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Suggested Citation:"Appendix A: Statement of Task." National Research Council. 2011. Understanding and Managing Risk in Security Systems for the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex: (Abbreviated Version). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13108.
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Appendix A:
Statement of Task

The National Academies will advise the Department of Energy (DOE) on the augmentation of its current risk-based approach, the Design Basis Threat, for securing the nuclear weapons complex, specifically for securing nuclear weapons usable materials and facilities. The study will examine the augmentation of cyber security as well, while recognizing that cyber security and physical security present different challenges. The National Academies will:

  1. Evaluate the potential applicability and feasibility of risk-based approaches, including probabilistic approaches, for securing the DOE nuclear weapons complex and document their potential strengths and weaknesses, cost effectiveness, and impediments to implementation. As part of this task, the National Academies will consider the experiences of DOE and its national laboratories, other federal agencies (e.g., Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission), and the private sector (e.g., nuclear power industry) on the use of risk-based approaches for securing complex technological systems.

  2. Evaluate whether and how dissuasion (i.e., deterrence and prevention) concepts can be incorporated into risk-based approaches to enhance security, both in terms of effectiveness and cost efficiency.

  3. Provide practical and actionable findings and recommendations on the use of risk-based approaches to (i) balance physical and cyber security; and (ii) communicate within the government and with the public about security risks and costs.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix A: Statement of Task." National Research Council. 2011. Understanding and Managing Risk in Security Systems for the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex: (Abbreviated Version). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13108.
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A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It might have particular value if acquired from a U.S. facility--in addition to acquiring a highly destructive tool, the adversary would demonstrate an inability of the United States to protect its nuclear assets. The United States expends considerable resources toward maintaining effective security at facilities that house its nuclear assets. However, particularly in a budget-constrained environment, it is essential that these assets are also secured efficiently, meaning at reasonable cost and imposing minimal burdens on the primary missions of the organizations that operate U.S. nuclear facilities.

It is in this context that the U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a semi-autonomous agency in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for securing nuclear weapons and significant quantities of SNM--asked the National Academies for advice on augmenting its security approach, particularly on the applicability of quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing its facilities. In carrying out its charge, the committee has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its security approach more effective and efficient.

The committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost, security, and operations at facilities in the nuclear weapons complex is not to assess security risks more quantitatively or more precisely. This is primarily because there is no comprehensive analytical basis for defining the attack strategies that a malicious, creative, and deliberate adversary might employ or the probabilities associated with them. However, using structured thinking processes and techniques to characterize security risk could improve NNSA's understanding of security vulnerabilities and guide more effective resource allocation.

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