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Appendix E Previous Research on Shipboard Task Analysis A number of shipboard task analyses have been conducted in recent years, some developed to identify optimal manning levels (Denny, 1987; Stanwick Corporation, 1971) and some to identify fruitful applications of technology in ships, in addition to optimal manning levels (Larsen, 1988; Liverpool Polytechnic, 1986~. All of these analyses used similar methodologies: detailed, bottom-up approaches to cataloging shipboard jobs and times required to complete them, qualified by expert interviews with shipboard and shore-based experts. The Stanwick Corporation (1971) study was an early effort to determine the manpower and skills required to operate and maintain modern (early 1970s) and advanced (early 1980s) technology cargo vessels. The study identified the skills and numbers of personnel required to operate five different ship types (container, RO/RO, LASH, OBO, and bulk oil carriers) and three different propulsion plants (steam, diesel, and gas turbine). The results showed that upgrading crew skills and cross-utilization of personnel could allow safe, efficient operation of present and future ships, at 50 percent of present manning levels (Table E-1~. Stanwick also concluded that many shipboard functions could be performed more efficiently and economically by shoreside personnel. The Stanwick Corporation (1971) used task lists, operations sequence charts and multiple activity tables, qualified by ships' visits and shipboard interviews to validate their findings. Some empirical data were used in the study, primarily preliminary Navy preventive maintenance system (PMS) data that was used to corroborate some of the engineering task estimates. 126
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON SHOPBOY TASK THESIS TABLE E-1 Recommended Manrung for Baseline Ships and Systems 127 PRESENT TECHNOLOGY ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY Present Upgraded Upgraded Type of Ship, Plant Skill Skill Skill and Hotel Services Levels Levels Levels Conta~nership, Steam, Full Hotel Services Conta~nership, Diesel or Gas Turbine, Full Hotel 19 18 14 16 16 14 Containership, Diesel or Gas Turbine, Minimum Hotel 13 13 11 Ro Ro/Lo Lo, Steam, Full Hotel 20 19 15 LASH, Steam, Full Hotel 20 19 15 OBO, Steam, Full Hotel 20 (+5)* 19 (+5)* 15 (+4)* Bulk Oil Camer, Steam, Full Hotel Services 20 19 15 . * Additional personnel required when performing hold changeover and cleaning underway. Williams (1983) documented manning requirements for diesel liner vessels built after 1960 which were operated by companies receiving federal operating differential subsidies. Williams used two vessels the SS Ameri- can Lancer and the MV Sugar Islander as baseline vessels, and performed task analyses using multiple activity charts to determine deck engine and steward department manning levels. Williams calibrated his engine depart- ment findings with preventive maintenance system (PMS) data from the Sugar Islander, and adjusted the data upward 33 percent to compensate for lost man-hours (coffee breaks, etc.~. In addition to supporting a manning reduction from 26 to 22 men (Table E-2), Williams was also suggesting transferring deck preventive maintenance duties and purser/administrative duties shoreside. Williams performed task analyses for best case and worst case naviga- tion scenarios (good visibility, open waters versus poor visibility, restricted waters, dense traffic), as well as for mooring, cargo, deck and engine PMS operations. Williams was one of the few studies to analyze and recommend manning levels for emergency situations, recommending an emergency crew of nine, Amble E-3) with an auxiliary stand-by team of six in a central emergency response area. Williams also recommended a realignment of
128 APPENDIX E TABLE E-2 Reduced Manning* 1 Master 1 Chief Mate 1 2nd Mate 1 3rd Mate 1 Radio Officer . Boatswain 3 ABs 2 OSs 1 Chief Engineer 2 Assistant Engineers 2 QMEDs 1 Wiper 1 Chief Steward 1 Chief Cook 1 Cook/Baker 3 Messmen 2 Utility Men TOTAL 11 6 8 25 *Additional manning reductions (to 22 people) through smaller steward's department. deck and engineering responsibilities within the new organizational frame- work. However, the Williams results were not validated with empirical data. Liverpool Polytechnic (1986) used a similar research design to de- termine manning requirements for the UK fleet of the l990s. A literature search, research observation voyages on foreign and domestic (UK) ships, and interviews with shipping officials were used to produce 16 variations to conventional manning, thought to be more responsive to needs for the UK merchant fleet heading into the l990s. Liverpool also performed a detailed technology analysis to assess the impact of automation and advanced com- puting systems on the merchant fleet. Liverpool steered away from specific crew size estimates or recommendations, and instead concentrated on the issues thought to be most significant in producing efficient, safe UK ship's complements (role flexibility and flexibility in trading areas). As with the Stanwick Corporation and Williams studies, the Liverpool study was also not validated with empirical data. Denny (1987) reported on a reappraisal and reorganization of ship- board and shoreside operations at Pacific Gulf Marine (PGM), which was
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON SHIPBOARD TASK ANALYS S TABLE E-3 Recommended Emergency Manning* 1 Chief Mate 1 3d Mate 3 Seamen (ABs or OSs) 1 1st Assistant Engineer 1 Q!IED 2 Messmen TOTAL 9 *Additional manning recommended of 6 people in central emergency location. 129 driven by a need for more efficient shipping operations. This coopera- tive program between the government and PGM used organizational and work assessment techniques- interviews, meetings, questionnaires, organi- zational analyses, time and motion analyses, daily activity logs, and "day in the life of" sessions to determine PGMs shipboard and shoreside work planning, work distribution, equipment maintenance, and requisite man- ning. Denny recommended maintenance of the present ship's complements of 20 personnel, and recommended institution of an onboard maintenance department, development of a shipboard management team, a combined navigation/communications watch (eliminating the need for a radio officer in the future), and institution of participative management techniques for both shoreside and shipboard operations. Denny reports that trial periods instituting the changes were moder- ately successful, and Coast Guard approval for the maintenance department concept for PGM ships was secured. Methodologically, Denny used anecdotal assessments, expert opinion summaries, and a man-hour analysis. However, because of the bridge watch-standing hours commitment, the man-hour analysis result showed an overly large requirement for deck personnel. Work hours per task by labor group were calculated and used to support the manning estimates of 20 people for the existing and proposed new crews. The man-hour analysis supported the current manning, although the work load was distributed differently following the study results. Denny recommended more equally distributed work loads (particularly among deck officers), crew performance feedback, and crew continuity. Yamanaka and Gaffney (1988) report on experiments conducted by a Japanese joint labor-management-government committee, the Japanese Committee on the Modernization of the Japanese Seafarer's System, which
130 APPENDIX E conducted a multiyear experiment varying shipboard manning levels and work designs. Six Japanese companies provided pilot vessels for the basic experiment, and each ship operated under 29 identical experimental condi- tions, with different manning levels (from 22 to 18~. This base experiment ran for 8 months in 1979, and found that horizontal and vertical crew linkages were critical to the success of the new shipboard organization. In addition, the study found that deck and engineering officers would require more training to successfully effect the horizontal linkages. Yamanaka and Gaffney then report on a series of more comprehensive manning experiments (1979-1986), which encompassed such innovations as horizontal linkages, dual purpose crews (officers and crew), and integra- tion of the third officer responsibilities (deck and engine) into a single watch officer position. These innovations were intended for 16-18 man operations, and the verification experiments conducted with these vessels and organizational designs from 1982-1986 laid the groundwork for the Japanese Pioneer ships with crew of 11, which began operating in 1988. This study used empirically validated task analyses as the foundation for the shipboard organizational redesigns. In experiments at the Netherlands' TNO Institute of Perception, (Schuffel et al., 1989), bridge manning and a variety of different integrated bridge designs were investigated: ~ a single-handed conventional bridge, · a two-handed conventional bridge, and an integrated bridge design, the "Ship 90" bridge ("Bridge 90") with a one-man watch. The Ship 90 bridge was configured based on the results of a func- tional task analysis, which considered how best to allocate bridge planning, monitoring, and ship-handling tasks that involved human and machine use of perceptive, information processing, and motor control processes. Based on these analyses, a one-officer work station was designed for the Ship 90 bridge, and a second work station was provided as a back-up and also to serve as a pilot's work station. Experiments were conducted using the three bridge designs, with an eye to examining the usefulness and efficiencies for the particular designs and attendant optimal bridge manning levels. The Bridge 9/one-man watch navigational performance (measured by deviation from a centerline course) was found to be superior to the other two bridge designs evaluated; path width remained within safe limits 95 percent of the time, in contrast to the two-handed conventional bridge, which resulted in safe path widths only 50 percent of the time. The single-handed conventional bridge fared less well in the bridge evaluations, with path widths measured within safe limits only 37.5 percent of the time, given identical subjects and conditions. Schuffel
PREP70US RESEARCH ON SHIPBOARD TASK ANALYSIS 131 concludes that because of the accuracy and care with which navigational information Is presented In the integrated bridge design with automated decision aids, navigational performance Is superior. More importantly, the studies also indicate that navigation in the Bridge 90 environment with the automated decision aids does not increase the mental load of the navigation task This study performed a detailed functional analysis of one subset of shipboard tasks bridge operations for advanced bridge designs and their attendant manning levels. Manning issues were one piece of the analysis, and were integrally tied to the bridge designs tested. Schuffel determined that a single-manned, advanced technology bridge was safer and more efficient (as measured by the trackkeeping and mental workload parameters) than either of the other nvo bridge configurations. These studies provide a perspective on different approaches to arriving at minimum manning levels. Two cautions, however, are important: (1) much of the previous work was not empirically tested, and (2) many of the studies failed to consider reduced manning scenarios in emergency conditions. REFERENCES Denny, M. 1987. Shipboard productivity methods. Vols. 1-3. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Washington, D.C. February. Larsen, P. Optimal manning for rational ship operation. Paper 88-P008. Det norske Veritas, H0vik, Norway. February. Liverpool Polytechnic and Collaborating Colleges. 1986. Technology and manning for safe ship operations. Vols. 1-2. Department of Transport. London. November. Schuffel, H., J. P. A. Boer, and L. van Breda. 1989. The ship's wheelhouse of the nineties: The navigation performance and mental workload of the officer of the watch. Journal of Navigation 42~1~:60-72. Stanwick Corporation. 1971. Merchant marine shipboard crew skills and disciplines study. U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Merchant Marine Safety, Washington, D.C. Report no. MA-RD-900-7202701. December. Williams, V. E. 1983. Crew rationalization study: ODS liner vessels. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Office of Research and Development, Washington D.C. April. Yamanaka, Keiko, and Michael Gaffney. 1988. Effective manning in the Orient. Report from American President Lines to U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Office of Technology Assessment. Cooperative Agreement No. MA- 11727, Report No. MA-RD-770-87052. March 15.