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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

APPENDIX
B

Report of the Subpanel on Commercial Aircraft and Jet Engines*

This report provides an overview of the U.S. and world civil aircraft industry, describes the increased globalization of and competition within the industry, and briefly assesses critical Western and Soviet aircraft technology. The report then examines export controls and the civil aircraft industry—in particular, the impact of export controls on U.S. firms, industry characteristics that inhibit or enhance the effectiveness of export controls, and specific problems with the export control system—and offers recommendations for change.

SYNTHESIS OF MAJOR FINDINGS

The major findings of the subpanel are as follows:

  1. U.S. export controls imposed for foreign policy reasons have had a far greater impact on the export of commercial aircraft and jet engines than have national security export controls.

*  

The Subpanel on Commercial Aircraft and Jet Engines was appointed by the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy to work in conjunction with the main panel to examine the impact of both current policy and alternative future policies on its specific industrial sector. The subpanel was not asked to consider the full range of issues addressed by the main panel; rather, it was given a specific set of tasks to undertake. The subpanel met less frequently than—and independently of—the main panel, and it had considerable latitude in conducting its discussions.

Thus, it should be noted that the conclusions and recommendations of this subpanel report, while providing valuable input to the deliberations of the main panel, do not necessarily reflect the main panel's views and, therefore, should not be considered to be a part of its findings.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
  1. The dynamism, innovative nature, and increasing internationalization of the aircraft and jet engine industry render export controls difficult to administer and maintain.

  2. The critical technology related to commercial aircraft and jet engines lies in the design, materials, and manufacturing processes, not in the end products.

  3. The competitive and technological position of the United States relative to West European and Japanese commercial competitors may be of greater future importance than its military standing vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

  4. Unilaterally imposed foreign policy and national security export controls on commercial aircraft and jet engines should be sharply limited. If controls are to be imposed, they should be imposed on a multilateral basis.

  5. U.S. management of export control lists has been characterized by inconsistent administration, discrepancies between U.S. and CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) lists, and use of overly broad export controls.

U.S AND WORLD CIVIL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

Major Companies

The West's commercial aircraft industry is a global enterprise comprising a few large, integrated airframe and engine producers that draw from a large and varied U.S. and international base.

The industry has five prime airframe contractors: Airbus Industrie, a consortium composed of Aerospatiale (France), British Aerospace, Construcciones Aeronauticas (Spain), and Daimler-Benz (Germany); Boeing (U.S.); British Aerospace; Fokker (the Netherlands); and McDonnell Douglas (U.S.).* The historic rise in market share of the largest commercial transport companies, in terms of aircraft orders, is shown in Figure B-1.

In addition to the prime airframe contractors, there are major subcontractors in the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Canada. Suppliers in the People's Republic of China, Sweden, and Indonesia are playing increasingly larger roles.

Three principal manufacturers in the West design and build engines for large commercial aircraft: General Electric Aircraft Engines, Pratt & Whitney Group, and Rolls-Royce.

*  

There is one other major player in the industry, namely, the huge Soviet civilian aircraft industry. It may eventually become a major factor on the international commercial market.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

FIGURE B-1

Increase in market share of largest commercial air transport companies

Features of the Civil Aircraft Industry

Among the characteristics peculiar to the civil aircraft industry are the complexity, high unit costs, and low-volume production of commercial transports. Market supply and demand are such that relatively few aircraft are manufactured. From 1952 to 1989, for example, the largest number of jet transports produced in the non-Communist world in any single year—1968—was only 742.

Another reason for the relatively low production rates is the long product life of most civil aircraft. A new computer may become relatively obsolete in two or three years, but a commercial aircraft may be 10 years in development and then stay in service for 20 to 35 years. While in operation, aircraft systems undergo continual improvements to the technology embodied in them. These improvements occur in far shorter cycles than the product life itself. New navigation and communications equipment and changes to the composition of high-strength metal alloys are among the ongoing enhancements.

The aircraft industry is a volatile, highly competitive business that involves extraordinary risks in bringing new products to market. As an example, it takes about 12 to 14 years to reach a break-even point, and relatively few commercial airplane programs have become profitable. As with civil trans-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

ports, engine development is fraught with large front-end investments; long lead times and a production run of at least 2,000 units over a 10-year period are required for a successful program. In both the aircraft and engine segments of the industry, it typically takes 3 1/2 to 4 1/2 years from design go-ahead to first delivery. And significant product improvements may still be introduced 3 to 10 years after first delivery.

The industry's innovative dynamism makes it all but impossible for any one firm to hold a lead indefinitely in a particular technological area. Aircraft technology is a perishable commodity; efforts to stand still or to control change are likely to prove futile. Much know-how diffuses rapidly throughout the industry by way of product sales, patents, licensing, publications, and competitive research and development (R&D).

Effect on U.S. Economy and National Security

In 1989, the U.S. commercial jet aircraft industry employed 304,000 people, including 35,000 engineers and scientists, and it had a positive trade balance of $10 billion. Exports of civil transports in 1989 reached $12.8 billion; turbine engines, $1.9 billion; and aircraft and engine parts, $9.9 billion. By the end of 1990, the transport industry was expected to have reached nearly $31.9 billion in sales, and new orders were expected to have added significantly to its backlog of $76.6 billion in orders.*1

In 1989, the major U.S. airframe and engine manufacturers let subcontracts valued at nearly $20 billion to U.S. firms and over $3 billion to foreign suppliers. Approximately 10,000 supplier firms, both domestic and foreign, contribute 60 to 70 percent of the value of the airframe. Suppliers provide subassemblies, components, parts, and other goods and services for civil aircraft and engine manufacturers.

The U.S. civil aircraft industry serves as a production and transportation base in the event of national emergency and provides military derivatives of commercial airplanes and engines. In addition, Boeing, General Electric, McDonnell Douglas, and Pratt & Whitney together spend well over $2 billion a year in commercial R&D. Much of the industry's research efforts are concentrated on leading-edge technology, such as electronics, aerodynamics, propulsion, advanced materials, and manufacturing design.

CONTINUING TREND TOWARD GLOBALIZATION AND FOREIGN COMPETITION

For much of the post-World War II period, U.S.-based firms dominated the manufacture of civil aircraft. Today, far from being a one-nation

*  

Over the next 15 years, the commercial aircraft industry is expected to try to meet an estimated $626 billion in additional orders.

†  

Annexes B1 and B2 list domestic and foreign purchase orders, respectively, for 1989.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

industry, the aircraft business is becoming increasingly globalized, which has attendant negative implications for control by any single nation of the export of production technology. The customer base is spread across nearly every country in the world and is made up of about 600 airlines, leasing companies, and foreign governments. At the same time, the global aircraft industry is being transformed by a wave of consolidation among companies within and among various nations—68 percent of all civil aircraft is purchased by about 5 percent of the non-Communist world's airlines.

The trend toward a truly worldwide industry is illustrated by the growing number of recent major international joint ventures.* In April 1990, for example, Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Germany's Daimler-Benz (which controls the aircraft firm Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm) signed an agreement on joint aerospace research. Also in 1990, West Germany's Bayerische Motor Werke (BMW) and the United Kingdom's Rolls-Royce, the major European manufacturer of jet airplane engines, agreed to collaborate on the development and construction of new jet engines. These and other transnational activities are in addition to the well-established joint ventures in the engine field between General Electric and SNECMA (Société Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs de Aviation) and the International Aero Engines venture involving Pratt & Whitney, Rolls-Royce, MTU (Motoren-und Turbinen-Union GmbH), Fiat Aviazione, and a Japanese consortium.

A useful indicator of dispersion of technical expertise throughout the world is the number of domestic and foreign facilities able to perform extensive aircraft maintenance. According to figures compiled by the major U.S. aircraft and engine manufacturers, there are 52 maintenance facilities in the United States, 15 of which are capable of heavy maintenance.§ There are 220 maintenance facilities overseas, about 40 of which can do heavy maintenance.||

Another indicator of how internationalized the aircraft industry has become is the geographical breadth of the companies that supply parts and components to major manufacturers. The industry's five prime contractors obtain a large

*  

A customer base for Western aircraft has already been established in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. General Electric, for example, has conducted negotiations to sell engines in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Airbus Industrie has taken orders for aircraft from the Soviet Union and Romania. And Boeing aircraft are operated by Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian airlines.

†  

Officials at Japan's Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) have suggested that the two companies cooperate to build a new midsize commercial airliner, the initial research for which is being sponsored by the Japanese government.

‡  

Annex B3 lists recent foreign partnerships involving Boeing, General Electric, McDonnell Douglas, and Pratt & Whitney.

§  

Heavy maintenance refers to the capability to tear down a system and completely rebuild it.

||  

Annex B4 lists nations with a heavy maintenance capability.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

percentage of their aircraft content from thousands of different suppliers, some of whom sell to multiple prime contractors. More than 5,000 firms, both foreign and domestic, are suppliers to just one firm—U.S. engine maker Pratt & Whitney; 3,800 suppliers from 33 countries provide parts for Boeing commercial aircraft.

With the increasing globalization of the civil aircraft industry, foreign aircraft manufacturers are mounting an increasingly effective competitive challenge to the United States. The share of the global aircraft market held by U.S. firms steadily dropped during the 1980s from about 85 percent to about 65 percent. The stated goal of Airbus Industrie is to achieve a 43 percent global market share by the mid-1990s, leaving the rest to be split among the remaining four competitors.

U.S. civil aircraft and engine manufacturers are private companies competing without special government assistance or subsidies, but some foreign competitors receive large-scale financial and marketing support from their governments. From the time of its inception in 1970, for example, it is estimated that Airbus Industrie has received $25.9 billion in subsidies.2 In contrast, U.S. firms must recover the immense cost of development and production themselves, while returning a profit to shareholders and retaining sufficient earnings to fund research and the development of successive generations of new aircraft.

The products of Airbus Industrie, moreover, are being steadily ''Europeanized." The company's earliest aircraft, the A300, had a U.S. content of 30 to 35 percent of total manufacturing cost in the 1970s. But a 1989 report of the French Senate tracked a decline in U.S. content for various Airbus Industrie aircraft.3 Apart from engines, the newer A330 and A340 series will depend almost entirely on non-U.S. suppliers.

An assessment of the technological standing of U.S. versus foreign commercial rivals reveals a narrowing U.S. lead in many technological areas. According to the Defense Department's 1990 Critical Technologies Plan, for example, Japan has comparable technology in composite materials and a lead in semiconductor materials and microelectronic circuits, areas of relevance to commercial aircraft.4

An overview of foreign aerospace technology by Operations Research, Inc. (ORI) lends support to the widely held view that European firms now hold a lead in some aspects of aerospace technology application and manufacturing, and that the once commanding U.S. lead in technology has been significantly reduced.5 It is widely believed the United States has a small but shrinking edge in technology over the West European countries and now lags the Europeans and, to a lesser extent, Japan, in areas of aerospace manufacturing and technology application.

In subsonic transports, Airbus Industrie is now considered competitive in high-lift systems and equal or ahead in transonic wing design. In the advanced materials area of advanced carbon-epoxy composites, the U.S. position is

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

roughly comparable to that of its trading partners and competitors in analysis and design, fiber/resin system qualification, and automated manufacturing processes. In flight systems, the United States is at least even in overall technology, but it is behind in certain applications and has become dependent on foreign companies for some components.

The United States leads in overall propulsion technology, but foreign competitors are growing stronger in applications and in components. Engine controls is one particular area in which the Europeans are gaining ground. According to ORI, European and U.S. capabilities in computational methods and turbine engine digital controls are even. (In the former category, the Soviets have compensated for a relative lack of computational power with innovative mathematics.) In aerodynamics, the construction of planned research centers in Europe could add to the lead the British and French hold in some applications.*

In short, it would be a mistake to maintain the long-held assumptions of easy and continued U.S. dominance in aerospace technology. The most significant trend in U.S. aerospace technology may not be the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union but the narrowing margin of superiority the United States has over its Western commercial competitors.

CRITICAL WESTERN AND SOVIET AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGY

Aircraft and Jet Engine Technology

The technology of commercial jet aircraft and jet engines can be examined in a number of ways. One approach is to break down the aircraft into its major components. Figure B-2 shows the systems, subsystems, and components of a typical commercial jet aircraft. The figure highlights the critical design and production technologies inherent in a commercial jet aircraft, which is made up of millions of pieces.

The first level shown in the figure is the end product—the commercial transport. The end product is a combination of processes constituting the know-how of the manufacturer making the end product. This know-how consists of various techniques for design integration, materials selection and processing, and manufacturing and assembly procedures critical for production. The product that results is not in itself critical technology but the result of a combination of processes constituting the know-how of the end product's manufacturer.

*  

The British also are competitive with the United States in several areas of supercritical wing design, and they have undertaken a joint effort with the Germans to overtake the United States in research for laminar-flow wing design.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

FIGURE B-2 Aircraft breakdown, by systems

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

The second level consists of the aircraft's subproducts—propulsion engines and major components and systems—which are, in most cases, end products in their own right. As with the aircraft as a whole, subproducts should not be considered technology but the end product of technology. Thus, they typically have little in themselves that would add significantly to the military capabilities of a controlled country.*

Given that commercial aircraft and their subproducts are not technology, but the end products of technology, the subpanel makes the following recommendation:

* The products of commercial aircraft and associated jet engines should no longer be subject to national security export controls.

Another way to view aircraft "technology" is to examine its major process technologies—design, materials, and manufacturing. Examples of design technologies are performance and structural analyses and structural and aerodynamic testing. Examples of materials processing technologies are turbine blade castings of single crystals and design of metal matrix composites. Examples of aircraft manufacturing technologies are detailed parts fabrication and flexible automated assembly. Figure B-3 depicts the dynamic interaction of the three processes. The most important technology is found where these three processes overlap. The "know-how" is much more important than the end product, and this know-how is not transferred with the export of the end product. "Aircraft and engine technology" is made up of all three processes. Each element is often not critical in itself; its success typically is highly dependent on the success of the others. For example, a manufacturing process may only be as good as the design process that determines the required quality of composite material used in production. The key to product superiority is not the acquisition of any single technique or associated product but the integration of all relevant systems.

Technologies Critical to Western Military Lead

To help explain the know-how illustrated in Figure B-3 and to assist in identifying technologies critical to maintaining the military lead of the West, the subpanel constructed separate tables identifying representative critical technologies for commercial jet transports (Table B-1) and engines (Table B-2).

*  

The principal military benefit of the end product is additional airlift capacity. However, purchase of large transports in excess of purely commercial requirements would be readily apparent due to the documentation and tracking that accompany commercial sales. If the quantity of the purchase seems to fit true commercial needs, prohibitions on sales would be difficult to justify.

†  

From the standpoint of the manufacturer, these highly proprietary processes often make up the most important part of a firm's competitive advantage.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

FIGURE B-3 Dynamic interaction of major aircraft process technologies

The technologies in each table represent know-how; none is simply an "end item."

Commercial aircraft and jet engines are designed and manufactured against demanding standards of safety, reliability, and cost. Many of the technologies involved can contribute to the needs of both commercial and military aircraft. For example, process technologies that produce cooled turbine hardware for improved fuel consumption in commercial aircraft also result in better thrust-to-weight ratios in military aircraft.

The process technologies listed in Tables B-1 and B-2 are available to some degree in controlled countries. Few are unilaterally controllable. The great majority of "end items" in commercial aircraft and jet engines are not "enabling" technologies,* and thus, they are inappropriate targets of controls.

In determining whether to control the export of a product, an assessment of the criticality of the product and associated technology should be made and should answer the following questions:

  1. What is the level of criticality or importance to national security of the product itself, its separable subproducts, subsystems, subcomponents, or piece parts?

  2. Does the product or its components provide an enabling technology for the advancement of critical products?

  3. What is the level of criticality or importance of any associated enabling technology?

*  

For the purpose of this report, an enabling technology is the know-how required to design and produce a product or its separable subproducts, subsystems, subcomponents, or piece parts. This includes know-how regarding design systems, materials processes, manufacturing processes, or components thereof.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

TABLE B-1 Representative Critical Technologies for Commercial Aircraft

 

Relative Rank

Technology

Non-U.S./ Non-Communist World

Controlled Countries

Criticality

Process (design) systems

 

 

 

Software technology

-

-

IV

Higher order language

 

 

 

Artificial intelligence

 

 

 

Neural networks

 

 

 

System architecture

=

-

IV

Common models

 

 

 

Multiprocessing architecture

-

-

III

Data/fusion processing

=

-

IV

Computer-aided design/manufacturing (CAD/CAM)

=

-

III

Carbon/carbon composites

=

-

IV

Design and analysis techniques

 

 

 

Control technologies

-

-

IV

Touch, voice, programmable switches

 

 

 

Advanced computational fluid dynamics (CFD) methods

=

=

III

Advanced test facilities/CFD verification

=

-

III

Materials and materials processing

 

 

 

Aluminum-lithium alloy applications

=

+

IV

Machining, forming

 

 

 

Carbon/carbon composite applications

=

-

IV

Fiber/resin system qualification

 

 

 

Resin transfer molding

 

 

 

Metal matrix composite applications

-

-

IV

Properties, machining, forming

 

 

 

Superplastic forming

=

=

IV

Aluminum, titanium

 

 

 

Fiberall-aluminum/carbon composite sandwich

+

-

IV

Advanced manufacturing processes

 

 

 

Electronic chip manufacture

+

-

III

Superconductivity, LSI/VLSI

 

 

 

Automated carbon-carbon composite

=

-

IV

Automated layup

 

 

 

Automated aircraft assembly

+

-

IV

NOTES: Each technology within a group has been assigned a relative order of "criticality"; I is the most critical and IV is the least critical. An equals sign means countries have capability in that technology that is essentially equal to that of the United States. A minus sign signifies less advanced capability relative to the United States, and a plus sign denotes more advanced capability than the United States.

These technology rankings are approximations based on the best available estimates of technological capability. They should be considered as somewhat subjective evaluations of relative capabilities.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

TABLE B-2 Representative Critical Technologies for Jet Engines

 

Relative Ranks

Technology

Non-U.S./Non-Communist World

Controlled Countries

Criticality

Process (design) systems

 

 

 

High-temperature turbine design methodologies

-

-

I

High cooling effectiveness

 

 

 

Definition of flow passages

 

 

 

Configurations

 

 

 

Combustion design methodologies

-

-

III

Control of discharge profiles

 

 

 

High cooling effectiveness

 

 

 

Aerodynamic design codes

=

-

IV

High stage loading

 

 

 

Swept aerodynamics

 

 

 

Advanced aeromechanics

 

 

 

Advanced computational fluid dynamics (CFD)

-

-

IV

3-D codes and Naiver-Stakes

 

 

 

Digital electronic controls

=

-

II

Logic, software, and codes

 

 

 

Advanced structural design

=

-

IV

Methodology

 

 

 

Statics and dynamics

 

 

 

Advanced system design

-

-

III

Methodologies

 

 

 

Life, operability

 

 

 

Test instrumentation

-

-

III

Materials and materials processing

 

 

 

Nickel-based superalloys

=

-

III

Melting and casting

 

 

 

Powder metal

 

 

 

Extrusion

 

 

 

Isothermal forging

 

 

 

Single crystal castings

=

-

III

Large structural castings

=

=

IV

Thermal barrier coatings

-

-

III

Composites

=

-

IV

Metal matrix composites

-

-

III

Ceramics

+

-

III

Advanced manufacturing processes

 

 

 

Metal joining

=

-

III

Laser drilling

-

-

II

Plasma spray deposition

=

-

III

Composites

=

-

III

Hollow fan blades

+

-

III

Nondestructive inspection techniques

-

-

III

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

NOTES: Each technology within a group has been assigned a relative order of "criticality"; I is the most critical and IV is the least critical. An equals sign means countries have capability in that technology that is essentially equal to that of the United States. A minus sign signifies less advanced capability relative to the United States, and a plus sign denotes more advanced capability than the United States.

These technology rankings are approximations based on the best available estimates of technological capability. They should be considered as somewhat subjective evaluations of relative capabilities.

An export control approach focused on process technologies, which would harken back to the 1976 Bucy report of the Defense Science Board,6 could make controls conform to the language of the Export Administration Act, as follows:

The establishment of adequate export controls for militarily critical technology . . . shall be accompanied by suitable reductions in the controls on the products of that technology and equipment.7

With respect to the civil aircraft industry, however, the U.S. export control system fails to recognize adequately the relative importance of processes over product.

Status of Soviet Aircraft Industry

In examining civil aircraft technologies useful to the armed forces of controlled countries, the subpanel limited its examination—because of resource constraints—to the Soviet Union. The subpanel made the basic assumption that commercial technology obtained from the West could indeed be "critical," that is, helpful in the significant enhancement of an adversary's military capability.

In evaluating Soviet aircraft technology, the subpanel drew on unclassified publications and information gathered during recent trips panel members and associates made to Soviet design bureaus and production facilities in order to make a limited assessment of Soviet design and manufacturing practices.

Some of the important weaknesses and strengths of the Soviet civil aircraft and jet engine industry are as follows:

Weaknesses
  • Outdated design and manufacturing know-how

  • Inadequate engine maintenance, noise reduction, repair, and reliability

  • Avionics

  • High operating costs, including excessive fuel consumption

  • Poor machine fabrication

  • Heavily labor-intensive production

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
  • Inadequate worker training

  • Shortages of spare parts

Strengths
  • Composites (e.g., carbon-carbon brakes and aluminum lithium alloys)

  • Long-range, heavy-lift transports

  • Engine test facilities

  • Supercritical wings

  • Certain areas of basic research

The Soviet military has influenced the design philosophy of the Soviet civil aircraft industry, whose outlook has differed significantly from that of Western aircraft industries. The Soviets exhibit a preference for the use of proven components and systems even if they represent a comparatively low level of technological sophistication. In addition, sizable production runs are made to ensure large quantities of end products.

The primary goals of the Soviet aircraft industry appear to be the following:

  • Improve production efficiency and technological level.

  • Integrate industry with Western industries and obtain badly needed Western technology.

  • Shift focus from the military to the commercial sector.

The Soviets are undertaking extensive internal reforms in an effort to reduce the widespread inefficiencies of their aircraft industry. They are cutting back the resources devoted to production of military aircraft, but they are attempting to replicate in the civilian sector the relatively successful management approach of their defense sector. Thus, the Ministry of Aviation Industry, which performs much military work, has become the institutional model for the Ministry of Civil Aviation. In addition, the Soviets have been attempting to establish links with Western commercial aircraft and jet engine firms.

The Soviets recently made their first significant purchases of Western transports and engines. In 1989, Aeroflot ordered five Airbus Industrie A310s and signed a $150 million contract with General Electric for jet engines. In addition to direct purchases, the number of research agreements with the West, especially in Western Europe, has been increasing, as has the number of joint ventures. The Soviet's Sukhoi Design Bureau, for example, has formed a partnership with Western firms to build a supersonic business jet.8 The growing relationship between the aircraft industries of the West and the Soviet Union should render more difficult continued restrictions on the transfer of civil aircraft technology.* However, most joint ventures so far have

*  

Greater Soviet involvement with Western aerospace firms is being extended to the area commercial space flight. In July 1990, for example, the Bush administration approved Soviet launch of U.S. commercial satellites.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

been small and primarily service oriented. More important, the uncertain political and economic situation in the Soviet Union (and Eastern Europe) makes predictions about the extent of future cooperation and the size of future markets very speculative.

Reduced Soviet restrictions on doing business with the West have important implications for the aircraft industry, including making the maintenance of export controls more difficult.* At least in theory, Western companies can now contract directly with Soviet enterprises without having to deal with so many intervening layers of Soviet bureaucracy. Many Soviet aircraft firms are being restructured to operate under a pricing system by which they must pay their own way. Although extremely secretive in the past, the Soviets have surprised recent Western trade show attendees by providing demonstrations of and extensive information on their aircraft products.

Although deep-seated economic and political problems inhibit, at least in the short term, the attempt of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to shift from command to market economies, the Soviet Union constitutes an important potential market. Today's limited sales and joint ventures might best be viewed as forerunners of expanded interchange between East and West.

Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Aircraft Technologies

In determining which items in the civil aircraft industry are important to maintaining the Western military lead, two key assumptions are usually made. The first is that the technology associated with civil aircraft plays a role in military systems. The second is that the West does indeed have a significant lead in that technology.

Both assumptions are generally true, although there are important nuances. In various areas, the Soviet Union has roughly comparable technology, although much Soviet technology lags as much as 8 to 10 years behind that of the West.

To aid in a broad comparison of commercial jet aircraft and engine technology in the United States and the Soviet Union, the subpanel assessed basic product performance resulting from the application of airframe and propulsion technology. The comparison involves the recently developed but not yet operational Soviet TU-204 and the U.S. Boeing 757-200. These aircraft are medium-range civil transports alike in configuration.

A large number of advanced features are common to both aircraft. Similar to current Western capabilities are such advanced TU-204 features as su-

*  

However, it should be noted that during the Cold War period, the small amount of commercial aircraft and jet engine exports to the Warsaw Pact countries was the result more of the Soviets' self-imposed import restrictions than of U.S. and CoCom restrictions.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

FIGURE B-4 Payload-range comparison at given take-off gross weight (TOGW): B-757–200 and TU-204

percritical wing design with winglets, full-span leading edge slats, double-slotted trailing edge flaps, carbon composite structure, carbon brakes, triplex fly-by-wire control systems, and high bypass ratio turbofan engines.

One measure of capability—payload-range performance for a given take-off gross weight (TOGW)—permits a rough comparison of the two aircraft. Figure B-4 shows the payload-range capability of the TU-204 and the 757–200, the latter at three TOGW values.

As shown in Figure B-4, the 757–200 has greater range capability than the TU-204 at their respective maximum TOGW. However, comparing the aircraft at the same TOGW provides a rough idea of the aerodynamic, structural, and propulsion system technology inherent in the two aircraft. This stems from the fundamental relationship for payload-range performance, which says that for a given TOGW, the range is defined by the product of aerodynamic efficiency, the structural efficiency (weight empty + payload/TOGW), and propulsion efficiency. If published data on the TU-204 reflect true capabilities, the result of equal range with equal payload at equal TOGW would suggest that the aerodynamic efficiency, structural efficiency, and propulsion efficiency are similar or offsetting in the two aircraft. This admittedly restricted analysis does not extend to all technologies and other factors related to reliability and operating costs, in which Western transports have traditionally had the advantage over Soviet models. For example, the

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

FIGURE B-5 Payload-range comparison at given take-off gross weight  (TOGW): C-5B and AN-124

direct operating costs related to either Soviet fuel consumption or maintenance are not thought to be comparable to those for Western aircraft.

The subpanel performed the same analysis on two military transport aircraft: the Soviet AN-124 and the U.S. C-5B. Advanced features of the AN-124 include fly-by-wire controls, advanced airframe composites, and 24-wheel undercarriage.9 The product availability of the AN-124 trails that of the C-5B by about five years. Figure B-5 compares the two aircraft.

Given that the payload-range performance for the two sets of aircraft is approximately equal at the same TOGW, it may be inferred that the aerodynamic and structural technologies are reasonably close. In engine technology, and particularly in thrust efficiency, however, the U.S. aircraft have the advantage.

In sum, it appears the Soviets have aircraft technologically comparable in many aspects of basic performance to their advanced U.S. counterparts, although they lag in general efficiency.

Based on this analysis, the subpanel recommends the following:

  • When the technologies of the Soviet Union and other controlled countries are comparable to those available in the West, the U.S. government as a general rule should seriously reconsider controls over such items.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

IMPACT OF EXPORT CONTROLS ON U.S. FIRMS

The subpanel found that U.S. export controls, and in particular foreign policy controls, can have a generally deleterious effect on the export sales of the U.S. civil aircraft industry. Export controls affect the industry in the following ways:

  • Loss of sales

  • Loss of follow-on sales

  • Loss of U.S. jobs

  • Labeling of U.S. firms as unreliable suppliers

  • De-Americanization of products

  • Encouragement of foreign competitors' products

  • Imposition of direct and indirect costs of implementing export control safeguards

  • Lost or reduced investment in R&D

Conservative estimates are that for every $50 million of lost sales, the United States suffers a $30 million trade loss and a decrease of 3,500 person-years in employment. Once an airline has chosen an aircraft model, it may continue to buy airplanes from the producer of that model over several decades. Thus, the loss of one sale can bring about the loss for an extended time of all or most of the market for a given customer.

The decision whether to purchase U.S. or foreign aircraft is often a narrow one in which export controls can tip the balance. The long-term ability of U.S. firms to provide product support in the face of unpredictable U.S. government export control policies can become a determining factor. Further, unilateral embargoes not only make sales impossible but can encourage foreign competitors to establish relationships with the airlines of the embargoed countries.

Controls on technical data increase business uncertainty and make it more difficult for foreign suppliers to obtain technical data. As joint ventures and co-development arrangements become more common, U.S. regulations inhibiting the exchange of detailed data and functional information required for cooperative ventures will increasingly drive foreign suppliers to avoid using U.S.-made components or parts.

The direct and indirect costs associated with complying with export controls are also significant. Large companies must establish dedicated staffs to deal with the bureaucratic procedures involved in obtaining export licenses and to keep track of changing laws and regulations. Moreover, in the event of delayed deliveries of aircraft or engines due to suspended and/or pending licenses, the manufacturer can incur significant inventory costs and interest expense from deferred deliveries. The seller also may be subject to legal action for nonperformance of contract.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

INFLUENCE OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS

The international aspects of the commercial aircraft industry inhibit the effectiveness of export controls. The industry has a worldwide customer base and a cross-national network of suppliers. Competitive concerns and considerations of cost and market access lead to a sharing of technology through subcontracts, licenses, joint ventures, and other cooperative arrangements. The growing number of joint ventures between U.S. and non-U.S.-based companies is leading to increased technology transfer.*

Extensive information sharing among manufacturers and airlines is indispensable to safety and efficiency. To this end, there is open communication across national boundaries among engineers, manufacturers, and suppliers. A variety of technical publications, conferences, and symposiums are also available to the public.

Offsets—the mandatory placement of subcontracts with a foreign country's industry—also contribute to the transfer of technology overseas. As a condition of making a sale, some foreign governments impose offset demands to gain access to higher technology or to increase the business base of their industry. Nearly all offsets involve lower level technology, however, and thus they do not constitute a significant technology transfer concern.

Several characteristics heighten industry's ability to protect critical technology without the imposition of export controls. Most important, the high costs and risks associated with new product development help drive the major competitors into protecting critical technologies from their business rivals. Provisions for the protection of proprietary data are routinely included in contracts, supplier subcontracts, and joint venture and offset arrangements. And because all the major aircraft and engine manufacturers and most of their first-and second-tier subcontractors have considerable experience with military contracts, carefully developed security controls are routine.

Technology protection and transfer have also been influenced by the changing competitive nature of the industry. In earlier decades, many airlines making equipment purchases emphasized acquisition of the latest technology. Today, technology must ''buy its way" onto an aircraft by offering more than just a technical edge. It must have a demonstrated operational, safety, or reliability advantage to overcome its acquisition and maintenance costs.

Another important consideration in determining the effectiveness of export controls is the recognition that the complexity of aircraft technology makes

*  

Corporations enter into joint venture agreements for such diverse reasons as risk sharing, obtaining new technology, and gaining or retaining access to markets that might otherwise be closed.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

it difficult to reverse-engineer aircraft and engine products. Although individual parts can be measured and analyzed for mechanical reproduction and materials content, such scrutiny is unlikely to reveal the design, manufacturing, or materials know-how necessary to produce an acceptable duplicate or substitute product.

Finally, the relatively low volume of aircraft and engine sales improves the ability of U.S. companies to protect technology. Unlike the situation prevailing in low-cost, high-volume industries, it is practical to do after-sale tracking on aircraft and engines sold to controlled countries and to perform extensive maintenance on controlled-country sales at facilities in Western countries.*

SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM

Broadly speaking, the subpanel concluded that CoCom controls played a positive role in protecting the West's military lead during the Cold War. More specifically, however, in examining pertinent areas of the U.S. Commodity Control List (CCL) and Munitions List (ML), the subpanel found that similar items are placed on different lists or are administered by different agencies in often unpredictable fashion. The failure to update the lists regularly and consistently has resulted in control of items that have been superseded by newer technologies or that have diffused into the public domain.

The subpanel examined export commodity control numbers (ECCNs) of the CCL pertaining to commercial aircraft and engines and found controls that were overly broad or inappropriate in each category examined. For example, in comparing ECCN 1460A (aircraft and helicopters, aero-engines, and aircraft and helicopter equipment) against the equivalent category in the CoCom Industrial List (dual use items), the subpanel determined that the United States has various, tighter restrictions relating to foreign policy controls and treatment of technical data than its CoCom partners. In category 1485A (inertial navigation systems), controls are imposed on various flight instruments, automatic pilots, accelerometers, and gyroscopes that can be classified as commodities, not critical know-how. The basis of controls for inertial navigation systems should lie in performance criteria that focus on militarily significant as opposed to civil applications.

*  

Such maintenance agreements are currently typical of leases or sales to East European operators, although the political changes in the region may lead to a loosening of these requirements.

†  

It should be noted that the subpanel's examination took place before the end of the effort within CoCom to reduce the Industrial List ("core list exercise").

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

A comparison of the U.S. Munitions List with CoCom's International Munitions List (IML) reveals an array of categories considered dual use by CoCom allies but controlled by the United States under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) for military-related items. In the following aerospace categories, the United States controls items that are not on the IML:

  • Aircraft modified or equipped, but not specially designed, for military equipment.

  • Aircraft engines not specially designed or adapted for military aircraft.

  • Airborne equipment not specially designed for military aircraft.

  • Components not specially designed for military aircraft or equipment.

  • Inertial navigation systems.

  • Spacecraft and satellites, including all related equipment.

The more difficult licensing of these items required by ITAR constitutes a disadvantage to U.S. firms because their CoCom competitors administer these items through CoCom's less exacting Industrial List. Consequently, the subpanel recommends the following:

  • Items on the U.S. Munitions List that are on the CoCom Industrial List should be transferred to the U.S. dual use Commodity Control List.

Administrative steps consistent with the ones outlined above would help to alleviate the confusion among the different control lists. However, such actions are unlikely to prevent similar confusion from recurring in the future. Therefore, the subpanel concludes that, for the sake of clarity, the United States should endeavor to integrate the U.S. control lists into a single list.

In the increasingly important area of foreign policy restrictions, the subpanel believes that unilateral U.S. controls are too frequently used to "punish" or signal U.S. disaffection with both controlled and noncontrolled countries. It is the subpanel's strong sense that foreign policy restrictions affect U.S. trade significantly more than national security controls. In some cases, foreign countries have refused to comply with such restrictions or have not maintained sufficient controls to prevent unauthorized transfers. Unilateral controls are ineffective unless they are soon accompanied by timely, full, and effective multilateral controls. In general, unilateral U.S. controls are ineffective, particularly in the growing number of areas in which competitor nations have attained technological parity or superiority. This is partly because many U.S. foreign policy controls engender little support from other countries.

The subpanel supports efforts to treat generally available technical data with a general license (Part 779.3 of the Export Administration Regulations) and recommends similar treatment for sales and operational data.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
  • Controls properly placed on technical data related to manufacturing processes—a truly important component of an effective control regime—should not include essentially descriptive information necessary to the efficient and safe operation of aircraft systems.

Finally, any policy on export controls must include, along with the objective of denying militarily useful items to controlled countries, the objectives of avoiding undue constraints on U.S. trade and permitting a free flow of technology and technical information. To this end, the subpanel recommends the following:

  • The importance of the economic benefits of trade should be given greater weight in designing an effective export control system.

NOTES

1.  

Aerospace Industries Association, 1989 Year-End Review and Forecast: An Analysis (Washington, D.C., 1989), p. 5.

2.  

U.S. Department of Commerce, An Economic and Financial Review of Airbus Industrie (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 2-2.

3.  

Rapport Général, French Senate, November 21, 1989, p. 44.

4.  

U.S. Department of Defense, Critical Technologies Plan (for the Committees on Armed Services, U.S. Congress) (Washington, D.C., March 15, 1990), pp. A-16 and A-209.

5.  

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Foreign Technology Assessment (Operations Research Inc., NASA A138) (Washington, D.C., 1988).

6.  

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology—A DoD Perspective Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

7.  

Export Administration Act, Section 5(d)(6).

8.  

Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 2, 1990, p. 30.

9.  

Michael J.H. Taylor, Commercial Transport Aircraft (London: Tri-Service Press, 1990), p. 121.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

Annex B1
DOMESTIC AIRCRAFT-RELATED PURCHASE ORDERS, BY STATE, 1989

Listed below, by state, are 1989 aircraft-related purchase orders for Boeing, General Electric, McDonnell Douglas, and Pratt & Whitney. The amounts listed are in thousands of dollars.

Alabama

$ 3,963

Missouri

$ 38,471

Arizona

779,745

Montana

276

Arkansas

1,236

Nebraska

976

California

4,157,992

Nevada

7,549

Colorado

23,281

New Hampshire

38,908

Connecticut

3,827,347

New Jersey

169,393

Delaware

28,912

New Mexico

22,813

District of Columbia

1,518

New York

788,733

Florida

169,183

North Carolina

97,237

Georgia

93,638

North Dakota

76,087

Hawaii

20

Ohio

5,153,423

Idaho

4,205

Oklahoma

47,361

Illinois

390,403

Oregon

117,664

Indiana

212,775

Pennsylvania

234,105

Iowa

144,849

Rhode Island

15,769

Kansas

104,863

South Carolina

11,477

Kentucky

32,868

South Dakota

1,235

Louisiana

18,156

Tennessee

11,132

Maine

7,421

Texas

634,123

Maryland

47,826

Utah

73,385

Massachusetts

457,142

Vermont

37,413

Michigan

413,152

Virginia

59,865

Minnesota

54,480

Washington

990,920

Mississippi

25,353

West Virginia

3,024

 

 

Wisconsin

89,686

 

 

TOTAL

$19,721,353

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

Annex B2
FOREIGN AIRCRAFT-RELATED PURCHASE ORDERS, BY COUNTRY, 1989

Listed below, by country, are 1989 aircraft-related purchase orders for Boeing, General Electric, McDonnell Douglas, and Pratt & Whitney. The amounts listed are in thousands of U.S. dollars.

Argentina

$ 2

Italy

$ 688,610

Austria

4,178

Japan

157,854

Australia

83,894

Mexico

2,156

Belgium

26,395

The Netherlands

10,417

Brazil

62

New Zealand

395

Canada

173,481

Norway

15,321

China

20,114

Pakistan

437

Denmark

367

Scotland

2,710

England

1,400,885

Singapore

925

Finland

269

South Korea

54,180

France

44,242

Spain

177,676

Germany

59,801

Sweden

25,774

Hong Kong

22

Switzerland

32,859

Hungary

4

Turkey

1,234

India

1

Venezuela

14

Indonesia

15,188

Wales

2,448

Ireland

11,619

Yugoslavia

4,398

Israel

141,565

 

 

 

 

TOTAL

$3,159,497

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

Annex B3
FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS

Boeing, General Electric, McDonnell Douglas, and Pratt & Whitney have recently entered into or strengthened partnerships with the following foreign companies:

Aeritalia—Italy

Eldim—The Netherlands

Fabrique National —Belgium

Fiat Aviazione—Italy

Japanese Aircraft Development Corporation—Japan

Kawasaki Heavy Industries—Japan

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries—Japan

MTU (Motoren-und Turbinen-Union GmbH)—Germany

Norsk Jetmotor—Norway

Rolls-Royce—The United Kingdom

Samsung—South Korea

Singapore Aircraft Industries—Singapore

SNECMA (Société Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation)— France

Volvo Flygmotor—Sweden

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×

Annex B4
NON-COMMUNIST NATIONS WITH HEAVY MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY

Listed below are non-Communist nations that have the capability to perform aircraft-related heavy maintenance.

Argentina

Indonesia

South Africa

Australia

Italy

South Korea

Austria

Japan

Spain

Brazil

Jordan

Sweden

Canada

Kenya

Switzerland

Denmark

Malaysia

Taiwan

Egypt

Mexico

Thailand

Ethiopia

The Netherlands

Turkey

Finland

New Zealand

The United Kingdom

France

Norway

United States

Germany

Pakistan

Tunisia

Greece

Philippines

Venezuela

Hong Kong

Portugal

Yugoslavia

India

Singapore

 

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
Page 222
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
Page 227
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
Page 228
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
Page 231
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
Page 239
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1991. Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/1617.
×
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×
Page 247
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Protecting U.S. security by controlling technology export has long been a major issue. But the threat of the Soviet sphere is rapidly being superseded by state-sponsored terrorism; nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation; and other critical security factors.

This volume provides a policy outline and specific steps for an urgently needed revamping of U.S. and multilateral export controls.

It presents the latest information on these and many other pressing issues:

  • The successes and failures of U.S. export controls, including a look at U.S. laws, regulations, and export licensing; U.S. participation in international agencies; and the role of industry.
  • The effects of export controls on industry.
  • The growing threat of "proliferation" technologies.

World events make this volume indispensable to policymakers, government security agencies, technology exporters, and faculty and students of international affairs.

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