National Academies Press: OpenBook

Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework (2005)

Chapter: Appendix B: Presentations to the Committee

« Previous: Appendix A: Statement of Task
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Presentations to the Committee." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

Appendix B
Presentations to the Committee

November 24-25, 2003


Dennis Imbro, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: Decontamination and Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities


Ellen Raber, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: How Clean Is Clean Enough? Recent Developments in Response to Threats Posed by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents


Nina Marano, CDC: Responding to Bacillus anthracis-Related Bioterrorism


Mark Wheelis, University of California, Davis: History of Biological Weapons


Kenneth Martinez, CDC: Environmental Sampling During the Anthrax Outbreak Investigations


Dorothy Canter, EPA: Anthrax Cleanups: Addressing Residual Risk Issues


Laura Rose, CDC: Environmental Bioterrorism Research Activities


Robert Eckhaus, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, U.S. Army: Capabilities in Support of How Clean Is Safe

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Presentations to the Committee." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

January 28-29, 2004

Tom Day, United States Postal Service: Decision Making Process for Declaring Brentwood Postal Facility Safe for Use


David Franz, Midwest Research Institute: (1) Comments on What Type of Standards and Guidelines Are Needed to Determine “How Clean Is Safe?” and (2) Information About Anthrax, Smallpox, and Plague


C.J. Peters, University of Texas, Medical Branch at Galveston: Information About Anthrax, Smallpox, and Plague


Dick Spertzel, U.S. Army (retired): Issues of Weaponized Microbes


M. Louise M. Pitt, USAMRIID: Information About Dose–Response


Rick Batycky, Alkermes, Inc.: Information on Lung Physiology and Delivery of Microbes


Ray Mariella, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: Reliability of Detection


Calvin Chue, Johns Hopkins University: Mechanisms of Detection


Linda Stetzenbach, University of Nevada, Las Vegas: (1) Sampling Methods on Various Surfaces Using Simulant Organisms and (2) Natural Background


Richard Sextro, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: Air Movement in Subways and Buildings and Reaerosolization of Microbes


Jeanine Prud’homme, New York City Department of Public Health: Information on Public Health


Brandolyn Thran, U.S. Army: Risk Assessment


Tony Cox, Cox Associates: Risk Assessment


March 29-31, 2004

Dean Wilkening, Stanford University: Human Effects Model for Inhalation Anthrax


Caron Chess, Rutgers University: Risk Communication


Kimothy Smith, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: Natural Background Levels of Anthrax

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Presentations to the Committee." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×

Terri Tanielian, RAND Corporation: Employee Decision-Making on Returning to Work at Brentwood and on Capitol Hill


John Eck and Laura Tankenson, NBC: Anthrax Incident at NBC


Peter Biggins, Dstl Chemical and Biological Sciences: Aerosols and Detection


July 20, 2004

E. Barry Skolnick: Surface-testing Issues in Bioagent Detection and Decontamination


October 13-14, 2004

John Mason and Karen Cavanagh, Sabre Technical Services, LLC: Decontamination and Sampling at AMI


Mike Shoemaker and Greg Knudson, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute: Clearance Decisions After 2001 Attacks


Tyler Cymet and Shivang Joshi, Sinai Hospital of Baltimore: Long Lasting Health Effects of Exposure to Bacillus anthracis

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Presentations to the Committee." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page 179
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Presentations to the Committee." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page 180
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Presentations to the Committee." National Research Council. 2005. Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/11324.
×
Page 181
Next: Appendix C: All Findings and Recommendations »
Reopening Public Facilities After a Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework Get This Book
×
Buy Paperback | $49.00 Buy Ebook | $39.99
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

The anthrax attacks in fall 2001 spurred an extensive and costly decontamination effort where many decisions had to be made about which sites required cleanup, what method to use, how to determine the effectiveness of the cleanup, and how "clean" the building had to be for reoccupation. As part of a project funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and managed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Research Council was asked to consider the criteria that must be met for a cleanup to be declared successful, allowing the reoccupation of a facility. The report finds that efficiently sampling and characterizing a pathogen is critical for choosing the best remediation strategy. However, there should be no universal standard for deciding when a building is safe to re-enter because varying pathogen amounts and characteristics could require different strategies. The report offers a flowchart for decision-makers that includes questions about the characteristics of the pathogen; how far it has spread; whether it is transmissible between humans; and how long it will survive to pose a threat. The report also recommends that a risk-assessment approach be adopted as part of a strategy for achieving a "socially acceptable" standard for cleanup.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    Switch between the Original Pages, where you can read the report as it appeared in print, and Text Pages for the web version, where you can highlight and search the text.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  9. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!