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Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary (2004)

Chapter: Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
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Appendix B
Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness1,2

Version 2. Reprinted with Permission from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003.

INTRODUCTION

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a recently recognized febrile severe lower respiratory illness that is caused by infection with a novel coronavirus, SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). During the winter of 2002 through the spring of 2003, WHO received reports of >8,000 SARS cases and nearly 800 deaths. No one knows if SARS-CoV transmission will recur, but it is important to be prepared for that possibility. Early recognition of cases and application of appropriate infection control measures will be critical in controlling future outbreaks.

Many studies have been undertaken or are underway to evaluate whether there are specific laboratory and/or clinical parameters that can distinguish

1  

This document provides guidance on the clinical evaluation and management of patients who present from the community with fever and/or respiratory illnesses. The material in this document supplements the information provided in Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Available: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/index.htm.

2  

Summary of Changes in Version 2: This updated version of the clinical guidance clarifies that, in a setting of ongoing SARS-CoV transmission in a facility or community, the presence of either fever or lower respiratory symptoms should prompt further evaluation for SARS-CoV disease. In addition, in accordance with the new SARS case definition, when persons have a high risk of exposure to SARS-CoV (e.g., persons previously identified through contact tracing or self-identified as close contacts of a laboratory-confirmed case of SARS-CoV disease; persons who are epidemiologically linked to a laboratory-confirmed case of SARS-CoV disease), the clinical screening criteria should be expanded to include, in addition to fever or lower respiratory symptoms, the presence of other early symptoms of SARS-CoV disease.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×

BOX B-1
Key Concepts

  • The vast majority of patients with SARS-CoV disease 1) have a clear history of exposure either to a SARS patient(s) or to a setting in which SARS-CoV transmission is occurring, and 2) develop pneumonia.

  • Laboratory tests are helpful but do not reliably detect infection early in the illness.

SARS-CoV disease from other febrile respiratory illnesses. Researchers are also working on the development of laboratory tests to improve diagnostic capabilities for SARS-CoV and other respiratory pathogens. To date, however, no specific clinical or laboratory findings can distinguish with certainty SARS-CoV disease from other respiratory illnesses rapidly enough to inform management decisions that must be made soon after the patient presents to the healthcare system. Therefore, early clinical recognition of SARS-CoV disease still relies on a combination of clinical and epidemiologic features.

IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL CASES OF SARS-COV DISEASE

The diagnosis of SARS-CoV disease and the implementation of control measures should be based on the risk of exposure. In the absence of any person-to-person transmission of SARS-CoV worldwide, the overall likelihood that a patient being evaluated for fever or respiratory illness has SARS-CoV disease will be exceedingly low unless there are both typical clinical findings and some accompanying epidemiologic evidence that raises the suspicion of exposure to SARS-CoV. Therefore, one approach in this setting would be to consider the diagnosis only for patients who require hospitalization for unexplained pneumonia and who have an epidemiologic history that raises the suspicion of exposure, such as recent travel to a previously SARS-affected area (or close contact with an ill person with such a travel history), employment as a healthcare worker with direct patient contact or as a worker in a laboratory that contains live SARS-CoV, or an epidemiologic link to a cluster of cases of unexplained pneumonia. Once person-to-person SARS-CoV transmission has been documented anywhere in the world, the positive predictive value of even early clinical symptoms (e.g., fever or lower respiratory symptoms in the absence of pneumonia), while still low, may be sufficiently high—when combined with an epidemiologic link to settings in which SARS-CoV has been documented—to lead clinicians to consider a diagnosis of SARS-CoV disease.

In that context, the guidance that follows should be considered in the evaluation and management of patients who present from the community with fever or lower respiratory illnesses. For more detailed guidance on infection control, see Supplement I in Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/index.htm.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×

GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATION OF SARS-COV DISEASE AMONG PERSONS PRESENTING WITH COMMUNITY-ACQUIRED ILLNESS (SEE FIGURES B-1 AND B-2)

The following is an approach for the evaluation of possible SARS-CoV disease among persons presenting with community-acquired illness. As part of the evaluation, in addition to identification of suggestive clinical features, clinicians should routinely incorporate into the medical history questions that may provide epidemiologic clues to identify patients with SARS-CoV disease.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

In some settings, early recognition of SARS-CoV disease may require additional measures. The following guidance is provided to assist in the evaluation of patients in settings or with characteristics not detailed/outlined in Figures B-1 and B-2. These include SARS outbreaks in the surrounding community, management of patients who become ill while already in the hospital, workers from laboratories that contain live SARS-CoV, pediatric patients, the elderly, and persons with chronic underlying diseases.

Additional Epidemiologic Risk Factors to Consider in Community Outbreak Settings

The risk factors that should trigger suspicion for SARS-CoV disease may vary depending on the level of SARS-CoV transmission occurring in the community. Specifically, as outbreaks become more widespread, the types of epidemiologic characteristics that are considered as risk factors for SARS-CoV disease should be broadened appropriately. Two examples are given below.

  1. Evaluating patients in the midst of a community outbreak in which more extensive secondary transmission of SARS-CoV is occurring in well-defined settings with all cases linked to other cases (e.g., an outbreak in a local hospital)

    • Continue the activities for evaluation of persons with ‘fever and/or lower respiratory illness’ outlined in Figure B-2, but in addition:

    • Consider the diagnosis of SARS-CoV disease among all persons with radiographic evidence of pneumonia (even if not requiring hospitalization) if they:

      • Have had exposure to hospitals in the 10 days before onset of symptoms (e.g., patient, visitor, or staff), or

      • Are employed in an occupation at particular risk for SARS-CoV exposure, including a healthcare worker with or without direct patient contact or a worker in a clinical or research virology laboratory, or

      • Have close contact with a patient with documented pneumonia.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×

BOX B-2
Diagnosis of SARS-CoV Disease

In the absence of person-to-person transmission of SARS-CoV anywhere in the world, the diagnosis of SARS-CoV disease should be considered only in patients who require hospitalization for radiographically confirmed pneumonia and who have an epidemiologic history that raises the suspicion of SARS-CoV disease. The suspicion for SARS-CoV disease is raised if, within 10 days of symptom onset, the patient:

  • Has a history of recent travel to mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan (see Figure B-1, footnote 3) or close contacta with ill persons with a history of recent travel to such areas, OR

  • Is employed in an occupation at particular risk for SARS-CoV exposure, including a healthcare worker with direct patient contact or a worker in a laboratory that contains live SARS-CoV, OR

  • Is part of a cluster of cases of atypical pneumonia without an alternative diagnosis

Persons with such a clinical and exposure history should be evaluated according to the algorithm in Figure B-1.

Once person-to-person transmission of SARS-CoV has been documented in the world, the diagnosis should still be considered in patients who require hospitalization for pneumonia and who have the epidemiologic history described above. In addition, all patients with fever or lower respiratory symptoms (e.g., cough, shortness of breath, difficulty breathing) should be questioned about whether within 10 days of symptom onset they have had:

  • Close contact with someone suspected of having SARS-CoV disease, OR

  • A history of foreign travel (or close contact with an ill person with a history of travel) to a location with documented or suspected SARS-CoV, OR

  • Exposure to a domestic location with documented or suspected SARS-CoV (including a laboratory that contains live SARS-CoV), or close contact with an ill person with such an exposure history.

Persons with such an exposure history should be evaluated for SARS-CoV disease according to the algorithm in Figure B-2.

a  

Close contact: A person who has cared for or lived with a person with SARS-CoV disease or had a high likelihood of direct contact with respiratory secretions and/or body fluids of a person with SARS-CoV disease. Examples of close contact include kissing or hugging, sharing eating or drinking utensils, talking within 3 feet, and direct touching. Close contact does not include activities such as walking by a person or briefly sitting across a waiting room or office.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
  1. Evaluating patients in the midst of a community outbreak in which transmission is widespread and epidemiologic linkages between cases are not well defined

    • Since epidemiologic links to persons with SARS-CoV disease may not be identifiable at this point, SARS-CoV disease should be considered in any patient presenting with fever or lower respiratory illness, even in the absence of known epidemiologic risk factors.

Persons with a High Risk of Exposure

For persons with a high risk of exposure to SARS-CoV (e.g., persons previously identified through contact tracing as close contacts of a laboratory-confirmed case of SARS-CoV disease; persons who are epidemiologically linked to a laboratory-confirmed case of SARS-CoV disease), symptoms that should trigger the clinical algorithm should be expanded to include the presence of any of the following: sore throat, rhinorrhea, chills, rigors, myalgia, headache, diarrhea. For more details on the clinical features of SARS-CoV disease, see Figure B-2, footnote 1.

Management of Patients Who Acquire Illness While in the Hospital

This document focuses on the evaluation and management of patients who present from the community, although many of the same principles apply to hospitalized patients who develop nosocomial fever or lower respiratory symptoms. The diagnosis of nosocomial SARS-CoV disease may be particularly challenging, however, since many inpatients may have other reasons for developing nosocomial fever, lower respiratory symptoms, and pneumonia. Therefore, in hospitals known to have or suspected of having patients with SARS-CoV disease, clinicians and public health officials must be particularly vigilant about evaluating fever and respiratory illnesses among inpatients. Additional guidance on when to apply Figure B-2 in the evaluation of patients who develop fever and/or respiratory illness while hospitalized is provided in Supplement C, Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/index.htm.

Laboratory Workers

Breaks in technique in laboratories that contain live SARS-CoV can result in laboratory-acquired cases of SARS-CoV disease. Personnel working in laboratories that contain live SARS-CoV should report any febrile and/or lower respiratory illnesses to the supervisor, be evaluated for possible exposures, and be closely monitored for clinical features and course of illness. If laboratory workers with

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×

FIGURE B-1 Algorithm for evaluation and management of patients requiring hospitalization for radiographically confirmed pneumonia, in the absence of person-to-person transmission of SARS-CoV in the world.

1Or Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) of unknown etiology.

2Guidance for the management of community-acquired pneumonia is available from the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) and can be found at www.journals.uchicago.edu/IDSA/guidelines/.

3The 2003 SARS-CoV outbreak likely originated in mainland China, and neighboring areas such as Taiwan and Hong Kong are thought to be at higher risk due to the high volume of travelers from mainland China. Although less likely, SARS-CoV may also reappear from other previously affected areas. Therefore, clinicians should obtain a complete travel history. If clinicians have concerns about the possibility of SARS-CoV disease in a patient with a history of travel to other previously affected areas (e.g., while traveling abroad, had close contact with another person with pneumonia of unknown etiology or spent time in a hospital in which patients with acute respiratory disease were treated), they should contact the health department.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×

FIGURE B-2 Algorithm for management of patients with fever or lower respiratory symptoms when person-to-person transmission of SARS-CoV is occurring in the world.

1Clinical description of SARS-CoV disease and approach to treatment: Clinical judgment should be used to determine when symptoms trigger initiation of the algorithm in Figure B-2. The early symptoms of SARS-CoV disease usually include fever, chills, rigors, myalgia, and headache. In some patients, myalgia and headache may precede the onset of fever by 12-24 hours. Respiratory symptoms often do not appear until 2-7 days after the onset of illness and most often include shortness of breath and/or dry cough. Diarrhea, sore throat, and rhinorrhea may also be early symptoms of SARS-CoV disease. In the absence of fever, when screening patients for potential SARS-CoV disease, respiratory symptoms that would trigger the clinical algorithm are generally defined as lower respiratory tract symptoms (e.g., cough, shortness of breath, difficulty breathing). However, when screening patients who have a high risk of exposure to SARS-CoV (e.g., persons previously identified through contact tracing or self-identified as close contacts of a laboratory-confirmed case of SARS-CoV disease; persons who are epidemiologically linked to a laboratory-confirmed case of SARS-CoV disease), symptoms that should trigger the clinical algorithm should be expanded to include any of the following: sore throat, rhinorrhea, chills, rigors, myalgia, headache, diarrhea.

Although not diagnostic, the following laboratory abnormalities have been seen in some patients with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV disease:

• Lymphopenia with normal or low white blood cell count

• Elevated hepatic transaminases

• Elevated creatine phosphokinase

• Elevated lactate dehydrogenase

• Elevated C-reactive protein

• Prolonged activated partial thromboplastin time

As of December 1, 2003, no specific treatment recommendations can be made for management of SARS-CoV disease. Empiric therapy for community-acquired pneumonia should include treatment for organisms associated with any community-acquired pneumonia of unclear etiology, including agents with activity against both typical and atypical respiratory pathogens. Treatment choices may be influenced by both the severity of and the circumstances surrounding the illness. Infectious disease consultation is recommended. The Infectious Diseases Society of America has guidelines for the management of community-acquired pneumonia at www.journals.uchicago.edu/IDSA/guidelines/.

2Exposure history for SARS-CoV, once SARS-CoV transmission is documented in the world:

In settings of no or limited local secondary transmission of SARS-CoV, patients are considered exposed to SARS-CoV if, within 10 days of symptom onset, the patient has:

• Close contact with someone suspected of having SARS-CoV disease, OR

• A history of foreign travel (or close contact with an ill person with a history of travel) to a location with documented or suspected SARS-CoV, OR

• Exposure to a domestic location with documented or suspected SARS-CoV (including a laboratory that contains live SARS-CoV), or close contact with an ill person with such an exposure history.

In settings with more extensive transmission, all patients with fever or lower respiratory symptoms should be evaluated for possible SARS-CoV disease, since the ability to determine epidemiologic links will be lost.

For up-to-date information on where recent SARS-CoV transmission is suspected or documented, see the CDC and WHO websites: www.cdc.gov/sars and www.who.int.

3Clinical work-up: Clinicians should work up patients as clinically indicated. Depending on symptoms and exposure history, initial diagnostic testing for patients with suspected SARS-CoV disease may include:

• Complete blood count (CBC) with differential

• Chest radiograph

• Pulse oximetry

• Blood cultures

• Sputum Gram’s stain and culture

• Testing for viral respiratory pathogens, notably influenza A and B and respiratory syncytial virus

• Legionella and pneumococcal urinary antigen testing if radiographic evidence of pneumonia (adults only)

An acute serum sample and other available clinical specimens (respiratory, blood, and stool) should be saved for additional testing until a specific diagnosis is made.

SARS-CoV testing may be considered as part of the initial work-up if there is a high level of suspicion for SARS-CoV disease based on exposure history. For additional details on specialized laboratory testing options available through the health department and the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), see CDC’s SARS website: www.cdc.gov/sars/.

4Alternative diagnosis:

An alternative diagnosis should be based only on laboratory tests with high positive-predictive value (e.g., blood culture, viral culture, Legionella urinary antigen, pleural fluid culture, transthoracic aspirate). In some settings, PCR testing for bacterial and viral pathogens can also be used to help establish alternative diagnoses. The presence of an alternative diagnosis does not necessarily rule out co-infection with SARS-CoV.

5Radiographic testing:

Chest CT may show evidence of an infiltrate before a chest radiograph (CXR). Therefore, a chest CT should be considered in patients with a strong epidemiologic link to a known case of SARS-CoV disease and a negative CXR 6 days after onset of symptoms. Alternatively, the patient should remain in SARS isolation, and the CXR should be repeated on day 9 after symptom onset.

6Discontinuation of SARS isolation precautions:

SARS isolation precautions should be discontinued only after consultation with the local public health authorities and the evaluating clinician. Factors that might be considered include the strength of the epidemiologic exposure to SARS-CoV, nature of contact with others in the residential or work setting, strength of evidence for an alternative diagnosis, and evidence for clustering of pneumonia among close contacts. Isolation precautions should be discontinued on the basis of an alternative diagnosis only when the following criteria are met:

• Absence of strong epidemiologic link to known cases of SARS-CoV disease

• Alternative diagnosis confirmed using a test with a high positive-predictive value

• Clinical manifestations entirely explained by the alternative diagnosis

• No evidence of clustering of pneumonia cases among close contacts (unless >1 case in the cluster is confirmed to have the same alternative diagnosis)

• All cases of presumed SARS-CoV disease identified in the surrounding community can be epidemiologically linked to known cases or locations in which transmission is known to have occurred.

 



Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×

fever and/or lower respiratory illness are found to have an exposure to SARS-CoV, they should be managed according to the guidance in Figure B-2. In addition, in an exposed laboratory worker, symptoms that should trigger the clinical algorithm in Figure B-2 should be expanded to include the presence of any of the following: sore throat, rhinorrhea, chills, rigors, myalgia, headache, diarrhea (see Figure B-2, footnote 1, for more information). Detailed information for persons who work in laboratories that contain live SARS-CoV is provided in Supplement F, Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/index.htm.

Considerations for the Pediatric Population

The document does not specifically address the evaluation and management of infants and children. Much less is known about SARS-CoV disease in pediatric patients than in adults. During the 2003 outbreaks, infants and children accounted for only a small percentage of patients and had much milder disease with better outcome. Their role in transmission is not well described but is likely much less significant than the role of adults. Taking these factors into account, the following guidance may change as more information becomes available on SARS-CoV disease in the pediatric population:

  • In the absence of person-to-person SARS-CoV transmission in the world, evaluation and management for possible SARS-CoV disease should be considered only for adults, unless special circumstances make the clinician and health department consider a child to be of potentially high risk for having SARS-CoV disease.

  • In the presence of person-to-person SARS-CoV transmission in the world, the evaluation algorithm established for adults can be used in children with the following caveats:

    • Both the rate of development of radiographically confirmed pneumonia and the timing of development of such radiographic changes in children are unknown.

    • The positive predictive value of rapid virus antigen detection tests (e.g., RSV) “in season” will be higher in a pediatric population.

    • Pneumococcal and legionella urinary antigen testing are not recommended for routine diagnostic use in children.

Elderly Persons and Patients with Underlying Chronic Illnesses

Typical symptoms of SARS-CoV disease may not always be present in elderly patients and those with underlying chronic illnesses, such as renal failure. Therefore, the diagnosis should be considered for almost any change in health

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×

status, even in the absence of typical clinical features of SARS-CoV disease, when such patients have epidemiologic risk factors for SARS-CoV disease (e.g., close contact with someone suspected to have SARS-CoV disease or exposure to a location [domestic or international] with documented or suspected recent transmission of SARS-CoV).

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease Among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness." Institute of Medicine. 2004. Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/10915.
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The emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in late 2002 and 2003 challenged the global public health community to confront a novel epidemic that spread rapidly from its origins in southern China until it had reached more than 25 other countries within a matter of months. In addition to the number of patients infected with the SARS virus, the disease had profound economic and political repercussions in many of the affected regions. Recent reports of isolated new SARS cases and a fear that the disease could reemerge and spread have put public health officials on high alert for any indications of possible new outbreaks. This report examines the response to SARS by public health systems in individual countries, the biology of the SARS coronavirus and related coronaviruses in animals, the economic and political fallout of the SARS epidemic, quarantine law and other public health measures that apply to combating infectious diseases, and the role of international organizations and scientific cooperation in halting the spread of SARS. The report provides an illuminating survey of findings from the epidemic, along with an assessment of what might be needed in order to contain any future outbreaks of SARS or other emerging infections.

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