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3 U.S.-Russian Working Group on Energy System Vulnerabilities A. Chelsea Sharber (Rapporteur) The Working Group on Energy System Vulnerabilities met March 19-20, 2007. The Nuclear Safety Institute (IBRAE) of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) served as host for the meetings. Working group members made presenta- tions on a wide range of issues concerning energy systems. The U.S. participants also made site visits to the Central Gas Control Department of Gazprom and the Rosenergoatom Crisis Center. WORKING GROUP PRESENTATIONS Ashot Sarkisov of IBRAE described the development of a strategic mas- ter plan (SMP) as an example of an approach to making decisions on global safety and security issues. Russia developed an SMP for decommissioning re- tired nuclear submarines and surface vessels and for carrying out environmental rehabilitation after a mass retirement of ships in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At that time it was necessary to reduce the number of nuclear-powered vessels in operation. The SMP calls for an integrated approach to vessel disposal involving many organizations, a variety of laws and regulations, and many technological ap- proaches. The SMP deals not only with naval submarines but also with icebreak- ers owned by private companies. Internationally, the Northern Environmental 14
U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON ENERGY SYSTEM VULNERABLITIES 15 Partnership was established to address environmental problems, including nuclear submarine and icebreaker disposal and also nonnuclear environmental problems. It accepts funds from international donors, and in these cases the emphasis is of course on joint planning. Before the SMP was developed, there was no properly justified concept for coping with problems of submarine decommissioning and environmental reha- bilitation, and the use of available financial resources to solve the problems was far from optimal. The SMP has been very important in improving the situation. The SMP does not include a strict short-term time line. However, it adheres closely to the dual objectives of prompt disposal of nuclear vessels and preserva- tion of the environment. The SMP integrates all previously developed planning aspects that had been approved. Concepts for some parts of the SMP were not well defined, and a series of strategic studies has been undertaken to elaborate these concepts. More than 70 high-priority projects are under way pursuant to the more than 40 approaches justified within the framework of the SMP. Sergei Serebryakov of the RAS Oil and Gas Research Institute led a dis- cussion of pipeline security. Russia has 34 percent of proven world reserves of natural gas and 13 percent of world oil reserves. Natural gas is shipped through a series of Gazprom trunk pipelines. System operation stability is achieved by effective reliance on diagnostics and timely repair. Today the system operates at nearly 100 percent capacity. There are plans for further expansion of the system by Gazprom and independent companies. The 2005 report of the Federal Authority for Industrial Safety Issues identi- fied the following pipeline hazard factors: â¢ Stress corrosion (for pipelines built more than 15 years ago) â¢ Theft from pipelines â¢ Accidents due to poor quality installation practices and assembly work and poor quality assurance To help ensure industrial safety and security, owners such as Gazprom, Transneft, and Transneftprodukt have approved plans for reconstruction and major overhaul of selected facilities. Also, all entities have plans for countering terrorism. To date, there have been several acts of terrorism carried out against pipelines in Russia (for example, in Dagestan). Pipelines and trunk lines make attractive targets for terrorists worldwide, as has been seen recently in Iraq. Serebryakov contended that the political situation in Iraq has prompted attacks against pipelines in Sudan, India, Turkey, Colombia, and Nigeria. He added that the pessimistic conclusion is that as long as gas and oil are the basis for economies in many areas of the world, it is difficult to eliminate the terrorist threat completely. Vyacheslav Kuznetsov of the Russian Research CenterâKurchatov Institute described underwater technologies for transportation of liquefied natural gas
16 COUNTERING TERRORISM (LNG) and the strengthening of global energy safety. An efficient, reliable, and safe energy supply can be obtained by reviewing vulnerabilities of local energy systems; detecting weak points; and developing international cooperation efforts, shared technologies, and adequate protection. Some steps are contingent on the globalization of the gas market, however. There have been no terrorist attacks to date on LNG tankers, but there have been accidents. LNG production growth cur- rently exceeds natural gas production, and there are plans to expand production. At the same time, LNG facilities also provide a high-impact target for terrorists. With subsurface transport and careful management of LNG, the risk of terrorism would be greatly reduced, creating a better economic and technical situation, according to Kuznetsov. Yury Parfyonov of the RAS Scientific Association for High Temperatures addressed electromagnetic terrorism and the threat to a nationâs energy infrastruc- ture. Electromagnetic terrorism involves the use of strong electromagnetic pulse (EMP) transmitters and high-voltage pulse generators that can damage flight control systems, telecommunication systems, electromagnetic devices at nuclear power plants, information systems, technical systems of environmentally hazard- ous facilities, and electrical power generating facilities. Several examples of small EMP devices were described. Research has focused on the effect of EMP devices on various kinds of systems. Facility designers must take all possible measures to protect electronic systems. Some of the suggested measures for protection include international cooperation, joint experiments on the topic, and both Russian and international standards for use of the technology. Siegfried Hecker of Stanford University made a presentation on industry- sponsored studies of the vulnerabilities of U.S. power systems. There have been numerous energy vulnerability studies in the United States, including studies by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the U.S. Energy Association. The EPRI studies focus on the nature, consequences, and mitigation of a terrorist threat. A terrorist attack could be perpetrated on the energy grid itself, could use the energy grid as an attack medium (dispersion of chemical or biological agents through natural gas pipelines), or could use the grid to amplify the attack (for example, through EMP). The energy grid in the United States is vulnerable be- cause it is centralized, its complexity continues to increase, communication on the grid is not secure (sometimes occurring via the Internet), supply and transmission nodes are easily accessed, energy companies are not aware of their own vulner- abilities, and the response to an attack is insufficient or poorly coordinated. Strategies to counter disruption include greater government efforts to prevent attacks, more resistant facilities, prompt restoration of damaged facilities, and new capacity additions for the energy system. Short-term protection measures are multifaceted. They include, for example, ensuring that Internet connections are secure, checking gas pipelines and electrical grids through drones, and pre- paring probabilistic vulnerability assessments of the physical infrastructure as a basis for identifying weak spots. Installing more natural gas leak detectors and
U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON ENERGY SYSTEM VULNERABLITIES 17 protection-critical substation components are obvious steps that can be taken. Preventing dispersion of carbon fiber and Mylar chaff may also be important in some situations. Medium-term protective measures include breakaway devices that prevent a cascade and line breakers that switch and reroute when necessary. A secure and private wide-area communication network with backup can be critically important. As final examples, more natural gas storage capacity is needed, and more efficient electric driver compressors to switch the direction of gas flow are important. In conclusion, Hecker noted that in the policy area, little has changed in the United States in the past 20 years. Federal energy policy continues to emphasize reliance on options with significant vulnerabilities as compared to alternatives. Policy tends to ignore or at least minimize many resilient options that can make the system efficient, diverse, and dispersed. Siegfried Hecker also made a presentation on the security of nuclear power plants on behalf of John Ahearne of Sigma Xi, who had prepared the presenta- tion but could not participate in the meetings in Moscow. As is well known, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for nuclear power plant security. After September 11, 2001, nuclear power plant security guidelines were revised. The NRC also specified requirements for training, access, security officer working hours, defense strategies, mitigating measures, and integrated response. Recent changes dealing with security of nuclear power plants are detailed in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. They include background checks for personnel with access to any weapons, as well as access authorization programs for person- nel who use computer systems affecting operation safety, security, and emergency response capabilities. Other recent changes designed to safeguard information include increased security of personnel, increased patrols, increased physical barriers, vehicle checks farther from facility entry points, improved coordination with the military forces, better security and emergency response training, and restricted site access. After September 11, 2001, there has also been an increased focus on security of radioactive materials and spent nuclear fuel. Aircraft attacks on nuclear power plants are also a concern. Design criteria for new reactors should include the ca- pability to withstand an aircraft attack. Finally, a lack of adequate understanding of technological performance, suppression of information on security violations, and lack of engineering recognition of the fragility of some systems sometimes create obstacles to objective analyses. Drew Lieb of the New Jersey State Police discussed homeland security con- cerns about energy facilities. New Jersey is the most densely populated state in the United States, located between Philadelphia and New York City, and contains many industrial facilities, including four nuclear power plants and a proposed new LNG terminal. Northern New Jersey is home to oil companies, chemical plants,
18 COUNTERING TERRORISM energy facilities, and transportation hubs. Southern New Jersey houses the stateâs major concentration of oil refineries. Hence, New Jersey provides attractive targets for terrorists. Several terror- ist attacks have been planned or attempted from within New Jersey. As a result, statewide coordination is necessary. A homeland security department consisting of two parts (emergency management and special operations) has been estab- lished to protect the state. The Emergency Management section works in parallel to the national Fed- eral Emergency Management Agency and handles natural, industrial, and nuclear disasters and terrorist attacks. It organized the Top Officials (TOPOFF) 3 simu- lated terrorism attack exercise in coordination with the state of Connecticut and the United Kingdom. It works with private security personnel of the nuclear facilities in New Jersey on training and the Regional Operations Intelligence Center on security. The Emergency Management section is also involved with pipeline security and the consequences of catastrophic events, such as the 2003 Northeast power blackout. The Special Operations section includes the following divisions: hazardous materials, canine, aviation, marine services, government security, arson/bomb, and transportation security. They are all involved in protection of the stateâs infra- structure. The Marine Services Bureau protects the stateâs nuclear power plants, which are located along the coast. Boris Krupchatnikov of the Nuclear Industrial Environmental Regulatory Authority (Rostekhnadzor) made a presentation on current Russian requirements regarding protection of nuclear power facilities. During the history of nuclear power generation in Russia, the focus has shifted back and forth between safety and security. The Federal Law on Atomic Energy stresses that physical protec- tion must be provided in all stages of power generation. Nuclear operators must provide physical protection, with one exception. If an operator cannot guarantee physical protection, the responsibility is shifted to state authorities. Regarding supervision and compliance to regulations (licensing require- ments), the function of Rostekhnadzor is similar to the NRC. The four levels of regulatory requirements are (1) federal law, (2) government acts, (3) Rostekhnad- zor acts, and (4) agency regulatory documents. Physical protection requirements are based on International Atomic Energy Agency recommendations, and inspec- tion efforts are based on internationally accepted principles. John OâNeil of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) discussed DHS science and technology interests in countering terrorism in 2007. A major realignment of effort in the DHS Directorate for Science and Technology was under way, including a framework for a customer-focused, output-oriented sci- ence and technology management organization and the possibility of science and technology liaisons embedded worldwide. This step should provide a better basis for international science and technology collaboration. At that time, the Director- ate for Science and Technology had six divisions: (1) explosives; (2) biological
U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON ENERGY SYSTEM VULNERABLITIES 19 and chemical; (3) command, control, and interoperability; (4) borders/maritime; (5) human factors; and (6) infrastructure and geophysics. These divisions sup- ported research, including work with universities, DHS centers of excellence, U.S. Department of Energy laboratories, and DHS laboratories. Two models to support research were being established: (1) an industry board-of-directors model with the customer defining the need and (2) the con- sensus process model with national capability gaps defining the need. Both were unusual models for action in the U.S. government and highlight the importance of the realignment that was under way. Raphael Perl of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe gave a presentation on a strategic approach to protecting energy facilities. He emphasized that it has not yet been decided how to deal with terrorist attacks on the energy sector in the United States. When terrorists attack the infrastructure, what do they want to accomplish? When governments respond to attacks, what do they want to achieve? Six policy issues should be considered: 1. How can critical links in infrastructure be reestablished without rebuild- ing the entire system? What network disruptions cause the worst effects? What causes an attack to have national impact? 2. How is the threat assessed? 3. What and whose information is used in threat assessment? 4. How are potential consequences assessed? 5. How is risk reduction best accomplished? 6. How are resource requirements prioritized within the framework of a master plan? Two conceptual approaches to the possibility of terrorist attacks are impor- tant: (1) security and strengthening of the infrastructure and (2) infrastructure recovery if attacked. Will the capability for a quick recovery make us a less at- tractive target for terrorists? Donât the goals of terrorists go beyond infrastructure damage to include economic damage and paralysis, confusion, lawlessness, and loss of confidence in the government? And should this expanded set of goals be taken into consideration when preparing to respond? Vitaly Gridin of the RAS Oil and Gas Research Institute discussed the safety of gas pipelines. He described a theory based on biorhythmic cycles and the intervals in which geodynamic hazards are more likely. Satellite technology and statistics have been utilized to identify zones with geodynamic shortcomings where cave-ins, faults, and so forth, are more likely to occur, with examples cited involving accidents at mines and oil wells.
20 COUNTERING TERRORISM SITE VISITS Central Gas Control Department of Gazprom Anatoly Paramonov, deputy head of the department, emphasized that Gaz- prom provides the entire nationâs gas supply. With any impact on the system, whether a natural disaster or technical event, Gazprom attempts to mitigate conse- quences and maintain production capacity. After notification of such an event, an entity other than Gazprom categorizes the problem. Gazprom is not an emergency response center. Special communications channels exist and are used when an incident occurs. Gazprom is simply notified that there was an event, in accordance with the list of persons and entities to be notified for appropriate response, with the goal that consumers should not feel the consequences of such an event. According to Paramonov, consequences can usually be isolated despite the Soviet heritage of an integrated grid and flow of power, despite the large regions, despite the large number of time zones, and so forth. If there is not enough gas for some consumers, a switch can be made to oil or coal. Gazprom is obligated to follow such an order. Russian gas pipelines are now connected to Europe. Gazpromâs task is to maintain a balance of resources and distribution. Gaz- prom has nearly real-time information available on pipelines, with an 8-minute delay. However, many factors can impact the task of ensuring distribution, such as weather, the human factor, and so forth. Rosenergoatom Crisis Center Igor Gorelov, head of the Rosenergoatom Crisis Center, and his deputy, Boris Pivnenko, provided a brief history of the Crisis Center. In 1987, after the Chernobyl accident, a government decree was issued regarding the safety of nuclear power plant operations. A questionnaire was prepared to determine what was needed. From architects and designers, from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health, and from many other organizations, suggestions were offered concerning how information was processed and dispatched at control centers. Materials from the Three Mile Island accident as well as Chernobyl were studied. After a search for an entity within the country that had addressed closely related problems, the Kaliningrad Space Flight Command Center, with its rapid- response capabilities, was chosen as a model, and a contract was initiated with that center. There was great interest in the approach for involving experts in unusual situations that had been developed at the Space Flight Command Center. The center cannot control flights, and similarly the Rosenergoatom Crisis Center cannot control nuclear power plants. Then in 1992, after many studies of the Russian experience, a 7-year coop-
U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON ENERGY SYSTEM VULNERABLITIES 21 eration agreement was initiated with ÃlectricitÃ© de France to develop operations documentation covering emergency procedures in the nuclear power sector. The Rosenergoatom Crisis Center system monitors online all power units in Russia. The Crisis Center is supported by 11 other centers, connected via video- conferencing capabilities to the Crisis Center. All 11 centers operate 24 hours a day. Ten centers receive real-time information, and the 11th is being upgraded to have this capability. The Crisis Center receives a summary of the activities of 21 nuclear complexes operated locally. In an emergency, the center can access these complexesâ information. One lesson drawn from the Chernobyl accident was the lack of coordination of efforts during a crisis. Now there are annual drills, often observed by invited representatives of other countries. Antiterrorism drills are prepared by other agencies, and the Crisis Center participates in these drills. All emergency technical support centers are located a short distance from the Crisis Center, and arrangements are in place for rapid transportation between the centers as needed. There is a dedicated, secure, non-Internet channel for communica- tions. In an emergency, one person from each center comes to the Crisis Center. The Crisis Center has operated with its current level of technical capabilities for 3 years.