An Airport Guide for Regional Emergency Planning for CBRNE Events (2009)

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

S U M M A R Y Airport planning for emergencies has evolved from a focus on air crashes to the inclusion of all hazards and threats to which airports are vulnerable. Though exercises are still based mostly on aircraft crashes, airport emergency plans (AEPs) have expanded their coverage to address more elements of disaster response and some aspects of chemical, biological, radi- ological, nuclear, and explosive incidents, including criminal attacks. A major trend nationally over the past 10 years has been a move toward better coordina- tion and emergency resource sharing at the state and regional level. Local mutual aid agree- ments and intra- and inter-state emergency assistance compacts are being replicated at the regional level, and airports need to be involved in this improved regional coordination. Federal guidelines such as the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Framework (NRF) and supporting planning tools are followed by cities and counties which provide much of the mutual aid assistance to airports. Logically, airport plans should re- flect the structure for response and recovery that surrounding jurisdictions have identified. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has produced a draft circular stipulating how NIMS should become the basis for AEPs. This Airport Cooperative Research Report serves as a com- panion to those guidelines which are expected to become final at the end of 2008. The research team from the TriData division of System Planning Corporation collected in- formation about airport preparedness via an airport questionnaire and from reviewing 18 AEPs. The team compared that information to the forthcoming FAA guidelines; to NIMS re- quirements; to the NRF; and to industry standards, regulations, and relevant laws. The results comprise the basis for this primer which delves into the following areas and provides airport managers information they can use to strengthen emergency response and recovery planning. This report addresses the details airports should cover in their hazard and threat assess- ments so that response to those incidents can be more thoroughly and accurately planned. It also discusses special issues involving terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive materials targeted at airports, and the mutual aid that would be drawn upon beyond the immediate locale. The results of an airport survey on preparedness and the highlights from selected AEPs are presented for consideration by other airports. Also, fed- eral emergency preparedness standards are compared to the provisions of AEPs in general, with suggestions on priorities for upgrading AEPs to meet those standards. Key Findings There were many key findings from this research. Generally speaking, AEPs address many of the elements necessary for efficient and regionally coordinated response to the range of hazards and threats they face. However, there are important provisions that tend be lacking and levels of detail that are missing. Typically, airport plans do a good job of identifying the key airport personnel An Airport Guide for Regional Emergency Planning for CBRNE Events 1

2who are responsible for disaster planning and management, and the first responder agency com- mand structure is well detailed. Other results are as follows: Communications Tactical communications channels and procedures are sufficiently described though back-up systems are sometimes not identified, and they should be. Planning with Regional Partners Airports are working with many, but not all local stakeholders and airports need to broaden their scope to include regional resources because a disaster may make it impossible for close-in jurisdictions to provide help because they will be needed for their own service area. By the same token, airports should consider forming airport assistance pacts which designate those resources specific to airport operations that could be made available to help another airport during a major disaster. Airports are also advised to establish a regional advisory committee for response and recovery and to include private sector partners on the committee. Local government emergency plans should be obtained and studied to help ensure better communication and coordination. Hazardous Materials and CBRNE An airport’s response to hazardous materials and communicable disease threats tends to be covered in AEPs; however radiological incidents, “dirty bombs,” terrorist actions using weapons of mass destruction, and other threats are under-represented in the planning details. Personnel Protective Equipment More information on personal protective equipment (PPE) for emergency responders and managers at the airport needs to be provided. It is critical that airports explain what PPE is avail- able, where it is stored, and who will use it. Quarantine Also connected to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and (high yield) Explosives (CBRNE) and to natural disease outbreaks is the subject of quarantine. AEPs typically identify a small area where a passenger would be held for diagnosis and observation; however, if an entire planeload of passengers and the crew have to be socially isolated for a period of time, plans should discuss the particulars of those arrangements, which are substantial. Under the International Health Regulations1 and ICAO standards and recommended prac- tices, potential quarantine facilities (i.e., space to receive and hold individuals who have been ex- posed to contagious disease) should be identified as part of an airport plan. It is important to note that these facilities need not be located at the airport. Emergency Public Information Some airports do not designate a dedicated public information officer (PIO), require train- ing for those responsibilities, or provide for a joint information center. Rather, this critical func- 1 IHR Annex 1B.2(d) states that one of the core capacities of an airport designated by a country (“State Party”) as a point of entry is “to provide for the assessment and, if required, quarantine of suspect travelers, preferably in facilities away from the point of entry I.” (emphasis added).

tion often is described as being part of the airport manager’s duties or the duty of another in- dividual with collateral responsibilities, and this is not wise. The airport will have to handle a huge surge of media inquiries and will have to communicate the status of the disaster to the air- port population at the time, along with the protective actions they should take. This is not a part-time job. Family Assistance Center The mechanics of setting up and operating a family assistance center is another area where plans need to be expanded. For major incidents, other than an airliner crash, it may well be the airport, not the airlines, that will have to arrange for family assistance services. Outside agencies supplying food, grief support, child care, and other services must be identified, and the site must be adequately equipped to enable protected communications, areas for meditation, interview rooms, and so forth. Airport Emergency Operations Centers More thought needs to go into setting up an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the equipment, capacity, and logistics of that important nerve center. Evacuation/Protect-in-Place at an Airport While the conditions that could require an evacuation are identified in plans, details on how the evacuation will proceed, where the collection points will be, and how the process will be su- pervised generally are very thin. Shelters and supplies for shelters need to be identified. Mass Casualty Planning A mass casualty incident would significantly stress airport resources and would require fatal- ity management capabilities and a surge in EMS and hospital response. If injured or deceased in- dividuals are victims of contamination, special arrangements and PPE would be necessary and should be covered in an AEP. Formal Input from Regional Stakeholders Emergency response partners in the region should be brought into the airport’s emergency planning and training process. This can be accomplished through a formal advisory committee or other means, as long as key stakeholders have an opportunity to gauge their own plans and resources against hazards and threats to the response envisioned by the airport. Private Sector Assistance Private sector resources should be inventoried in detail and merged into the AEP along with specific information on how those resources could be quickly tapped for support. Better Assessment of Disaster Impact AEPs identify what hazards and threats could affect the airport and surrounding area. How- ever, many do not analyze those threats in terms of their specific impact on airport operations, tenants, employees, and the public at large. 3

4NIMS and Joint Exercises As airports continue bringing their plans into compliance with NIMS, joint exercises—even if those are just table-top training sessions—should be organized for participation by a wide range of regional assets. That training should then be critiqued so that the lessons learned can inform changes to procedures and plans. This report provides a host of good ideas drawn from airport AEPs that other airports can con- sider for their own plans. A list of priorities for bringing AEPs into compliance with NIMS and the upcoming FAA’s guidance for strengthening AEPs is also provided. Future research on best practices and on the lessons learned from disasters, exercises, and training involving airports will continue the progress underway for greater public safety at airports.