National Academies Press: OpenBook
« Previous: Appendix C: Final Questionnaire
Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Additional Data and Analysis." National Research Council. 2009. A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12460.
×
Page 165
Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Additional Data and Analysis." National Research Council. 2009. A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12460.
×
Page 166
Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Additional Data and Analysis." National Research Council. 2009. A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12460.
×
Page 167
Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Additional Data and Analysis." National Research Council. 2009. A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12460.
×
Page 168
Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Additional Data and Analysis." National Research Council. 2009. A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12460.
×
Page 169
Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Additional Data and Analysis." National Research Council. 2009. A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12460.
×
Page 170
Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Additional Data and Analysis." National Research Council. 2009. A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12460.
×
Page 171
Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Additional Data and Analysis." National Research Council. 2009. A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12460.
×
Page 172

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Appendix D Additional Data and Analysis Table D-1 Survey Questions and Number of Responses for Each Question Number of Question Responsesa 1. Have you ever conducted research or managed others’ research in the 1,950 life sciences? 2. Have you made any changes in how you conduct or manage research because of concerns that knowledge, tools, or techniques from your research might be deliberately misused to facilitate bioterrorism? I decided against conducting a specific research project/experiment 1,744 I decided to shift my research away from an area altogether 1,744 I decided against seeking funding for a proposed research project 1,744 I decided against collaborating with particular scientists, postdocs, 1,744 students, etc. I limited my conversations about my research 1,744 I decided against submitting a manuscript to a journal 1,744 I modified a manuscript 1,744 I decided against presenting research at a conference 1,744 I modified a conference presentation 1,744 3. Are you currently conducting or managing research in the life 1,843 sciences? 4. Do you consider any of the research you currently conduct or manage 1,376b to have dual use potential? 5. Are you currently conducting or managing research which includes 1,376c any of these seven types of experiments? 165

166 APPENDIX D Number of Question Responsesa 6. Do you now or have you ever worked with or managed research 1,798 using select agents? 7. Do the journal(s) in your field require reviewers to evaluate whether 1,755 manuscripts include knowledge, tools and techniques with dual use potential? 8. Do the journal(s) in your field require authors to disclose any research 1,755 with dual use potential to editors upon submission of the manuscript? 9. Should scientific journals have policies regarding publication of dual 1,755 use research? 10. Have you ever contacted an editor because you felt that a 1,755 manuscript you were reviewing contained knowledge, tools, or techniques that could pose a threat to national security? 11. Should professional scientific societies have codes for the responsible 1,743 conduct of dual use life sciences research? 12. Are you a member of any professional scientific societies that 1,743 already have codes of conduct that include statements about the responsible conduct of dual use research? 13. Principal investigators should be responsible for the initial 1,658 evaluation of the dual use potential of their life sciences research. 14. Scientists should provide formal assurance to their institution that 1,658 they are assessing their work for dual use potential. 15. Scientists conducting or managing research should take an oath, 1,658 similar to medicine’s Hippocratic Oath, to carry out research responsibly and guard against deliberate misuse of the knowledge, tools, or techniques of dual use research. 16. Preventing the potential that knowledge, tools, or techniques from 1,658 dual use research could pose a threat to national security requires . . . Certification of researchers conducting dual use research 1,658 Greater restrictions on access to specific biological agents or toxins. 1,658 Licensure of certain biological equipment that is commonly used in 1,658 life science research. Restrictions on disclosure of details about the research or its findings 1,658 through personal communication. Alteration or removal of certain experimental methods or findings 1,658 prior to publication or presentation. Restrictions on publication of findings based on dual use potential. 1,658 Classification of research findings based on dual use potential. 1,658 17. Dual use research needs greater federal oversight. 1,637 18. Principal investigators should be responsible for training lab staff, 1,637 students, and visiting scientists about dual use research including policies and practices to minimize the potential for misuse of information from their research.

APPENDIX D 167 Number of Question Responsesa 19. University and college students should receive educational lectures 1,637 and materials on dual use life sciences research including the potential that knowledge, tools, and techniques from such research could pose a threat to national security. 20. Institutions should provide mandatory training for scientists 1,637 regarding dual use life sciences research. 21. All grant proposals for life sciences research with dual use potential 1,633 should be reviewed by a researcher’s institution prior to submission for funding. 22. Funding agencies should require grantees to attest on grant 1,633 applications that they have considered dual use implications of their proposed research. 23. Funding agencies would be less likely to fund grant proposals if the 1,633 proposed research has dual use potential. 24. What is the percent chance (ranging from 0 percent chance to 100 1,588 percent chance) that an act of bioterrorism will occur somewhere in the world in the next five years? 25. What is the percent chance (ranging from 0 percent chance to 100 1,588 percent chance) that an act of bioterrorism will occur in the United States in the next five years? 26. What is the percent chance (ranging from 0 percent chance to 100 1,588 percent chance) that knowledge, tools, or techniques from dual use life sciences research will facilitate an act of bioterrorism in the next five years? 27. To date, there have been few acts of bioterrorism. Which of the following help explain why? Terrorists lack the knowledge to work with or create dangerous 1,588 biological agents. Terrorists lack the equipment to work with or create dangerous 1,588 biological agents. Terrorists lack access to dangerous biological agents. 1,588 Terrorists are deterred by the threat of being caught and punished. 1,588 Terrorists prefer to use other means. 1,588 28. Do the following means of communication provide sufficient information for an individual with college level life science training to deliberately create a harmful biological agent? Scientific journal articles 1,588 Presentations at scientific conferences or meetings 1,588 Personal communications (e.g., e-mail, phone calls) 1,588 Internet 1,588 29. On June 1, 2007, what was your citizenship status? 1,586 30. What is the highest educational degree you have been awarded? 1,586

168 APPENDIX D Number of Question Responsesa 32. Which one of the following best describes your current occupational 1,586 status? Are you . . . 33. Which one of the following best describes your principal employer 1,443 during the week of June 1, 2007? 34. Which scientific discipline of the following do you consider to 1,586 be your primary area of work or study? (If currently unemployed or retired, please select the discipline that most closely matches your last occupation.) a Unless otherwise noted, these numbers are the number of responses to each question out of the possible 1,954 respondents who answered at least part of the survey. bThis number is the number of respondents who answered this question out of the 1,407 respondents who answered “yes” to question #3. cThis number is the number of respondents who answered this question out of the 1,407 respondents who answered “yes” to question #3. Table D-2 Percentage Likelihood of Dual Use Research Facilitating a Bioterror Attack, by Type of Research in Which Respondents Are Engaged Percentage Likelihood of Dual Use Facilitating a Bioterror Attack Type of Research Mean (%) SD (%) N Works with dual use Yes 28 33 196 No 25 30 1,033 Total 1,229a Works with seven types of experiments Yes 31 33 74 No 25 30 1,155 1,229a Works with select agents Yes 30 34 416 No 27 30 1,051 Don’t Know 29 32 120 Total 1,587b aThese two questions (works with dual use and percent likelihood and works with seven types of experiments and percent likelihood) could only be answered by the 1,407 people who were currently engaged in research. The 178 other respondents did not answer one or both of these questions. bThe questions about working with select agents and percent likelihood were asked of all 1,954 respondents. The other 367 respondents failed to answer one or both of these ques- tions. SOURCE: NRC/AAAS Survey; data tabulations by staff.

APPENDIX D 169 Table D-3 Percentage of Respondents Agreeing or Disagreeing with Statement That Greater Federal Oversight Is Needed, by Type of Research and Employment Strongly Strongly Obser- Variable Values Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree vations Works with Yes 20 40 16 21 3 198 dual use No 11 35 29 21 4 1,065 Works with Yes 23 32 18 22 5 74 seven types of No 12 36 28 21 4 1,189 experiments Works with Yes 15 40 21 19 4 427 select agents No 10 34 30 23 4 1,088 Employer type Industry 9 37 23 25 7 223 Academe 12 36 28 20 3 1,023 Government 10 32 28 26 4 125 Other 14 29 25 29 3 72 NOTES: The number of observations reflects the number of individuals who answered each question down the left column (“Variable”) and the likert scale question. Recall that only 1,407 individuals were asked about whether they considered their research to be dual use or involve the seven types of experiments. As can be seen in the far-right column, not all of these 1,407 individuals answered the combination of dual use research and the likert scale question or seven types of experiments and the likert scale question. All 1,954 respondents could have answered whether they work with select agents and what their employer type was, although as noted in the far-right column, not all 1,954 respondents actually did so. SOURCE: NRC/AAAS Survey; data tabulations by staff. Table D-4 Percentage of Respondents Agreeing or Disagreeing That Particular Policies Should Be Required, by Policy, Type of Research and Employment Strongly Strongly Obser- Variable Values Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree vations A. Certification of researchers Works with Yes 17 35 9 28 11 198 dual use No 10 25 24 31 11 1,077 Works with Yes 20 30 11 30 9 74 seven types of No 10 26 22 31 11 1,201 experiments Works with Yes 14 27 17 29 13 429 select agents No 10 25 23 32 10 1,100 Employer type Industry 12 26 18 35 9 223 Academia 11 26 22 30 11 1,023 Government 9 23 27 29 12 125 Other 11 24 28 29 8 72

170 APPENDIX D Strongly Strongly Obser- Variable Values Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree vations B. Restrictions on access Works with Yes 19 30 9 33 10 198 dual use No 9 24 22 34 12 1,077 Works with Yes 18 32 4 36 9 74 seven types of No 10 24 21 34 11 1,201 experiments Works with Yes 15 28 16 28 13 429 select agents No 7 22 21 38 13 1,100 Employer type Industry 7 21 15 40 17 223 Academia 10 26 20 34 11 1,023 Government 7 23 13 40 17 125 Other 7 15 35 35 8 72 C. Licensure of equipment Works with Yes 32 42 9 14 4 198 dual use No 23 37 21 14 4 1,077 Works with Yes 32 42 9 15 1 74 seven types of No 24 38 20 14 4 1,201 experiments Works with Yes 26 39 17 13 5 429 select agents No 22 35 21 17 5 1,100 Employer type Industry 22 35 18 19 6 223 Academia 25 39 19 14 4 1,023 Government 18 38 19 19 6 125 Other 19 32 25 21 3 72 D. Restrictions on personal communication Works with Yes 33 32 15 18 2 198 dual use No 20 38 23 16 4 1,077 Works with Yes 22 34 18 26 1 74 seven types of No 22 37 22 15 4 1,201 experiments Works with Yes 27 33 18 17 4 429 select agents No 19 37 24 17 3 1,100 Employer type Industry 18 31 24 21 6 223 Academia 22 39 22 15 3 1,023 Government 23 26 26 19 5 125 Other 24 33 24 15 4 72 E. Modification of manuscripts or presentations Works with Yes 33 26 15 23 3 198 dual use No 22 35 23 17 3 1,077 Works with Yes 26 30 12 31 1 74 seven types of No 24 34 22 17 3 1,201 experiments Works with Yes 25 32 20 19 5 429 select agents No 21 35 23 19 3 1,100

APPENDIX D 171 Strongly Strongly Obser- Variable Values Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree vations Employer type Industry 18 29 22 24 6 223 Academia 24 36 20 17 3 1,023 Government 21 30 26 19 4 125 Other 19 35 25 19 1 72 F. Restrictions on publications Works with Yes 28 36 16 17 3 198 dual use No 20 38 23 17 3 1,077 Works with Yes 28 42 15 12 3 74 seven types of No 20 37 23 17 3 1,201 experiments Works with Yes 19 36 23 19 3 429 select agents No 18 37 24 19 2 1,100 Employer type Industry 16 29 26 25 5 223 Academia 21 40 21 16 2 1,023 Government 19 35 25 18 3 125 Other 19 39 21 21 0 72 G. Classification of findings Works with Yes 32 27 21 18 3 198 dual use No 19 28 26 24 3 1,077 Works with Yes 27 28 27 18 0 74 seven types of No 21 28 25 23 3 1,201 experiments Works with Yes 24 25 21 26 4 429 select agents No 17 29 27 24 4 1,100 Employer type Industry 15 25 24 28 8 223 Academia 20 31 25 22 3 1,023 Government 22 19 26 27 6 125 Other 18 22 28 31 1 72 NOTES: The number of observations reflects the number of individuals who answered each question down the left column (“Variable”) and the likert scale question. Recall that only 1,407 individuals were asked about whether they considered their research to be dual use or involve the seven types of experiments. As can be seen in the far-right column, not all of these 1,407 individuals answered the combination of dual use research and the likert scale question or seven types of experiments and the likert scale question. All 1,954 respondents could have answered whether they work with select agents and what their employer type was, although as noted in the far-right column, not all 1,954 respondents actually did so. SOURCE: NRC/AAAS Survey; data analysis by staff.

A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science Get This Book
×
Buy Paperback | $90.00 Buy Ebook | $69.99
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

The same technologies that fuel scientific advances also pose potential risks--that the knowledge, tools, and techniques gained through legitimate biotechnology research could be misused to create biological weapons or for bioterrorism. This is often called the dual use dilemma of the life sciences. Yet even research with the greatest potential for misuse may offer significant benefits. Determining how to constrain the danger without harming essential scientific research is critical for national security as well as prosperity and well-being.

This book discusses a 2007 survey of American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) members in the life sciences about their knowledge of dual use issues and attitudes about their responsibilities to help mitigate the risks of misuse of their research.

Overall, the results suggest that there may be considerable support for approaches to oversight that rely on measures that are developed and implemented by the scientific community itself. The responses also suggest that there is a need to clarify the scope of research activities of concern and to provide guidance about what actions scientists can take to reduce the risk that their research will be misused by those with malicious intent.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!