in the past 5 years. Should this situation persist, the development of more capable non-lethal weapons systems in the future will be severely impeded. To mature non-lethal weapons capabilities and gain more widespread acceptance, the sys- tems must be subjected to a robust program of experimentation, a thorough evaluation of training needs, candid assessments of vulnerabilities and counter- measures, and reviews to ensure their consistency with a myriad of evolving logistics and maintenance requirements. In the end, the successful development and deployment of NLWs will depend on many factors, but a thorough under- standing of effectiveness will be essential. The committee's assessment is discussed more completely below. Findings in the specific contributing areas of experimentation and training, logistics and maintenance, and vulnerabilities and countermeasures are also presented. Effectiveness Finding: The electiveness of non-lethal weapons is poorly understood in almost every dimension fact that will impede the development of more capable non- lethal weapons systems in the future if not addressed. Besides the shortcomings in the characterization of human and materiel effects discussed in Section 3.1, there have been very limited efforts in the following areas: quantification of military operational advantages and improve- ments in capabilities with NLWs, understanding both of U.S. vulnerabilities and of enemy countermeasures to non-lethal weapons use, and development of
86 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY CONOPS. In addition, the warfighter must understand and be able to adapt to the inherently variable effects of NLWsas a specific engagement unfolds, it is essential that the warrior have the ability to obtain and act on immediate feed- back to be able to "dial an effect" for re-engagement should that prove neces- sary. Well-characterized effects and effectiveness are probably the most con- vincing factor in gaining widespread acceptance and integration of NLWs into warfighting capabilities, yet that area is currently the weakest part of the overall non-lethal weapons program. Given that the effectiveness of non-lethal weapons options is not well under- stood, it comes as no surprise that system concepts and assessments are generally immature. Complete systems concepts, including delivery vehicles and sensors for targeting and battle damage assessment, are few. Logistics and maintenance considerations are limited to compatibility with whatever exists. Lessons learned from operational use do not appear to be influencing further development. Fully integrated lethal and non-lethal weapons capabilities remain to be assessed, al- though such force mixes are essential to implementing effects-based targeting. There are many dimensions to assessing the effectiveness of a new weapon system. Beyond the technical capabilities of weapons, platforms, and sensors, developers must address the entire range of considerations that go into the devel- opment of the system. Table 3.1 contains a list of questions relevant to non-lethal weapons systems. Answers to these Questions will orovide insight into overall ~ , system effectiveness. ., It is unrealistic to expect developers of NLWs to have an answer to each of the questions in Table 3.1 early in systems development. However, developers should have a reasonable, affordable plan for obtaining answers as their system concepts mature. Many of the answers to these questions can be obtained through robust experimentation and training, full consideration of logistics and mainte- nance issues, and candid assessments of vulnerabilities and countermeasures. Contributing Areas Finding: Experimentation and training have been limited in scope; logistics and maintenance concepts are immature; and vulnerabilities and countermeasures are not integrally assessedfor non-lethal weapons. Each of these areas is impor- tant, if not critical, for non-lethal weapons systems development and acceptance by commanders. Experimentation A robust experimentation program is an essential element in the develop- ment of NLWs. Experiments can highlight new systems' desirable characteris- tics, benefits, and risks. They encourage thinking about rules of engagement as well as countermeasures and vulnerabilities, and foster the development of con-
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 87 cepts of operations. The JNLWD has taken impressive first steps in stimulating experimentation in NLWs with the Marine Corps and joint community and in obtaining lessons learned from related experiments. Many of these activities are discussed in Chapter 2. The committee believes, however, that these experiments are only the be- ginning of what must become a more robust experimentation program. To date, many of the experiments have focused heavily on the current generation of tactical NLWs in the capability sets, or more recently, on a VMADS-like sys- tem. Over the long run, experiments integrating or geared specifically toward NLWs must be more frequent and pervasive with all the Services and the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Experiments should also include a broader and more comprehensive array of scenarios and non-lethal weapons systems, such as antivehicular and antipersonnel non-lethal effects; human response; three-di- mensional geographical and structural items such as in urban warfare; robotic systems to detect, target, and engage; tactical advantages such as ballistic pro- tection, speed, and surprise; and systems that support the restoration of infra- structure (such as water, power, and transportation), and provide for the basic needs of a population (food, shelter, and medical aid). Training The introduction of new NLWs, such as VMADS, that are considerably more complex than the tactical NLWs in the capability sets requires a substantial increase in the level and sophistication of training. The committee did not see evidence that this level of training was being planned. While specific training needs will vary for each non-lethal weapon system, training will need to address a wide variety of issues, such as the following: · Effects. Users must know the specific effects that they can expect from a weapon. They must understand how the effects can differ with increasing or decreasing distance to the target. They must know if the weapon affects individu- als of varying sizes (children, adults), ages (young adults, the elderly) and health or medical conditions differently. They must understand the circumstances under which the system will produce unintended consequences. Because many NLWs are designed to affect human behavior or motivation, users must understand how cultural differences might influence weapon effects. · Targeting and battle damage assessment. Users must understand how to identify, track, and engage targets. They must learn how to assess, with high reliability, whether a system has worked as expected. · Tactics. Users must know when a weapon works best. They should know if its effectiveness can be enhanced or diminished when it is used in combination with other weapons. They must know the importance of surprise, offensive action to achieve decisive results, maneuver, and economy of force. They must
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6 90 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY understand how frequently the weapon can be fired and how many engagements are possible before reloading or its equivalent, such as recharging is needed. They must understand how to respond to anticipated countermeasures. They must understand the circumstances under which the weapon will not produce the desired effects. Perhaps most importantly, they must understand what to do if the NLW fails to achieve its intended purpose in the expected time frame. · Deployment scenarios. Commanders must understand how to use a weapon in different scenarios. For example, systems that are effective against lightly armed drug smugglers might not work well against heavily armed, well- trained, highly motivated guerilla forces. Effectiveness may vary in urban con- flict, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, truce monitoring, disaster relief, hu- manitarian aid, drug interdiction, and so on. · Logistics. Users need to know what is required to reload and how long a system will be out of operation while reloading is underway. They must know how to maintain and repair the system, how to assess its readiness, how it will be transported, and what is required of the logistics chain to keep it operational. · ROE and legal constraints. Although ROE will vary for each military operation, users must be trained in how a non-lethal weapon system fits into the ROE for their particular situation, including limitations imposed by treaty con- straints. This list of training needs is illustrative, not comprehensive. The introduc- tion of NLWs may create training requirements beyond those for immediate users. For example, the introduction of NLWs that can be fired or launched from a common weapon platform, such as an aircraft, ship, tank, or artillery system, could generate training needs for every organization with responsibility for oper- ating or supporting the platform. In summary, more complex NLWs will create more complex training re- quirements. These requirements are likely to be quite challenging for new NLWs. Early, continuing, and creative thinking about training needs is essential for the long-term success of NLW efforts. Logistics and Maintenance The logistics and maintenance considerations of most tactical NLWs found in the capability sets have been simple and readily accommodated within existing practices and capabilities. Complex operational-level systems, such as VMADS or some of the laser concepts under development, introduce logistics and mainte- nance issues that are both unique and possibly burdensome; they must be consid- ered integrally with system development to avoid a "show-stopper" downstream. The current mindset of the NLW community is still at the level of the individual tactical capability set and is not yet acculturated to the perspective that these complex systems demand.
i. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 91 In general, it is important to consider logistics issues during every stage in the weapon development process. Weapon developers can increase operational effectiveness and reduce life-cycle costs by accommodating the varied needs of the logistics community while a system is being developed, rather than afterward. Table 3.2 illustrates logistics questions that should be addressed in the develop- ment process. Vulnerabilities t Because of its charge to study NLWs for U.S. naval expeditionary forces, the committee devoted little attention to NLWs developed or deployed by other nations. The committee's limited exposure to two activities, however, raised concern. Awareness of foreign NLWs is important for understanding the vulnerabili- ties of U.S. forces and key infrastructure assets, such as electrical grids, financial networks, and the air traffic control system. Other nations are investigating, developing, fielding, and/or selling NLWs. The committee was briefed on one effort to defeat NLWs and one experiment that highlighted the vulnerability of an important infrastructure asset in the United States. Both of these activities pointed to the current lack of well-thought-out responses to use of NLWs against U.S. forces, and the serious consequences that could result. Proliferation is also a concern. U.S. forces could be vulnerable to NLWs that have proliferated from the United States or foreign nations to enemy nations or non-state actors. More- over, smart adversaries will develop and exploit non-lethal weapons technologies with or without U.S. efforts in the same technologies if they see an advantage in doing so. In general, NLWs could represent an asymmetric threat to the United States and its allies. Countermeasures DOD Directive 3000.3 states that NLWs "must not be easily defeated by enemy countermeasures once known, or if they could, the benefits of a single opportunity to use the weapon in a given context would be so great as to outweigh that disadvantage." It should be made clear that countermeasures are of two types. The first type, discussed in the directive, includes those countermeasures employed by adver- saries to counter U.S. forces' use of NLWs. For these, counter-countermeasures, technical and/or tactical, are needed. The second type includes the countermea- sures that could be used by U.S. forces to protect against adversary uses of NLWs. In this latter case, U.S. forces need reaction time for retaliation to the foes' attack and for mitigating options of NEW effects. Military experience has been that countermeasures, technical and/or opera- tional, appear sooner or later after any system has been put to use. As the
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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 93 directive indicates, by itself the identification of countermeasures should not stop the development or even the considered use, of NLWs. Rather, a thorough evaluation of NLW countermeasures is needed to help weapons designers, high- light needs for more experimentation, and improve tactics and training. Another lesson from experience is that S&T has an important role to play in the develop- ment of countermeasures and counter-countermeasures. In the case of NLWs this S&T will involve challenges in both the "hard" and "soft" sciences. As a simple example, a new system enabling use of different types of NLW at once or in a controlled sequence, governed by an assessment of effectiveness by sensors, knowledge of effects, and psychological and cultural criteria, could provide a degree of counter-countermeasures capability. 3.4 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL INTEREST IN NON-LETHAL WEAPONS 6 Finding: U.S. Marine Corps interest and priority regarding non-lethal weapons have been growing since the early l990s. Navy interest was largely dormant until the USS Cole incident, but it has been evident since then, growing notice- ably throughout the course of this study. Investments in people, dollars, and concept development have not yet caught up with that interest. AS discussed in Section 2.6, the Marine Corps has had a visible and growing interest in NLWs since the early 1990s. That interest has been reinforced with commitments to development, experimentation, and procurement of NLWs to support tactical mission needs. Needs for more sophisticated operational NLW systems are emerging, but supporting R&D and acquisition are not yet in place. The Navy's interest, however, has lagged behind that of the Marines. OPNAV Response Prior to Attack on USS Cole The command capability issues provided by the fleet/force to the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements (CNO N091) in August 2000 reported that non-lethal weapons technologies ranked 19th in the composite roll-up of each command's "Top 10" issues. Box 3.1 lists the needs identified. As noted in Section 2.4, the command capability issues drive the future naval capabilities and accompanying enabling capabilities and supporting technologies. OPNAV designated an individual to act as the Navy central action officer, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Programs. The billet currently resides in OPNAV N757, Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Coastal Warfare Branch, Expeditionary Warfare Division. This individual is the focal point for the JNLWD on the breadth of U.S. Navy activities regarding the generation and coordination of non- lethal weapons requirements, the identification of needed technology develop-
94 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Face ~No~n-~hal Weapons Needs I~dentified~fo;r ~~:~-~-~:~nmand~il:y~ss~es,~ust Anon go. ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ; . ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ .~ :~ .. :~ ~ :~ ~ ~ ~~ . : : :~::: : I: :: ~ ~ : : ~ :~ - Counte~rperson-ne~l~:~ ~ ~ : ~clearfacilit'~and~;~-~ucturesof~nne~i ~~ ~: Derby ares personnel; r~al~fome~ protection~(U.S~K Naval-~F~-~£~-~Centra~ ~:~ i:: Com~m=~USI1~-~:~ - -::- ~~:~::~::~:~:~:~:: ~ ~ ~~ ·- ;; Protect against swimfner/intrudef ~(Commander, Submarine Far£e,~:~1:antic ~ Nonstop an individual (combat logistics forces OFF . meet, the use and creation of modeling and simulation capabilities, and participa- tion in experiments as well as ongoing and planned acquisitions. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) accepted the role as the lead laboratory area in the non-lethal weapons area. ONR pro- vided support to the Joint Mission Area Analysis Conference. The Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures at NSWCDD accepted the char- ter for the development of non-lethal weapons countermeasures. Although the Navy had not formally procured any non-lethal weapons systems prior to the attack on the USS Cole, it had undertaken some initial efforts in the acquisition process. It had completed a capstone requirements document on stop- ping vessels. It had accepted the role as Service lead on the following Joint Non- Lethal Weapons Program efforts: one Pre-Milestone A program for the develop- ment of a running gear entanglement system, one CEP to disable vessels, and studies and analysis efforts toward options for underwater and maritime intercept.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS ., 95 OPNAV Response After Attack on USS Cole In response to the attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000, the Depart- ment of the Navy established the Antiterrorism/Force Protection Task Force on October 27, 2000; its activities and recommendations are discussed in Section 2.5. As a part of the ATOP Task Force effort, technology transition for improved force protection was organized into three efforts: the Immediate Response Program, the Bridge Program, and the Coordinated Acquisition Program. While the latter two are longer term and ongoing, the Immediate Response Program, as its name implies, was given a short time line. On November 9, 2000, the CNO assigned the Office for Naval Operations Other Than War-Technical Center (NOOTW-TC) at NSWCDD to lead the Immediate Response Program. This office undertook an analysis to characterize known and potential asymmetric surface, subsurface, air, and onshore threats to surface vessels in ports and harbors and while transiting restricted waterways to or from ports and harbor areas, to key shore installations (including command centers, aircraft storage, and so on), and to aircraft during approach, takeoff, and landing (outside the continental United States). The office then identified potential technologies, techniques, and/or procedures that might enhance current naval capabilities in the areas of situational awareness (threat detection and classification), defense in depth (threat deterrence and neutralization), and operational risk manage- ment, emphasizing commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf sys- tems. Directions were to include NLWs in the assessment. On December 13, 2000, NOOTW-TC delivered a "Quicklook" report to the CNO, in which it recognized current force protection capabilities and identified systemic shortfalls. The report recommended near-term enhancements that em- phasized the application of technology instead of the increased use of manpower; overt, passive systems for deterrence; active defense systems; non-lethal weapons capabilities forfirst response; and lethal weapons capabilities as a last resort. All candidate technologies could be fielded in 3 to 9 months. On December 15, 2000, the CNO (N3/N5) organizations directed NOOTW- TC to facilitate an NEW concept demonstration within 60 days. On December 21, 2000, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, was briefed on the concept demonstration about to get underway. On December 28, 2000, the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, was briefed. On January 2, 2001, the 60-day clock started, with an expected completion date of March 1, 2001. Phase I component demonstrations (AN/APQ-2, water cannon, ROES, detector experi- ments, live fire gunshoot) were conducted on February 15-23, 2001, at NSWC Dahlgren. On March 1, Phase II, an exercise already underway (DDG-58) was used to demonstrate baseline and enhanced capabilities across three basic sce- narios with multiple vignettes. The demonstration results are providing baseline direction for part of the CAPS ACTD (the principal element of the Bridge Pro- gram), information for near-term fleet/force decisions, and prioritization of future force protection R&D efforts.
~ - 96 AN ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE ID TECHNOLOGY As a result of the success of this demonstration, efforts are underway by OPNAV to establish a more permanent "council" of expertise to address force protection issues and efforts throughout the fleet. Oversight of these efforts will be provided by the COO AT/FP Council with ad hoc working groups in the areas of personnel, doctrine, training and policy, expeditionary antiterrorism, installa- tions, resources (fragmented and difficult to apply), technology, and intelligence information. Findings and recommendations will be reported periodically to the CNO and fleet staffs. While aspects of improved naval AT/FP postures include more than NLWs, the value of NLWs beyond their use for tactical self-defense is being recognized more widely in the Navy. It remains for OPNAV to inject NLWs more perva- sively into institutional planning, assessments, R&D, and acquisition and to con- sider offensive roles for NLWs, as recommended in the Sea Strike concept de- scribed earlier. 3.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS For ease of reference, the findings presented throughout this chapter are compiled in the following subsections. On the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate The progress of the JNLWD, in light of its limited resources and authority as a joint organization, coupled with the considerable pressure placed on it since its creation in 1996, has been nothing short of remarkable. Looking to the future, however, and assuming that NLWs are to play an integral role in both warfighting and operations other than warfare, the committee believes the following: · The present JNLWD approach for developing and transitioning non-le- thal weapons capabilities to the field cannot be sustained into the future. . The JNLWD efforts to stimulate new ideas for non-lethal weapons must be substantially augmented cooperatively with the Services S&T programs. · The JNLWD plans and program to address the human and materiel effects of non-lethal weapons through the establishment of a single center of excellence are insufficient and will not meet the need. Without substantial change, the lack of effects characterization will be a "show-stopper" for non-lethal weapons in the field. On Commitment A wide gap exists between the rhetoric on the importance of non-lethal weapons as expounded by senior leadership in the unified commands, fleet com- mands, and the U.S. Marine Corps, and the limited attention in planning, assess-
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 97 meet, R&D, and acquisition given to NLWs throughout DOD, in general, and the Department of the Navy, in particular. On Shortfalls and Opportunities R&D As screened by the committee, the highest-priority S&T elements for naval expeditionary forces are as follows: · Calmatives and malodorants for controlling crowds and clearing facili- ties, developed and applied in accordance with U.S. treaty obligations in the Chemical Weapons Convention; · Directed-energy systems beyond VMADS: HPM for stopping vehicles and enabling distance communications, and solid-state lasers for advanced non- lethal weapons applications; · Novel and rapidly deployable marine barrier systems; and · Adaptation of unmanned or remotely piloted platforms and targeting/ battle damage assessment sensors to non-lethal weapons applications. Systems Development ., The effectiveness of non-lethal weapons is poorly understood in almost ev- ery dimension a fact that will impede the development of more capable non- lethal weapons systems in the future if not addressed. Experimentation and training have been limited in scope; logistics and main- tenance concepts are immature; and vulnerabilities and countermeasures are not integrally assessed for non-lethal weapons. Each of these areas is important, if not critical. for non-lethal weapons systems development and for acceptance by commanders. Department of the Navy Organizational Interest U.S. Marine Corps interest and priority regarding non-lethal weapons have been growing since the early 1990s, although the Marine Corps and the JNLWD have not been successful in motivating naval-unique R&D investments in non- lethal weapons. Navy interest was largely dormant until the USS Cole incident, but it has been evident since then, growing noticeably throughout the course of this study. Investments in people, dollars, and concept development have not yet caught up with that interest.