Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report 2: C4ISR (2004)

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, shattered the relative calm of the early days of the 21st century by introducing large-scale international terrorism to American soil. These attacks brought an increased sense of urgency and new meaning to the Army’s top priority of protecting the U.S. homeland.

This report reflects the deliberations of the Committee on Army Science and Technology for Homeland Defense—C4ISR and is the second in a planned series of three reports of studies requested by the Department of the Army to assist it in better preparing for its emerging responsibilities in homeland security and homeland defense.¹ Building on the first National Research Council report in this

series, Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security (NRC, 2003), this second report emphasizes how the Army, through its efforts to field the Future Force (previously called the Objective Force), could assist the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and emergency responders in their efforts to respond to a catastrophic event. While many aspects of homeland security and homeland defense overlap, an extremely high correlation exists in the area of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). The committee believes that C4ISR is a high-payoff capability that offers great return on investment for the nation. The committee acknowledges that this evaluation was accomplished at a fairly high level of abstraction. It is possible that different conclusions might be drawn should a highly detailed examination be conducted.

The committee’s individual findings, conclusions, and recommendations are presented in Chapters 1 through 5 and are grouped together in Chapter 6. The overarching recommendation of this study is as follows:

• Work with the senior leadership in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to put in place and to institutionalize a process for collaboration and sharing between the Army and the DHS;

• Assist the DHS in establishing the research, development, testing, and evaluation infrastructure (i.e., an acquisition process, systems engineering discipline, modeling and simulation technologies, and testing and evaluation facilities) to support the emergency responder community;

• Work with the DHS to find common areas of science and technology collaboration, starting with the Future Force technologies identified in this report. Central to this effort will be the development of a framework or architecture to enable the integration of these technologies into an effective system of systems; and

• Work with the DHS to establish processes for joint²operations, including joint training and exercises, shared standards, and interoperable systems.

President George W. Bush declared war on global terrorism with a goal of eradicating it from the face of the Earth. In declaring that objective, the president launched the nation on a campaign with two fronts—overseas and at home. The overseas effort is spearheaded by the Department of Defense (DOD), but it

involves all elements of national power—military, economic, diplomatic, and moral. The paradigm for conducting the overseas “homeland defense” phase of this war is well understood. However, at home the situation is much different. As of this writing (March 2004), no coherent planning paradigm or operational model for homeland security yet exists, and although a national operational concept for emergency response is being developed, no fully approved comprehensive framework exists to pull together the efforts of federal, state, and local responders. While much has been done in homeland security, there is much more to accomplish. The foundation of a national operational framework for emergency response involves partnerships—among federal, state, and local levels of government; between the private and public sectors; and between civilian emergency responders and the military, specifically the U.S. Army. This report deals primarily with the latter partnership.

Responsibility for homeland security as a whole has now been assigned to the Department of Homeland Security, and civilian emergency responders find themselves leading the frontline efforts to respond to terrorism on U.S. soil. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law [P.L.] 107-296), the public law establishing the DHS, describes the department’s mission as follows:

The DHS performs this mission by, among other things,

• Securing U.S. borders, the transportation sector, ports, and critical infrastructure;

• Synthesizing and analyzing homeland security intelligence from multiple sources;

• Coordinating communications with state and local governments, private industry, and the American people about threats and preparedness;

• Coordinating government efforts to protect the American people against bioterrorism and other weapons of mass destruction;

• Helping to train and equip emergency responders; and

• Managing federal emergency response activities.

At the direction of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (February 28, 2003), the DHS is developing two plans to assist the nation in preparing for a major disaster or terrorist attack: the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The NIMS will provide an operational framework for implementing the NRP. Both plans are currently in final draft form.³

The DOD has a long history of providing Army support to civil authorities. However, since the terrorist attacks against the United States, new emphasis is being placed on this mission. This emphasis has resulted in the establishment of new offices and commands.

The new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD [HLD]) has responsibility for providing guidance and policy for the DOD to implement the desires of the Congress. The ASD (HLD) is thus a key position in the DOD’s overall effort to help eradicate terrorism.

The operational arm of the DOD’s efforts to combat terrorism in the homeland is the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), established October 1, 2002. NORTHCOM’s mission is homeland security and civil support, specifically:

• Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and

• As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations. (NORTHCOM, 2003)

NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility is the United States, Canada, and Mexico and the land, sea, and aerospace approaches to these countries. NORTHCOM is planning to provide support to any of the more than 79,000 municipalities scattered across the United States that may be subject to any type of disaster, whether man-made or natural. This combatant command continues to mature and to develop strategies.

Within the DOD, the Army is the service with the most experience in providing support to civilian authorities. It has provided the preponderance of support received by civilian authorities for all disasters for many years and has accumulated considerable experience in this area. The Army has a good understanding of what is required to save lives and mitigate damage and possesses important capabilities that could assist emergency responders.

The Army’s organizational structure consists of three components: the active Army, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard, because of its dual state and federal responsibilities, is ideally suited to lead the homeland security mission for the Army. The National Guard Bureau has already begun this effort with the establishment and deployment of its Civil Support Teams to deal with the aftermath of an event involving weapons of mass destruction. The National Guard’s interface at the state level provides a natural bridge from the Army to emergency responders.

Additionally, the institutional part of the Army⁴ provides a well-developed and structured research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) process and infrastructure that could assist emergency responders in developing, testing, and certifying the technologies needed to enhance their capabilities.

The Army’s Future Force is designed to utilize network-centric warfare (NCW) capabilities to support the principles of “See first, Understand first, Act first, and Finish decisively.” This system-of-systems approach could also be applicable to the requirements for emergency responders to see, understand, and act upon the situations that they face. The opportunities for the DOD and the DHS to leverage this approach are considerable.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines emergency response providers as including “federal, state, and local public safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities” (P.L. 107-296, Sec. 2(6)). These responders include hazardous materials response teams, urban search and rescue assets, community emergency response teams, antiterrorism units, special weapons and tactics teams, bomb squads, emergency management officials, and municipal agencies and private organizations responsible for transportation, communications, medical services, public health, disaster assistance, public works, and construction. Key responders also include emergency management personnel and political leaders at all levels who make crucial decisions and assessments during a crisis.

The ways in which the Army and the emergency responder community acquire technologies in the form of new products, processes, and procedures differ widely. The DOD has a very well developed model for acquisition, with formal procedures and top-to-bottom management. The emergency responders acquire new technology through local city and municipal purchasing agents. The DOD process is controlled by standards of practice and rigorous testing and certification, while the emergency responder community has far fewer formal procedures and sometimes none at all.

The military acquisition process is designed to minimize failure and the attendant loss of life on the battlefield; however, because it is so methodical, it can be too slow for the purposes of many programs. Various ways have been devised to circumvent this problem. Spiral development, for example, is a process developed and refined by the Army to improve current capabilities through technology insertion. It involves fielding these new capabilities with a test unit, testing by that unit, and using the test results for fielding to the entire force. It is particularly suited for enhancing such capabilities as C4ISR. If it is interested in this process, the DHS might consider spiral development as part of a menu from which to choose options that would work for emergency responders.

Unlike the Army, emergency responders have not had a dedicated RDT&E system at their disposal, and many are concerned by the lack of standardization and certification of items that they must purchase. There are, however, several efforts under way on behalf of responders: the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) coordinates the federal research programs designed to help responders, and the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability (IAB) is developing agreed-upon standards for emergency responders. As the DHS continues to mature, the development of a more formal RDT&E system for emergency responders will be required.

The committee developed example scenarios described in Chapter 1 as an aid in assisting both the DOD and the DHS in determining requirements and capabilities necessary to structure a system to protect the homeland. The committee believes that scenarios can be a valuable tool to assist in the planning and execution of emergency response to disasters. They are helpful in determining the capabilities needed for emergency responders and can assist in training at all levels. Individuals can be trained in the specific tasks that they need to accomplish when these scenarios are blended into multidisciplinary, all-hazards training. The result can be more coordinated response to emergency situations. Scenarios

also help to provide a framework to improve compatibility between emergency responders and the Army.

The Army’s Future Force⁵ is literally the future Army, with transformational changes required in the areas of leader development, acquisition, training, sustainment, and institutional initiatives. As discussed in Chapter 2, central to the Future Force is the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW).

NCW is intended to provide three fundamental capabilities to the warfighter and his or her commander through real-time networking. NCW shifts the emphasis from platform-based to network-based capabilities, thereby generating the following opportunities:

• All members of the network will have access to all networked resources within established security protocols. Even single platforms can access all of the resources residing within the network. These resources include the sharing of situational awareness with all members of the network, so that all NCW participants can immediately see the whole battlefield.

• Networked commanders can make more informed decisions. The commander of an NCW force is able to see the whole picture from the viewpoint of any member of his or her network. The commander is thus able to understand the entire situation quickly.

• A networked force can more effectively and efficiently synchronize its assets. NCW provides commanders with the capability to generate precise warfighting effects at an unprecedented operational tempo, creating conditions for the rapid countering of adversary courses of action. As a result, operations may become more efficient and the conduct of war may change. For example, close air support operations may be significantly reduced by the increased ability to anticipate the need for air support and thus to avoid or minimize situations that involve a time-critical requirement for conducting air operations in close proximity to friendly forces.

The committee anticipates that, just as NCW acts as a force multiplier on the battlefield, network-centric operations (NCO) could benefit homeland security. While some of the capabilities that are being developed for the Future Force might be too complex or expensive for the use of emergency responders, many of the technologies would be very helpful, and the concept of network-centric operations could provide a common framework for these technologies.

Chapter 3 identifies C4ISR requirements for emergency responders. It addresses capabilities currently lacking, as well as future emerging requirements, defining the following: the scope of the responder community, the tasks that this community could be required to perform, the conditions under which these activities might occur, and the characteristics and functionality of appropriate C4ISR technologies, and a description of training and exercise opportunities. Lastly, it ends with a description of Project Responder, an independent effort focusing on the status of equipment for emergency responders.

It concludes that responders and Army forces share many common needs. In addition to individual C4ISR technologies, the committee observes that the Army’s network-centric approach to operations could serve emergency responders equally effectively. Such a system could produce significant efficiencies in terms of sharing skills, knowledge, and scarce, high-value assets; building capacity and redundancy in the national emergency response system; and gaining the synergy of providing a common operating picture to all responders. Network-centric systems could be particularly valuable for responding to large-scale or multiple attacks with weapons of mass destruction, in which responders would have to surge capacity quickly, be able to adapt to difficult and chaotic conditions, and respond to unforeseen situations. The value of a network-centric approach suggests that individual emergency responder systems have much to gain from being linked and integrated into a national system of systems. Emergency responders require C4ISR capabilities similar to those enabled by Army technologies, such as the abilities to perform C4ISR in urban environments, to network new capabilities with legacy systems, and to provide protection and redundancy against attacks on responder assets.

Chapter 4 focuses on the technologies currently being developed in the Army or other DOD components in the area of C4ISR that may have application to the homeland security mission and the needs of emergency responders. It begins with a general discussion of the technical issues associated with C4ISR, primarily from a broad systems perspective. Some broad-based programs and tools at the integrated system level are identified that should be of interest to emergency responders and the DHS.

The choice of “command, control, and computers” as a grouping was made because of the integral nature of decision-making algorithms and software now so prevalent in command-and-control systems, and in fact enabled by the vast data capacity and fast processing made available by today’s computers. “Communications” stands by itself as the backbone of any such system. The “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” aspect of C4ISR is treated as a single

entity because of the overlapping technologies underpinning the area. Finally, other programs and activities within the DOD that, although outside the strict C4ISR arena, offer real value to the emergency responder are discussed. For example, the major investment and significant advantages available in the DOD modeling and simulation arena are highlighted.

Chapter 5 discusses possible ways of bridging the gap between the Future Force technologies and emergency responder requirements and suggests means to facilitate collaboration between the DOD and the DHS to help specify and meet those requirements. Substantial overlap exists in the capabilities required by civilian emergency responders and by the Army. This overlap confirms the potential for collaborative efforts by the DOD and the DHS and the resultant establishment of a conduit for transferring technologies to state and local emergency responders. Table ES-1 highlights examples of potential collaborative efforts for certain technologies and programs that underpin C4ISR for the Army’s Future Force.

Additionally, Chapter 5 explores six major opportunities for collaboration:

• Systems engineering: An integrated design approach to optimize the synergistic performance of a C4ISR system or systems of systems, so that its functions are executed in the most efficient and effective manner possible;

• Technology transfer coordination: The concept of establishing a joint Department of Homeland Security and Army collaboration forum for sharing mutually beneficial technologies and services with emergency responders;

• Experimentation, testing, and review: The extensive system of experimentation, testing, and evaluation processes and assets that exist within the DOD and that could be shared with the DHS where practical to avoid cost and duplication of effort;

• Training programs: The ability of the Army to assist the DHS in the development and execution of a multidisciplinary, multiechelon, and multihazard training, simulation, and exercise program for emergency responders;

• Network-centric operations: “See first, Understand first, and Act first” are network-centric warfare principles that clearly apply to the domain of the emergency responder. The Army might assist the DHS in the implementation of an integrated communications expressway that will facilitate NCO; and

• Standardization efforts: The Army’s Mission Essential Task List training model could be beneficial if adopted by emergency responders. It would allow for definition of the capabilities required to respond to a terrorist attack and would highlight equipment, technology, and training deficiencies. Additionally, common product standards and conformity testing would ensure better interoperability between DOD and emergency responder equipment.

The committee believes that significant opportunities exist for collaboration between the Army and the DHS to secure the homeland more effectively. Several elements of C4ISR could be used to establish a more formal paradigm to address additional areas. The committee also recognizes that the DHS, because of its relative newness, faces numerous organizational challenges. These challenges, coupled with the current high operational tempo of the Army, make policy commitment on behalf of both organizations possibly the biggest hurdle to overcome.

However, the events of September 11 underscore why all obstacles to this collaborative process must be overcome.

The requirement for C4ISR is ubiquitous, whether for the Army’s Future Force or for the future emergency responder. The committee is convinced that quick action on the part of the Army can provide beneficial C4ISR solutions to the Department of Homeland Security that will ensure a high level of interoperability between emergency responders and the Army should our nation be forced again to respond to a catastrophic event on U.S. soil.

NORTHCOM (Northern Command). 2003. Who We Are—Mission. Available online at <http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_mission>. Accessed March 26, 2004.

NRC (National Research Council). 2003. Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.