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17 IAEA Activities in Preventing Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Miroslav Gregoric, Office of Nuclear Security, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, International Atomic Energy Agency FOUR CONCERNS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM One terrorist target could be of a nuclear nature. Terrorists might acquire a nuclear weapon or nuclear material to produce an improvised nuclear explo- sive device (IND) or obtain other radioactive material to produce a radioactive dispersal device (RDD). If used in a city, the consequences of an IND explo- sion would be devastating in terms of direct human loss, while if an RDD is used in a city, the prevailing damage might not be in human casualties but rather in psychological, sociological, and economic impacts due to relocation of the population, long-term decontamination, and possible long-term health effects. Similar concern relates to the risk of a sabotage of nuclear or other facilities or transport with radioactive material. SPECTRUM OF TARGETS More than 120,000 nuclear weapons have probably been produced in the world in the past 60 years.1 Many were dismantled after the cold war, but the number of existing ones is estimated at more than 25,000.2 These weapons and related nuclear materials are clearly outside the mandate and statute of the In- ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We must assume that all necessary 173
174 COUNTERING TERRORISM measures are being carried out in states possessing these weapons and materi- als to address nuclear security at the level commensurate with the risk. Worldwide inventories of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are more than 3,000 metric tons, including both the civilian and the military sectors. There are 442 commercial nuclear power plants operating worldwide in 31 states.3 Many of them have spent fuel storage and radioactive waste onsite. According to the IAEA database on research reactors, there are 248 research reactors in operation and 239 have been shut down awaiting further decisions.4 HEU is still used at 60 research reactors and is present at an ad- ditional 10 research reactors that have been shut down. Within the initiatives to eliminate the use of HEU in research reactors, some operators managed to send the spent fuel and the HEU fuel back to the state of originâthe United States or Russia. Another IAEA database also shows 8 operating reprocessing plants, 18 conversion plants, 40 fuel fabrication plants, 13 enrichment plants, and 89 storage facilities. 5 What about radioactive sources? The numbers in this area are much larger, as are the potential targets.6 According to the IAEA Safety Standards, the sources are divided into five categories depending on the âD valueâ of a radioactive material known to be a dangerous source. 7 As defined in the standards, âthe D value is the radionuclide specific activity of a source which, if not under control, could cause severe deterministic effects for a range of scenarios that include both external exposure from an unshielded source and internal exposure following dispersal of the source material.â The number of Category 1 sources (with activity of more than 1,000 D) is estimated to exceed 10,000.8 These include industrial and food-processing irradiation facilities, medical teletherapy units and gamma knives, 9 and radioisotope thermal gen- erators (RTGs). The number of Category 2 sources (with activity between 10 D and 1,000 D) is estimated to be more than 100,000. These sources include industrial radiography devices and high and medium dose rate brachytherapy units. Finally, the number of Category 3 sources (with activity between 1 D and 10 D) is estimated to be more than 1,000,000; these include industrial gauges and well-logging sources. In total there are more than 3 million radio- active sources worldwide. Operations at nuclear facilities and the use of radioactive sources also depend on the transport of nuclear or other radioactive materials. All this presents pos- sible targets for theft of the materials, sabotage of a nuclear facility, actions aimed at inducing nuclear accidents, or other malicious acts. This situation is a subject of concern that warrants special attention. INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME Nuclear security, which involves preventing, detecting, and responding to thefts, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts
IAEA ACTIVITIES IN PREVENTING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 175 involving nuclear materials, other radioactive materials, or their associated fa- cilities, is undoubtedly the responsibility of the state. However, because of the international and transnational character of terrorism and because of possible transboundary effects of terrorist acts, an effective international system needs to be established to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, and this system should include international cooperation and coordination. The role of the IAEA in this process is advisory; it can offer support and assistance to member states. The international nuclear security regime has slowly evolved over the past three decades. It includes the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM),10 with 126 parties; the CPPNM amendment,11 adopted by consensus in 2005 with 9 ratifications so far; the Nuclear Terrorism Convention of 2005, 12 with more than 100 signatories so far and 20 ratifications; and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1373 and 1540. The Code of Conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources is an essential complement, which serves as a political commitment by states to put in place safety and security infrastructure and measures to control radioactive sources effectively. A total of 90 states have expressed such a commitment. These instruments were developed primarily to address substate actorsâterrorists or criminalsâand to prevent, detect, and respond to malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material and facilities. The international community should strive for universal adherence to these instruments. This framework is further enhanced by complementary safety instruments such as the Convention on Early Notification (100 parties), the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (98 parties), the Convention on Nuclear Safety (60 parties, including all states with operating nuclear power plants), and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Manage- ment (45 parties), as well as the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors. The latter two conventions are of particular importance because of the established periodic review mechanisms of the parties. These instruments were developed to provide a national legal infrastructure to prevent nuclear accidents and mitigate their consequences should they happen, and here again broad adherence is welcome. SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS An equally important enhancement to nuclear security is provided by in- struments related to safeguards, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), safegards agreements, additional protocols (APs), and agreements on nuclear-weapons-free zones, as well as nuclear supplier rules. These instru- ments were developed to restrain state activities aimed at weapons develop- ment. Several of them require strong accounting and control; export and import controls; and physical protection of materials, equipment, and tech-
176 COUNTERING TERRORISM nology. As IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei has pointed out: âThe nuclear nonproliferation regime continues to face a number of challenges. I remain concerned by the fact that 30 countries have not yet fulfilled their legal obligations under the NPT to conclude and bring into force comprehensive safe- guards agreements. I am also concerned by the comparatively slow progress on the conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols. To date, more than 100 countries remain without an additional protocol in force. As I have stated on many occasions, the Agency can provide no assurance with regard to countries that have no safeguards agreement, and limited assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities with regard to countries that do not have an additional protocol in force.â The IAEA safeguards system is designed for the verification of the fulfill- ment of the statesâ commitments not to divert nuclear material from peaceful use towards nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The agencyâs safe- guards system includes commitments relevant to strengthening national controls over nuclear material and nuclear-related material and activities: â¢ State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC): Comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), which are required for all nonnuclear-weapon states under the NPT and comparable nonproliferation treaties and agreements, require states to maintain effective SSACs, to ensure that nuclear material is accounted for at all times, and to record and report to the IAEA any changes in national inventories. States with APs in force are also required to provide information to the agency, inter alia, on research and de- velopment activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle but not involving nuclear material. â¢ Export and import controls: IAEA comprehensive safeguards agree- ments require states to report exports and imports of nuclear material to the agency. APs expand these export-reporting requirements13 to certain specified equipment and nonnuclear material. These obligations assume that the states maintain import and export controls that enable them to report such international transfers to the agency. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)14 The CPPNM is included on the list of 13 legal instruments of relevance for combating terrorism adopted by the United Nations.15 The CPPNM is the only international, legally binding undertaking in the area of physical protection of nuclear material aimed at averting potential dangers of the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material. In particular, certain CPPNM commitments are relevant to the control and protection of nuclear material:
IAEA ACTIVITIES IN PREVENTING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 177 â¢ Protection of nuclear material: The CPPNM obliges contracting states to ensure the protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes at the levels specified in the CPPNM on their territory, ships, or aircraft during inter- national transport. It also defines three categories of nuclear material and their corresponding levels of protection during international transport. It requires that states prohibit transport or transit unless nuclear material is protected at appropriate levels. â¢ Export and import requirements: States parties to the CPPNM com- mit themselves not to undertake or authorize undertaking international transports (such as the export and import of nuclear material) unless assurances are provided that nuclear material will be protected at the required levels. Parties must also apply the agreed levels of protection to nuclear material during transit from one part of their territories to another and while passing through international waters or airspace. â¢ Measures to prevent, detect, and punish offenses relating to nuclear material: Parties are obliged to make offenses relating to nuclear material pun- ishable by appropriate penalties under their national laws and to establish their jurisdiction over such offenses. These offenses should be included as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing between the parties. Parties that make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty may consider the CPPNM as a legal basis for extradition with regard to those offenses. CPPNM AMENDMENT OF 2005 The amendment to the CPPNM emphasizes a stateâs responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities on its territory as well as for domestic and international transport of nuclear material, protection against sabotage, and securing of confidential information. The document sets physical protection objectives and fundamental principles and expands the scope of pun- ishable acts related to nuclear material or facilities that states must prosecute. These include, among others, intentional acts involving nuclear material without lawful authority, infliction of substantial damage to the environment, smuggling of nuclear material, sabotage of a nuclear facility, organization or direction of others to commit an offense, and acts by groups of persons. In essence, the physical protection objectives are to protect against theft, locate and recover stolen material, protect against sabotage, and mitigate radiological consequences of sabotage if it occurs.16 Fundamental principles of a state physical protection system relate to the responsibilities of a state, including responsibilities during transport, legislative and regulatory framework, establishment of a competent authority, responsibility of a license holder, security culture, a threat-based ap- proach, a graded approach, in-depth defense, quality assurance, contingency plans, and confidentiality.
178 COUNTERING TERRORISM THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES By undertaking to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, states are committed to reinforcing the responsibilities of manufacturers, suppliers, users, and those managing disused sources as well as those responsible for the safety and security of radioactive sources. 17 Further- more, they are committed to establishing an effective national system of control over the management of radioactive sources; creating legislation and regulations that prescribe and assign governmental responsibilities for the safety and secu- rity of radioactive sources; and providing for the effective control of radioactive sources. In particular, under such legislation and regulations, states are obliged to include security measures to prevent, protect against, and ensure the timely detec- tion of theft, loss, or unauthorized use or removal of radioactive sources during all stages of management. A total of 88 states have made political commitments to the Code of Conduct. Its supplementary Guidance for the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources has also been receiving growing attention, with 41 states having made a political commitment to it. In 2006, states agreed to establish a mechanism for a voluntary, periodic exchange of information among states on their implementation of the code and its guidance. This mechanism would include regional and international meetings, with an informal report summarizing the discussions. The technical meetings related to implementation of this guidance are attended by more than 50 states, including nonmember states. UNSC Resolution 1540 The UNSC Resolution 1540, which is binding for states, focuses on pre- venting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. It specifically addresses concerns regarding terrorism and illicit trafficking, obliges all states to enforce effective measures to prevent prolifera- tion, and specifically references the need to develop and maintain appropriate physical protection measures and accounting for nuclear material. It defines punishable acts related to proliferation that states must prosecute. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism The nuclear terrorism convention, which was opened for signature in Sep- tember 2005, is the most recent of 13 UN antiterrorism instruments. It offers a definition of acts of nuclear terrorism and a broad definition of radioactive material, thus covering radioactive dispersal devices as well as nuclear explosive devices. It details offenses relating to unlawful and intentional possession and use of radioactive material (including nuclear material), nuclear explosive devices,
IAEA ACTIVITIES IN PREVENTING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 179 radioactive material dispersal, and radiation-emitting devices, as well as the use or damage of nuclear facilities. States parties are required to adopt the necessary measures to criminalize these offenses. It also includes an obligation to cooper- ate, share information, and inform the UN secretary general and the IAEA. States parties are âto make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive material, taking into account relevant recommendations and functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency.â IAEA STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES CONTRIBUTING TO NUCLEAR SECURITY There are several IAEA documents from the safety area contributing to nuclear security, such as the International Basic Safety Standards for Protec- tion against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (Safety Series No. 115); Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (Safety Standard Series No. TS-R-1); Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste and Transport Safety Safety Requirements (Safety Standard Series No. GS-R-1); Safety Requirements on Preparedness and Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2); Emergency Notification and Assistance Technical Operations Manual (ENATOM); and others. Also worth mentioning is the Handbook on Nuclear Law, covering the areas of safety, security, safeguards, and nuclear liability, which may assist states in drafting their own nuclear legislation. 18 IAEA RESPONSE TO SECURITY THREATS The IAEA serves as a central component of the international security in- frastructure that provides the framework for cooperation. In cooperation with member states, the agency has prepared a Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009, which was approved by the Board of Governors, and endorsed by the General Conference in September 2005, to address threats to nuclear security. 19 It is the continuation and expansion of the initial plan adopted in 2002. 20 The Office of Nuclear Security in the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security is in charge of coordinating and implementing the plan, which is divided into three areas: (1) coordination and data analysis (including the Illicit Trafficking Database), (2) prevention, and (3) detection and response. The office also coordinates activi- ties related to safety and safeguards that contribute to security. The main such activities include promoting international instruments relating to nuclear security, establishing the international nuclear security recommendation and guidance doc- uments, promoting the development of human resources, and providing nuclear security services, statesâ needs for which could be identified and addressed in the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans. It covers also some security upgrades for nuclear facilities and facilities with radioactive sources and is involved in
180 COUNTERING TERRORISM combating illicit trafficking, such as through the use of border detection and monitoring equipment. PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO NUCLEAR SECURITY The work of the IAEA has contributed to a considerable increase in the num- ber of states that adhere to the CPPNM, which has risen from 63 states parties in 1999 to 95 in 2003 and to 126 in 2007. The need to strengthen the international physical protection regime has been widely recognized, inter alia, by the IAEA Board of Governors and the General Conference. By adopting the amendment to the CPPNM in 2005, the international community has recognized the need to strengthen the existing international legal regime in the area of nuclear security. A set of Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles has been endorsed by the IAEA Board and the General Conference and incorporated into the amended CPPNM. These objectives and fundamental principles are to be included in a security fundamentals document that will serve as further guidance to all member states. They provide a platform for national and international ef- forts to improve physical protection of nuclear material, particularly in their use, storage, and transport. The document underlines the need for a security culture to be implemented at all levels. Representatives of more than 130 states have attended the agencyâs regional and interregional seminars on safeguards agreements, additional protocols, and the strengthened safeguards system in the past 4 years. The agency has an out- reach program to encourage and facilitate statesâ conclusion of CSAs and APs. Several meetings have been organized internationally and regionally to promote the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Also, the IAEA has participated in several seminars aimed at promoting implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS: NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES One of the high-priority efforts of the IAEA is establishing nuclear security guidance for states to implement the conventions and other international instru- ments and providing supplementary measures for nuclear security at the state, regulator, and operator levels. Internationally accepted baseline documents for nuclear security are now being developed in the new Nuclear Security Series, which covers nuclear and other radioactive materials and associated facilities as well as transport. The process for the development of the Nuclear Security Series document was designed to assure high-quality consistency with other agency standards and guidance and broad international consensus through involvement of member states. The fundamentals of nuclear security will represent the top
IAEA ACTIVITIES IN PREVENTING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 181 level, and recommendations will represent the second level (part of this level is currently covered by IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4). The third level will consist of different implementing guidelines, which will provide guidance in areas such as design basis threats; protection against sabotage; vital area identification; protection against insider threats; identification of radioactive sources; security of radioactive sources, waste, and transport; and combating of illicit trafficking and nuclear security at major public events. Several cross-cutting areas will also be covered, including nuclear security culture, information technology security, confidentiality of information, and emergency response guidance. The first four documents in the Nuclear Security Series, covering specifications for border- monitoring equipment, detection of radioactive material in the mail, nuclear forensics, and self-assessment of nuclear facilities against sabotage, were recently published. Two more guidance documents from this series are in the final stages of publication, namely, the materials devoted to identification of radioactive sources and devices and the handbook on combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material. EVALUATION AND ADVISORY SERVICES Different nuclear security missions, evaluations, and technical visits are the IAEAâs main tool for assisting states in improving their nuclear security by identifying nuclear security needs. These needs can be subsequently addressed by the state alone, with the assistance of a bilateral partner, or in conjunction with agency support, funded through the voluntary Nuclear Security Fund. The International Nuclear Security Service (INSServ) mission serves as a flexible mechanism to help identify a stateâs broad nuclear security require- ments for prevention, detection, and response, as well as the measures needed to meet these requirements. This is the basis for drafting the Integrated Nu- clear Security Support Plan (INSSP), which, once agreed upon by the recipient state, provides an action plan to be implemented by the state, the IAEA, and an optional bilateral donor. The INSSP provides a platform for work over an extended period of time, which will cover all of the needs related to nuclear security from the prevention, detection, and response areas. It is based on the confidential INSServ report, other mission reports and technical visits, and the stateâs requests. It is the main tool for identifying bilateral donors and coordi- nating efforts with them. So far, more than 30 INSSPs have been developed, of which 12 have been transmitted formally to states for agreement. Most relevant to the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities are the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions. They continue to serve as the agencyâs main tool for evaluating existing physi- cal protection arrangements in member states. The IPPAS missions carry out detailed reviews of the legal and regulatory basis for the physical protection of nuclear activities in the requesting state and of physical protection systems
182 COUNTERING TERRORISM and arrangements at facilities. The IPPAS team also reviews compliance with obligations contained in the CPPNM and with guidance provided in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 and compares their observations with international best practices. The findings of the IPPAS missions are formulated into confidential mission reports for further action. A total of 38 missions have so far been undertaken in 28 states. Specific IPPAS followup assistance, such as training, technical support, and more targeted assessments, continues to constitute an essential feature of this advisory service. An effective SSAC is fundamental to a stateâs ability (1) to account for and control its nuclear material and detect possible losses or unauthorized use or re- moval of nuclear material and (2) to fulfill its international nuclear nonprolifera- tion obligations. The agency offers an SSAC advisory service (ISSAS), whereby a team of experts, at the request of a state, inter alia, reviews the legal framework and regulatory, administrative, and technical systems of SSACs and evaluates the performance of those systems in meeting safeguards obligations. Recommenda- tions are made and an action plan is formulated in cooperation with the state to improve its SSACs. The follow-up to such missions may involve, for example, assistance with equipment procurement or training of staff from the SSAC author- ity and from facility operators. Two ISSAS missions and 12 SSAC evaluation missions have been under- taken at the request of member states since 2002. In addition, eight seminars and workshops relating to security and accounting of nuclear material have been held, and technical assistance (including equipment) has been provided to three states. Furthermore, the IAEA organizes International Team of Experts (ITE) mis- sions, composed of legal and technical experts, to advise states on adherence to and implementation of international instruments relevant to enhancing protection against nuclear terrorism. ITEs have visited 18 countries to date in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Other types of missions offer states reviews and advice regarding their regulatory infrastucture for safety and security of radioactive sources and for emergency preparedness and response arrangements. HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT: EDUCATION AND TRAINING To assist states in establishing and maintaining effective nuclear security, a variety of training courses, seminars, and workshops at the international, regional, and national levels are offered. From 2002 to 2006, more than 160 training events (99 in prevention and 62 in detection and response) lasting from 3 days to 3 weeks were organized for more than 120 states and involved 3,000 participants. The target audience depends on the subject of the course or workshop but can include policy makers; nuclear regulators; facility opera-
IAEA ACTIVITIES IN PREVENTING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 183 tors; legislators; lawyers; emergency responders; police; border forces; and customs, military, and intelligence officials. The training modules cover basic and advanced topics related to physical protection and a systematic methodology to design and evaluate physical protec- tion systems for nuclear facilities that are effective against theft and sabotage. One module is focused on the physical protection and control of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle, while another module concentrating on trans- port security will be offered this year. Specialized physical protection modules in- clude national workshops on methodology for developing the design basis threat (DBT) required to define performance targets for physical protection systems. Modules are available for protection against sabotage, vital area identification, and prevention of insider threats. Also offered are modules including hands-on training on the technical features of physical protection systems and a course to prepare national authorities for conducting inspections of physical protection ar- rangements. Several modules cover measures for combating and responding to illicit trafficking, border monitoring, and the use of different monitoring equip- ment. Some of these training courses are organized after equipment is supplied to a state. Another example of IAEA outreach activities is the relatively new course on security of radioactive sources, which began in 2004. This course has been held in 10 states (Namibia, Algeria, Australia, South Africa, Argentina, Pakistan, Slovenia, India, Tunisia, and Syria), reaching 310 participants from 63 states. Five more training events are being implemented in 2007 (Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Spain, China, and Estonia) and will serve an addition 150 participants from 30 states. Similar statistics can be drawn for several other modules. For university education, an academic module on physical protection, con- trol, and accounting of nuclear material began in 2005 with IAEA support at the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry (SNUNEI) in Ukraine. An essential element of the project was the collaboration of academic staff from the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, which has had such a pro- gram since 1997, and SNUNEI. Collaboration between the Naif Arab University for Security Science (NAUSS), the King Abdul-Aziz City of Science and Tech- nology in Saudi Arabia, and the IAEA may result in the establishment of similar educational modules on nuclear security at NAUSS in the near future. TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENTS AND UPGRADES IAEA is assisting states in upgrading their physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and in improving their border detection and monitoring equipment for customs, police, and border police that have been identified through the nuclear security services and are a part of the INSSP. As in the past, IAEA supports national efforts to increase nuclear security during major public events by providing relevant equipment and
184 COUNTERING TERRORISM training. These technical improvements can be made with bilateral support from member states or to some extent from the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. CONCLUSIONS The threat of nuclear terrorism is real. The potential targets are nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities or transport. As these are abun- dant, the possibility of terrorist acts cannot be ruled out. Threat reduction can be achieved by both eliminating materials at risk and protecting those in use. Nuclear security is a responsibility of states themselves, but it is also sub- ject to the emerging international nuclear security regime. States are addressing threats to nuclear and radioactive material and associated facilities and transport. Different measures are being taken to reduce the threats to and vulnerabilities of potential targets, including by means of design-basis threat reassessment and physical protection enhancements. Simultaneously, other measures have been taken to protect major infrastructure in individual states against terrorist attack, including aviation security enhancement. Information sharing, while at the same time securing confidential information at state and international levels, is slowly improving. All of this is contributing to enhanced nuclear security. Security mea- sures are an essential element of threat reduction. To further improve nuclear security worldwide, the international community should strive for universal adherence to international nuclear-security-related instruments and their implementation, including continued use of IAEA nuclear security advisory services and the Nuclear Security Series documents. We should all be aware that safety, safeguards, and security are prerequisites for the sustainability and renaissance of nuclear power. IAEA has several pro- grams and activities to cooperate with, support, and assist states in their efforts to combat nuclear terrorism and implement their international obligations, such as UNSC Resolution 1540. NOTES 1. Norris, R., and H. Kristensen. 2006. Nuclear notebook: Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945- 2006. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62(4):64-67. Available online at thebulletin.metapress.com/ content/c4120650912x74k7/fulltext.pdf. Accessed May 6, 2008. 2â The Weapons of Mass Destruction Comission. 2006. Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World . of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms. Available online at www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weap- ons_of_Terror.pdf. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 2006. Nuclear Power and Sustainable Devel- opment. Available online at www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/06-13891_NP&SDbrochure. pdf. 3â IAEA. Nuclear Power and Sustainable Development. . 4â Research reactors database, available online at www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb/. . 5. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System, available online at www-nfcis.iaea.org/NFCIS/.
IAEA ACTIVITIES IN PREVENTING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 185 6. Ferguson, C., T. Kazi, and J. Perera. 2003. Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks. Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of Interna- tional Studies. Available online at cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op11/op11.pdf. 7â IAEA. 2005. Categorization of Radioactive Sources: Safety Guide. Safety Standards Series . RS-G-1.9. Vienna: IAEA. Available online at www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_ web.pdf. 8â IAEA. 1991. Nature and Magnitude of the Problem of Spent Radiation Sources. TECDOC- . 620. Vienna: IAEA. Available online at www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_620_web. pdf. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. 2000. Sources and Ef- fects of Ionizing Radiation. Available online at www.unscear.org/unscear/en/publications/2000_1.html. Gonzalez, A. 2001. Security of radioactive sources: The evolving new international di- mensions. IAEA Bulletin 43(4). Available online at www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/ Bull434/article8.pdf. 9â DIRAC (Directory of Radiotherapy Centers). Available online at www-naweb.iaea.org/nahu/ . dirac/default.shtm. 10â The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. INFCIRC/274/Rev.1. 1980. . Available online at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274r1.shtml. 11â Nuclear Security: Measures to Protect against Nuclear Terrorism. Amendment to the Convention . on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Report by the Director General. GOV/INF/2005/10-GC(49)/ INF/6. 2005. Available online at www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Documents/gc49inf-6.pdf. 12â International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. 2005. Available . online at untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism/English_18_15.pdf. 13â Imports are to be reported by the state upon request of the IAEA. . 14â The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. INFCIRC/274/Rev.1. 1980. . Available online at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274r1.shtml. 15â Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. A/RES/46/51. 1991. Available online at www. . un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r051.htm. 16â First included in Nuclear Verification and Security of Material: Physical Protec- . tion Objectives and Fundamental Principles. GOV/2001/41. 2001. Available online at www.iaea. org/About/Policy/GC/GC45/Documents/gc45inf-14.pdf. 17â The code does not apply to nuclear material, as defined by the CPPNM, except sources . incorporating plutonium-239. 18â Stoiber, C., A. Baer, N. Pelzer, and W. Tonhauser. 2003. Vienna: International Atomic . Energy Agency. 19â Nuclear Security: Measures to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism. Progress Report and . Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009. Report by the Director General. GC(49)/17. Available online at www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Documents/gc49-17.pdf. 20. Protection against Nuclear Terrorism: Specific Proposals. GOV/2002/10. 2002.