Beyond 'Fortress America': National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World (2009)

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Appendix G Possible Topics for Future Research 1. Determining Global Leadership in Military Critical Scientific Fields. The list of specific technologies or areas of scientific research in footnote # 6 (repeated below) is at best a snapshot of America’s lost dominance, for how, when, and where scientific advances occur has become fluid in today’s globalized world. What are the standards that should be used to determine whether a country is leading in a militarily critical field of science or technology? What are the political, military, and economic impacts for the United States in particular, of losing or gaining domi- nance in a particular area of science and technology? 2. Envisioning Multilateral Regimes for a Post-Cold War Era. Current multilateral export control regimes are legacy agreements based on Cold War threats. Specifically, these regimes are built around the assumption of unanimity among participating countries, a coherent enemy with e ­ asily predicted technological shortcomings, and technology bases for commerce and defense that are predominantly separate rather than inter­ connected. The realities of today’s world undermine these assumptions and, by extension, threaten the viability of multilateral regimes built with the old system in mind. Multilateral regimes remain an essential pathway Footnote #6 (Chapter 2, p. 21): The 2007 report to Department of Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez from the independent Deemed Export Advisory Committee (hereafter referred to as the DEAC Report) has listed the following areas in which the United States has lost its scientific and engineering leadership: “polymer composites (Germany), 3D optical memories (Japan), bulk metallic glass (Japan), biostatistics/multivariate statistics (France), population biology (UK), adap- tive dynamics (Germany/Switzerland), theoretical biology (Netherlands), and solar energy (Japan/­ Germany).” The DEAC Report, p. 11. 123 

124 APPENDIX G to ensure national security, but their focus, structure, and application should be evaluated and reformed in light of current realities. 3. An “Immune System” to Replace the “Hermetic Seal.” Ashton Carter has described the U.S. strategy of keeping secrets during the Cold War as a “hermetic seal” model: denying “technology to others by seeking to put an impermeable barrier around the American defense technology base.” In a globalized world, he explains, militarily critical technology advances occur “outside the barrier as well as inside” and therefore it is no longer in the U.S. interest to try to build a hermetic seal. He recom- mends an “immune system” model “that can sense dangers and combat the most dangerous ones selectively.” What would it mean to opera- tionalize this idea? What steps are necessary for implementing such a system, and what will it look like in application? Is this the way to build “high walls around narrow areas” in a globalized world? 4. Sharpening the distinction between weapons and their dual-use applica­ tions. The structure of today’s export controls, both multilateral and uni- lateral, depends upon categorizing technologies in two broad categories: munitions and dual-use.  Significant gray areas between the two com- plicate export controls, lengthen and confound licensing procedures, and there remains a lack of a clear framework that separates a munition from its related dual-use technology.  Better understanding of the term “munitions” and the controls that must be applied to them, which lie on the other side of this contention, would aid our clarification of the system as a whole.  Closer study and the development of clarified work- ing definitions for “munitions” and “dual-use” as they apply to export controls is necessary to clarify and expedite any and all export control regimes that are built upon either or both of these definitions. 5. Streamlining the Government Classification System. Following the terror attacks of 2001, the default practice has become to classify gov- ernment data. While a rather-safe-than-sorry approach is prudent, over- classification weakens the system. In addition, the use of the “sensitive Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. Edited by Ashton Carter and John P. White. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001. As Justice Potter Stewart said during the Pentagon Papers case, “when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those intent on self protection or self-promotion.” Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB48/supreme.html. Accessed October 29, 2008. 

APPENDIX G 125 but unclassified” (SBU) designation introduces additional confusion that can potentially lead to adverse results, including publication restric- tions and a less robust scientific foundation in the very areas that need to be understood. Reconsideration of the application of SBU designations, and other aspects of the system, is necessary to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of government classification system as a whole. 6. Global Supply Chains and Militarily Critical Technologies. What are the critical technologies that have global supply chains? How dependent is the United States on the foreign components in critical technologies? How interconnected is the global community that designs and produces the components that go into American systems?