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9Some airports have a strong working relationship with sur- rounding political jurisdictions. These airports have emer- gency plans which follow the construct of NIMS and the NRP and which have been prepared with input from first respon- ders and emergency management agencies in the area. These airports have practiced their plans with stakeholders from throughout the region on a variety of scenarios possibly in- cluding mass decontamination, dirty bombs, tornadoes, quarantine operations, and acts of terrorism. Response man- agers at the airport can talk on the same radio frequencies using the same equipment as the local emergency response personnel, and when an incident occurs, pre-planned proce- dures are instantly set in motion among players who know and understand each othersâ roles. All concerned have iden- tified the jurisdictions closest to them that have special re- sponse expertise in explosive ordnance, search and rescue, lo- gistics management, damage assessment, and other areas requiring special skills and training. They are linked with pri- vate sector resources and tied in to human service and health and medical treatment providers such that should a mass casualty incident occur, victims would be rapidly triaged, treated, and transported to the right trauma centers. For this group of airports, future steps mostly will involve fine-tuning and updating established plans and practicing new scenarios. Airports which are not in the position just described need to take additional measures to become current with national standards for emergency preparednessâand to ensure they are ready to handle all types of disasters. For these airports, it may be helpful to outline airport emergency planning from a regional perspective and how to engage in that process. The closest partners are those jurisdictions contiguous to the airport whose emergency response personnel would be able to arrive immediately with critical assets to buttress the airportâs emergency personnel. Typically, these are the fire, police, and emergency medical services responders, though in some cases, industrial fire or security brigades may be among the core partners as well. Many airports routinely work with nearby first responders but may not have established liaisons with other resources in the region. Other primary partners are local hospitals, the public health service, the Medical Examinerâs office (or Coronerâs Office), the Red Cross (or Salvation Army and other volunteer groups), and the utility companies. Local government public works de- partments can be an enormous asset, and bring a wide range of skills and equipment, and supplier networks to a disaster situ- ation. Other organizations available to assist include: â¢ Cities and counties, â¢ Other airports, â¢ State Police, â¢ Stateâs regional emergency operations center, â¢ Private industry (major employers, heavy construction companies, large home improvement stores, trucking companies, etc.), â¢ Schools, and â¢ FEMA regional headquarters. â¢ State partners: âNational Guardâregular forces and Civil Support Teams, âEnvironmental protection/environmental quality agency, âDepartment of Transportation, âDepartment of Emergency Management, and âDepartment of Public Works. â¢ Federal partners: âFederal Emergency Management Agency, âDepartment of Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, âImmigration and Customs Enforcement, âThe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, âDepartment of Transportation/Federal Aviation Admin- istration, âTransportation Security Administration, âCorps of Engineers, âCoast Guard, âMilitary Reserve Units, C H A P T E R 3 Findings
âDisaster Medical Assistance Team, and âDisaster Mortuary Operational Response Team. Special Considerations for CBRNE This section of the report examines airport preparedness for CBRNE, including suggestions on areas to be covered within the AEP. Command and Control Command and control is one of the single most important aspects of a coordinated response. CBRNE events will rapidly overwhelm the airport operations staff if their plans, facilities, and exercises do not test the features of managing a CBRNE in- cident. Command and Control must be tactical (immediate on-scene) and strategic (centralized, forward-looking, coordi- nated interagency response). The complexities of a CBRNE event include the number and nature of casualties, the multi- layered responses of local, state, and federal agencies, the ex- treme media attention and the large-scale logistical issues that could include a mass fatality response or the isolation and quarantine of dozens of passengers and the flight crew. The airport operations manager and staff are typically the best suited to be the lead agency for an airportâs response to a CBRNE event. If there are indicators that the event was inten- tionally caused, the FBI will arrive and will become the lead federal agency. Until their arrival, the airportâs operations staff, with their first-responders and mutual aid partners will be in charge. There will be many federal and state agencies all with a legal mandate to participate in the resolution of the incident. This could easily include, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the DHS, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and Customs and Border Protection just to name a few. State- level agencies would likely include state police, environmental response, health departments, and the National Guard. The operations staff should use the incident command system (ICS) to coordinate a multidiscipline, multi-agency, multi- jurisdictional federal crime scene. As a CBRNE incident will likely last for days, a single Incident Command structure would have to evolve to Unified Command. For effective command and control to occur, airports will need several basic elements: â¢ Training in NIMS and the ICS with a focus on Unified Command; â¢ Facilities, such as mobile command posts and a designated Emergency Operations Center (EOC); â¢ A realistic, tested AEP that covers circumstances related to CBRNE; and â¢ Robust and redundant communications. Training in ICS and NIMS is available from a variety of sources. ICS has been in use for many years and originated with the group of Federal agencies that responds to wildland fires. They recognized the need for a standard command sys- tem they all could follow. For example, the system is required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the EPA for responses to hazardous materials releases. Federal agencies, arriving in the hours and days after a CBRNE event, will be operating under the direction of Homeland Security Presidential Directive #5 (HSPD-5), and the NRF requires that federal agencies comply with NIMS when pro- viding disaster assistance. The command center must be set up at a location with secure and redundant communications so that all involved parties can meet. It can be a mobile command post or a fixed facil- ity. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) should be at a separate location at the airport or in a contiguous jurisdiction. The EOC should be properly equipped for communications. The larger indexed airports often have both types of facilities. The challenge for the smaller airports is to designate space or a mobile unit on site that could be used as a command post. A CBRNE event has the potential to continue for several days or even weeks. This is especially true with a biological outbreak that may require quarantine or the closure of the airport by federal authorities. The airportâs emergency plan should be structured to be NIMS compliant. One of the major reasons for this measure is so the airportâs plan will mirror the structure and provi- sions set forth in their mutual aid partnerâs plans, whose as- sets will be essential during a full-scale response. Plans must be tested and exercised beyond completing a checklist. The requirements for certified airports include annual table-top and triennial, and full scale exercises. While the FAA requirements in Title 14 CFR Part 139.325 mandate âinstructions for response toâ3 a variety of threats and hazards, CBRNE incidents are not mentioned by name. In actuality, airport exercises typically are driven by the mis- sion to practice responding to an airplane crash. Few airports have addressed threats that are not based on that theme as a starting point. To be effective, airport emergency plans should address the challenges of a CBRNE event. Pre-scripted mes- sages covering a host of potential situations save time when an emergency occurs. These can be prepared and approved in advance so they are ready to be used. With the complexities of a CBRNE event, the airport oper- ations staff and the public safety agencies that respond to the airport must be able to demonstrate unified command and the impacts of a change from a local response to federal involve- 10 3 Code of Federal Regulations Title 14: Aeronautics and Space, Part 139 Certifi- cation of Airports Subpart D-Operations section 139.325 Airport Emergency Plan.
ment. The evaluation criteria should be NIMS-compliant in conjunction with the Target Capabilities List published by DHS in September 2006. Responder Communications Interagency and intra-agency communications, the ability to warn and notify the internal and external customers of the air- port of threats and hazards, and the means for keeping the pub- lic informed of events at the airport are all part of emergency public information tasks of the communications function. Airport operations likely will be the lead agency to manage the communications hardware, software, and the communi- cations systems of the airport. Communications hardware in- cludes radio systems, video feeds, telephones, internet, and intranet systems. The airport also should have a designated public information officer with training in media relations. The airport must have the capability to communicate with other agencies or groups that might be involved with a CBRNE event at the airport. At a minimum, the airport must be able to communicate internally (e.g., the operations staff must be able to commu- nicate with the public safety forces and with the service and support elements at the airport). Additionally, the on-site employees, visitors, vendors, travelers, and others must be part of the communications loop. They will need to be told what to do and where to go. The communities surrounding the airport will rapidly become part of the response group so interoperability of equipment and communications proto- cols with them is essential. These communities will be pro- viding mutual aid and may be at risk themselves, depending on the emergency (e.g., they may be down-wind of a chemi- cal release or in the blast area of an explosion). The hospitals and EMS services in the area also are vital members of the communication group. Cellular telephone systems should be scaled to absorb the spike. The communication hardware must be robust, func- tionally redundant, and interoperable with the mutual aid agencies and units that may respond with the airport. The EOC should have inter-operable radio equipment and mul- tiple channels for the different disciplines to utilize. A multi- channel or âtrunkedâ system is harder to overload and re- duces the possibility that important traffic is missed or delayed. Cellular telephone systems should be able to absorb the spike in usage that occurs when an incident takes place. If the event includes a disruption of electrical power, battery and backup generator systems must be in place to ensure continued op- erations. The operators of the hardware need to have effective, effi- cient protocols to guide the usage of the hardware. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 139.325 requires, âprocedures for prompt response to all emergencies listed in paragraph (b) of this section, including a communications network.â4 The CFR further requires the plans to have contact lists that iden- tify the name, location, and capacity of each hospital in the area as well as the name, location, and telephone number for each rescue squad, ambulance service, or military installa- tion that agrees to provide medical assistance or transporta- tion.5 These lists must be maintained for accuracy. Notifi- cation drills and exercises are vital so that personnel are proficient in the use of the equipment and procedures for conducting notifications and establishing ongoing commu- nications links. Table-top exercises should be used to detect any flaws in the communications systems while a functional exercise can test and measure the capabilities of the hardware and the per- sonnel that operate it. Emergency Public Information Providing the public with timely accurate information is a challenge for all agencies that deal with emergency responses. A CBRNE incident at an airport is certainly no exception. One of the first matters to handle during an emergency is ac- tivating a designated PIO and instructing all personnel to refer questions to that individual. Policies and procedures for the accurate and timely dissemination of information within the airport and to off-site stakeholders are essential. The PIO should have a backup to ensure 24/7 coverage, and both individuals should be trained in disaster communications. The NIMS documentation describes the use of a Joint In- formation Center (JIC) and a Joint Information System (JIS). The JIC is where all incident-related public information ac- tivities are coordinated. The concept is that all participating agencies would work from the same location. A JIC can be ad- jacent or nearby the EOC but should not be in the EOC since the commotion of EOC operations makes disseminating public information and answering media inquiries problem- atic. The physical layout of the JIC should enable press con- ferences and live television and radio broadcasts. It may be appropriate to locate the JIC in a separate facility from EOC, depending upon space availability. A JIS is the process of bringing all of the stakeholder agen- cies together to deliver coordinated interagency messaging and executing public information plans, including rumor control. Developing this process with the stakeholder agen- cies takes time and practice. The practice can come in the annual table-top drills and the tri-annual exercises. 11 4 Code of Federal Regulations Title 14: Aeronautics and Space, Part 139 Certifi- cation of Airports Subpart DâOperations section 139.325 Airport Emergency Plan. 5 Ibid
Firefighting and Hazmat Response The airport fire department, often with support from off site resources, is the agency charged with extinguishing air- craft fires on airport property. The size and nature of the fire protection organization will vary depending upon the class and index of the airport and the size of the community near the airport. In some cases, there is a distinction between fire protection for the terminal and other buildings and fire pro- tection for the airfield. In those situations, the local fire de- partment will respond to reports of fire, smoke, or other haz- ardous conditions in the structures while another entity (often a vendor) provides fire protection for the aircraft on the runways and taxiways. If the nearby community is large enough, the airport fire department may be part of the larger municipal fire depart- ment as in the case in Chicago and Philadelphia. In many other cases, the airport fire department is a stand-alone de- partment that relies on extra resources from outside the air- port. In some airports, Emergency Medical Service (EMS) is provided by the airport fire departments (EMS will be cov- ered in more detail under the Health and Medical function). A response to the release of hazardous materials (including fuels) is typically a fire department responsibility. Depending on the size and organization of the airport fire department, responses for levels higher than first-responder operations may require the assistance of an offsite hazmat team trained to the technician level as defined in the CFR 1910.120 and Na- tional Fire Prevention Association Standard 472. Most air- port departments can handle the typical hazmat response generated by either fuel spills or damage to the packages of the small amounts of regulated hazardous materials that are shipped on commercial or cargo aircraft. Decontamination The airport fire department should be able to provide mass decontamination if a group of people is exposed to either a Toxic Industrial Chemical (TIC) or Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA). Mass decontamination plans and protocols have been established by and for fire departments. One of the first such protocols was developed in 1999 in conjunction with the U.S. Armyâs Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) now the Research, Development, and Engineer- ing Command and other units. SBCCOMâs âGuidelines for Mass Casualty Decontamination during a Terrorist Chemi- cal Agent Incidentâ applies the use of a minimum of two pumpers and, in some configurations, an elevated stream from an aerial device or articulating nozzle to provide a cor- ridor where large quantities of water at low-pressure flush chemical contaminants from the patients. The presumption, of course, is that the exposed individuals are only mildly symptomatic, are ambulatory, and can move through the de- contamination corridor on their own or with minimal assis- tance. (Privacy for disrobing often is an issue. The airport needs to designate in advance where decontamination oper- ations would be carried out and to obtain the supplies and equipment necessary for this operation.) For those individuals who are not ambulatory, decontam- ination prior to transport is required for both the safety of the ambulance crew and to prevent the ambulance from becom- ing cross-contaminated. Also, controlling the crowd before, during, and after the decontamination will require a robust law enforcement presence. The airport fire department may have to use mutual aid re- sources to provide additional personnel and apparatuses to establish a mass decontamination process as described in the SBCCOM literature. In that case, the airport fire department and the mutual aid companies must train and drill on setting up the process. This is no different than any other multi- company drill. Following the decontamination, the airportâs EMS providers will take over to complete the triage, treatment, and trans- portation of the patients. Most decontamination operations use water, and subjects will be wet. Their outer garments will have been removed and separated from them. There must be provisions for both the privacy and comfort of the patients. In cold weather, hypothermia could become a secondary in- jury to the patients. If a CBRNE incident in the form of an explosion causes a fire, the airport fire department should have the structural firefighting capabilities to extinguish that fire. Offsite assis- tance in the form of mutual aid should be available from the surrounding community. If the event is an explosion and there is a structural collapse(s), technical rescue units, such as regional, state, or federally mobilized, Urban Search and Res- cue (USAR) would be called. If the airport fire department does not provide more than first responder operations-level hazmat response, technician-specialist level hazmat teams must be available through mutual aid. It is vital that the air- port have effective mutual aid agreements with the offsite agencies as a CBRNE event will require assistance from the outside. The fire department must also be trained in NIMS beyond the traditional ICS roles. Beyond the criteria established for the application of ex- tinguishment agent on runways, the airport fire department must provide leadership and support in the recognition and identification of the threats and indications of a CBRNE event. At a minimum, the fire department should be well- enough versed in CBRNE threats that their members and the other public safety first responders will not be among the ini- tial victims. Exercises and drills should be held to test and measure the skills in recognizing and identifying CBRNE agents. Mass de- 12
contamination of affected people and the care for them after the decontamination is also a skill that can be tested and measured through training, drills, and exercises. Law Enforcement (including Bomb Squads, Hostage Negotiation, and Special Weapons and Tactics) Law enforcement and security will have extraordinary challenges in the event of a CBRNE incident at an airport. Airport security and law enforcement vary with size and own- ership of the airport. Some airports have their own police de- partments while others are protected by the local law en- forcement agency. These resources provide sworn police officers who have arrest powers and are armed. There often are state police agencies that have jurisdiction at an airport, and there is federal law enforcement per the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The lead law enforcement agency will be the airport police department, followed by the FBI. If the CBRNE incident is an intentional act, the airport will be considered a federal crime scene. The FBI will have jurisdiction and become the lead agency. Airport law enforcement officials should be able to move from a single command to unified command for law enforcement activities. This move may occur before the FBI arrives if a state police agency arrives and has jurisdiction. Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations parts 1542 and 1544 lists the minimal security standards for airport opera- tors to follow. Subpart DâContingency Measures requires airport operators to have a security program and adopt a contingency plan that is approved by the TSA. The incident management section of Part 1542, 1542.307 requires that âeach airport operator must establish procedures to evaluate bomb threats, threats of sabotage, aircraft piracy, and other unlawful interference to civil aviation operations.â6 Sec- tion (b) (2) further requires the airport operator to âinitiate appropriate action as specified in the Airport Emergency Plan.â7 If the airport does not have specialized resources such as bomb squads, hostage negotiators and Special Weapons and Tactics units (SWAT), they must have mutual aid agree- ments in place to summon these resources. Health and Medical (includes EMS, Quarantine, and Fatality Management) EMS is the immediate treatment of injuries and illness that occur on the airport property. Quarantine is the holding apart and restriction of movement of persons that have or may have been exposed to a communicable disease and may become ill themselves and further spread the disease. Fatality management is the legal determination of the cause of death, proper identification of the deceased, the notification of next of kin, and the release of the remains to the next of kin. These three functions are listed as health and medical functions, and they have diverse needs and requirements. The major challenge of a CBRNE event will be the nature of injuries and the number of patients. There could be patients who are contaminated with a chemical: either a toxic indus- trial chemical or a chemical warfare agent. An incident of biological nature may necessitate a group of people to be quarantined or isolated on the airport property. During out- breaks of Sudden Acquired Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Toronto, Singapore, and Hong Kong, social distancing meas- ures were implemented to help limit the spread of the disease. The problems and the successes that were experienced pro- vided important information for public health agencies and emergency planners worldwide that made adjustments to their plans accordingly. A CBRNE event could kill a substantial number of people. The determination of cause and manner of death could be- come an issue. Moreover, the accurate and timely legal iden- tification of the deceased and the notification and release of remains to next-of-kin is a time consuming process. Airport emergency planners must recognize the intricacies and legal- ities of these health and medical functions in order to prepare an appropriate response that links to the local public health agency and the medical examinerâs office. The medical ex- aminer (or coroner), is the person charged with determin- ing the cause of death and with providing legal identification of the deceased. The office is a function of either state or local government. In many cases, the airport fire department is responsible for providing basic EMS service to people at the airport. There are some situations where EMS is either a third public service along with police and fire, or it may be provided by a vendor. In any case, EMS for response to aircraft accidents is under the requirements of CFR 14 Part 139.319: Aircraft Res- cue and Firefighting: Operational Requirements. Specifically 139.319 (i) (4) Personnel, requires that âat least one individ- ual, who has been trained and is current in basic emergency medical services is available during air carrier operations. Training must be at a minimum of 40 hours and cover the following topics; bleeding, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, shock, primary patient survey, injuries to the skull, spine and extremities, internal injuries, movement of patients, burns and triage.â8 13 6 Title 49 CFR Chapter XII Part 1542 section 307. 7 Ibid 8 Code of Federal Regulations Title 14: Aeronautics and Space, Part 139 Certifi- cation of Airports Subpart DâOperations section 139.319 Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting: Operational requirements.
The requirements for the airport emergency plan do little more than require the certificate holder (airport) to have âprovisions for medical services, including transportation and medical assistance for the maximum number of persons that can be carried on the largest air carrier aircraft that the airport reasonably can be expected to serve;â9 Sections (2) and (3) call for the plan to identify the name, location, and telephone numbers of hospitals and rescue squads.10 Airport Plans should include a description of what steps will be taken if any emergency involves individuals who are contaminated or suspected of being contaminated. Whether contaminated by jet fuel or carrying a communicable disease, individuals so affected will require special handling in terms of treatment, transport, and so forth. Most states have a Health Department with local offices. Local governments also may have a bureau of health and the federal governmentâs Centers for Disease Control has juris- dictional interest in airports as well. The roles of these enti- ties should be understood and reflected in AEPs. The U.S. Department of Transportation in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human Services has prepared the âNational Aviation Resource Manual for Quarantinable Diseases.â This manual considers the problem of sick travelers; however, the manual only considers natural outbreaks of ill- ness in a non-bioterrorism event, and is not intended to pro- vide minimal standards for airports to use, and most airports do not have a manual that details the total effort necessary for establishing quarantine and isolation capabilities.11 There is limited guidance from the FAA or in federal laws regarding the establishment of isolation or quarantine at an airport in the event of a bioterrorism incident. The CDC has designated certain airports as quarantine stations to receive and hold individuals who have been exposed to contagious diseases, but the threat is a potential problem for all airports. The impact of quarantine on airports can be significant, and was addressed by ACRP Report 5: Quarantine Facilities for Ar- riving Air Travelers: Identification of Planning Needs and Costs. The challenges a state or local medical examiner would face in a CBRNE event at an airport would be two-fold. First, a CBRNE event has the potential to overwhelm the system with a caseload surge. There may be issues with proper storage and disposition of the deceased individuals, especially on a large scale. Surviving family members will be clamoring for infor- mation and for the release of the remains to the next-of-kin. Second, the local system may not have the expertise or equip- ment to safely perform autopsies and medical-legal identifi- cation on contaminated remains. The medical examiner or coroner must either have the in- house capacity or have plans for quickly obtaining the capa- bilities to deal with the surge in cases and to be prepared for the possibility of chemically contaminated or infectious re- mains. If local and state resources are not available, a regional approach is needed. This may include requesting federal as- sistance via the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). NDMS has specialized teams that can provide assistance in fa- tality management. The medical examiner, as with any other responder, must have some form of mutual aid program to provide assistance. Resource Management (Logistics) A CBRNE incident at an airport will require support from elements besides the first responders. There may be needs for sheltering and quarantine. As previously mentioned, there may be large numbers of injuries or deceased persons. The activities of response, stabilization, investigation, and recov- ery may take days or even weeks. The first responder agencies will need support after the first 24 hours of the incident. This support will include, but not be limited to: â¢ Fuel for vehicles; â¢ Vehicle support, such as shuttle bus service, cranes and trucks; â¢ Rehabilitation and/or break areas; â¢ Sanitary facilities, e.g., restrooms, and showers; â¢ Mass care supplies, e.g., cots and blankets; â¢ Lighting for 24-hour operations; â¢ Bulk supplies, such as sandbags or barricades; â¢ Lodging; and â¢ Food. The airport should have in place the equipment, supplies, and facilities to support the activities listed above or have ven- dor contracts in place to have the supplies brought to the air- port within 24 hours of the event. With the maintenance equipment present at most airports, the airport operations staff typically is the best suited to coordinate support for the first responders. The first responder community (police, fire, and EMS) is relatively self-supporting for the initial hours of an incident. After that point, support will be needed to main- tain the operation. The requirements in the federal regulations for airport emergency plans requires the certificate holder (the airport) to provide âAn inventory of surface vehicles that the facilities, agencies, and personnel included in the plan under paragraphs (c) (2) and (3) of this section will provide to transport injured and deceased persons to locations on the airport and in the 14 9 Code of Federal Regulations Title 14: Aeronautics and Space, Part 139 Cer- tification of Airports Subpart DâOperations section 139.325 (c) (1) Airport Emergency Plans. 10 Ibid 11 Department of Transportation, National Aviation Resource Manual for Quarantinable Diseases, page 2.
communities it serves.â12 The airport plan review checklist does not go into detail beyond brief mention of equipment inventory for surface vehicles and the buildings to accom- modate the injured, uninjured, and deceased.13 Likewise, it does not have a specific section for logistical support. What is needed in an exercise is that numerous logistical tasks are addressed. For example, how would the airport provide for a request from the Incident Commander for the acquisition of and service for 30 portable toilets for a period of two weeks or provide portable lighting for an area designated for the same amount of time? These two considerations are some of the logistical challenges that will arise in the course of any major incident at an airport. Continuity of Operations As part of the critical infrastructure, it is essential that air- ports have continuity of operations plans (COOPs) that iden- tify the essential functions of the airport and provide for how those will continue operating, if only on a limited basis, dur- ing the first 72 hours of a major emergency and beyond. Per- sonnel safety and public safety; utilities; communications; site security; and security of vital records, data, and information systems are some of the primary functions that will need to continue functioning at some level. Plans for protecting these functions, carrying them out at alternative locations, and for bringing them back to normal levels of service are part of a COOP plan. The core piece of an airport COOP plan is identifying the essential services, determining who are the essential staff (and assigning those roles at least three deep), and spelling out the plan for leadership succession should primary personnel be away at the time of the incident, not able to get to the airport, or directly impacted (injured, killed, or held hostage) by the incident. The Department of Homeland Security maintains guidance documents for assessing COOP and other aspects of emergency preparedness. Plans for how to triage emergency priorities should clarify who, where, and how. Public protec- tion and protection of assets requires pre-arranged mutual- aid pacts, and back up systems for priority records. There should be alternative communications systems in the event power is disrupted or radio towers are compromised. Family and Customer Assistance (Evacuation, Shelter) In the event of a CBRNE incident, the traffic flow of trav- elers to, from, and within the airport will be disrupted. If the airport is closed for flight operations for several hours, and it is hard to imagine that this would not be the case, there will be an accumulation of travelers stranded at the airport. The airports and the air carriers should have contingency plans to deal with service interruptions that strand passengers. Many airports do. The broadcast media is fond of displaying images of travelers sleeping in air terminals awaiting improved weather conditions. A CBRNE attack at an airport is different from most weather events in several ways. First, the events are no-notice. A storm system would be monitored for several days giving the air carriers some time to adjust flight schedules. This may minimize the effect of the shutdown. Second, weather events such as snow are usually cleared within 24 hours of the storm allowing the air traffic to resume, even if on a limited basis. A CBRNE event differs in that it has the potential to contami- nate runways and taxiways, and decontamination of those areas may take weeks. Third, the attack may render portions of the airport structures unsafe and force an evacuation of the facility. The airports must consider among many other things, what to do with hundreds of people who may be sep- arated from their belongings (baggage) that have to be moved out of harmâs way. Airport operations should likely take the lead in movement (evacuation) and protection (sheltering) of the passengers stranded at the airport in the event of a CBRNE attack. The airport must be prepared to work with offsite agencies such as the state and local emergency management agencies. If the attack causes an aircraft to crash, the NTSB has the authority under the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act (ADFAA) to provide assistance to families of the deceased and injured. If evacuation of the airport is considered, some people will require transportation. The airport must have either the means on-site or have the ability to acquire adequate trans- portation to move people to safe locations in a timely fashion. This will require pre-arrangements with the local authorities and designated locations of shelters where adequate parking will be essential. After arrival at the shelter(s), considerations for support such as food and communications must also come into play. Reuniting travelers with their luggage is important, as many travelers may need medications that could not be placed in carry-on bags. Special attention should be given to how individuals with special needs, especially individuals with visual and mobility impairments, will be evacuated from the airport. Local human service organizations that represent the interests of persons with disabilities are ideal sources of information and advice on what should be considered and what solutions would be the most effective. If the decision is made to shelter in place, the airport has several other considerations. Is the location safe and secure? Will there be sanitary services (adequate restrooms)? Is food 15 12 Ibid 13 Ibid, Appendix 3 I.A.g. (1) & (2)
service available? The same issue regarding reuniting travel- ers with their luggage applies here, as well. Through table top and functional exercises the airport can work with offsite agencies at the problems of completely evac- uating the airport or supporting a shelter on site. Upgrading AEPs and Coordinating with Other Jurisdictions One of the challenges in regional disaster planning rests with the fact that each jurisdictionâindeed, often different departments within the same jurisdictionâhas its own plans and standard operating procedures. As long as the impact of an emergency is limited and can be handled within the re- source base of a given community (or a given airport in this case), outside coordination matters less. However, if a major disaster occurs and help is needed, problems will arise if offi- cials are unfamiliar with the protocols of their disaster re- sponse partners or if the incident affects a large area and mu- tual aid is not available because those agencies are committed to needs in their own communities. If they have not already done so, the airport managers and their emergency preparedness teams should read and review the basic plans of adjacent communities with an eye toward particular areas where synchronicity is especially important. It might be advantageous to develop an advisory team to sup- port the airport emergency preparedness teams. The follow- ing steps are one way to approach this task. Airport Emergency Preparedness Team Composition and Responsibilities The airport emergency preparedness team or task force is the core group of decision-makers and managers who are re- sponsible for incident command and management of sup- porting functions during an emergency. The team generally includes the airport manager, operations manager, fire chief, the head of security and law enforcement, the director of communications, and the emergency management director (if other than the aforementioned positions). The chief engi- neer should be part of the team as well. Others may be ap- propriate to include ensuring adequate representation of key airport functions. The group should be neither too large nor too exclusive. If they have not already done so, airports should identify the emergency team members; Part 139 requires as much. However, some AEPs do not go much further than that. They do not describe what each position is responsible for and how they are organized in terms of the overall emergency struc- ture. An organization chart of positions helps to clarify chain of command, communications, and coordination, and the Basic Plan should detail the roles and responsibilities. Small airports may rely on outside organizations for almost all of the response actions and the functions of disaster response. Even so, those roles and responsibilities still should be iden- tified and reflected on the organization chart. If not already provided for in the airportâs emergency plan, the specific ac- tions of the emergency team should be documented and aligned to each response function. Table 2 offers an example. Another important job of the airport emergency team is to update their risk assessment and vulnerability analysis. His- torically, plans revolved around air-side emergencies involv- ing aircraft and hazardous materials: crashes, emergency landings, fires on aircraft, hostage situations, and fuel spills. AEPs evolved to include better coverage of other potential emergencies. With the arrival of FAAâs new standards, AEPs will need to ensure sufficient coverage of severe weather emergencies, technological hazards, natural disasters, pan- demics, and intentional acts of terror. This is an important part of the planning where input from other agencies in the airportâs region can contribute significantly. Some airports already have linked the emergency team members to the appropriate incident command positions upon which NIMS is based. These individuals become the functional managers at the airport EOC during emergencies and will be aligning with their counterparts at local govern- ment and state EOCs as resource coordination and status re- porting are underway. For smaller airports where a major portion of incident management will be done by individuals other than airport personnel, the AEP would identify which individuals and agencies will fill those positions and where they are located. All mutual aid partners need to be oriented to airport-specific issues, cleared by TSA, and involved in drills and exercises. Airport Emergency Advisory Committee One of the most efficient ways to engender regional infor- mation sharing and to coordinate changes and improvements to an AEP is to organize an advisory committee that can serve as both a source of information and an objective party for air- port security and preparedness planning. The committee could contribute in major ways to the content of an AEP and to the efficiency of disaster response when the AEP is put to use. The idea is to establish a vehicle through which other emergency plans and key stakeholders in the region can be accessed. If a regional emergency planning group already exists in the community and it appears to be functioning successfully, then airports simply need to make sure they are represented on that group. Creating extra layers of bureaucracy where they are not needed is counterproductive and dilutes the im- pact that is otherwise possible with one key structure in place. The airport emergency preparedness team could find that an advisory committee is especially valuable when it comes to 16
enhancing preparedness for CBRNE incidents. Because these types of events will almost assuredly require assistance from neighboring communities and will automatically signal in- volvement from federal agencies, it behooves airports to be knowledgeable about how neighboring jurisdictionsâ plans are set up to handle CBRNE threats and incidents. Depend- ing on the scale and area impacted, a CBRNE incident may tie up resources that the airport otherwise could count on, so it is crucial to expand the concept of mutual aid to a wider area, and to have a plan for stabilizing the situation until help can arrive. Where that help would come from and how long it would take to arrive are questions that must be answered. There is another reason why an advisory committee should be considered. Communities are vulnerable to a myriad of potential threats and unexpected disasters. Airports can be the supplier of mutual aid, not just the receiver of regional re- sources. When relevant parties become familiar with each otherâs operations, facilities, and services, each participant gains insight into how a regional consortium could benefit them. The prospect of a symbiotic relationship generates a greater willingness to sincerely invest in developing partner- ships and contributing to emergency planning. The members of an advisory committee will vary to some degree with the types of hazards to which the airport and sur- rounding area are vulnerable and with the available mutual aid resources. Two points are particularly important: (1) mem- bers should be experienced individuals who have the authority to make decisions and commit resources, and (2) all jurisdic- tions with current or potential mutual aid agreements should be invited to send their relevant representatives. 17 Response Action Possible Lead(s) Immediate Duties Related Emergency Function Emergency Responder Communications Dispatch Manager Rapid dispatch of airport emergency preparedness team and appropriate support agencies Communications Public Alert and Notification of Emergency Public Information Officer Alert with instructions to all individuals on the airport premises, including airline managers, tenants, employees, and the traveling public. Warning and Emergency Public Information Size-up and Assessment of Emergency Relevant first responder incident commander, Chief Engineer, and Airport Manager Initial evaluation of disasterâs impact and risks and establishment of response priorities with immediate actions necessary to protect life, health, and safety. Damage Assessment Incident Command (also Unified Command) Relevant first responder incident commander(s) (Fire, Police, EMS) Commit and command resources to mitigate the impact of the disaster and control the course of the incident or emergency situation. Includes firefighting, hazardous materials and biological detection and response, decontamination, crime control, perimeter control, emergency medical services, search and rescue, and others. Develop and update Emergency Action Plan and Monitor safety of response personnel. Tactical and Strategic Response Operations (for all hazards) Emergency Medical Services Personnel Safety Population Protection Intelligence Emergency Responder Communications Dispatch Manager Rapid dispatch of airport emergency preparedness team and appropriate support agencies Communications Management of Emergency Support Operations and EOC 1. Command staff â Safety Officer, Public Information Officer, and Liaison Officer 2. Operations 3. Finance/ Administration 4. Planning 5. Logistics Emergency management director and team Activate, staff, and manage the EOC in support of incident command. Maintain communications with ICs to identify support requirements and coordinate mutual aid with outside agencies. Oversee and coordinate activities associated with the emergency functions itemized in the next column. Population Protection Public Information and External Affairs Personnel Protection Intelligence Resource Management Sheltering and Mass Care Public Health and Medical Services Transportation Infrastructure/Public Works (including damage assessment and debris management) Volunteer and Donations Management Table 2. Suggested alignment of airport emergency preparedness team with emergency response functions.
Suggested members of an airport emergency advisory committee might include the following: â¢ Representative(s) of airport tenants, â¢ Senior law enforcement officials, â¢ Senior fire officials, â¢ Senior emergency medical services officials, â¢ Traffic engineer, â¢ Public health department, â¢ State and local highway and transportation managers, â¢ Regional hospital/medical consortium, â¢ Public works department, â¢ City and county emergency (911) dispatch center, â¢ Utility companies, â¢ Military official (if dual-use airport or installation is prox- imate to the airport), â¢ Other nearby airport(s), â¢ Port authority and U.S. Coast Guard (if airport is next to a port or other waterway), â¢ Neighboring school district and nearby university emer- gency managers, â¢ Local media, â¢ Public relations company, â¢ Volunteer agencies, â¢ Heavy equipment suppliers/construction company, and â¢ Neighboring transit authority. The rationale for the each suggested member is self evi- dent, except perhaps for a public relations company. That is included because there have been good examples of how public relations and communications volunteers from the private sector have provided much needed assistance to air- ports during major events when the airportâs PIO was over- whelmed. Several airports were grateful for this assistance after the September 11th attacks forced closure of all U.S. air- ports. A note on the university and school district as advisory committee members: schools have fleets of buses, technol- ogy, and facilities that might be needed, and some universi- ties have medical centers attached. As presented, the advisory committee will end up being a large group. The advantage is that airports would achieve wide input into airport emergency preparedness; the dis- advantage is that it is unwieldy to work with big groups and accomplish time-sensitive goals. Efficiency can be gained by organizing the advisory committee into sections that match the AEP functional groups. Doing so will allow each member to work on issues directly related to their areas of expertise and will streamline coordination. Table 3 depicts one way the groups could be configured. Mission of the Advisory Committee The airport emergency preparedness team will determine the mission of the advisory committee. The mission will de- pend on many factors including how detailed the airportâs cur- rent AEP is, and what level of effort will be necessary to bring it into compliance with FAAâs new requirements. Airports can consider using the committee to accomplish the following: â¢ Provide examples of their own emergency plans, which air- ports may be able to use for their own AEPs, especially for the sections on threat assessment; operational communi- cations; certain first responder SOPs; resource lists; and public information management. â¢ Establish or update mutual aid agreements with regional resources, and clarify procedures and conditions under which mutual aid will function, including shared equip- ment and cost recovery issues. â¢ Obtain objective input into plans and procedures from ex- perts operating in the same geographic area. â¢ Map a strategy for how to handle a widespread disaster that negates the possibility of sharing personnel, equipment, systems, and supplies within the immediate area. â¢ Identify and discuss the challenges of priority setting in the event several mutual aid partners affected by an emergency are relying on the same outside resources. â¢ Uncover potential conflicts or contradictions in plans and resolve differences BEFORE a major event occurs. â¢ Discover the full range of potential assets available and provide information to other jurisdictions on the airportâs resources that could help others during a disaster. â¢ Identify areas of planning and coordination that should be tested through interagency training opportunities, e.g., table top or functional exercises. â¢ Specify how a required quarantine of passengers would be managed, including the location of the quarantine site, who would manage it and which agencies would be re- sponsible for providing all related services. â¢ Detail the procedures for any evacuation from the airport with area agencies so that the procedures, direction, avail- able transport, and destinations are consistent with the evacuation instructions and support of neighboring juris- dictions. â¢ Inventory the communications systems and equipment with respect to interoperability and technology solutions for enhancing that capability. One of the challenges airports are likely to face is concern over the time commitment required to serve on the advisory committee. That potential roadblock can be minimized in several ways. First, plan to accomplish the goals within 12 months. If people know that there is a specific and reasonable time frame in which their involvement will be required, they will be more inclined to make a commitment. Beyond the one year mark, the advisory committee could be used to help the airport maintain the AEP and to organize joint training exer- cises, perhaps once a year. Second, assign the right airport personnel to each of the functional subcommittees and rely 18
on them to lead. There should be agendas for the meetings so discussions can stay focused and members can see progress against their groupâs tasks. Meet only as often as necessary and utilize electronic mail to the greatest extent practical. An- other useful tool is the web-based conference where members can interact on-line in real time without leaving their office. Find ways to reduce the demand on the memberâs time and travel; the level of participation will be higher. Third, publicly recognize the participants for their involvement. Everyone likes to feel appreciated, and the goodwill that ensues from acknowledging the individuals and the departments or com- panies they represent will pay off. Threat (Hazard) Assessment AEPs already contain information about hazards and threats, but they may only superficially cover the nature of the threat. Threat assessments should include any local or re- gional hazards which would directly affect the airport; a nearby nuclear power plant or the potential for volcanic and seismic activity are obvious examples. Any situations that would be unique to the airport have to be identified as well. Airplane crashes lead that list and is one type of threat where airports have the expertise that contiguous communities need to ensure that local plans are adequate. The current task is to review how hazards and threats are described in the AEP and to augment that information where necessary to ensure that they are adequately covered. Since surrounding communities will share a similar hazard and threat profile, it makes sense to obtain and review their pro- files and then add or subtract elements in keeping with the airportâs specific environment. It often will not be necessary to start from scratch and there is little point in re-inventing the wheel. The threats identified in the assessment should be quanti- fied per the hazardâs potential impact on airport operations and public safety. It is not enough to say that blizzards occur every winter and could force the airport to close temporarily. 19 Emergency Function Advisory Group Representative Direction and Control On-site Incident Co mma nder Director of EOC and Support Functions Fire, police, EMS, and public works senior officials Area Em ergency Managem ent Directors; Stateâs regional emergency ma nagem ent director; hospital emergency management director Operational Co mm unications Area dispatch centers; operational co mm unications directors from school district, me dia, m ilitary inst allation, ham radio organization, Radio Am ateur Civil Em ergency Service (RACES), transit com panies, private industry Alert and Warning Media; public relations company; area dispatch/ 911 departments Em ergency Public Inform ation Local me dia; public relations com pany; area dispatch/ 911 depart me nts; air carrier public inform ation representative Protective Actions (Evacuate and Protect in Place) School district and university em ergency ma nagers; Red Cross and other volunteer agencies; Shelter ma nagers from local governm ent; transit and bus companies; State highway patrol Firefighting, Rescue, and Hazm at Officials from local fire departments (especially any special operations units available); State or regional EPA office Law Enforcement Officials from local police departments (especially any special operations units available); FBI office; military police (joint use airports) Health and Medical Officials from EMS providers; CDC Quarantine Station covering the airport; medical transport operators; hospitals; state and local public health service; local government health departments; Medical Examinerâs Office; university medical center; pharmacies; regional EPA office; mental health agencies; funeral homes; social service agencies; military (joint use airports) Operations and Maintenance Local government public works departments; heavy equipment suppliers; water and food suppliers; communications equipment suppliers; utilities; sanitation service company; utility companies; state department of transportation Resource Management Local public works departments; private industry logistics, procurement, and transportation experts; local government planning departments; local government emergency management departments; volunteer organizations; financial and legal expertise Table 3. Advisory group members by emergency function.
The assessment must describe specifically how blizzards af- fect airport operations and operators, vendors, access to and from the airport, delayed or stranded passengers, possible power loss, among other impacts. Threats need to be evalu- ated in detail because response preparedness builds on that baseline of information. The AEP describes how the airport will mitigate the consequences of emergenciesâthose which provide some warning, and those which do not. It is essential that disastersâ effects on all facets of airport operations be scrutinized and documented. For example, what would happen if a terrorist were to syn- chronize multiple sarin gas releases in several terminals? Widespread panic on the premises (which would create its own consequences) would add to the challenge of a multiple casualty event where identifying, locating, and arresting the attackers would compete with treatment of victims and re- ducing panic for priority attention among incident com- manders and EOC leaders. Likewise, if an individual were to walk into the main terminal and detonate high yield explo- sives hidden in his garments, how would that impact the im- mediate area? What would happen within the airport as a whole? What should be the airportâs first actions and priori- ties? By thinking through the likely consequences of each threat, planners will know what to anticipate in terms of immediate demands and can build the response procedures accordingly. The place in the AEP to describe the disaster situation and as- sumptions concerning impact are the hazard-specific sec- tions. That is also where the details on anticipated mutual aid requirements and who the mutual aid providers will be should be clearly articulated. Revising AEPs AEPs should not sit on the shelf. They must be reviewed and updated at least once a year, as new technology, new con- cepts, new threats, and changes in local partners take place. Once the airport has determined its new emergency pre- paredness planning goals, established an emergency advisory committee (or some other means for outside input), and strengthened the threat assessment, revisions to response procedures can be tackled. There are an almost overwhelm- ing number of reports, guidelines, and standards that are in use and are available. Homeland security and emergency pre- paredness have been studied and sliced in a myriad of ways, the result being an often-confusing mixture of federal and state goals, standardized tasks, typed resources, capability- based guidelines, metrics, frameworks, systems, and the likeâ all organized around an acronymic language of its own. As suggested previously and to facilitate coordination with other emergency agencies, the AEP should be organized by both functional areas and specific hazards. To help with updating the AEP, there are several documents that are basic and nec- essary to the process. Other publications may prove useful for additional fine-tuning once the main requirements are met. The following documents should be included in the airport emergency preparedness library: 1. Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 150/ 5200-31B, Airport Emergency Plans. 2. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101. 3. Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations Part 139, Certifica- tion of Airports. 4. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards 424, 2500, 1561 and 1600. 5. Any selected diagram of the National Incident Manage- ment System depicting the basic structure as well as uni- fied command and area command. 6. Department of Homeland Security Target Capabilities List, Version 2.0. 7. Department of Homeland Security Universal Task List. 8. Airport Security Plan requirements for law enforcement. The FAA Advisory Circular is a practical guide; its strength lies in the detailed specific actions for primary response ele- ments for each functional section and type of hazard. There is information about unique planning considerations and helpful examples on organization and assignment of respon- sibilities. The Airport Emergency Plan Review Checklist is structured around the threats referenced only in Part 139. Airports using the âIncident and Actionâ headings will need to broaden these to include more types of threats or to use the nomenclature more common to NIMS. FEMAâs CPG 101 is the baseline from which the FAAâs Cir- cular 150/5200-31B evolved. It is a valuable tool. Airports are already familiar with Title 14 CFR Part 139, which will continue as the rule that airports must meet for emergency preparedness and certification. The NFPA stan- dards also are not new to airport fire departments and oper- ations managers, and they remain as an important reference for essential safety and disaster readiness. It also is handy to have a stand-alone copy of how NIMS is structured for refer- ence throughout the AEP update deliberations. The Universal Task List (UTL) developed by the U.S. De- partment of Homeland Security (DHS) has over 1,500 tasks for all levels of government from nationally managed re- sponse to catastrophic or national security incidents, to lo- cally managed responses to small-scale events. Use the UTL as a reference and a tool to plan for the actions necessary to protect, respond, and recover. The Target Capabilities List (TCL) Version 2.0, also devel- oped by DHS, has valuable information that will help inform decisions about response plans. The document approaches 20
preparedness by suggesting what the relevant jurisdiction (the airport in this case) should be able to do or cause to have done by mission area. The TCL assumes basic capabilities and operational readiness for normal operations and emergencies of limited impact even if those are provided mostly through mutual aid resources. The TCL describes capabilities that would be necessary to address major events, e.g., disasters of significant impact, health emergencies, and terrorism. It will help planners move from status quo operations to surge level by means of a defined process, interagency cooperation, mu- tual aid pacts, and joint training. Some of the questions to ask about capabilities are: â¢ Why is the capability needed? â¢ How will it be used? â¢ What function will it perform? â¢ Who will need the capability? â¢ When will it be available? â¢ What key performance and other attributes comprise the capability? â¢ How will it be supported? â¢ What skills will be required? â¢ How will responders be trained? â¢ How much will it cost to have this capability? By reading through the descriptions one can glean insight into a wide range of resources and actions that should be con- sidered in the AEP, though the TCL does contain levels of detail that are not be germane to airports, so this should be kept in mind. The TCL is built around what is needed to get the job done. The jurisdiction or airport then decides how best to build the capabilities given available resources, outside assistance, what is affordable, what the threat level is, and so forth. Being able to highlight what task is at risk, or which capability element is deficient provides the means to link resource decisions to specific shortfalls in proficiency or capability. The measures needed to mitigate the gaps can be built on a priority basis that respects fiscal realities. Airports would not need to de- velop and sustain all the capabilities to the same levelâthis will vary based on risks and needs. The process can be compared to hiring an employee. First, one develops a job descriptionâitemizing, qualifying, and quantifying the tasks and outcomes that must be accom- plished. Will it be necessary to hire someone full-time, or are the tasks seasonal in nature or only necessary during unan- ticipated work surges? Where do the tasks fall in order of pri- ority? Can any existing staff do the job, in addition to their other assignments? If not, other candidates (resources) are sought to fill the position, looking for the best match of skills and capabilities to fit the needs of the job. Requirements that call for someone part-time or on an as-needed basis would be equivalent to the requirements filled though mutual aid part- ners during an emergency. Those resources need to be made familiar with (trained) how you do business and the structure of the organization. This process can be used to discern all the capabilities needed to prepare for major incidents or severe weather emergencies at the airport. To the greatest extent possible, the AEP should include maps, color codes, organization charts, and lists to support or in lieu of long narratives. Lengthy AEPs are less valuable than short concise ones that cover details through visual presenta- tions that can be quickly read and understood during crises conditions. The revised AEP should be distributed as appropriate to the Advisory Committee for review and comment. There may be some necessary fine-tuning to the plan before it becomes final. Discussion of Airport Survey Results It was noted in Chapter 2 that about a dozen airports pro- vided information to the research team on what resources the airports have to handle major incidents, and what resources are available from nearby jurisdictions or private companies. The airports also explained the structure of their emergency team. Five of the responding airports have designated a small group of individuals to handle emergency planning. Those teams varied in membership from ones that include Opera- tions, Fire, and Police; others that assign this responsibility to Operations Security and Public Safety; the Airport Manager or Operations Manager with some fire department input; and last, a Disaster Planning Executive Committee comprised of Fire, Police, Aviation Operations, Public Safety, Information Technology, and Public Affairs. Five of the 13 airports vest primary responsibility with Airport Operations; two do so under Public Safety; and one assigns emergency planning re- sponsibility to Operations Security. Structural fire protection of airport facilities is provided by the on-site Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting ARFF unit (at least until the local fire department arrives) in most cases. Members of the ARFF unit typically are trained to the basic EMS level and serve as the first responders for initial triage and treatment. Generally, they are supported by the local fire department which has more emergency medical technicians and advanced life support response in EMS provisionâcertainly in terms of advanced life support. Transport is handled by private contractor, or by city or county EMS service. Only three of the 13 airports reported having a hazardous materials response team at the airport proper, fully trained to the technician level (per NFPA 72). Some airports have staff that is trained to the awareness or operations level. Most of the responses indicated that hazmat response is provided by a nearby National Guard Civil Support Team, a county or city 21
fire department, or a regional hazmat team. Many are contin- uing to train specific personnel to higher levels of hazmat cer- tification and to augment their hazmat response capabilities. With regard to law enforcement presence and special ex- plosive ordnance disposal teams, the responding airports re- ported several different configurations. Typically, law en- forcement is handled by metropolitan police departments, county sheriff departments, or city police departments. Seat- tle uses the Port of Seattle Police Department and Massachu- setts State Police is the primary law enforcement agency at the airport in Boston. Interestingly, eight airports said they have an on-site Explosive Ordnance Device (EOD) team; others rely on bomb squads from nearby big cities, counties, state police, or military units. Minneapolis/Saint Paul augments their unit with SWAT plus canines trained to detect explo- sives or narcotics. Chicago has canines trained for explosives and a mobile x-ray truck. Denverâs airport has a device con- tainment vehicle and a ârender safeâ bunker. On the topic of the degree to which CBRNE threats are covered in current airport AEPs, responses indicate under- representation of these risks, with a couple of airports being the exception. Some aspects of CBRNE are covered under the hazmat or fire sections of the AEPs. In other cases, CBRNE is addressed through references to mutual aid. A few respon- dents were not sure how or if CBRNE plans were part of their airport preparedness. Where biological agents were reported as covered, the emphasis seems to be on the prospect of pan- demic flu carried by travelers, but not as a terrorist attack with biological weapons, though one large airport categorizes bi- ological under suspicious materials. On the question of, âDo you have automatic aid or mutual aid agreements that are specific to CBRNE events?â What can be derived from the 13 airports that responded is that they have mutual aid partnerships with immediately adjacent ju- risdictions. In only a few cases does that arrangement capture a wider geographic area, however. Four of the airports have plans that have been field-tested and maintained on a regular basis. These airports commonly work with their response partners in exercises and table top drills. In one case, the air- port noted that special CBRNE mutual aid is set up with the local Civil Response Unit. While there is evidence that air- ports work with adjacent communities in disaster prepared- ness, it was difficult to determine the extent to which the work to date has included CBRNE scenarios. Approximately two-thirds of the reporting airports have updated their AEPs to be NIMS-compliant. A few were not sure, and one is currently working on compliance, having re- cently completed FEMAâs IS-700 training. The final question to airports was open-ended. It asked the respondents to describe any special features of their emer- gency preparedness activities. A collection of practices and experiences that bear special mention follows: 1. We conduct an emergency incident management discus- sion class each month. The class is usually 1â2 hours. This is done to get as many people as possible actively involved in incident management. We are in the process of devel- oping an Incident Management Airport Operations Guide. In addition, we are translating our emergency plans into Operating Guidelines, which further clarify the roles and responsibilities of each agency and/or department that operates here at the airport. 2. We have a plan to insulate and quarantine incoming pas- sengers suspected of viral infections. We also have an area to handle this. 3. Our airport has an EOC on the ground floor. We are one of 18 CDC quarantine stations nationwide. The National Guard and Reserves are at the airport and have special hangers. We have a stand-up morgue on site, and one of the airport commissioners is a forensic dentist. â¢ Radio communications are interoperable. All radio communications are on 800 MHz. We have two staff in public affairs and we activate a joint information center (JIC) during any incident. We have had three incidents recently. â¢ Early in the fall of 2006 we had to evacuate part of a ter- minal because there was a passenger with mace. Opera- tions went smoothly. In other situations, an interna- tional flight from the Dominican Republic arrived with passengers complaining of stomach flu and two passen- gers on one flight arrived bleeding and required assis- tance. 4. We are a CDC Quarantine Station and there are eight or nine CDC employees there. Work with CDC is focused on biological planning for communicable disease. We coordinate exercises frequently with our nearby cities, especially in hazmat training. A zoned response area is set up, including three fire zones. 5. With both airports under the ownership of the city, the fire department and police department spearhead most contingencies which are supported well by the airport community. 6. Currently we are spending a lot of effort on the CDC quar- antine planning. We have identified areas where we need more from CDC, e.g., law enforcement support, should we face a major disease outbreak at the airport. 7. One of the solutions to avoiding panic and streamlining a response to a biological threat is education. We need to educate airport workers, e.g., the shuttle drivers, the bag- gage handlers, the maintenance folks, vendors, airline per- sonnel, etc., as to what is not to fear. This could pay off in a big way. There should be widespread information dis- seminated on the range and degree of impact of the most common chemical and biological threats and the differ- 22
ences between exposed, contaminated, contagious, and infectious. Many workers could safely continue to do their jobs using basic protection, like a mask over their mouths. Airports need instruction on PPE and its effectiveness, plus how to use it. AEP Evaluation and Gap Analysis Summary The research team set several goals for reviewing the 18 AEPs assembled by FAA for this project. The team wanted to see how the AEPsâ provisions compared against standards set by the NRF and NIMSâstandards that mutual aid responders are meeting. The first step was to examine NIMS and elimi- nate the provisions that are irrelevant to airports. There were 44 NIMS provisions that remained, and these were organized into the following categories, each having sub-elements: â¢ Emergency Services and Mutual Aid, â¢ EOC and Support Functions, â¢ Public Communications and Media, â¢ Emergency Medical Services, and â¢ Law Enforcement. A sample of the evaluation tool is presented in Appendix C. The 18 AEPs submitted for review were analyzed against the 44 NIMS provisions to determine if the plans failed to cover or poorly covered the subject, partially covered the subject, or covered the subject well. Separate summary reports were pre- pared as well to capture more details about the plans and any elements that contained good practices to document in this report. From this research, it appears that in general AEPs do the best job addressing the provisions described below. 1. The structure of airport first responders command is organized per the Incident Command System. 2. Hazardous materials capabilities and response are described. 3. There are separate provisions for the injured and the deceased. 4. Emergency medical services transport is identified. 5. The location and staffing for a temporary morgue are identified. 6. Law enforcement and fire suppression duties and respon- sibilities are based on the nature of the emergency. 7. Tactical communications channels and procedures are identified. Airports may need to do more work on identifying and documenting the essential resources they will need to re- spond and recover from each type of hazard they antici- pate. All resourcesâthose at the airport, those from local government, and those from non-profit and private sector organizationsâshould be itemized. In particular, information about what private sector resources would need to be tapped and how they would be acquired quickly is lacking. This part of the AEP needs to be closely planned with outside stakeholders so all concerned know who is counting on what resources and what the priorities are for use and distribution. Plans need to sufficiently cover major incidents involving CBRNE, particularly in the context of intentional releases, ac- tivations, and exposures. Intelligence becomes an important function at the airport EOC, and airport plans should iden- tify the personnel who would be responsible and the neces- sary security clearance for this role. CBRNE threats can be de- veloped further within existing hazard-based appendices, but many will need to be expanded to cover additional contin- gencies. For example, the section Bombs needs to cover the threat of âdirtyâ bombs, those used as dispersal agents for bi- ological or radiological material. Under the section Hazardous Materials Incidents and Dangerous Goods, chemical, biological, radiological, and nu- clear attack scenarios should be considered. The AEP should identify the response requirements specific to these threats, with special attention paid to personal protective equipment, detection equipment, and evacuation or protect-in-place procedures. Moreover, since airports often are multi-modal transportation centers connected to or near mass transit and rail, the impact on, or the threat represented by these services, needs to be considered in preparing the threat assessment and the responses to specific hazards. Training and drills with ju- risdictions in the region are essential. All airports may want to check their AEPs to determine whether the areas below are sufficiently addressed. Of the sampled AEPs, the following list identifies AEP areas most in need of enhancement: 1. PPE and responder safety are addressed. 2. Transfer of command is covered. 3. CBRNE is addressed and included in incident-based annexes. 4. Coordination with local/state agenciesâ emergency plans is adequate. 5. Continuity of Operations (COOP) is covered. 6. Evacuation procedures include and identify assembly areas/meeting locations. 7. EOC location, facilities, and equipment are detailed. 8. On-site sheltering is addressed. 9. Private sector resources are identified by type and methods of acquisition. 10. Power failure (airside and landside) is adequately covered. 11. Airport is conducting training with their area and re- gional mutual aid partners on the AEP. 12. Quarantine procedures and site (on or off airport) are well described. 23
13. A post traumatic stress disorder program and other men- tal health services are identified. 14. There is a logistics position identified. 15. Emergency personnel rehabilitation (food, water, rest) is covered. 16. There are stored supplies, and their locations are identified. 17. Airport recovery from an incident is covered. 18. Back-up and alternative communications are identified. 19. A public information officer position is described and is not a collateral duty to other responsibilities during an emergency. 20. A location for the JIC is identified and coordinated pub- lic information is described. 21. The providers of all levels of emergency medical services are identified. 22. Hospitals and patient tracking are addressed. 23. There are separate annexes for bombs, active shooter/ hostage, terrorist, and hijacking. Highlights and Ideas from Selected AEPs As airport managers update their AEPs, it may be helpful to know how other airports have addressed disaster pre- paredness and where some good examples of various provi- sions can be found. This chapter presents a collection of ideas, model protocols, and accepted practices from airports through- out the country. The examples are derived from the AEPs of airports of different sizes and locations, and are but some of potentially other notable examples that could be identified given an opportunity to examine more plans. The highlights were found in the AEPs of these airports: 1. Indianapolis International Airport, Indiana. 2. Springfield Airport, Illinois. 3. Chattanooga Airport, Tennessee. 4. Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Washington. 5. Minneapolis/Saint Paul Airport, Minnesota. 6. Omaha Airport Authority, Nebraska. 7. Kansas City (Charles B. Wheeler) Airport, Missouri. 8. Los Angeles International Airport, California. 9. Memphis-Shelby County Airport, Tennessee. 10. Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. 11. Chesterfield (Spirit of St. Louis) Airport, Missouri. 12. San Francisco International Airport, California. Their AEPs were studied to gain insight into what is cov- ered, and what is not. Another purpose for that review was to find novel approaches and good examples that could be transferred to other airports, and, therefore, be of interest to airport managers. Indianapolis The AEP contains a checklist that outlines the duties and responsibilities of emergency service personnel if the evacua- tion of a terminal or aircraft becomes necessary. The plan also addresses sheltering and identifies the airport officials re- sponsible for initiating and coordinating the sheltering plan. Four staging areas are identified where mutual aid units are to report to receive their assignments. The fire company offi- cer that arrives at the staging area assumes the role of Staging Officer. Each site is equipped with boxes that contain supplies and maps for the Staging Officer to use in tracking the mu- tual aid resources and their assignments. The Indianapolis International Airport AEP has excellent coverage of public information protocols. The Airport Pub- lic Affairs director liaises with the media, airline media per- sonnel and other impacted organizations. During an emer- gency, all press releases are coordinated through the Airport Media Center, which serves as the JIC during an airport dis- aster. It is staffed by the airport Public Affairs Officer. The air- port also has designated a staging area where media mobile units and satellite trucks report to and then are escorted to a vantage point near the incident. This plan includes good, specific information related to mass casualty incidents and emergency medical services. They have coordinated with Marion County and, if necessary, the airport incident commander can implement the Marion County Mass Casualty Incident Plan. That step activates an EMS officer who reports to the incident commander for as- signment. The medical sector officer tracks patient transports and the plan identifies area hospitals and specialty centers as well as the ambulance transport routes. Local and State police work together to ensure that all ambulance routes remain open. Security and credentialing of emergency services per- sonnel are handled by airport police. The AEP identifies the location and staffing for a tempo- rary morgue. Following a major disaster at the airport, the county Coronerâs Office will be alerted immediately and will place staff on standby for possible mobilization. The AEP has comprehensive guidelines for handling this situation. Abraham Airport Authority, Springfield, Illinois The AEP for this smaller airport has several key provisions worth noting. First, the plan covers coordination with local and State agencies well with ample references back to the spe- cific emergency plans of those mutual aid partners. Review- ing and knowing the provisions of the emergency plans from surrounding jurisdictions is one of the key recommendations in this ACRP report. 24
Springfieldâs AEP also provides details about the Airport Crisis Management Centerâwhere is it located, the equip- ment and resources in the Center and the location of the back-up site in the event the primary location can not be used. They also were careful to address a power failure emer- gency not just from the air side, but from the land side as well. Public communications and the media are well covered in this AEP which identifies one official spokesperson for the airport and a media staging area. The media is to broadcast information directing family and friends to the Family Assis- tance Center at the local Salvation Army. Finally, the EMS section is well detailed and includes re- gional mutual aid partners for all EMS levels. Ambulance and air ambulance transport are discussed, the hospitals are all identified with reference to the hospitalsâ internal disaster preparedness plans for patient tracking, and the location and staffing of a temporary morgue is described in sufficient measure. The airport has designated three separate staging lo- cations for three types of casualty classifications. Chattanooga Airport, Tennessee The AEP for this airport is excellent in many areas. The plan is largely NIMS compliant. Most of the emergency re- sponse organizations directly involved with emergency oper- ations at the airport will be represented at the incident com- mand post to assist the incident commander in coordinating tactical operations. The support functions will be controlled through the EOC. Each tactical and support agency is re- sponsible for ensuring continuity of operations for their re- spective organization, including the succession of command personnel. The depth of the command structure during an emergency incident is at least three deep for fire, rescue, and EMS response and two deep for law enforcement incidents. The plan specifies who is in charge during all phases of the emergency operations and outlines the process for the trans- fer of command and briefings, which ensures continuous leadership throughout the incident. The AEP does a comprehensive job of covering tactical communications channels and procedures. The airport emer- gency services and the EOC use an 800 MHz radio system. The system is compatible with the Chattanooga Fire Department, the airportâs primary mutual aid support. There are alterna- tive forms of communications (direct telephone lines, Nextel direct connect phone system, pagers, and runners) in case the 800 MHz radios fail. The system has a sufficient number of channels to permit all support functions to operate on sepa- rate frequencies. The airport police and fire chiefs are respon- sible for ensuring that all responding units can communicate with each other and that the communications equipment from different agencies interfaces as expected. The airport provides airport familiarization training to agencies and per- sonnel supporting the AEP. The City of Chattanooga Radio Shop maintains the airportâs 800 MHz system. Personal protection equipment often receives only a pass- ing glance in AEPs. But Chattanoogaâs AEP requires that all emergency personnel be provided appropriate PPE and be given training on the proper use and care of this equipment. The use of PPE is mandatory and specified by type in most of the incident-based annexes, including the Contagious Disease and hazmat annexes. Three of the incident-based annexes address airport evac- uations and sheltering: Alert and Warning, Protective Ac- tions, and Natural Disasters. Evacuation procedures vary de- pending on the type of emergency. Evacuation orders with instructions on where to go and what to do will be made via a general announcement on the public address system. Air- port police officers will assist in clearing the area affected and direct the evacuees to another part of the airport or to a des- ignated shelter, and will remain with patrons and employees until conditions permit re-entry. The AEP provides for mental health and critical incident stress management services for survivors, relatives, eyewit- nesses, and emergency service personnel through a regional critical stress management team and occupational health consultants connected to two hospitals. Seattle-Tacoma International Airport This is another strong AEP. Referred to as the Airport Com- prehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP), it is NIMS compliant. All responses to emergency incidents are organized and coordinated using the NIMS/Unified Command System. The CEMP is thorough. Each of the planâs 15 functional and 10 incident-based annexes addresses in detail the roles and responsibilities of the Port of Seattleâs emergency services, other airport departments, and mutual aid jurisdictions. The highly structured plan helps the incident commander main- tain control and coordination among all disaster responders at the airport and resources from the region. The CEMP not only identifies the mutual aid assistance for each type of inci- dent, but includes an accounting of their assets (personnel and equipment) that will be committed to the airport incident. All requests for mutual aid assistance to the airport are made through the King County EOC. All airport operations and departments are linked by the 800 MHz radio system. The Airport Maintenance Depart- ment handles the requirements for inter and intra-operable radio communications and maintains the system. The role of airport tenants is discussed in the CEMP. Their responsibilities are outlined in the functional and incident- based annexes. 25
There are six access gates that serve as staging areas for mu- tual aid units. The first-arriving officer at the emergency sur- veys the scene and determines which of these locations should be used. Training is emphasized in the plan. They indicate a multi- faceted training program that includes requirements for ini- tial training, recurrent training, and specialized training. Training is conducted using classroom instruction, orienta- tion seminars, drills, tabletop exercises, functional exercises, full-scale exercises, evaluations and critiques. Post incident critiques are conducted after all incidents, events, drills, and exercises to discuss successes and areas needing improve- ment. This information then is used to validate the effective- ness of the CEMP or to make improvements to the plan. The airport does designate two disaster assistance centers: one for relatives of disaster victims and one for non-injured individuals. It is good practice to maintain separate locations for these two groups as their priority needs and situations are different. The Relative Care Collection Center is organized according to established FAA and airline requirements and must ensure security and privacy for discussing information about victims, their condition, and notifying next of kin. The collection site for individuals affected, but not injured, by the disaster serves as a central registry, which helps account for the individuals involved in the emergency. At that center, in- dividualsâ health is monitored, they can communicate with relatives and friends, and they can receive spiritual and psy- chological support from trained practitioners. Minneapolis/Saint Paul Airport, Minnesota The strengths of the Minneapolis/Saint Paul Airportâs plan are its compliance with NIMS and ICS, their detailed Re- sponder Safety and Welfare annex, the well-designed evacu- ation and sheltering plan, Annex 23 (Hazardous Materials/ Dangerous Goods), the Communicable Disease Response Protocol, a well-defined Logistics Chief position, and the in- volvement of tenants in annual plan reviews. Since adopting NIMS as the basis for all incident manage- ment at the airports, the Metropolitan Airport Commission (MAC) has provided NIMS and ICS training for all MAC and first line first responders. Special attention has been given to ensuring that emer- gency services personnel have current, reliable personal pro- tection equipment and other equipment necessary for safe operations, including that which is needed for response to CBRNE incidents. MAC personnel have received special training and information on emergency response practices. A safety officer is assigned at each incident. The officer is re- sponsible for protecting all MAC and mutual aid responders. Rehabilitation sites are established to monitor first respon- ders and provide a location for rest and recovery. Emotional and mental support is also made available to all MAC re- sponders following a major incident through their Critical Incident Stress Management System. A number of personnel are qualified to conduct peer de-briefings, which can be ini- tiated by the police, fire, or risk departments. MACâs evacuation and sheltering plan is one of the best re- viewed in its level of detail and logistics planning. Fire and po- lice officials at the airport have the authority to determine when an evacuation is necessary. When the decision is made, notifications go out using a combination of audible and vi- sual alarms, public addresses, and personnel sweeps. The MAC Emergency Communications Center will make the necessary public safety notifications and inform the MAC air- side operations. The Communications Center will make an- nouncements to airport tenants and passengers who will be notified of safe area and routes via telephone calls, fax mes- sages, public address systems, and person-to-person contacts. Tenants will assist MAC and TSA with evacuations of pas- sengers and with their own employees. The public safety and other airport employees will assist in directing airport pa- trons, tenants and staff to designated evacuation routes. The plan identifies over 30 safe areas where displaced indi- viduals can be relocated during an emergency, as well as al- ternative refuge areas should the locations at the terminals be insufficient. Airport military facilities cargo buildings and so forth are among the alternative sites. The plan outlines trans- portation resources to move evacuees to the safe areas or refuge areas, working in cooperation with TSA and Metro Transit buses. The threat and response to hazardous materials is covered in Annex 23, a very comprehensive section that describes the following: â¢ Hazmat response protocols, â¢ Pre-identification and risk analysis, â¢ Determination of hazmat release and detection, â¢ Personnel training and certifications, â¢ Field maintenance responsibilities during a release, â¢ Facility Emergency Response Plan activation, â¢ Hazmat response capabilities and response resources, and â¢ Federal support. There is a Communicable Disease Response Protocol which defines the roles, responsibilities, and actions to be taken for a multi-agency response to a potentially quaran- tinable disease at the airport. If quarantine is required, a two phase approach is used. In Phase I, individuals can be held temporarily and observed for approximately 6â8 hours, pending more information. Phase II of quarantine would function in accordance with the nature of the specific disease. A temporary quarantine area would be mobilized where po- tentially infected passengers would be detained and suspected 26
sick aircraft would be directed to the Federal Inspection Ser- vices area. The logistics chief at the airport is responsible for gathering, allocating, and tracking all resources, including personnel, equipment, facilities, and materials. The Chief is also responsi- ble for all volunteer coordination and any debris clearance fol- lowing a disaster. The head of logistics works with the MAC PIO on news media logistics, including media staging area, incident site tours, and any associated credentialing requirements. Omaha (Eppley Airfield), Nebraska The Omaha Airport Authority operates Eppley Airfield and has produced a very good AEP that can be a model for smaller airports. Procedures are very well described for all respon- dents to an incident, and within a short time one can read the AEP and understand what actions each stakeholder will take and with whom they will coordinate. Especially well described are the incident command post (ICP), the perimeter com- mand post, and the EOC which they call the situation room. The roles of jurisdictional agencies and mutual aid depart- ments are clearly defined. One of the highlights of this AEP is Section 14âEmergency Resources Lists, one of the best reviewed for including the capability or capacity or each re- source and how contact can be made to request it. Kansas City, Missouri (Charles B. Wheeler) Airport There are several parts of the Kansas City AEP that stand out as being exceptionally well-developed. For one, the plan includes a detailed discussion of what the airportâs tenants are responsible for handling to prevent and to respond to emer- gencies. Tenants must meet certain requirements for listings in an emergency telephone directory (including sub-tenants), to prevent unauthorized access, and to ensure maximum co- operation if their aircraft is involved in an accident at the air- port. The plan is very clear on what actions tenants must take in the event of an aircraft accident. There is information on where tenant personnel must report if they are needed at an emergency scene and two alternative points of contact are given if the preferred actions can not be accommodated. Two other highlights of this AEP are the Fuel Farm Fire Re- sponse Plan and the well-detailed section on Hazardous Materials/Dangerous Goods Incidents, especially the treat- ment of nuclear weapons which is lacking in many other plans and the manner in which biological threats are defined and initial actions described. The format and organization of the overall plan, including such basics as the emergency telephone list, make it easy to find information quickly and to use the plan. These are im- portant qualities during times of emergency. Los Angeles World Airports, California Only a few brief sections of this AEP were made available. Of the information received, the protocols for bomb inci- dents contain clear and detailed procedures for incidents in- volving bombs on aircraft, bombs in buildings, and suspi- cious baggage or packages. The duties of each emergency component are specified and there is good information to fa- cilitate coordination among airport responders. Memphis International Airport, Tennessee The Memphis AEP includes a helpful feature. At the end of each incident-based annex where actions and responsi- bilities have been presented, there is a checklist of the first critical actions each relevant function (tower, communica- tions, fire, police, operations, airlines, and primary mutual aid responders) should carry out. The checklists are short and direct, meant to ensure rapid confirmation of respon- sibilities and steps. The AEP includes some specifics that tend be overlooked, for example, identifying where the fuel storage areas are lo- cated, and providing the text for the public information alert about an emergency at the airport. Another desirable feature of this AEP is that the authority to declare an emergency is given to more than one or two air- port management officials. Memphis decentralizes the decla- ration of emergency procedures, allowing pilots, the Federal Security Director, FAA facility personnel on duty, tenant manager, and fire and police representatives to declare that an actual or potential emergency exists. Atlanta (Hartsfield-Jackson) International Airport At the beginning of Atlantaâs basic plan there is a list of pri- mary agencies that could respond to the airport in an emer- gency situation. Many plans itemize the primary stakehold- ers in specific functional and incident-based annexes, but it is helpful for representatives at the EOC to have a compilation of all key response organizations in one list. The list identifies the relevant organizations by these categories: â¢ Department of Aviation, â¢ Emergency Management Agencies, â¢ Federal Agencies, â¢ Hospitals, â¢ Mutual Aid Fire Departments, â¢ Mutual Aid Police Departments, â¢ State Agencies, â¢ Support Agencies, and â¢ Tenants. 27
Chesterfield (Spirit of St. Louis) Airport, Missouri There are several good ideas in this plan, beginning with a page that states the assumptions and situations that are in- cluded in the AEP. It is valuable to present the framework within which the plan will operate in essence, ensuring that all readers understand the basic, underlying premises. Chesterfield approaches the organizations and assignment of responsibilities in a comprehensive, yet concise manner. Every possible organization that could be involved in an emergency is identified along with the main mission. There are 44 entries, a few examples of which follow: â¢ St. Louis County Medical Examinerâ(1) responsible for taking charge and care of fatalities, (2) assembles mortali- ties in a temporary morgue until a more suitable location is found, and (3) begins identification procedures. â¢ Coast Guard/Harbor Patrolâ(1) provides primary rescue and other support services in the event an accident requires operations to take place in or around the Missouri River, and (2) coordinates their services with other mutual aid rescue services. â¢ National Weather Serviceâ(1) provides related technical support information in support of emergency response and recovery operations, and (2) assists with alert and warning processes. The Chesterfield airport has created a special Emergency Readiness Team comprised of private sector resources that would provide assistance if needed. This is a great idea. The plan lists the organizations and a page on each that identifies the senior and alternate contacts, multiple contact numbers, and the type of equipment that they can provide, such as fork- lifts, hoists, jacks, and so forth. Their team is geared to airside requirements, but the concept could be expanded upon to cover all mutual aid assets needed for major incidents. San Francisco International Airport, California San Franciscoâs AEP delineates a novel approach to struc- turing disaster response. It is a great idea that other airports may want to consider. Essentially mirroring the emergency management structure from the Federal Emergency Manage- ment Agency, San Francisco established TOCs where emer- gency response and recovery actions are managed at the most âlocalâ level of the airportâthe terminal. Terminal-specific emergencies are first addressed a this level in much the same way as a local emergency is handled by local government re- sources. If the TOC determines that a problem exceeds its capabilities and/or resources, the TOC contact the EOC for support or hands off the problem. Remote facilities (e.g., United Express terminal) report to the EOC if they do not have a representative at the TOC. Each TOC is supported by the airlines operating from the terminal area under its juris- diction and provide employees to support and staff the TOC. One airline is designated as the primary âhostâ for the TOC and is responsible for set up and operation. A secondary host is identified as back up. There is a two level (strategic and tactical) coordination plan laid out in the Natural Disaster Annex. The Annex ad- dresses coordination, administration, logistics, medical, food and water, facilities inspections, evacuation and sheltering, sanitation, command, command posts, and communications. The potential for earthquakes in the San Francisco area means that the AEP includes special provisions for this type of incident. The plan acknowledges that evacuation immedi- ately following initial earthquake shocks is expected to be haphazard and virtually uncontrolled. The plan calls for a po- lice officer with command authority to report to the EOC to assist with response and recovery management. Duties would include helping to control evacuations and passenger con- tainment if evacuation onto the AOA has occurred, as well as managing public re-entry to terminal shelter areas when au- thorized by the EOC. Shelter areas are activated only after Building Inspection and Code Enforcement (BICE) teams have inspected and determine a building to be safe. There also are off-airport shelter sites. Patient transport and tracking is well thought out. The lo- gistics associated with management and movement of casu- alties is based on a two-tier approach. The first level involves moving causalities to Casualty Collection Points, generally lo- cated at primary security checkpoints (or a boarding area hub) in the terminal buildings for triage and first aid. The sec- ond level applies to patients assessed as needing more than first aid. These casualties are moved to the Mass Casualty Treatment Area where advanced medical procedures are pro- vided and evacuation is coordinated. Non-ambulatory casu- alties are moved using Emergency Casualty Evacuation Carts which are maintained on the airportâs Emergency Medical Recovery buses stationed on the airfield. 28