Complete List of Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Finding 1-1. Homeland security is an important extension of the Army’s historical role of providing military support to civilian authorities. The Army will be called on to assist the lead federal agency, the Department of Homeland Security, in meeting a wide range of demands for consequence management and recovery of public order and critical services.
Finding 1-2. The Army National Guard, given its historical mission and flexibility, geographic dispersion, dual-mission capabilities, and frequent association with local agencies, is the key Army asset to meet homeland security demands and can be augmented as necessary with special capabilities from the Army Reserve and the active Army.
Finding 1-3. There are many similarities between military operations involving allied or coalition forces and operations involving civilian emergency responders.
Conclusion 1-1. Many of the technological requirements for homeland security will be important for the Objective Force.
Recommendation 1-1. To optimize current science and technology efforts, the Army should take advantage of potential transferability between technologies for homeland security and those for the Objective Force.
Conclusion 1-2. There needs to be better means to coordinate the homeland security science and technology efforts of the Department of Defense and those of the various civilian agencies.
Recommendation 1-2. The Army should encourage better coordination of the disparate homeland security science and technology efforts.
Conclusion 1-3. Homeland security technologies developed by the Army could be of great benefit to the private sector and to other government agencies.
Recommendation 1-3. The Army should facilitate technology transfer in order to allow the private sector and other government agencies to exploit the homeland security technologies it develops.
Conclusion 1-4. The ability to rapidly deploy a capability-based task force in support of either the homeland security mission or an Objective Force mission will become even more critical.
Recommendation 1-4a. The Army should investigate the technologies necessary to put together on the fly the force packages necessary to meet the requirements of both homeland security and the highly deployable Objective Force.
Recommendation 1-4b. Given the time lag associated with training personnel and leadership to use new technology, now is the time to start dealing with these issues in the context of homeland security, so that they are well honed by the time the Objective Force is fielded.
Conclusion 1-5. The Army National Guard does not appear to play a direct role in defining the critical requirements associated with homeland security.
Recommendation 1-5. The Army National Guard’s homeland security role must be considered in the development of the Army Science and Technology Master Plan, and resources for these requirements applied as appropriate in developing the Department of the Army Master Priority List.
Conclusion 1-6. Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) is of supreme importance and will apply to a greater or lesser extent in each of the four operational areas in both homeland security and the Objective Force.
Conclusion 2-1. In conducting the survey it was often difficult to obtain authoritative and certified data on the real-world performance of many of the indicators and warning sensors in use or in development. This difficulty also applied to data on sensitivity and noise characteristics.
Recommendation 2-1. It is critically important that all sensors not only be well characterized at the point of purchase but also be regularly rechecked by compe-
tent technicians. Software used to integrate disparate sensors should be well documented and checked against standardized problems.
Conclusion 2-2. Technologies should be pursued that (1) deny theft or diversion by maintaining real-time inventory control, then tracking if control is lost or (2) reduce the utility of such equipment to terrorists. Incorporation of detection markers and identification taggants into all legitimately manufactured low-vapor-pressure explosives will assist in both detection and forensic analysis.
Recommendation 2-2. An international convention requiring the incorporation of detection markers and identification taggants should be sought.
Conclusion 2-3. The physical detection of dangerous packaged materials (nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and explosive weapons) is an extremely difficult and stressing task, even when the materials are forced through choke points.
Conclusion 2-4. A purely technical solution to the indications and warning problem based upon sensors, even networked sensors, is unlikely. Establishing the proper interrelationships among the sensor networks and the broader intelligence collection activity will be crucial for properly queuing the sensor network.
Recommendation 2-4a. The Army should ensure from the outset that the necessary interrelationships among the sensor networks and the broader intelligence collection activity are established and maintained as a coherent undertaking.
Recommendation 2-4b. Army science and technology should aggressively seek out and invest in those cross-cutting sciences and technologies that will benefit both the Objective Force and the homeland security requirement to detect weapons of mass destruction.
Conclusion 3-1. The current database describing injuries and fatalities due to blast-related terrorist activities is sparse.
Recommendation 3-1. To gather valuable and perishable medical and other forensic data, the Army should support the establishment of rapid response data-gathering teams to investigate bombing attacks that may occur in the future. The data collected by these teams should be integrated with information from past events and made available to researchers and practitioners in emergency medicine, injury epidemiology, search and rescue, architecture, and engineering.
Conclusion 3-2. Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems can be improved and integrated with architectural/civil design features for both new build-
ings and retrofits to provide better resistance to chemical, biological, and radiological attacks.
Recommendation 3-2. The Army should monitor and integrate new heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning technologies developed by the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency and other organizations into building and infrastructure design and retrofit guidelines. These technologies include detection, neutralization, filtration, and active ventilation defenses.
Conclusion 3-3. Research currently being conducted by universities in window/glass behavior and structural response through failure in dynamic environments can help to improve the blast resistance of key structures.
Recommendation 3-3. The Army should continue to survey and evaluate relevant ongoing university research with the objective of identifying and synthesizing technology that could improve the performance of buildings in a blast environment, and it should also consider inviting universities to directly participate in the research effort.
Conclusion 3-4. As the Army becomes more dependent on computer-based systems, cybersecurity becomes more of an issue.
Recommendation 3-4a. The Army should partner with other agencies and the commercial sector to develop and adopt the appropriate tools and protocols for the protection of its own computer and communication systems.
Recommendation 3-4b. The Army should continue to review its cybersecurity procedures to assure that the best practices from the community are adopted on an ongoing basis.
Conclusion 3-5. Even if the attack does not directly inflict physical or cyberdamage on computer and communication systems, the public systems may become overloaded. Since the first responders often use components of public systems, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) may be a significant problem in the aftermath.
Recommendation 3-5a. Whether through the Army National Guard or active or reserve Army units, the Army should play a major role in providing emergency command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) in the event of a major natural or terrorism disaster because it has both the skill set and the equipment to provide such services in hostile environments.
Recommendation 3-5b. Equipment and trained personnel should be available to provide vital information and communications for interoperable command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) in the case that civilian systems are seriously impaired in an emergency event.
Conclusion 4-1. A new national emergency response command, control, and communications system for homeland security must be developed and fielded to meet the demands of the emerging threats, particularly to integrate the response to chemical, biological, high explosive, radiological, and nuclear weapons. This system must be compatible with developments in the new Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Northern Command, and state and local entities. Current Army science and technology thrusts and programs that are integral to the Objective Force can be adapted for the new national system.
Recommendation 4-1. To facilitate the development and fielding of an integrated command-and-control system for homeland security, the Army should initiate or continue research that permits the earliest possible fielding of investigate deployable communications packages equipped with universal multiplexer capability to facilitate command and control across the vast, and disparate, array of agencies that will respond to incidents and events.
Conclusion 4-2. Rapid assessment of the effects of natural disasters and attacks using chemical, biological, high explosive, radiological, and nuclear weapons is essential to mitigate the damage, save lives, and restore order. To some degree, the process for event assessment is similar to that used by the Objective Force in building a common operational picture; however, different sensors and analytical processes will be used.
Recommendation 4-2. The Army should conduct research on processes and systems to facilitate the event assessment process. It should support high-priority research such as sensor networking and fusion to merge reports from disparate sensors into a common picture.
Conclusion 4-3. An aggressive, continuing science and technology program across the spectrum of technologies needed for individual and collective protection is necessary for the Army and civilian emergency responders.
Recommendation 4-3. The Army’s research and development across the spectrum of technologies needed for individual and collective protection against the effects of weapons of mass destruction for the Army and civilian emergency responders should be continued.
Conclusion 4-4. The new challenges for recovery and consequence management include triage, tracking, and treatment of mass casualties following an event involving weapons of mass destruction. The scale of such an event and the need to conduct an orderly treatment process in the presence of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear contamination is daunting. In all likelihood, the nation’s military, including the Army, will be called on to play a significant role in this activity.
Recommendation 4-4a. The Army should expand its research in the area of triage, tracking, and treatment of mass casualties.
Recommendation 4-4b. The Army should ensure development of individual triage assessment for mass casualties from events involving weapons of mass destruction.
Recommendation 4-4c. The Army should ensure the development of a process to leverage information technology to effectively conduct mass casualty triage, tracking, and treatment following such an event. The process development should incorporate remote decision support systems that can be integrated with civilian systems, and a tracking system.
Conclusion 4-5. The processes for decontamination following chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or even large explosive events need to be expanded. Rapid remediation of the areas involved in such an event will be necessary to limit casualties and to restore critical services. Expanded Army science and technology can contribute significantly to process development and to finding decontamination materials to assist the activity.
Recommendation 4-5a. Army science and technology should concentrate on the further development of a process to plan and implement remediation and decontamination for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events. This process must be capable of being conducted in real time based on limited information.
Recommendation 4-5b. Army science and technology should concentrate on the further development of decontamination solutions for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or even large explosive events.
Conclusion 5-1. Lack of mobility in an urban environment is a critical disadvantage that can result in survivability challenges.
Recommendation 5-1. The Army should continue and enhance current research and development to focus on mobility operations in the urban environment, to
include exploration of small, mobile armored carriers for use in urban environments and mini-breachers to clear streets and alleyways.
Conclusion 5-2. Precision and lethality of weapons are critical issues the Army should address to improve fire support for operations in urban environments.
Recommendation 5-2. The Army should modify current systems or develop new systems, along with appropriate munitions, that are specifically designed for extremely precise fire support in urban environments.
Conclusion 5-3. Several capabilities and technologies being developed by the Army would be extremely useful for the civilian first responder, for example the situational awareness Blue Force Tracking and health monitoring system.
Recommendation 5-3. The Army should make technologies such as the situational awareness Blue Force Tracking program and the health monitoring system available to the Department of Homeland Security, which will consider whether or not they can be adapted for civilian use.
Conclusion 5-4: A very sophisticated situational awareness system, with highly accurate Blue Force Tracking in an urban environment, although difficult to construct due to complex radio frequency characteristics and the degree of accuracy required, will provide the soldier and civilian emergency responders a very powerful tool in the war against terrorism.
Recommendation 5-4: The Army should continue to develop a robust soldier situational awareness system begun in Land Warrior that provides a real-time, fused information system.
Conclusion 5-5. Terrorist cell tracking and surveillance in the urban environment and in rugged terrain are extremely difficult as they rely on a very small signal against a large background.
Recommendation 5-5. The Army should adopt a tiered approach to the problem of terrorist cell tracking and surveillance in the urban environment and in rugged terrain, first increasing sensor sensitivity, then networking and fusing sensors, and, finally, fusing information from disparate sources.
Conclusion 6-1. Science and technology can and will assist the Army in its homeland security role.
Recommendation 6-1. The Army should focus its funding and research efforts on the high-payoff technologies shown in summary Table 6-1.