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Posiconffict Chechnya: Analysis of the Situation and Reconstruction Problems (Political Aspects)* Dzhabrai' Gakoev Institute of Economic Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences n April 15, 2000, Russian military and political leaders officially an pounced the completion of the military portion of the antiterrorist ~ campaign in Chechnya. According to the Russian Federation Gen- eral Staff, Ministry of Defense units had crushed all major heavily armed groups and destroyed the rebels' military command structure and unified infrastructure. According to official sources, up to 13,000 rebel fighters were killed, including 20 known field commanders, and the same number were detained and are being held in isolation units for interrogation. The Russian army lost about 3,000 service members (although these figures are questioned by many nongovernmental organizations and the media). According to human rights organizations, about 10,000 civilian residents were killed during the second Chechen campaign (Ichkerian representa- tives cite other figures, namely that the federal troops lost 14,000 men, while the Chechen rebels lost 1,500~. During the campaign, federal troops occupied all strategically important population centers and for the first time gained control of the Chechen segment of the Russian-Georgian bor- der. With the completion of active military operations, the major burden of combating small groups of rebels was supposed to fall to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Services (FSB). However, in defeating the main rebel forces and occupying the entire perimeter of *Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins. 145
146 APPENDIX A Chechnya, the federal troops did not win the war. It is still going on, gradually taking on the characteristics of a guerilla war. It has already been six months since the conflict entered into a partisan warfare phase without an end in sight. According to the estimates of Russian military leaders, there are about 2,000 to 2,500 fighters left in Chechnya (Maskhadov states that he has 15,000~. They are attacking Russian troops on a daily basis and carrying out acts of sabotage, resulting in losses of 50 to 70 Russian servicemen a month. The number of rebels is not declining, and their leaders Maskhadov, Basaev, Khattab, Gelaev, and Baraev- are still at large, moving unhindered throughout Chechnya and success- fully controlling military operations. As a result, the major goal of the antiterrorist campaign remains unmet. Army units have proven ineffective against small mobile separatist groups. They have gone on the defensive, reducing active military opera- tions to a minimum. This marked the start of a difficult and exhausting struggle against diversionary warfare operations. The troops are further- more sustaining heavy losses, especially from kamikaze-type actions. "During the daytime, we are the bosses, and at night, the rebels are," say soldiers. The completely ruined city of Grozny, with its crushed and de- stroyed factories, demolished apartment buildings, and deep ravines, is a perfect platform for guerilla warfare. According to military sources, there are several hundred rebel fighters permanently positioned in the city. During the daytime they hide, and at night they attack checkpoints and shell and mine targets they have identified. All the attributes of guerilla warfare are present in Chechnya. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that a guerilla war lasts as long as the causes that produced it. Official statements from the Russian military to the effect that the situation is under control do not truly represent the facts. In fact, the federal troops cannot ensure their own security or protect the civilian population. On December 9, General Anatoly Kvashnin, the chief of the general staff, announced the start of a new phase of the antiterrorist cam- paign. The essence of this phase is that federal military units and the Chechen militia are planning to take under their protection several hun- dred major population centers of Chechnya, thus guaranteeing the secu- rity of the residents. This decision illustrates the no-win nature of the situation. There are 450 villages in Chechnya, and there will not be enough military garrisons to cover them all. Bogged down in a prolonged guerilla war, the Ministry of Defense for the first time officially expressed its dissatisfaction with the actions taken by the MVD and FSB. General Valery Manilov, deputy chief of the general staff, publicly stated that "the effectiveness of the campaign has been noticeably reduced. Things continue to drag on. Look how the check- points operate and how clearing operations are performed. It's no won-
APPENDIX A 147 der that with operations like these the bandits can move almost unhin- dered across the territory of the republic and set up bases and storage facilities" (Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 17, 2000~. The military lead- ers correctly believe that it should be the task of the special intelligence services to destroy small groups of rebels, carry out operational missions, and suppress terrorist activities. But the facts indicate that the internal security troops Special-Purpose Militia Detachments (OMONs) and Emergency Response Composite Detachments (SOBRs) that were tem- porarily commissioned to the Chechen Republic are not coping with this task. Furthermore, these special operations, clearing operations, and retri- bution actions are producing numerous civilian casualties, contributing to an increase in the number of refugees, and expanding the support base of the Chechen fighters. The inappropriate use of force against the civilian population of Chechnya, based on the so-called principle of collective responsibility, produces animosity among the people, who initially had been inclined against the separatists. At times the rebels themselves carry out actions that provoke retribution operations by the army, but the federal troops bear all the blame for the consequences. Naturally, military operations that lead to civilian casualties negate the effects of all social and economic programs, and this is the major obstacle to the stabilization process in the Chechen Republic. Outrages and violence on the part of Russian military structures against Chechen civilians only intensify the emerging tendency by which the military actions of the federal troops are perceived as "anti- people," while the resistance of the Chechen rebels takes on the features of a national liberation movement. A new wave of recruits could become the dominant force in the Chechen resistance. Together with their new leaders, they will become ideological crusaders, meaning that they will be more brutal. It must be kept in mind that the Russian military contingent in Chechnya is basically uniform in its ethnic composition, and it is fight- ing in a territory with an ethnically homogeneous population. This is also an objective precondition for the tension in relations. World experience shows that an army brought from its barracks into the field is liable to become degraded quickly. Acts of vandalism and robberies of civilians become everyday occurrences. Today the command is facing the following challenge: how to protect troops who have fulfilled their military duties from being subject to degradation. The soldiers, mostly paid contractors, who have been put through severe tests and ordeals, now find themselves with a good deal of spare time. As a result, this group of some 120,000 servicemen is becoming uncontrollable. An increase in the crime rate is being registered among service personnel as a result of drug and alcohol abuse and fraternization. The combination of guns, drugs, and alcohol is of greater danger now for the troops than the
148 APPENDIX A Chechen fighters are. Many soldiers who have survived war and risked their lives are failing the test of peaceful life and reaching for their weap- ons on the slightest pretext, using the only argument they know kill- ing in any conflict situation. In most instances, local residents become the victims. The war in Chechnya has become a very profitable business for both sides in the conflict, and this is the main obstacle to the stabilization process in the Chechen Republic. Some high-ranking army officers have an interest in maintaining the stagnating war. The current situation guar- antees the military a fat line item in the budget and growing authority with the nation's leadership. Chechnya is needed as a test site, a live target for building up the army's muscles. In trying to preserve all of this, the generals impress upon themselves and the public that the "Chechen problem" will be resolved once the militant leaders are captured or elimi- nated. In fact, the military leaders are in no hurry to resolve this problem. According to the newspaper Segodnya (dated August 28, 2000), the Rus- sian military structures in Chechnya have "two options for actions in the current situation. The first is to follow the behest of General Vladimir Shamanov, who thinks that the rebels' family members are not much different from the rebels themselves. The second is to try to gain as much personal benefit from the war as possible, even at the expense of treason. Both options are equally dangerous. While the harm of treason is quite straightforward and does not require long deliberations, the implementa- tion of the principle 'a good Chechen is a dead Chechen' is not only amoral but also creates new participants in the guerilla war." The war in Chechnya is of a fundamentally criminal nature. Every- thing, including human life, is bought and sold. The continuation of the conflict in its present phase is to the advantage of certain forces in Russian political, financial, and military circles. Their representatives have so- called business contacts in Chechnya. Mafia structures make their busi- ness dealing in people, weapons, drugs, and petroleum products. The clans of certain regional "barons" are involved in this business as well. A portion of the funds gained from the sale of humanitarian aid sent from abroad goes to line their pockets (and embezzlement of federal funds goes without saying). Because of such criminal outrages, Chechnya has seen the development of an environment in which it is impossible for people to do good and fulfill their essential human nature. Human rights violations are occurring on a massive scale in Chech- nya. Russian laws have no effect, and lawlessness and tyranny reign. There is still no legislation that would regulate how antiterrorist opera- tions are conducted. Certain military service personnel (contractors and OMON and SOBR troops) perform acts of violence, commit premeditated murders of civilians, and rob local residents during clearing operations.
APPENDIX A 149 Such robberies are often committed completely openly and furthermore involve not only small valuables, such as money or jewelry, but also the organized removal of large cargo. Such robberies may take place only with the authorization of the commanders of individual units. Systematic extortion is quite common at the checkpoints. Today it is not only bandits who are kidnapping and selling people; legal armed formations are involved in this business as well. During the conflict, more than 10,000 people have passed through the detention and interrogation system, with many of them being ransomed by their rela- tives. According to official data, 467 criminal cases have been filed against military personnel, but only 14 involve crimes committed against civil- ians. The problem is complicated by the lack of a judiciary system in Chechnya. The lack of legal protection during the entire period of military operations in the Chechen Republic means that the residents of Chechnya are deprived of the main mechanism for protecting their legal rights. According to data gathered by the independent commission of Pavel Krashenninikov, cases of pillaging and extortion have become more fre- quent among military personnel. "In just one region of Chechnya, accord- ing to commission member Ella Panfilova, the commandant had to fire 62 contract soldiers for using forged documents" (Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 14, 2000~. There are instances in which clearing operations have been carried out without federal government authorization. Recently, disappearances have become more frequent in Chechnya. People detained at checkpoints disappear without a trace. According to official data, the number of missing people has reached 500. According to the Pavel Krashenninikov commission, "the names of many detained lo- cal residents cannot be found in the lists of the MVD, the General Prosecutor's Office, or the FSB." A serious problem faced by Chechen residents is that many people do not hold Russian passports, and the latter are issued very slowly. Without a passport, citizens are deprived of the right to move about freely, and they face a real danger of being de- tained during clearing operations in various population centers. In general, the commission believes that "since military operations ended, the humanitarian situation in the Chechen Republic has deterio- rated dramatically" (Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 14, 2000~. The problem of human rights violations during wanton clearing operations, drug and ammunition search operations, and similar actions was raised for the first time on such a high level at parliamentary hearings held on September 21, 2000. Almost all speakers at the hearings, including Vlad- imir Kalamanov, special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the preservation of human rights and freedoms in Chech- nya, admitted that "human rights violations are still occurring on a mas- sive scale" (Nezovisimaya Gazeta, September 22, 2000~. According to
150 APPENDIX A Aslanbek Aslakhanov, State Duma deputy from the Chechen Republic, the army and law enforcement agencies are conducting "all sorts of ex- periments in brutality, unscrupulousness, and immorality" on the resi- dents of Chechnya. As for the residents who left Chechnya and now reside in other regions of Russia, "some werewolves with shoulder straps have turned them into private sources of off-budget financing" (Nezovisi- maya Gazeta, September 22, 2000~. It is generally agreed by Duma leaders, analysts, and experts that the problem of providing for the security of residents and protecting them from both the Chechen fighters and the federal troops remains the biggest problem in Chechnya. Council of Eu- rope Secretary General Walter Schwimmer and Council of Europe Parlia- mentary Assembly representative Lord Judd confirmed this point during their appearances at the hearings. Recently the refugee problem has again intensified. The economy and social sector of the Chechen Republic, which had been partially restored after the first war and had been functioning to a certain extent, have now been completely destroyed. Those who left Chechnya before 1999 will not be able to come back to their homes, as they have been destroyed once again. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of new forced migrants have now joined their ranks. And with the onset of winter, 150,000 refugees in Ingushetia again found themselves in a desperate situation. From the beginning, the rebels have been using the refugees as a means of putting pressure on the federal authorities, trying to push them into negotiations with Maskhadov. Some of the forced migrants are willing to return home, but they need security guarantees and minimal social support. The Chechen rebels have recently stepped up their terror campaign against local residents. For the purposes of intimidation, they shoot local government officials and carry out conspicuous executions of those who dared to condemn their actions publicly. A string of murders has oc- curred in many communities of Chechnya. From March through fuly 2000, 9 heads of local government administrations, 12 Chechen police officers, 4 staff members of the public prosecutor's office, and 4 imams of rural mosques were killed. In late August 2000, the rebels executed two men in the villages of Dargo and Belgatoi and placed their heads on stakes for intimidation purposes. On September 16, five people (local residents ranging in age from 15 to 70) were killed in the village of Starye Atagi. Previously, six people were killed in the same village (local resi- dents suspect federal troops in this incident). The rebels publicly executed Lieutenant Colonel Shamil Azaev, deputy commander of the Regional Department of the Interior in Chechnya's Vedeno Region, and Lieutenant Colonel Said Bisultanov, chief of the general staff. On October 11, the separatists carried out a terrorist act against Chechen police officers by blowing up the building of the Regional Department of the Interior in the
APPENDIX A 151 Oktyabrsky District of the city of Grozny. A total of 12 people were killed and 17 wounded; the victims were all Chechen, including women and children. On October 23, 70-year-old Magomed Saidaliev fell victim to the terrorists. He was chairman of the Council of Elders in the village of Goity, Urus-Martan Region and an irreconcilable adversary of the Wahhabists. On October 31, Isa Yemurzaev, a police inspector from the Grozny Regional Department of the Interior, was killed at his home in Alkhan-Kala. On November 9, Isa Tsuev, head of the Alkhan-Kala Village Administration, was killed along with two female employees. On No- vember 12, nine civilians were killed in the city of Urus-Martan. On No- vember 16, Dadalov, head of the Mesker-Yurt Village Administration, was killed along with his deputy. On December 8, two Chechen police officers were killed and three wounded as a result of a terrorist act in Gudermes. In November-December, in Urus-Martan Region alone about 100 Chechen civilians fell victims to terrorists of them, 40 died and al- most as many were wounded. And this bloody score keeps increasing. By using terror against war-weary Chechen civilians, the rebels are attempting to intimidate their compatriots who are cooperating with the Kadyrov administration. In addition, the operations of the federal troops often turn against civilians as well. As a result, the civilian population of Chechnya finds itself facing two equally severe dangers, a hostage to the conflict. Ivan Babichev, the commandant of Chechnya, has admitted that in some cases civilians are also affected during clearing operations. Akhmed Kadyrov, the head of the government administration in Chech- nya, has also stated that continuing the practice of mass-scale clearing operations could have serious negative consequences and cause intense public indignation. Should this ever occur, Kadyrov has indicated that he "will be compelled to admit that the people are right" and that he "will be on the side of the people" (Nezovisimaya Gazeta, September 19, 2000~. The appointment of Akhmed Kadyrov as head of the Chechen Re- public Administration has yet to have a significant impact on the align- ment of forces in Chechnya. Moreover, the reaction of people in Chechnya and Russia to this appointment has been quite ambiguous. Not only sepa- ratists but also the pro-Russian segment of Chechen society have reacted negatively to the Kremlin's choice, believing that a more authoritative person capable of consolidating Chechen society could have been selected from within the Chechen establishment, if the will to do so had been there. However, the Kremlin had its own logic in backing Kadyrov, a choice that was based on a number of circumstances. First, it was condi- tioned by the influence of military circles on the president of the Russian Federation (Kadyrov is the protege of the military and intelligence ser- vices and is controlled by them). Second, the foreign policy factor also played a significant role. It was important for the leaders of the Russian
152 APPENDIX A Federation to demonstrate to the international community that a spiritual leader of the Chechens, a former colleague of Maskhadov who had grown disenchanted with the policy of separatism, had been appointed as the head of Chechnya. Third, the appointment of Kadyrov was supposed to serve as an example of reconciliation with the former followers of Dudaev and Maskhadov, who for various reasons were not taking up arms at the time. It was the Kremlin's intention to use the ambiguous and contradic- tory figure of the mufti to unite all Chechens against the Wahhabists. Finally, should Kadyrov fail, the federal government could lay the blame on the Chechen political elite, reasoning that the latter by definition is incapable of producing and supporting a leader from within its own ranks. The idea of appointing a Russian governor-general in Chechnya is al- ready being actively discussed by the Russian media. Recent events in Chechnya demonstrate that the new administration is not succeeding in changing the situation. And it is not only that Kadyrov's popularity rating among the public is not very high; the main problem of the local authorities lies in the legal outrages perpetrated by the federal troops and the lack of funds for restoring the economy and the social sector in the Chechen Republic. Against this backdrop, conflicts among the major figures of the Chechen administration have reintensified. This primarily involves Akhmed-khadzhi Kadyrov and his first deputy, Bislan Gantamirov. That there is still no clear legislative solution regard- ing the division of authorities among the various government structures in Chechnya has also contributed to this conflict. According to Kadyrov, he "does not know himself what authorities he has, what authorities the president's plenipotentiary representative in the southern district has, and what authorities the commandant of the republic has." Some analysts are inclined to view the attempt to team Kadyrov and Gantamirov as not so much a mistake as a deliberate action of the Krem- lin. According to these analysts, this is being done with the aim of proving to everyone that the Chechens are incapable of governing the republic themselves. General Vladimir Shamanov has confirmed these suspicions to the fullest extent. He was quick to state that there is "a fight going on among the ringleaders of local crime families in Chechnya"; therefore, leadership may be entrusted only to a Russian. It appears no coincidence that the same idea has been put forth by Mikhail Gutsiriev, head of the oil company Slavneft. According to local experts, it is the commanders of federal troops in the Chechen Republic who are promoting this idea to convince the country's political leadership that the military should gov- ern Chechnya for the time being. They then proceed to conclude that the military leadership does not have the goal of bringing the war to an end. In fact, the instability that gives rise to conflicts within the Chechen ad- ministration helps to prolong the war.
APPENDIX A 153 It is difficult to predict what actions the Kremlin might take in re- sponse to a split in the republic's leadership. For the time being, Ganta- mirov and Kadyrov have been reconciled once again. However, recent observations made by Viktor Kazantsev and Gennady Troshev as well as reports in the media indicate that the federal government will very soon be forced not only to choose between these two leaders but also possibly to change the very structure of government in the Chechen Republic. The appointment of Vladimir Yelagin as federal minister for the recovery of the Chechen economy and social sector is only the beginning of this pro- cess. It is quite obvious that the Russian president is interested in solving the Chechen problem; however, the desired results are not yet being achieved because of the weakness and disunity of the government and the prevalence of bureaucratic interests. External factors are also having an extremely negative impact on the situation in Chechnya. The Chechen conflict is taking on an increasingly international character, drawing into its orbit new players on the world geopolitical stage. Chechnya has become a platform for anti-Russian forces, a staging area for the clash of interests between world and regional powers seeking to take advantage of the collapse of the USSR and the weakness of Russia for the purpose of reallocating spheres of influence and the energy resources of the Caucasus. A broad-scale information war is being conducted against Russia. In the West and in the countries of the Islamic Conference, Chechen separatists aided by certain elements of the Western media are persistently spreading the myth that the Chechen people support the struggle against the federal troops. The rebels strive at all costs to inflict maximum losses on the federal troops and to demon- strate their combat potential to the local population and the West in par- ticular. They do this with only one intent, namely to compel the federal government to begin negotiations. Certain political forces in the United States, for example Zbigniew Brzezinski; representatives of the left wing forces in France; and radical Islamic centers in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United Arab Emir- ates, and other Muslim countries oppose the positive steps that Russia has taken towards stabilizing the situation not only in Chechnya but also in the Caucasus region as a whole. Chechnya has fallen victim to the sprawling expansion of international mercenaries and terrorists. This is illustrated by the regular flows of funds and personnel being sent to aid extremist groups in the North Caucasus. Each influx of dollars brings a new wave of subversive activities. Units of international mercenaries and their leaders, such as Khattab and others, have begun to play a dominant role in the Chechen resistance movement. It is they who are receiving large funds from abroad, so they make the decisions and are thus gradu- ally displacing Maskhadov and the Chechen field commanders into a
54 APPENDIX A secondary role. Foreign partners of the Chechen rebels have invested too much in the creation and development of this conflict to let the invested efforts and funds be dissipated so easily. The stakes in this game are too great. The hard line of the West regarding Russia's actions in Chechnya and the increasing aid to the Chechen rebels by radical extreme Islamic organizations are promoting a protracted war in Chechnya and drawing new regions of the North Caucasus into the conflict. PROGRAM PROPOSITIONS FOR POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT 1. An analysis of the situation in Chechnya confirms that this problem will not be resolved by force alone. The government must initiate the process of political resolution of the conflict by declaring its intent to make every possible effort to overcome the effects of the devastating conflict and bring life in Chechnya back to normal. It is important to publicize the conflict resolution program, including the conditions for ending the war in Chechnya, the boundaries of the republic, and its legal position within the Russian Federation. Chechnya must be provided with the fullest rights of self-determination and high sovereign status within the Russian Federation. The Chechen people must feel confident that their sovereignty will be preserved and that they will not be governed by re- gents or military commandants, but rather they will be able to choose their own leaders on the basis of free elections and establish a basis for civil governance. Taking into account the tragedy of the war and the extreme severity of the problem, additional (foreign) guarantees of Chechen sovereignty may be possible. While waging a decisive war against terrorism, the federal government must clearly and unambigu- ously define the limits of a possible compromise in resolving the crisis and indicate where concessions are impossible by definition. The federal government must proceed on the assumption that Chechnya may remain an integral part of Russia, should the country and its people recognize not only the territory but also the Chechen people as full-fledged members. Hence, the program should provide for maintaining within Russia not only the territory of Chechnya but more importantly its people. Conse- quently, it is necessary to change the climate of interethnic relations in the country, curb the rage of xenophobia and chechenophopia, and guarantee in practice equality before the law for all citizens of the Russian Federa- tion, regardless of their ethnic origins. The Russian state is a state made up of all its component nationalities, and they must be assured of this in practice. The federal government must place the actions of the military under strict control and ban the shelling of Chechen population centers. It must
APPENDIX A 155 demonstrate to the world that Chechens are rightful citizens of the Rus- sian Federation and that the goal of the military campaign is to protect their lives, rights, and property from terrorists and thugs. It is not expedi- ent for the Russian authorities to formulate a harsh ultimatum on recog- nizing the priority status of certain federal laws. Chechnya has the right to its sovereignty. The constitution of 1992 could serve as a starting point for drafting a Chechen constitution. This will help to avoid a defeated nation syndrome and will maintain the dignity of the Chechen people. The initiatives of the Russian leadership on launching the peaceful resolu- tion process should be given broad coverage and interpretation in the media. 2. The Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia must define the priorities of Caucasus policy for the current phase and defend these priorities consistently in the changed geopolitical condi- tions. Ethnopolitical conflicts in the Caucasus may be resolved by work- ing out mutually accepted rules of the game on the basis of international law. It is important to convince the world community that development of a global network of noncivil society organized crime, drug traffick- ing, money laundering, and international terrorism (all of which are pres- ent in Chechnya) poses a threat to humanity. Russia must provide the world and especially the Islamic countries with objective information on the causes and nature of the Chechen conflict and must disavow Udugov's propaganda about the "jihad against the unbelievers" that is supposedly under way in Chechnya. The world community must know that the Chechen separatists have discredited the idea of independence. They ter- rorize the civilian population and lack mass popular support. Russia must identify and neutralize the political and financial centers that support the terrorists. 3. At present, Chechen society is in a state of deep division and con- flict. Striving to maintain oligarchic control in the country, Russian politi- cal elites continue to use Chechnya for their own expedient interests. The people of Chechnya have become spare parts in the geostrategy of a uni- polar world. Civil and ethnic reconciliation in Chechnya is the key condi- tion for resolution of the conflict. The federal government must facilitate the return of refugees, contribute to the consolidation of the Chechen people, and encourage the taking of power by genuinely national forces oriented towards union with Russia. These objectives are in line with the country's strategic interests. In addition to the military component, a dia- logue should be initiated with organized forces within the Chechen com- munity. A conflict resolution program must be developed and imple- mented by the federal authorities in cooperation with all actors in the Chechen political process, except for those associated with criminal ac- tivities, armed separatism, and terrorism. For the purpose of defining
156 APPENDIX A terms for the cessation of military actions, negotiations with Maskhadov and the field commanders may be initiated. The problem of the status of the Chechen Republic cannot be discussed with the separatists, since it is the prerogative of the Chechen people to decide on this matter. 4. The Chechen conflict is primarily a consequence of internal contra- dictions within Chechen society. Hence, an internal political resolution represents the foundation for the overall stabilization of the situation in the Chechen Republic. This political resolution implies the resolution of an entire range of problems, including overcoming civil opposition and conflicts within teips (clans), localities, and virds (Sufi brotherhoods), which became urgent during the period of government by radical nation- alists. As a result, tens of thousands of people in Chechnya are involved in deadly feuds. Stabilizing the situation in Chechnya is impossible by defi- nition without reaching national consensus and achieving peace within Chechen society, that is, the reconciliation of hostile groups of people. Solving this problem requires not only firm government and the rule of law but also traditional institutions and people's diplomacy, specifically in the form of reconciliation commissions composed of authoritative indi- viduals. This is a major and extremely important effort that also requires government support. The main task of the Chechen political elite is to overcome the split within the nation. The resolution of Chechnya's socio- economic and political problems is possible only through national con- sensus and reconciliation. 5. The following principle must prevail in the work of all federal agencies and departments: Chechnya's problems must be solved by Chechens themselves, with support from the federal government. In this context, it is essential that an operable system of law enforcement be reestablished in the Chechen Republic as soon as possible. Chechen law enforcement structures, diverse in the ethnic backgrounds of their offic- ers, must combat thugs and terrorists by means of special operations, protect citizens' rights, and maintain law and order across Chechnya. The number of officers and their backgrounds must correspond to the level and size of problems to be solved. Officers should be employed on a contractual basis. The MVD and FSB should hire young people who wish to display their talents in the fight against separatists and who have good references from authoritative elders and local community leaders. The army must be relieved of performing police functions as soon as possible, as such functions are not the army's duty. MVD agencies should be given responsibility for maintaining law and order. It is their job to arrest or eliminate identified gang leaders and guarantee security for the civilian population. The size of the army contingent in Chechnya must be re- duced, with units on permanent dislocation status to remain in place. It is essential that the border control regime with Azerbaijan and Georgia be
APPENDIX A 157 strengthened accordingly and that heightened controls be put in place over ammunition and weapons maintained by federal troops. It is of the utmost importance to overcome tendencies of opposition between federal troops and local residents, eliminate the sociopolitical conditions for a revival of the rebels' influence, and mobilize local residents and the Chechen diaspora to cooperate with the federal government and support its policies. Military units with experience and skills in combating terror- ism should be permanently deployed in Chechnya, with the units to be partially staffed with draftees and contract soldiers from Chechnya. All federal forces in the Chechen Republic should be placed under a unified command, with their efforts to be focused on protecting strategic sites and supporting the actions of the Chechen police force. Only through the joint efforts of Chechen and federal military and law enforcement struc- tures can success be assured in operations to eliminate saboteurs and terrorist groups. 6. To consolidate positive forces within Chechnya, a Constitutional Assembly of the Chechen Republic should be convened. An organiza- tional committee should be elected to develop the constitution and other legislation for the Chechen Republic, which are crucial for the restoration of constitutional rule. It is important to ensure public support for the government of the Chechen Republic, provide it with the appropriate legislative base, and clearly divide authorities among the various power structures. It may be feasible to establish a state council, a temporary collegial executive body, during the transitional preelection period. Such a council could include all authoritative leaders of Chechen society and representatives of the regions and ethnic groups of Chechnya. The main priorities are completing the process of building an operable governance system for the transitional period and restoring the vertical chain of com- mand. Potential candidates to serve in the governing bodies of the Chechen Republic should be qualified professionals with authority and influence in Chechen society. 7. Nationwide democratic elections must be the final phase in the political resolution of the conflict in the Chechen Republic. Ending the protracted civil conflict in Chechnya and consolidating Chechen society are possible only through the election of a legitimate government that carries authority with the people. The historic traditions and mentality of the Chechen people are in favor of a parliamentary republic. Institutions of collective power based on the consensus of the main ethnic groups are typical for the weakly structured Chechen society. The free democratic societies of Chechnya did not tolerate authoritarian power or tyranny. That is why the institution of the presidency did not take root in Chechnya. Traditionally, Chechnya has had a collective or parliamentary form of government. Organs of state power in Chechnya have always
158 APPENDIX A been based on such traditional institutions of self-governance as the Mekhk-Kkhel (Council of Elders), Community Council, and Village Coun- cil. This is how the Chechen people have lived over the ages. Conse- quently, they need to return to a controlled society with an autonomous parliamentary system of governance. The parliament of the Chechen Republic should consist of two cham- bers. The upper chamber (9 to 11 members) would be formed on the basis of proportional representation of regions and major ethnic and religious groups. The lower chamber (38 to 40 members) would be formed on the basis of nationwide elections. The parliament elects a State Council and council chair from among its own members and approves members of the Cabinet of Ministers. Elections to the Chechen Republic parliament should be held in 2001, without further delay. However, the problem of Chech- nya, and of Russia as well, lies not only in choosing a form of government appropriate to their historical traditions but also in selecting a governing class of individuals who must be united in the common goal of serving the people. Chechnya's prosperity depends on the selection of honest men and women who would lead their people through chaos and hesita- tion to the correct path of their progressive development. This is the foun- dation for the nation's recovery. 8. The recovery of the economy and the social sector of the Chechen Republic is a crucial condition for stabilizing the situation not only in Chechnya but also in the North Caucasus region as a whole. Ending the war in Chechnya is possible only by making the war unprofitable, that is, by starting a process of creation. The more efficiently the federal govern- ment works to resolve the socioeconomic problems that caused the crisis, the more isolated the separatists will be and the sooner the war will end. The priority objective remains restoring the housing stock, the agricul- tural sector, and the petrochemical industry, as well as developing knowl- edge-intensive and waste-free technologies. At this conjuncture, the fed- eral authorities must first assist forced emigrants from Chechnya, provide financial support in the form of pensions, benefits, and humanitarian aid for the poor and war victims in the Chechen Republic, and most impor- tantly promote the consolidation of social and political forces loyal to Russia. The program of recovery activities in Chechnya should be directly linked to the process of returning forced migrants to their homes, includ- ing not only Chechens but also Russian-speaking people (some 800,000 citizens of the former Chechen-Ingush Republic currently reside outside Chechnya). This point is even more important, given that it is by defini- tion impossible to restore the economy and the social sphere, revive the popular culture, and generally stabilize the situation in Chechnya and surrounding areas without the help and support of these people, who have better professional and educational backgrounds than other seg-
APPENDIX A 159 meets of the population. The attitude of the federal government regard- ing the problem of forced migrants is the key to resolving the Chechen conflict. Finally, in terms of protecting the rights of Russian Federation citizens of Chechen nationality, the way in which the federal authorities respond to their needs may win the trust of those who are currently being deceived by nationalistic propaganda within Chechnya. The federal and local authorities must move decisively to eliminate oppression, unlawful acts, and ethnic discrimination directed against people from Chechnya. In the aim of returning forced migrants to Chechnya, it is essential to guar- antee their security and provide them with targeted governmental and humanitarian aid within the republic. 9. It is extremely important to have ethnic Chechens working in gov- ernment departments and agencies at both the regional and federal levels. These people should be worthy and highly qualified. It is a matter of fundamental importance that Chechens, as representatives of the third largest ethnic group in Russia, are represented proportionally within the ranks of government officials and employees. Their appointments to re- sponsible positions along with other nationalities, especially on the fed- eral level, would have great resonance in the Chechen community. This along with other factors would reduce ethnic tensions in the country and strengthen the confidence of Chechens in the Russian government. 10. The Chechnya problem is largely a cultural problem. During the reign of radical nationalist leaders, the Chechen Republic became a sort of factory producing new members of the lumpenproletariat. Therefore, re- solving the Chechen crisis first and foremost requires providing new jobs for people and ensuring their education and enlightenment. The tens of thousands of young people who have reached adulthood in the past 10 years could become a social base for the separatists if they are not pro- vided with employment or training. Federal health and education pro- grams must be high-priority activities. Every year, tens of thousands of Chechen young people should be enrolled in Russian universities, techni- cal colleges, and vocational training schools. The main point is to support Russian cultural and educational centers in Chechnya, the foundations of civilized society. 11. The Russian media have created a negative image of Chechens, presenting a marginal segment of that population as a reflection of the entire Chechen nation. This conscious misrepresentation must be dis- avowed. The federal and local authorities must present persuasive argu- ments to prove the reasonableness of the antiterrorism campaign, reveal the danger and the antihuman nature of terrorism, and destroy the false hero status of its leaders. Representatives of the Chechen intelligentsia, who represent the true interests of the people, must have the opportunity to use the Russian media to tell the entire world the truth about what is
160 APPENDIX A happening in Chechnya and how they feel about it. So far, the voice of the separatists has been presented as the voice of the people, while the true interests and opinions of most Chechen people, who want to live as part of Russia, have been suppressed. A Russian television channel (broad- casting in both Russian and Chechen) is essential. There must be more coverage of the lives and activities of Chechens in Chechnya and in Rus- sia, and persecutions and the practice of labeling the entire nation and presenting Chechen people as "proud savages" must be ended. It is nec- essary to show more coverage of people who are engaged in constructive work. Only by restoring confidence between peoples can the Russian state be strengthened and the Chechen conflict be resolved. 12. For 10 years, Chechnya has been outside the legal space of the Russian Federation. It is necessary to restore the judicial system of the Chechen Republic, ensure the efficient operations of the courts and inves- tigative agencies, facilitate effective prosecutorial oversight, and stop the practice of abductions. A significant portion of the population has been deprived of the right to travel because of their lack of identification docu- ments. Therefore, the issuance of passports to all citizens must be a high- priority objective, as without these documents it is impossible to guaran- tee the rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation in Chechnya. 13. To ensure the rights of citizens of Chechnya, the inappropriate use of force in the republic must be halted. The unreasonably large number of checkpoints in the Chechen Republic must be reduced (today there are more than 400 of them), and the practices of extortion, blackmail, and oppression of local residents by federal troops must be ended. Arrange- ments should be made for checkpoints to be jointly manned by federal troops and Chechen militia. Special rules and standards should be intro- duced in the army and other federal military and civilian structures in Chechnya to govern the treatment of local residents, rebels, and fellow service members. A law prohibiting the use of alcohol is urgently needed for armed services personnel during their service in Chechnya. All seg- ments of the noncombatant population must receive humane treatment, and international legal standards must be observed when dealing with rebels who have voluntarily laid down their arms. Another amnesty should be announced for individuals who have not committed grave crimes and are willing to stop their resistance. At the same time, public judicial inquiries should be conducted regarding those who have commit- ted grave offences against the civilian population. The fight against ter- rorism must be waged consistently, without hesitations or extremes, and in a highly professional manner in strict compliance with legislative acts and democratic principles. Otherwise, state terrorism will replace com-
APPENDIX A 161 mon terrorism and banditry. The use of force against bandits must be lawful and justified in the people's eyes. 14. The Russian business sector and Chechen entrepreneurs in par- ticular are called upon to play an enormous role in the recovery of Chech- nya and the revival of its economy and culture. Private capital must be attracted to restore the economy and the social sector of the Chechen Republic, so the government must take the appropriate actions to encour- age the flow of investments. The creation of a Council of Chechen Entre- preneurs, a Foundation for Chechen Revival, and other social organiza- tions may facilitate the achievement of these objectives. A Russia-wide campaign is urgently needed to provide humanitarian aid for Chechnya and Chechen refugees. The effects of the Chechen conflict may be over- come if all of Russian society confronts the problem.
Ethnic and National Conflicts in the Age of Globalization Anatoly M. Khazanov University of Wisconsin, Department of Anthropology ne postmodern concept of the world as a huge supermarket in which customers voluntarily choose from a wide range of identities just like they choose consumer goods is far from reality. The twenty-first cen- tury is often characterized as the Age of Globalization; however, the claim that ethnic and national identities are becoming vague and utterly mer- etricious remains unsubstantiated. So far, globalization is primarily an economic and technological de- velopment. Economic factors should certainly not be ignored or over- looked, but as important as they are, by themselves they are only blind forces. They are revealed in changing social constellations, interpreted in the language of politics, and expressed and perceived through culture. It is claimed that if cultures overlap and interpenetrate, they cease to be available as a political symbol of national difference and national unity. Hardly so, since any cultural trait, however it is or seems to be, can serve as an ethnic or national marker. Many assimilationist projects failed because they were based on di- rect identification of ethnicity and nationalism with culture, which is prob- lematic. Actors live not only in the here and now; they encounter the present in terms of the past and the future. Therefore, the social and historical context should always be taken into account to make sense of the choices that actors are able to make regarding self-identification. Ethnic and national identities are based on selected, or even con- structed and imagined, but emotionally significant and integrating sym- bols and landmarks of historical memory, as much as on cultural similari- 162
APPENDIX A 163 ties and differences. Even myths cease to be myths and become social reality when people internalize them and are ready to kill and be killed for them. The advent of the postmodernist era has not changed much in this respect. Inasmuch as ethnicity and nationalism are directly or indirectly linked to identity formation and maintenance, there is so far nothing in the glo- bal process that for better or worse can break this link. On the contrary, globalization, which makes individual cultures less bound by their tradi- tional ethnonational and territorial entities, at the same time enables them to use new technologies in order to reinvent, redefine, reproduce, and propagate themselves and their real or imaginary differences. Likewise, globally produced ideas contribute to contemporary concern with iden- tity, uniqueness, tradition, and indiginization. Another argument in favor of globalization as a force capable of re- ducing nationalism is connected with the allegedly diminishing role of nation-states. It is true that a strong link between unitary and more or less homogeneous states, on the one hand, and economic and social advance- ment, on the other, is not imperative, but it is far from clear that nation- states are weakening, declining, eroding, and withering away because of transnational economic forces. So far, globalization has not shaken the world system of nation-states, or the so-called nation-states. Their some- what changing economic functions do not diminish their role as the main actors on the global political scene. There are many reasons to doubt that globalization per se is a remedy for centrifugal forces. On the contrary, sometimes it brings them to the fore and provides a favorable environment for them. Nationalism and ethnic strife not only have many varieties, they also have many causes. Still, in most of the cases nationalism is directly connected with the mod- ernization process and its consequences. However, globalization is but a new stage of modernization, and like modernization in general, it is un- even and differential. Being primarily an economic and technological de- velopment, it creates a new disequilibrium and new gaps between ethnic groups. As with previous stages of modernization, globalization has its winners, its losers, and those whose rewards are delayed. First, various components of globalization occur sequentially rather than simulta- neously. Second, individual countries, as well as certain strata and groups within these countries, benefit from globalization to a greater extent and more quickly than others. Where the differences are of an ethnic nature, competition for the scarce goods of modernization may be increased and, thus, ethnic relations aggravated. Third, globalization presupposes a fur- ther increase in mobility, both occupational and spatial. This disrupts the old division of labor but sometimes creates a new one. Such situations in time of rapid social, economic, and cultural change in plural societies and
164 APPENDIX A even worldwide may transpose economic, social, and political competi- tion to the ethnic plane. Conventional wisdom says that modernity brings about stability. Correspondingly, incomplete and insufficient modernity may easily cause and be accompanied by instability. The same may be said about global- ization, especially at its present, initial stage. In this case, one should expect growth of nationalism as a reaction to the difficulties and short- comings connected with the globalization process. It seems that we are already witnessing some signs of such backlash. Another factor that should be taken into account is the illusion of the universality of nation-statehood. Historically, nationalisms have envi- sioned a world consisting of nations that were uniform within but sharply distinct from what lay beyond their borders. It turns out, however, that the world as a whole may be becoming less diverse, while individual nations are becoming more heterogeneous than it was perceived or de- signed. There is a certain terminological and even conceptual confusion in the social sciences. Many alleged nation-states are simultaneously char- acterized as multiethnic states, states with plural or multicultural societ- ies, and so on. In fact, some of these states are already not multiethnic but multinational, since the process of nation building is ongoing. However, when ethnic groups develop into nationalities or nations, with literary languages, cultural institutions, mass media, occupationally differenti- ated social structures, specific economic interests, and political elites or counter-elites, there is less room for unifying integration than in the premodern and early modern societies. Multiethnic, and especially multi- national societies with particularistic identities, increase the necessity for and simultaneously the danger of an activist state. The striving of a state for homogenization is rife with the potential for conflict. Under this situ- ation, the policy of ethnic and national homogenization and in a broader sense, all kinds of nationalizing projects, are at present less successful than in the past, even when linguistic assimilation or accommodation has made progress. Since the obituary of ethnonationalism is premature, it is better to turn our attention to more programmatic questions, to the ways of pre- venting and reducing tension, conflicts, and violence. The first observa- tion that should be made in this regard, while at the moment trivial but still worth repeating, is as much empirical as it is theoretical. As a rule contemporary liberal democracies are more successful in regulating ethnonational problems than any other sociopolitical and economic or- der. Repressive regimes can temporarily contain nationalism, but in the long run they only aggravate it. On the contrary, liberal democracy, or rather the civil society without which it is impossible, often weakens the threat of ethnic corporatism and is sometimes capable of diffusing the
APPENDIX A 165 conflict. Civil society not only guarantees but also implies awareness of and participation in the political process; it is based on agreement and the search for compromise. This is a necessary condition for its very exist- ence. Based on the separation of the public and private spheres and on the plethora of voluntary associations from the control of state power, civil society ideally provides its citizens with the opportunity to have a num- ber of identifications and loyalties at once, and ethnic identity is only one of these. Besides, a multiplicity of groups that cries-cross each other re- duces the centrality of any one particular group. Surely, liberal democ- racy per se is not a solution for ethnic and national problems. However, it is the best precondition for their solution. This is especially true with liberal democracy in developed countries. Human behavior is inspired by more than stomachs and purses, but credit cards and checkbooks do matter. Though much despised and criticized, consumerism also has many advantages, and not only of the economic variety. It reduces the desire to fight for any ism. Citizens of affluent democratic states have a different appreciation of the value of human life than the subjects of repressive authoritarian regimes and calculate differ- ently the cost and effects of military expenditures and violent conflicts caused by nationalism, because they have more to lose. This is one of the reasons only the extreme fringes of the ethnic minorities in these coun- tries tend to resort to terrorism. The rest prefer to pursue their goals by legal political means. Like it or not, the continuing salience of ethnic and national identities, both territorialized and transnational, and ethnonational strife and con- flicts seem to be inevitable at the current stage of globalization. The best we can hope for is that their underlying reasons will not be eliminated, but that their most extreme forms will be prevented. At present, even this is sometimes impossible. Thus, these conflicts should somehow be regu- lated and diffused, and the first thing that must be done in such cases is to reduce violence and bloodshed. There is a growing understanding that local conflicts can no longer be addressed as purely internal issues. We are witnessing a gradual erosion of the nonintervention principle in the affairs of other states when univer- sal human rights are at stake. lust as the right for self-determination can- not always be equated with the right to independent statehood, in the twenty-first century, the monopoly on violence of individual states in dealing with ethnonational conflicts on their territory can no longer be regarded as their absolute prerogative. Through moral condemnation, sanctions, and other measures, the international community can and should raise the cost of violence, when the latter exceeds internationally accepted norms and violates international treaties on human rights. This allows the international community to exercise a certain deter-
166 APPENDIX A rent influence. Under this situation, freedom of information and its collec- tion, as well as the activities of international truth-seeking bodies, should be guaranteed and become sine qua non of conflict resolutions. Since it is the civilian population that suffers the most in ethnonational conflicts, it should be protected first and foremost. I refer to crimes com- mitted against the civilian population by all sides in such conflicts, be they mass destruction, execution, rape, looting, ethnic cleansing, or ter- rorist activities. The perpetrators should be uncovered and punished, and it is depressing that so far too many of these remain unpunished and protected by their states or ethnonational communities. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Crimi- nal Tribunal for Rwanda, both created by the United Nations, as well as the permanent International Criminal Court that may soon be established are only the first steps in the right direction. Actually, some local ethnonational conflicts have already become somewhat internationalized. Hopefully, in the future, international law in this regard will also be adjusted to new realities, but this is still a far cry from the current situation. Meanwhile, the growing de facto involvement of international peacekeeping forces in these conflicts in different parts of the world has become a fait accompli. It seems that this is sometimes the only way to interrupt violence and bloodshed. Maybe in the future, inter- national forces will be used to prevent violence. Large-scale ethnic cleans- ing should especially be prevented by any means, including international intervention. The main danger of international forces is that after a while they become almost irreversible and thus perpetuate conflict. Another danger is their destabilizing effect, which extends far beyond the conflict area. International intervention, even when it is accepted by all sides of a conflict, has many deficiencies. It is very difficult to reach a consensus in the United Nations or in the U.N. Security Council on this extreme mea- sure. For many reasons, including domestic ones, individual countries are reluctant to commit their troops to this purpose. Additionally, interna- tional intervention interrupts conflicts, but by itself does not solve the problems that lead to violence, as well as those that emerge as the result of violence. Even when peaceful agreement between warring sides is achieved, or imposed by the intervention of external force, not infre- quently with far more gusto than it deserves, it must often be maintained by this force indefinitely. It is much better to prevent conflicts than to deal with their disastrous consequences. In this regard, I envision at least two positive roles for the international community. First, it can play a much more active role in diagnosing ethnonational strife and encouraging national governments to find peaceful resolutions before conflict breaks out. An imperfect and
APPENDIX A 167 painful compromise is better than bloodshed. If this principle is assumed or installed, then politics as the art of the possible may be directed toward ethnonational accommodation and accord as a part of negotiated political culture. These accommodations need creativity, imagination, patience, flex- ibility, and the ability to redefine one's own position. Moreover, since we are living in a rapidly changing world, the laws and rules regulating ethnonational relations should hardly be considered unchangeable. Cer- tain mechanisms acceptable for all sides can be elaborated, which may imply the possibility of their eventual reconsideration by well-defined legal means. When trust is low, international monitoring and certain guar- antees with the clear understanding that unilateral departure from the agreements would not remain unpunished by the guarantors, are also desirable. This is another important role for international organizations that I foresee in the future. In all, there are many reasons to expect that nationalism will remain one of the main sources of conflict and violence in many parts of the world. The only hope that remains is not to eradicate it, but to contain it, to curb its excesses, in other words, to try to domesticate it by making it civil. This happens only when the mutual benefits of cohabitation are obvious to the vast polyethnic majority in a common state. It would be too optimistic to expect that even the most thoughtful, considerate, and gen- erous politics in plural societies, with good will, skill, and luck also, can satisfy all nationalist demands. However, if ethnic and national identities are respected and minorities are provided with a real voice in decision making, then it may be possible to avoid the desire to fight because the consequences of strife may appear worse than other options.
Transition and Conflict in Multiethnic Postsocialist Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tone Bringa University of Bergen, Norway n her fascinating presentation yesterday, Professor Drobizheva referred to the quest for scapegoats in times of deep socioeconomic crisis in a given society, and that in multiethnic societies the scapegoat and en- emy tend to become the ethnic other.2 This is clearly what happened in the former Yugoslavia and in Bosnia- Herzegovina. However, why does the ethnic other become the enemy, and what are the processes whereby this happens? This is a crucial ques- tion to examine, for without an understanding of this issue, we will not be able to identify constructive and long-term approaches to reintegration and reconciliation postconflict. The issue of the ethnic other may be approached from different angles and will receive different answers depending on the particular case at hand. This presentation focuses on the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, dis- cussing three main themes organized according to the three phases of the war. 1This presentation uses arguments and material in an article by Tone Bringa called "Averted Gaze: Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995," and published in Hinton, A., ed. 2002. Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2Leokadia Drobizheva gave a presentation on December 18, 2000, entitled "Socioeco- nomic Parameters of Interethnic Stability and Tension," at the Symposium on States in Transition and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: Russian and International Perspective, Moscow. 168
APPENDIX A 169 1. preconflict, focuses on the institutional legacies of the communist Tito regime, and in particular the institutionalization of ethnicity 2. conflict, focuses on fear as a necessary driving force in the escala- tion of conflict; how a climate of fear is created and eventually turned into a climate of hatred 3. postconflict, focuses on the need to change the ways in which ethnicity is institutionalized; how to eliminate fear of the ethnic other, and create secure conditions for displaced people and refugees to return to their homes Before proceeding further, however, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between identity and identifications. A person's identity consists of a set of identifications, and ethnicity (or nationality) is only one of these. If one fails to make this distinction, it is not possible to properly account for the process whereby ethnicity becomes a person's only rel- evant public identification.3 This is the National Academies process we could observe taking place in the former Yugoslavia. In Bosnia- Herzegovina this process was not merely borne out of the need for secu- rity amidst the chaos of a severe economic and political crisis but had to reach its completion by organized, violent force. The breakup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars cannot be explained by one factor only (Bringa, 2002~. It was the result of a combination of factors; a series of circumstances whereby dramatic structural changes, both domestically and internationally, and certain political players came together at the end of the century in Yugoslavia. Some of these circum- stances were contemporary, for example, those in the international arena, while others were legacies of previous structures (this was particularly the case in the domestic arena). Internationally, there were, among others, the following circumstances: · the end of the cold war and the crisis of the communist and totali- tarian state structures · the misguided efforts of the European Union to draw up a com- mon foreign policy line in its attempt to establish itself as a prominent player in international affairs, using Yugoslavia as its launching case · the absence of the great powers of the United States and Russia (the latter was struggling with its own problems) in any positive media- tion role at an early preventive stage 3For use of this distinction to highlight the issue of identity formation in Sarajevo during the siege of 1992-95 see Macek, 1999.
170 APPENDIX A · the international mediators who mistook the nationalist leaders for democratically elected and democratic-minded representatives of their constituencies, when in effect they were mostly totalitarian-minded eth- nically defined leaders who each controlled an army and media outlets and therefore the minds and actions of their ethnic communities · the international mediators and diplomats who, with a few excep- tions, let their understanding of the conflict be informed by the rhetoric and force of the separatist nationalist leaders, and dismissed other non- nationalist politicians as not representative · the fourth faction in Bosnia, nonnationalist Serbs, Croats, Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims) and others, being ignored and silenced by domestic and international forces alike · the roller-coaster approach of international players such as the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union in dealing with the conflict There is plenty to discuss. However, I would argue that the war was primarily caused by factors within the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; domestic causes will therefore be the focus of this presenta- tion. REDEFINING SPACE AND BELONGING BY FORCE The extreme personalized violence that soldiers, paramilitaries and thugs directed toward individuals because they belonged to or were iden- tified with a specific nationality or ethnic group was the expression of a politically organized attempt at radically redefining categories of belong- ing and redrawing spatial boundaries. But why the need to redraw bound- aries? The old structures of Tito's Yugoslavia that defined the boundaries disintegrated, but legacies of the old system remained. The forced re- drawing of boundaries of exclusion and inclusion could be seen as the eventual resolution of authority a delayed transition of authority a transition that had never found resolution after the death of Yugoslavia's founder and post-World War II leader, Tito, in 1980. The premise for this argument is that the Yugoslavs did not properly address issues of succession and political legitimacy following the death of Tito in 1980, and no other mode of authority than the one embodied by Tito was allowed to develop. This was the Tito we swear to you model of paternal authority that Tito passed on not to one successor but to six, each of whom, with the important exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, repre- sented the special interests of their republic/nation in a rotating presi- dency (see Bringa, 2002 and 2003~. When Yugoslavia held multiparty elec- tions in 1990 there had been more than 10 years of an unresolved process
APPENDIX A 171 of authority transition, to which was added the problems entailed in the transition from an authoritarian one party system to a democratic multi- party system. It should be clear that Yugoslavia was in a fragile state of transition. In Tito's single party state the only opportunity to express diversity was through ethnicity. Indeed, in many instances political representation was based on ethnicity, for example, in the rotating presidency that Tito had designed, all seats were allocated on the basis of ethnic or national identity (Bringa, 2002~. Thus the foundation for a political system based on ethnic or national identity was already in place. Since very little time was allowed to lapse and other forms of thinking to take place before calling for multiparty elections, the fact that people overwhelmingly voted for ethnically defined parties in the first multiparty elections in 1990 was only a logical extension of this system. The leaders who came to power in 1990 though popular vote (except Milosevic who maneuvered his way to the top of the Serbian Communist party hierarchy) came to power with different agendas, but they had one thing in common: their new power base was the ethnically defined na- tion. Their hold on the masses (the people) was, as with the Titoist leaders who preceded them, a rhetoric and public discourse based on fear, but no longer fear of an outside threat (the Soviet Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) but of the ethnic other within. COMMUNISM REINVENTED AS NATIONALISM In a process that started with the 1974 Yugoslav constitution (result- ing in the Revolution of power to the republics), the people as one principle that is characteristic of totalitarian rule was moved from the Yugoslav (federal) level to the ethnonational level (see Bringa, 2002 and 2003~. The one-party Communist state that controlled its army and media dissolved into one-party ethnonationalist-governed republics that each controlled an army and media. When this logic was taken to Bosnia-Herzegovina it resulted in the formation of three ethnically defined parties, three govern- ments and three armies: Croat, Bosnian (majority Muslim or Bosniac), and Serb. But there was a twist only the Croat-defined and the Serb- defined nationalist parties propagated an ideology of ethnic purity, and were separatist. The Bosniac party preferred a unitary and multiethnic Bosnian state when that still seemed an option. The totalitarian thinking of the one-party state was thus transferred to the ethnonational level. This, together with the tradition of viewing political conflict or competi- tion in ethnic terms, accounts for the fact that all people that the ethno- nationalist elites identified as belonging to another ethnic group were branded as political enemies. In Serbian President Milosevic's political
72 APPENDIX A project for a greater Serbia (and later Croatia's President Tudjman's for a greater Croatia), all non-Serbs (or non-Croats, in Tudjman's case) were considered enemies who had to be removed in the fashion characteristic of totalitarian systems (Bringa, 2002~. Tito's regime was ambivalent in its policy toward ethnic relations. On the one hand, it encouraged national identities through the political and administrative system,4 and on the other, it ethnicized political opposi- tion. Demands for more democracy were branded as outbursts of nation- alism and an anathema, a threat to the very existence of Yugoslavia (based on the principle of brotherhood and unity) and therefore considered antistate and prosecuted (Bringa, 2002~. When the totalitarian thinking of the one-party state was transferred to the ethnonational level it also implied a particular perception of the majority-minority relationship. During the 1990 elections in Bosnia and elsewhere people worried about the outcome of free elections and the new divisions of power they would create. Since there was no political tradition of democracy or pluralism, people feared that to be a minority in a political-administrative area could mean having no rights (under one- party rule, only those who supported the party had political rights; conse- quently no one wanted to be a minority [Bringa, 2002~. This was a con- cern that was not addressed by the new political leaders (except in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia). THE ENEMY RHETORIC OF THE NEW NATIONALIST LEADERS The transfer of the totalitarian thinking of a one-party state to the Yugoslav republics and therefore to the ethnonational level is also evi- dent from the way in which people not siding with one of the nationalist parties were marginalized or silenced. Indeed, the war was not primarily ethnic but political; it was a war about silencing political plurality and quelling the democratic movement by casting it in totalitarian-nationalist rhetoric, by casting all politics (party politics and opposition politics) in the idiom of ethnicity. Those who challenged or broke with that idiom were marginalized, silenced, and relegated to the realm of nonreality (see Gagnon, 1996~. This is clear from the fact that Serbs who opposed the project of estbablishing an ethnically pure greater Serbia by publicly ex- pressing solidarity with non-Serb neighbors were targeted, too: Anyone 4For Bosnia this still goes on with the help of the international community and the gov- ernmental structures laid down in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Political representation and the allocation of resources are still based on ethnic for nationals community member- ship.
APPENDIX A 173 who was against the nationalist aim of creating ethnically homogeneous territories and states was targeted (Bringa, 2002~. They were branded as enemies of the people; indeed they were exposed to the same kind of rhetoric and harassment that political dissenters were during the Tito regime.5 Under Tito the crime was to be a nationalist, under his successors the crime was not to be a nationalist. In Bosnia in 1993, one could no longer choose to be a Bosnian rather than a Croat or Serb, or to be a Yugoslav rather than a "Muslim" or just a Sarajevan or a citizen. Any category other than Croat, Serb, or Bosniac fell outside the dominant discourse, that is, the discourse of power (Bringa, 2002~. Opposition and resistance became impossible. If a Serb opposed the harassment or expulsion of his neighbor with a Muslim name, he was a traitor, risked being killed (or was killed), or the ethnic cleansers threat- ened to kill (or killed) his son or another close relative. The brave persons who resisted and opposed, in other words, were given impossible choices. The methods the Serbian paramilitaries in particular applied were very efficient. Serbs who either protected their Muslim friends or neighbors or voiced opposition to the mistreatment of non-Serbs in any other way were dealt with effectively tortured, killed, and left in view for others who might contemplate similar acts. Individuals who refused to be sepa- rated from their friends or neighbors along ethnic lines were dealt with, too. 5In Communist times, dissidents and political opposition were branded as cominformists or nationalists that is, traitors, or fifth columnists. In a speech given in early 2000, Yugoslav President Milosevic stressed that "[w]e have no opposition, but rather contemporary janissaries. These latter-day poturice (turncoats) are at the service of foreign masters." In other words, Milosevic brands his political opponents janissaries and poturice. Both terms are associated with Muslims and refer to the Ottoman period. Poturice literally means those who have become Turks. The term refers to South Slavs who converted to Islam during Otto- man rule in the Balkans. But in some contexts it is used as a term for traitors or turncoats. The term is often used in this meaning in Serbian folklore. Janissaries is used as another term for fifth-columnists. [Editor's note: The janissaries were an elite corps of Turkish troops originally organized in the fourteenth century as the sultan's guard, drawn chiefly from subject Christian boys siezed in tribute and forcibly converted to Islam. This corps contin- ued as the largest and strongest unit of the army until abolished after revolting in 1826. Information taken from Gove, P. B., ed. 1963. Webster's Third New International Dictio- nary. Springfield: G. & C. Merriam Company and http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/europe/ Youginfpre.htm.] The Communist-turned-nationalist has changed his labels and targets for repression, but the rhetorical strategy remains the same and has changed little since the late 1980s except for the current absence of the words Muslim and Muslim fundamentalism. A twenty-first century nationalist is using sixteenth-century terms to express his twentieth- century Communist world view (Bringa, 2002~.
74 APPENDIX A Potential witnesses to massacres were silenced by implicating them in the acts (c.f., Rhode, 1997~.6 In this fashion, even if a person wanted to disassociate himself from acts of violence committed in the name of the ethnic or national group with which he identified, it would be difficult since every attempt was made to implicate everybody in inflicting pain on the perceived enemy. Whatever opposition there was against dividing Bosnians along ethnic lines the separatist elites effectively dissipated through the use of the rhetoric of fear and hate propaganda and orga- nized violence. Bosnians quickly learned not to argue with a gun. Ethnic cleansing then was not only and not even primarily about ethnic purifica- tion. It was primarily, to borrow a term from Gordy (1999), about the "destruction of alternatives," and the elimination of people who repre- sented these alternatives by virtue of identifying or being identified with another ethnic community or political community or both (Bringa, 2002~. This meant that Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslims, Croat, and Serb nonseparatists, and individuals of ethnically mixed backgrounds, who all favored the continued existence of a multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina within its existing borders became particularly vulnerable. So why were Muslims and nonnationalists the main targets in first, the propaganda war preceding and then accompanying the war, and sec- ond, in the physical harassment and violence during the war? First and most simply, they were nonseparatist, favored a multiethnic and undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina and were therefore (according to the logic described above) considered political enemies who had to be paci- fied or eliminated. Second, the principle of multiethnicity by itself was considered an ideological enemy to ethnonationalism. This was because the idea was detrimental to the essence of separatist political movements based on ethnonationalism and because multiethnicity and particularly its most poignant expression, "interethnic marriage" was portrayed as the ultimate communist invention (it did look very much like brother- hood and unity, one of Titoist Yugoslavia's three ideological pillars). This was particularly destructive for Bosnia, which had a long tradition of cooperation between the different ethnoreligious communities hundreds of years before Tito's Yugoslavia (Bringa, 2002~. Indeed, interethnic or so- called mixed marriages were considered (and probably rightly so) a threat to the mobilizing effect of nationalism. Bosnia was the region of the former Yugoslavia where intermarriage was the most common. It is interesting to note that cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia where the ethnic com- 6In addition to Rhode, 1997, court documents from the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague and Human Rights Watch reports from Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war provide examples.
APPENDIX A 175 munities were most intimately connected through a relative high number of inter-marriages, were also those (Sarajevo, Mostar, Vukovar) that were subject to the most severe bombing and destruction. Third, there was a rich repertoire of prejudice and negative folk images about "Muslims" particularly in Serbian folklore that the Serb nationalists could use to encourage forces of intolerance (see Sells, 1996; Loud, 1996~. The tradi- tions and vocabulary of hatred in folklore, such as old epics, do not moti- vate people's actions per se. It is the activation of the images that matters; the reconnection of those historic images and attitudes with the present and their translation into contemporary action. People have to be made to act upon them; fear and violence are the triggers. Both Serb and Croat nationalist rhetoric portrayed the native Slavic Muslims in Bosnia- Herzegovina as fundamentalist and as representatives of a long-gone re- pressive Ottoman regime, and thus turned them into a threat of a future force of oppression that had to be defeated. Forces of intolerance were not only allowed to flourish they also were encouraged by the postsocialist and nationalist leaders. Propaganda via the media outlets controlled by the nationalists was backed up by organized violence and harassment. Little by little, the harassment, violence, and war experience of indi- viduals served to confirm the nationalist propaganda of the need for eth- nic unity and the threat from the ethnic other. War experiences changed the way people and communities think and feel about their and others' identities. Indeed, the experiences of violence and war seem crucial for the strong ethnic and national identification people in most of the former Yugoslavia have developed (cf. Povrzanovic, 1997~. Yet, the fact that eth- nic separatist armies and militias needed to perpetrate intimate and per- sonalized terror and violence toward individual members of an "other" ethnic community on a large and organized scale the hallmark of ethnic cleansing and the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to engineer new ethnically defined nation-states, proves that most people did not want the new social order that was being imposed on them. How then did so many citizens seemingly end up participating in or supporting the violence aimed at driving out people of a different ethnicity from their commu- nity? THE MANIPULATION OF FEAR AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY Fear was the mobilizing factor. The nationalists (the new elites) cre- ated and manipulated fear by publicly raising old grievances. One can call this the politics of memory. This was possible because there had been no public process under Tito for acknowledging injustices and crimes committed during the Second World War.
176 APPENDIX A Tito had been reluctant to deal with past injustices, such as atrocities towards civilians of a specific ethnic identification, and had instead glossed over the animosities created by the communal fighting during the Second World War by his key ideological pillar, Brotherhood and Unity. The civil wars that ran parallel and intertwined with the larger World War II in Yugoslavia were never properly dealt with in the official history after 1945. It operated with two mutually exclusive categories: the Fas- cists (the evil perpetrators) and the Partisans (the heroic victors and vic- tims of the fascists). The suffering and injustices of anyone who fell out- side of these categories were not publicly acknowledged. Civilians who had been caught in between or those who had suffered at the hands of the Partisans did not have a place in the official account. No memorial was ever erected over the graves of these victims. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, "the nameless dead" were in many cases exhumed and given a religious burial, a burial that imbued these victims with an ethnic identity (Verdery, 1999~. They became Serb victims of the Croat Ustasha or Croat victims of Communists (Serbs). Finally, there was public acknowledg- ment of the suffering and loss that had been silenced under Tito, but the public acknowledgment was only to the living members of the victims' ethnic/national groups. It was therefore not a ritual that could be part of a process of reconciliation; on the contrary, there was another, hidden message a collapsing of time identifying the victims with all other mem- bers of the same ethnicity and the perpetrators with all other living mem- bers of the group they were seen to represent. As argued by Verdery (ibid.), the underlying message was, "they may do it to you again." Indeed, the public process of remembering these events from 1989 onwards was not owned by the local communities where the events had taken place; instead, it was hijacked by national leaders as a tool to ma- nipulate fear and create a social climate where supporters would rally behind them for protection. Manipulation of fear became the most important tool for the national- ists. Media (controlled by the various nationalist governments) would dwell on past atrocities committed by members of other nationalities and reinterpret them in the light of the present political development. Or they would simply fabricate incidents, such as massacres, perpetrated by the other group. Such incidents were broadcast repeatedly in the nationalist party-controlled media. Incidents were provoked in local communities by police or paramilitaries before the war broke out. Incidents involving one or a few persons from the enemy group, it was hoped, would lead to retribution and give an excuse for a more massive attack on the local enemy population as a whole. Intimidation and provocations could con- sist of beating up people and bombing shops owned by members of the perceived enemy group. This happened in municipalities throughout
APPENDIX A 177 Bosnia. Barricades were put up, people were stripped of their freedom of movement, war raged elsewhere in the country, and citizens asked them- selves, are we next? A siege mentality developed with fear of an immi- nent attack by members of the other group. The media propaganda and individual incidents of intimidation did not bring immediate results, and ultimately war proved to be the only means by which Bosnians could be separated and convinced of the truth of the doctrine (Bringa, 2002~. On the eve of the war, this was illustrated by Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb nationalist leader's favorite pro- paganda line, that they could not live together. KINSHIP, ETHNICITY, AND MOBILIZATION Why did nationalist rhetoric and the appeal to ethnic solidarity have such resonance in Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia)? The issue of politi- cal representation and the allocation of resources have already been dis- cussed; a few words about the emotional appeal are now necessary. First, let it be clear that before the war, Bosnia was neither a society of ethnic hatreds and incessant intercommunal killings, nor was it the ideal model of a harmonious multiethnic society free of ethnic prejudices. Be- fore the war, there were various ways in which people with different ethnoreligious backgrounds coexisted and accommodated each other's differences. Social patterns of interaction among people with either Serb, Croat, Bosniac, or a combination of two or all three ethnic backgrounds varied across time, place, and social groups. There were urban neighbor- hoods or workplaces where ethnic identification rarely defined a person in his/her interaction with his/her neighbors or colleagues; a common identity relating to place, network, education, or profession was more important. There were Bosnians who grew up in families whose networks of friends and family consisted of a mixture of Bosnians and Yugoslavs of different ethnic backgrounds. Like Bosnians who grew up in "mixed" neighborhoods they took pride in the diversity and in knowing about the different traditions and religious rituals of their friends, neighbors, and relatives with whom they socialized during informal coffee-drinking get- togethers. There were also Bosnians who grew up in families whose networks of friends and family consisted entirely of people from the same ethnic back- ground, but this in fact seems to have been a rarer situation. In some villages people from different ethnoreligious backgrounds would live side by side, socialize over coffee, visit each other to pay their respects at various ritual events, exchange favors, and sometimes have close friend- ships, but they would rarely intermarry. In others they would live parallel lives in separate hamlets and know little about each other. While in some
178 APPENDIX A ethnically mixed villages relationships between members of different ethnoreligious groups were friendly and relaxed, in others there were tensions, mutual distrust, and separation. In some cases, tensions were caused by injustices during or immediately after the Second World War that had not been addressed during the Tito era of Brotherhood and Unity, in others they were due to neighborhood quarrels over land and property that had mobilized people along kinship lines. And this leads me to the point of the emotional appeal of nationalist rhetoric. In rural Bosnia-Herzegovina (which is where the nationalist appeal is perhaps the strongest), kinship networks are important; kinship is the primary bond of loyalty. In rural areas, ethnic intermarriage is rare and therefore kinship overlaps with ethnicity. In other words, kin are also members of the same ethnic community. This fact may help explain a mobilizing potential in a conflict that was based on the rhetoric of nation- alism, because nationalist discourse uses the idiom of kinship. It is, in other words, kinship and not ethnicity that holds the primary emotional appeal and is the mobilizing factor. Having said that, however, it should be remembered that for most civilians on all sides, the mobilization (the motivation to fight in a war) was primarily based on fear, and varying degrees of coercion, and the need to protect one's family and kin and therefore perceived in defensive terms. Indeed, it could be argued that the level of fear and violence needed to engage people (or rather to disengage people, that is, to silence their opposition) is an indicator of the weak power of ethnic sentiment as a mobilizing factor (see Gagnon, 1996~. Fur- thermore, for the perpetrators of crimes the motivations were often eco- nomic gain (through extensive looting), power, and prestige. Prestige was forthcoming since acts, which in a functioning state governed by the rule of law would be considered criminal and punished by society as a whole, were considered heroic by many of those in whose name and on whose behalf the crimes were allegedly committed; they were portrayed as acts in defense of the nation. As the nationalist rhetoric of ethnic solidarity takes hold, it becomes almost impossible to resist because national iden- tity becomes the only relevant identity, nationalism is the only relevant discourse, and people who resist are exiled, treated as traitors, or forced to become accomplices to crimes committed in the name of the group (see Gagnon, 1996; Bringa, 2002~. A FINAL WORD In all societies at all times there exist both the potential for conflict and the potential for peaceful coexistence. What will become dominant or prevail is very much dependent on what a given society's political and economic elites political leaders, academics, media, and others choose
APPENDIX A 179 to stress. Societies in states of radical transition and severe political crisis are more vulnerable to individuals and organizations that seek to exploit the potential for conflict. The nationalist political leaders that (aided by the media and armed forces they controlled) instigated and drove the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, consciously exploited the potential for con- flict. Manipulating fear of the threat of the other within became the most important tool in holding onto power and quelling the forces of democra- tization. Tellingly, all the nationalist leaders who had been voted into office because they had promised their people better living conditions in a time of severe economic social crisis brought a complete economic and social state of disaster onto their respective people. SUGGESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION A few points for emphasis in a discussion of lessons learned in Bosnia- Herzegovina that could be applied to conflict management in other multi- ethnic societies that have experienced ethnic conflict and war are sug- gested. Societies in economic and political regime transition are in a danger zone and in great need of attention. It is important to consider how to avoid marginalization of certain strata or groups (particularly the old elites) in such societies. An effort is needed to bring the old elites into the restructuring process as a constructive force. The issue of old grievances also deserves focus, including · the responsibility of media and political leaders in publicly ac- knowledging past injustices, suffering, and loss of "the other" · the need for the states involved in the war to cooperate with inter- national legal institutions (such as the Criminal Tribunal in The Hague) · a general process of acknowledging and assigning individual re- sponsibility for crimes committed so that responsibility is decollectivized; both processes above would contribute · a need to commemorate all war dead independent of ethnic/politi- cal affiliation In addition to actions taken by postwar authorities to ensure that citizens guilty of crimes are identified and brought to justice, media and respected public figures should also focus on those people who resisted the pressure to turn against their neighbor or fellow citizen of another nationality and helped without regard to ethnic identification. Once the fears and pressures associated with conflict and war recede such a focus may be a spontaneous response by ordinary people who want to try and overcome the past and live in peace with their neighbors.
180 APPENDIX A In thinking about the future structure of a multiethnic society like Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is a mistake to institutionalize the kind of division that ethnic cleansing and ethnonationalist wars create. Instead we need a Bosnia that embraces all the different ways in which people in Bosnia accommodated differences and coexist described above. Soft boundaries are needed that will allow people to establish relationships with fellow citizens free of the pressures and dictates of bigots. To put it simply: Those who do not want to live together should not be allowed to force their preference onto everyone else. Policy makers and mediators in con- flicts in multiethnic societies (that are based on the rhetoric of ethnicity) need to gain insights into and encourage the practical ways in which people deal with the issue of identity on the ground. Ethnicity is just one identification among the many that constitute a person's identity. It may be emphasized or de-emphasized depending on context. Multiethnic so- cieties should be structured in ways that allow for a multiplicity of forms for coexisting in accordance with the contexually shifting and flexible approach of ordinary people who interact in an atmosphere free of cohersion and fear. Lastly, governments' approach toward local politics should be based not on the assumption of a commonality of ethnic ties but on the commu- nality of experience. In postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina there are many ex- amples of people who share a common understanding with Bosnians of a different ethnicity than their own. This is an understanding based on shared war-time experiences. For insance, Sarajevo Serbs who lived there during the almost four-year-long siege and shelling campaign by Bosnian Serb forces may feel emotionally and socially as well as politically closer to their Bosniac or Croat neighbors who were in the same situation as them than to their Serbian relatives elsewhere (who do not share the siege experience and may have a very different perception of what happened based on what their government-controlled media told them). Instead of measures that help to reify boundaries and separation be- tween the three ethnic communities, arenas and fore should be created and ecouraged to develop so that citizens of different ethnic backgrounds who share similar experiences and nonethnic identifications can meet. In other words, arenas where people can relate to each other with reference to identifications other than those of ethnicity are needed. REFERENCES Bringa, T. 1995. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bringa, T. 2002. Averted Gaze: Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995, in Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide, A. Hinton, ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
APPENDIX A 181 Bringa, T. 2003. The Peaceful Death of Tito and the Violent End of Titoism, in Death of the Father: An Anthropology of the End in Political Authority, J. Borneman, ed. New York: Berghahn Books. Gagnon, V. P., Jr. 1996. Ethnic Conflict as Demobilizer: The Case of Serbia. Cornell Univer- sity, Institute for European Studies Working Paper, 96 (1~. (http://www.ithaca.edu/ gagnon/articles/demob/index.html). Gagnon, V. P., Jr. 2001. The Yugoslav Wars of the l990s: A Critical Re-examination of "Ethnic Conflict" the Case of Croatia. Presented at the annual meeting of the Asso- ciation for the Study of Nationalities, April 2001. Gordy, E. 1999. The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alter- natives. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Loud, J. F. 1996. Andric on Bosnia: The 1924 Dissertation, in Ivo Andric Revisited: The Bridge Still Stands, W. S. Vucinich, ed. Berkeley: University of California Research Series, International and Area Studies, 92. Macek, I. 1999. War within: Everyday life in Sarajevo under siege. Uppsala studies in cul- tural anthropology, 29. Povrzanovic, M. 1997. Identities in war: Embodiments of violence and places of belonging. Ethnologia europaea, Journal of European ethnology 27~2~. Rhode, D. 1997. Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux. Sells, M. 1996. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley: University of California Press. Verdery, C. 1999. The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change. New York: Columbia University Press.
States in Transition and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: Russian and International Perspectives AGENDA DECEMBER 18-20, 2000 MOSCOW Monday, December 18, 2000 Opening of the Symposium: Welcoming Comments Opening Remarks States in Transition and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict Robert McC. Adams, University of California at San Diego Session 1: Characteristics of Peaceful Management and Reduction of Tensions Within Multiethnic Societies The Global Context for Addressing Multiethnic Issues in the Age of Millennial Capitalism John L. Comaroff, University of Chicago Socioeconomic Parameters of Interethnic Stability and Tension Leokadia Drobizheva, Institute of Sociology 182
APPENDIX A Peace Enforcement in Ethnic Conflicts Anatoly Dmitriev, Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology, and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences Lessons Learned from Managing Conflict in Countries in Political and Economic Transition Allen Kassof, Project on Ethnic Relations Session 2: Violent Conflict and Methods for Resolution Ethnic Ideologies/Narratives: Causes and Consequences of Conflicts Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Colegio de Mexico Ethnopolitical Conflict and Paths to Its Resolution Arkady Popov and Vladimir Mukomel, Center for Ethnopolitical Research Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations Ronald Suny, University of Michigan The Chechen Conflict and Paths to Its Resolution Dzhabrail Gakaev, Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences Tuesday, December 19, 2000 Session 3: Postconflict Reconstruction: Political, Social, Psychological, and International Aspects Lessons from Post-Soviet Conflicts Fiona Hill, The Brookings Institution Interregional Cooperation of Federal and Local Executive Authorities Khasan Dumanov, Institute for Humanities Research of the Kabardin-Balkar Republic 183 Sociopsychological Aspects of Postconflict Situations Galina Soldatova, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
184 APPENDIX A Session 4: Postconflict Reconstruction: Problems of Economics, Education, Health, and Refugees Power, Fear, and Ethnicity: Forging Nations Through Terror in Bosnia-Herzegovina Tone Bringa, University of Bergen Ethnic Tension in Russia and Forced Migrants in the Territory of the Independent States Galina Vitkovskaya, Moscow Carnegie Center Political and Economic Aspects of the Disintegration of Russia's Internal Market Daniel Berkowitz, University of Pittsburgh Experience in Social Readaptation of Forced Resettlers Returning to Their Places of Former Permanent Residence Aleksey Kulakovskiy, Representation of the Russian President, Vladikavkaz Wednesday, December 20, 2000 Session 5: Paths to Peaceful Multiethnic Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Risks, Opportunities, Trends, and Needs for Long-term Strategies Ethnopolitical and Ethnoregional Factors in the Post-Soviet Territory Vitaly Naumkin and Irina Zvyagelskaya, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories Charles Tilly, Columbia University Ethnic and National Conflicts in the Twenty-first Century Anatoly M. Khazanov, University of Wisconsin Perspectives on Multiethnic Accord Within a Federal Government- the Example of Russia Rafael Khakimov, Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan
APPENDIX A Summary of Discussion and Closing Remarks Valery A. Tishkov, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences International Symposium Participants Leading scientists of academic institutes and other scientific centers, members of the Russian government, officials of the Administration of the President and the Security Council, Deputies of the State Duma, mem- bers of the Council of Federations, and leaders of nongovernmental orga- nizations (NGOs), migration services, and conflict reduction centers 185