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Page 126
Suggested Citation:"References." Transportation Research Board. 2012. TRB Special Report 309: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offshore Safety and Environmental Management Systems. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13434.
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Suggested Citation:"References." Transportation Research Board. 2012. TRB Special Report 309: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offshore Safety and Environmental Management Systems. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13434.
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Page 128
Suggested Citation:"References." Transportation Research Board. 2012. TRB Special Report 309: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offshore Safety and Environmental Management Systems. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13434.
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Page 128
Page 129
Suggested Citation:"References." Transportation Research Board. 2012. TRB Special Report 309: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offshore Safety and Environmental Management Systems. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13434.
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Page 129
Page 130
Suggested Citation:"References." Transportation Research Board. 2012. TRB Special Report 309: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offshore Safety and Environmental Management Systems. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13434.
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Page 130

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References Abbreviations ABS American Bureau of Shipping API American Petroleum Institute BOEMRE Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement BSI British Standards Institution CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board CSB U.S. Chemical Safety Board DNV Det Norske Veritas HSE Health and Safety Executive, United Kingdom IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors ISO International Organization for Standardization MMS-USCG Minerals Management Service–U.S. Coast Guard MOC Management of Change NAE-NRC National Academy of Engineering–National Research Council NRC National Research Council OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PSA Petroleum Safety Authority SPE Society of Petroleum Engineers USCG U.S. Coast Guard U.S. NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ABS. 2012. Guidance Notes on Safety Culture and Leading Indicators of Safety. Houston, Tex. http://www.eagle.org/eagleExternalPortalWEB/ShowProperty/BEA%20Repository/ Rules&Guides/Current/188_Safety/Guide. Accessed May 31, 2012. ABSG Consulting Inc. 2006. Review of Process Safety Management Systems at BP North American Refineries for the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. ABSG Consulting Inc., Houston, Tex. API. 1990. Management of Process Hazards. API RP 750 (with errata). API, Washington, D.C. API. 1993. Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities, 1st ed. API RP 75. API, Washington, D.C. 106

References 107 API. 2003. Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings, 2nd ed. API RP 752. API, Washington, D.C. API. 2004. Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities, 3rd ed. API RP 75. API, Washington, D.C. API. 2010a. Fatigue Risk Management Systems for Personnel in the Refining and Petro- chemical Industries. API RP 755. API, Washington, D.C. API. 2010b. Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries. API RP 754. API, Washington, D.C. Appleton, B. 1995. Lessons in Safety Management. Video. Mobil North Sea Technology Forum, 1995. Bea, R. 2002. Human and Organizational Factors in Reliability Assessment and Management of Offshore Structures. Risk Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 19–34. BOEMRE. 2010. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf— Safety and Environmental Management Systems. Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 199, Fri., Oct. 15, 2010, pp. 63610–63654. BOEMRE. 2011a. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf— Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems. Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 178, Wed., Sept. 14, 2011, pp. 56683–56694. BOEMRE. 2011b. Report Regarding the Causes of the April 20, 2010 Macondo Well Blowout. http://www.boemre.gov/pdfs/maps/dwhfinal.pdf. Booth, R. 1993. Safety Culture: Concept, Measurement and Training Implications. Pro- ceedings of the British Health and Safety Society Spring Conference: Safety Culture and the Management of Risk, Apr. 19–20, 1993. Borthwick, D. 2010. Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry. Montara Commission of Inquiry, Commonwealth of Australia. http://www.ret.gov.au/Department/Documents/ MIR/Montara-Report.pdf. Accessed Mar. 3, 2011. BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. 2007. The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel (also referred to as the “Baker Panel Report”). h ttp://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/SP/ STAGING/local_assets/assets/pdfs/Baker_panel_report.pdf. BSI. 2012. Guidelines for Auditing Management Systems (ISO 19011:2011). BS EN ISO 19011:2011. British Standards Institution, London. CAIB. 2003. Organizational Causes: Evaluating Best Safety Practices. In The CAIB Report: Volume 1, pp. 182–184. http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/pdf/vol1/full/caib_report_ volume1.pdf. CSB. 2007. Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire (15 Killed, 180 Injured). Report No. 205-04-I-TX. BP, Texas City, Tex., Mar. 23, 2005. http://www.csb.gov/assets/ document/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf. Accessed Apr. 4, 2012.

108 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offshore Safety and Environmental Management Systems Cullen, W. 1990. The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. HM Stationery Office, London. DNV. 2011. Major Hazard Incidents Arctic Offshore Drilling Review. Prepared for the National Energy Board. Report No. NEB 2010-04/DNV, Reg. No. ANECA 851. DNV, Houston, Tex. Hopkins, A. 2004. Safety, Culture, and Risk: The Organisational Causes of Disasters. CCH Australia Limited, Sydney, Australia. Hopkins, A. 2006. Working Paper 44: Studying Organisational Cultures and Their Effects on Safety. National Research Centre for OAS Regulation, Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory. http://regnet.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ u86/WorkingPaper_44.pdf. Hopkins, A. 2009. Failure to Learn: The BP Texas City Refinery Disaster. CCH Australia Limited, Sydney, Australia, 2009. HSE. 2011. Offshore Research. http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/offshoreresearch.htm. Accessed Apr. 4, 2011. IADC. 2011. Ralls: Industry Safety Culture Is Not Complacent. Drilling Contractor, Feb. 8, 2011. http://www.drillingcontractor.org/ralls-industry-safety-culture-is-not- complacent-8482. ISO. 2002. ISO 19011:2002. Guidelines for Quality and/or Environmental Management Systems Auditing. Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail? csnumber=31169. ISO. 2005. ISO 9000:2005. Quality Management Systems—Fundamentals and Vocabulary. Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_ detail.htm?csnumber=42180. ISO. 2008. ISO 9001:2008. Quality Management Systems—Requirements, 4th ed. Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail. htm?csnumber=46486. LaPorte, T. R., and P. M. Consolini. 1991. Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of “High-Reliability” Organizations. Journal of Public Admin- istration Research and Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 19–47. http://www.cs.st-andrews. ac.uk/~ifs/Teaching/Socio-tech-systems(LSCITS)/Reading/HROs.pdf. Leveson, N. G. 2011. Engineering a Safer World: System Thinking Applied to Safety. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge. Meshkati, N. 1999. Cultural Context of Nuclear Safety Culture: A Conceptual Model and Field Study. In Nuclear Safety: A Human Factors Perspective (J. Misumi, B. Wipert, and R. Miller, eds.), McGraw-Hill, New York, pp. 113–130. MMS-USCG. 2004a. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Minerals Management Service, U.S. Department of the Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Subject: Agency Responsibilities. MMS/USCG MOA: OCS-

References 109 01. Sept. 30, 2004. http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg522/cg5222/docs/mou/AGENCY_ RESPONSIBILITIES.pdf. MMS-USCG. 2004b. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Minerals Management Service, U.S. Department of the Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Sept. 30, 2004. http://www.boemre.gov/regcompliance/MOU/ cgmoufnl.htm. MMS-USCG. 2006a. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Minerals Management Service, U.S. Department of the Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Subject: Civil Penalties. MOA: OCS-02. September 12, 2006. http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg522/cg5222/docs/mou/CIVIL_PENALTIES.pdf. MMS-USCG. 2006b. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, U.S. Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Subject: Oil Discharge Planning, Preparedness, and Response. MOA: OCS-03. Apr. 3, 2012. http://www.uscg.mil/ hq/cg5/cg522/cg5222/docs/mou/MOA%20OCS%2003_FINAL_Signed_3APR12.pdf. MMS-USCG. 2008. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Minerals Management Service, U.S. Department of the Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Subject: Floating Offshore Facilities. MOA: OCS-04. Feb. 28, 2008. http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg522/cg5222/docs/mou/FLOATING_OFFSHORE_ FACILITIES.pdf. NAE-NRC. 2011. Macondo Well–Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2011. Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling. Report to the President. http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf. Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. 2011. Facts 2011—The Norwegian Petroleum Sector. Publication No. Y-0103 E. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Stavanger, Norway. http://www.npd.no/en/Publications/Facts/Facts-2011. NRC. 1990. Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. OECD. 1999. The Role of the Nuclear Regulator in Promoting and Evaluating Safety Culture. Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD, Paris. http://www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/reports/ nea1547-Murley.pdf. Peters, T., and R. Waterman. 1982. In Search of Excellence: Lessons Learned from America’s Best-Run Companies. Harper & Row, New York. PSA Norway. 2002. White Paper No. 7 (2001–2002): On Health, Safety and the Environment in Petroleum Operations. PSA Norway, Stavanger. PSA Norway. 2010. From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision. PSA Norway, Stavanger. http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in- petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html.

110 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offshore Safety and Environmental Management Systems PSA Norway. 2011a. Assessments and Recommendations after Deepwater Horizon. PSA Norway, Stavanger. http://www.ptil.no/news/assessments-and-recommendations- after-deepwater-horizon-article7890-79.html?lang=en_US. PSA Norway. 2011b. The Deepwater Horizon Accident—Assessments and Recommendations for the Norwegian Petroleum Industry. PSA Norway, Stavanger. http://www.ptil.no/ getfile.php/PDF/DwH_PSA_summary.pdf. PSA Norway. 2011c. Safety Status & Signals 2010–2011. PSA Norway, Stavanger. PSA Norway. 2011d. Supervision: A Finger on the Pulse. PSA Norway, Stavanger. http:// www.ptil.no/supervision/supervision-a-finger-on-the-pulse-article7624-88.html. Rasmussen, J. 1997. Risk Management in a Dynamic Society: A Modeling Problem. Safety Science, Vol. 27, No. 2–3, pp. 183–213. Rasmussen, J., and I. Svedung. 2000. Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic Society. Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Karlstad. https://www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/ 16252.pdf. Accessed Apr. 4, 2012. Reason, J. 1983. Achieving a Safe Culture: Theory and Practice. Work and Stress, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 293–306. Reason, J. 1997. Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate Publishing Company, Aldershot, UK. Scarlett, L., I. Linkov, and C. Kousky. 2011. Risk Management Practices: Cross-Agency Comparisons with Mineral Management Service. Discussion Paper # RPP DP 10-67. Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C. Schein, E. H. 1992. Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2nd ed. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, Calif. Schein, E. H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd ed. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, Calif. USCG. 2011. Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico April 20–22, 2010, Vol. I. MISLE Activity Number: 3721503. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=6700. U.S. NRC. 2011. Safety Culture Policy Statement. NUREG/BR-0500. http://pbadupws. nrc.gov/docs/ML1116/ML11165A021.pdf. Accessed Apr. 4, 2012. Weick, K. E. 1987. Organizational Culture as a Source of High Reliability. California Management Review, Vol. 24, pp. 112–127. Weick, K. E., and K. M. Sutcliffe. 2001. Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Perfor- mance in an Age of Complexity. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, Calif. Weick, K. E., and K. M. Sutcliffe. 2007. Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty, 2nd ed. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, Calif.

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TRB Special Report 309: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offshore Safety and Environmental Management Systems recommends that the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) take a holistic approach to evaluating the effectiveness offshore oil and gas industry operators' Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) programs. According to the report, this approach should, at a minimum, include inspections, audits by the operator and BSEE, key performance indicators, and a whistleblower program.

SEMS is a safety management system(SMS) aimed at shifting from a completely prescriptive regulatory approach to one that is proactive, risk based, and goal oriented in an attempt to improve safety and reduce the likelihood that events similar to the April 2010 Macondo incident will reoccur.

According to the committee that produced the report, it is not possible for a regulator to create a culture of safety in an organization by inspection or audit; that culture needs to come from within the organization. To be successful, the tenets of SEMS must be fully acknowledged and accepted by workers, motivated from the top, and supported throughout the organization and must drive workers' actions.

The report also notes that BSEE can encourage and aid industry in development of a culture of safety by the way it measures and enforces SEMS. The Committee believes BSEE should seize this opportunity to make a step change in safety culture by adopting a goal based holistic approach to evaluating the effectiveness of SEMS programs.

In recommending a holistic approach to evaluating the effectiveness of SEMS programs, the report explores in detail SEMS' role in helping to develop a culture of safety, highlights the pros and cons of various methods of assessing the effectiveness of a SEMS program, and investigates existing approaches for assessing the SMS programs of various U.S. and international regulatory agencies whose safety mandates are similar to that of BSEE.

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