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2 U.S.-Russian Working Group on Transportation System Vulnerabilities Cynthia Getner (Rapporteur) The National AcademiesâRussian Academy of Sciences Working Group on Transportation System Vulnerabilities met in Moscow March 19-20, 2007, to exchange information on vulnerabilities as they relate to urban terrorism. The Institute of Machine Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) hosted the meetings, which were followed by site visits in Moscow to two facilities of the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM)âthe Research Institute for Civil Defense and Disaster Management and the Research Institute for Fire Protection. Additional visits to EMERCOM facilities were carried out in St. Petersburg as indicated in Appendix A. WORKING GROUP PRESENTATIONS Academician Konstantin Frolov began the discussion with a presentation on the scientific basis for countering terrorism aimed at urban transportation. He focused on the human factor, which must be taken into account in both ter- rorism and other types of disasters. An in-depth analysis carried out by Nikolai Makhutov and his staff at the Institute of Machine Sciences indicated the extent to which the human factor is important in disasters and accidents as well as to vulnerabilities that can be exploited by terrorists.
COUNTERING TERRORISM To put terrorism in perspective, in Russia approximately 200 people lose their lives to terrorism annually, while more than 20,000 lose their lives to fire, 30,000-35,000 deaths are attributable to road accidents, and about 15,000 die from water accidents. Academician Frolov described a framework for reducing vulnerabilities that begins with the Security Council of the Russian Federation. It then has two or- ganizational paths: (1) a scientific panel of the Security Council and (2) various federal departments. Both paths lead to subordinate agencies and organizations that contribute their expertise and analysis. A joint strategy is developed that re- sults in technical standards and rules that are articulated, certified as technically sound, and then accredited as requirements. During the discussion, participants noted the importance of the human fac- tor when dealing with Hurricane Katrina and the relevance of this experience in responding to terrorism. Of special interest was the involvement of the security services when dealing with terrorism. In his presentation on control and supervision as a prerequisite for ensuring the safety of transportation systems, Vladimir Chertok of the Federal Transporta- tion Supervision Service stressed that a unified system of safety assurance for all transportation modes is needed. Standardized protocols and practices involving different modes of transportation are particularly important. At this time, the Fed- eral Authority for Transport Oversight supervises all types of transport. In Russia, 120 subnational entities are responsible for safety and security. The federal regu- latory system compiles information on all emergency transportation events that have occurred in various territories in Russia and determines the preparedness of each territory to handle safety and security situations. There are 7,000 safety inspectors to assess preparedness. Civil aviation provides a good example of international cooperation for mass transit based on the guidelines of the International Civil Aviation Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations. International agency safety inspec- tions are to be carried out in all of the 193 participating countries. To date, 150 countries have been subjected to inspections. Russia conducts joint inspections (announced and unannounced) with the U.S. Transportation Security Administra- tion at airports in Russia and the United States. The most valuable experience has often been these direct exchanges between member countries. In his presentation on counterterrorism awareness training for mass transit, Joseph Bober of the New Jersey Transit Police Department pointed out that since September 11, 2001, there has been a shift from traditional policing methods to a homeland security outlook. Since it is not possible for police to patrol all modes of transport at all times, technological and human resources are used as force multipliers. Technological resources include closed-circuit television, card access, intrusion detection, and interoperable communication systems, the latter being particularly important. Human resources that assist in policing are the part- nerships and associated training involving 560 other law enforcement agencies,
U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES daily commuters, employees of many facilities, and the general public. Often, the general public observes events that provide significant pieces of information. It is important to emphasize in public awareness training how to report such information to authorities. Training the community to identify and report possible threats is paramount to countering terrorism. Community policing efforts include training transit po- lice officers in behavioral assessment, improvised explosive device recognition, and counterfeit identification recognition. Employees of many components of the transit system attend training programs in system security awareness and training programs for community emergency response teams. There is also a community outreach informational program targeted on commuters and the general public. The use of the media to advise citizens on appropriate actions during a crisis is a particularly challenging task due to the potential for misuse. Vladimir Lopatin of the Research Institute of Intellectual Property discussed national and international priorities in countering transportation terrorism. Sev- enty percent of terrorist attacks rely on various means of public transport to convey the terrorists. However, terrorism threats in transit were not identified as a priority concern until recently. He emphasized the role of scientists in fighting terrorism. An analysis of transportation legislation and law enforcement in 2000-2001 indicated that a strong antiterrorism component was missing from transportation policy. In 2001, scientists recognized the need for interaction between government, science orga- nizations, and the business community. In May 2002 a high-level advisory group was established in Russia to ad- dress counterterrorism measures in the transportation sector. To date, scientists and practitioners on terrorism and transport security have convened at six inter- national conferences to share lessons learned based on experiences, with their findings and insights being published in the form of proceedings. Lopatin listed several priorities for international cooperation: â¢ Balancing the security of the general public with their civil rights â¢ Transferring security experience from one mode of transport to another, such as from aviation to rail transport â¢ Assuring continuity of effective counterterrorism and security methods â¢ Developing and implementing common standards for security â¢ Continuing scientific assessments of counterterrorism methods that should be considered in preparation of government regulations and in carrying out nongovernmental activities in the transport sector Mordecai Dzikansky, who is affiliated with the New York City Police Depart- ment, presented a strategic approach to protecting transportation facilities, draw- ing on his experience as an overseas liaison representative to the Israel National Police (INP). Detective Dzikansky described the INPâs approach. After an attack,
10 COUNTERING TERRORISM the affected area is divided into three zones: (1) the inner zone, the scene of the attack; (2) the second zone, where forces are gathered, victims are treated, and the joint command center for the first responders is located (spectators are evacuated from this zone as well); and (3) the third zone, which extends to the outermost limits of a sealed area, using roadblocks to contain any potential suspects. Estab- lishing these zones and understanding the roles and responsibilities of the various teams responding to the event allow the scene to be evacuated, secured, evaluated, and cleaned up in an efficient manner and time frame. Although the number of terrorist attacks of all types carried out in Israel has decreased since 2002, the number of attempted attacks has significantly increased. Suicide bombings are still the simplest and most effective method to maximize casualties. They often involve components of transportation systems. Consequently, it is important to recognize suspicious persons based on their appearance and behavior. Suspicious appearances can include inappropriate clothing for the season, place, or time; luggage that is incompatible with the surroundings; protrusions in clothing; and concealment of the hands. Indicators of suspicious behavior include excessive nervousness, profuse sweating, walking slowly while focusing on sidewalks, a determined walk, and an inability to carry on a coherent conversation when questioned. The presentation concluded with a discussion of the various methods Israel employs for defending against terrorist attacks. They include controlling bound- aries, utilizing highly professional security guards, training the community to be vigilant, and employing roadblocks. Of utmost importance is high-quality security intelligence. Vladimir Cherepenin of the Institute for Radio Engineering and Electronics described the application of magnetic inductive tomography for control of passen- ger flow. His presentation focused on magnetic inductive tomography as a tool for a screening portal. This type of passenger screening raises concerns over invasion of privacy, however. In any event, it is still in the prototype stage of development and will require considerable study to resolve the privacy issue. Adolf Mishuev of the Blast Resistance Research and Development Center discussed measures and technologies for ensuring blast proofing and blast resis- tance for transportation, industrial, energy, and civil facilities. Of course, fires occur much more frequently than blastsâperhaps 500 times more frequently. Thus, most studies emphasize flame resistance, and a new goal is to minimize damage from terrorism explosions. Mishuev focused primarily on tunnels. One example of an antiterrorism de- vice is the gas analyzer, which can be installed in a tunnel and, if an unusual gas reading occurs, can send a signal to a traffic light, stopping traffic before detona- tion occurs. Explosion of 1 kilogram of some gases (for example, acetylene or methane) can be roughly equal to 10 kilograms of TNT. Gas does not detonate; it conflagrates. In his presentation on transportation planning for evacuations, John Fal-
U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES 11 cocchio of Polytechnic University discussed the importance of an integrative evacuation process involving transportation agencies; first responders; and local, state, and federal government agencies. Technology was identified as an impor- tant component of the evacuation processâinforming travelers of circumstances clearly, reliably, and in a timely manner; monitoring the impacted area for real- time observation; and controlling the movement of vehicles and persons in the transportation system. Training programs and exercises are important to evaluate evacuation plans at various phases of preparation, response, and recovery. Viktor Dosenko of the Business Development Fund at the International Congress of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and Gennady Taranenko, advisor on science and security at the International Academy of Transport, made a joint pre- sentation. Their focus was on organizing the operation of complex transportation systems. The discussion raised the issue of international transportation standards that are most appropriate, including, for example, construction standards for facilities and electrical standards for operations. George Bugliarello of Polytechnic University discussed interfacial vulner- abilities of transportation systems. Of special interest is the lack of attention to the interfaces between biological, social, and machine components (BIO-SO- MA) of transportation systems. Examples of the biological component are the operators, security personnel, and individual users. Social components include an organizationâs operating entities, government, and the community. Machine components are vehicles, platforms, access facilities, power and fuel supply, and communication networks. Inadequate attention to the interfaces can often make an attack more effective. The vulnerabilities of the interfaces can take many forms; for example, the BIO-SO interface depends on individuals and organiza- tions taking the initiative to alert interested parties. The BIO-MA interface may reflect inadequate operational knowledge, machine failure, or sabotage. The response to Hurricane Katrina revealed failures in all three interfaces. Nikolai Makhutov, Vitaly Petrov, and Dmitry Reznikov of the Institute of Machine Sciences made a final presentation on specific features of terrorism with an emphasis on analysis of risk and damage for natural and technogenic catastrophes of various magnitude and frequency. SITE VISITS Research Institute for Civil Defense and Disaster Management The visit to the Research Institute for Civil Defense and Disaster Manage- ment began with a discussion of the role of the institute in supporting decision making at the regional level for protection of the population and territories during emergency situations, including those caused by terrorist acts. The institute was established in 1976. Recently, its staff has done considerable research on the con-
12 COUNTERING TERRORISM sequences of terrorist attacks. They model emergency situations using algorithms to help improve response scenarios. A monitoring center has several workstations that process incident-related information, gather geographical information, assess tasks for appropriate re- sponses, and transmit information to first responders. Monitoring and response depend on effective interaction between systems, such as sensor systems, a system for managing emergency resources, ventilation systems, light and sound warning systems for the public, electrical systems for support of buildings, and video surveillance systems. Requiring that these systems be interconnected im- proves the chances of preventing and eliminating emergency situations. Emer- gency packs are available for sale to members of the public. The institute has algorithms for simulating and combating terrorist attacks in the subway system. The focus is on the biological factor, and particularly the human factor. In the first stage, the attack must be recognized as a terrorist at- tack. Algorithms facilitate assessments of the validity of incoming information. At times, information comes from many sources and can be contradictory. In the second stage, the human and technological capabilities needed to respond to the attack are identified. A national crisis management center is being set up in Moscow to oversee coordination of the various agencies responding to an attack. At the subnational (city) level, monitoring system centers are being set up to receive information in real time. With preset algorithms in place, decisions can be made quickly to determine necessary actions. Sergei Todoseichuk described equipment and technology for emergency response and prevention activities. Some examples are airplanes capable of car- rying and dispersing 12 tons of water for fighting fires; robots for detection and handling of chemicals, biological agents, bombs, and radioactive debris; vehicles for transporting response teams; and mobile stations to temporarily replace infra- structure damaged during an emergency, including telecommunications facilities. He also described approaches for evacuations from high-rise buildings, such as helicopter landing sites on rooftops, devices installed in new buildings to assist individuals in descending during an emergency, and emergency response ladders capable of reaching the 40th floor of a building. Valery Akimov of the Center for Strategic Research of EMERCOM pre- sented an analysis of Russian rescue service activities in the elimination of con- sequences of terrorist acts in cities and on transportation in recent years in Russia and adjacent countries. At this time, a main weapon deployed by terrorists is ve- hicles, but unmanned aircraft may soon be used. Unfortunately, the coordination of agency interests may be difficult. For example, EMERCOMâs objective is to save lives, while other agencies are charged with eliminating the terrorist threat. This contradiction of objectives was illustrated during the October 2002 hostage incident in the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow. There was a lack of communication regarding the type of gas to be used by Russiaâs Federal Security Service (FSB)
U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES 13 in neutralizing the terrorists. EMERCOM was not prepared to protect personnel from the gas, and this deficiency reduced the success of the rescue effort. This case study was discussed in detail at a previous interacademy workshop. 1 Aleksei Popov of the Center for Information Technology of EMERCOM discussed the development of automated systems for a single emergency dis- patch service. The current system relies on separate emergency dispatchers for fire, police, and medical services. A unified duty dispatch service for fire, police, medical, emergency, gas leak, and antiterrorism response is in development, with a single emergency number (112) to be set up in 2008. A national crisis center is being established for the dispatch service for 112 calls. The 112 calls received by the regional dispatch service will be reported to the unified dispatcher. Research Institute for Fire Protection The Research Institute for Fire Protection is part of the State Fire Service and is the main fire engineering research center in Russia. The institute participates in research and in implementation of state scientific and technological policy in the field of fire safety. The institute maintains extensive information on fire emer- gency situations, regularly analyzes the information, and provides support for the implementation of management decisions. The institute has a situation center that conducts mathematical modeling of fires. Modeling helps determine the number of firefighting crews needed for a given incident and where to deploy them. The total time taken to detect a fire, receive the information, alert the fire brigade, dispatch the fire brigade to the site, and extinguish the fire should all be less than the time it takes to evacuate a burn- ing building. The firefighting system is being reformed and will be divided into five divisions: (1) federal, (2) subnational, (3) sectoral (government ministries and departments), (4) municipal, and (5) privately owned and volunteer. The site visit concluded with a tour of the building where various pieces of equipment are tested to determine whether they meet fire code standards and where new materials and methods for fire safety are also tested. NOTE 1. Kolesnikov, Y. 2004. Lessons learned from the Nord-Ost terrorist attack in Moscow from the standpoint of Russian security and law enforcement agencies. Pp. 26-34 in Terrorism: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses: U.S.-Russian Workshop Proceedings. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.