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Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles (2013)

Chapter: Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
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Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks

The tables in this appendix compare methodological qualities and potential applications of existing predefined frameworks for assessing proliferation resistance as defined in the main text. The “Fundamentals” table outlines the development and intended purpose of each methodology, the “Methodology Characteristics” table shows the composition, capabilities, and actual output of each methodology, and the “Application of Methodology” tables shows which and how each methodology was applied by decision makers. These tables were informed by a review of the available literature and input from those developing, implementing and using the results of the analysis.

The frameworks listed in the table are the six current frameworks detailed in Chapter 3 of this report:

• TOPS (Technical Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems) methodology (information sourced from: NERAC TOPS Task Force 2001; NERAC 2000a,b; Hassberger 2001; Ford 2010; Charleton 2012; Giannangeli 2007; Mendez et al. 2006; Zentner 2011);

• JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency) methodology (information sourced from: Takakai et al. 2005; Ford 2010; Charleton 2012; Giannangeli 2007; Mendez et al. 2006; Inoue et al. 2003);

• SAPRA (Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment) methodology (information sourced from: Charleton 2012; Zentner 2011; Ford 2010; Giannangeli 2007; Mendez 2006; Greneche et al. 2007)

• TAMU MAUA (information sourced from: Texas A&M University Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis) methodology (information sourced from: Pomeroy 2008; Ford 2010; Clarleton 2012; Giannangeli 2007; Mendez 2006; Takakai et al. 2005)

• RIPA (Risk-Informed Proliferation Analysis) methodology (information sourced from: Rochau et al. 2002; Ford 2010; Charleton 2012; Giannangeli 2007; Mendez 2006)

• GIF PR&PP (Generation IV International Forum Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection) methodology (information sourced from: GENIV 2007; DOE 2008a; DOE 2008b;GENIV 2009; ; GENIV 2011a; GENIV 2011b; Bari et al. 2007; Bari et al. 2008a; Bari et al. 2008b; Bari et al. 2009; Bari 2012; Charleton 2012; Ford 2010; Giannangeli 2007; Mendez 2007)

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
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For further background and evaluation of these predefined framework methodologies, see Chapter 3.

The content of these tables was reviewed by experts to ensure accuracy in their representation and content. The reviewers were:

• Robert Bari, Brookhaven National Laboratory

• Joe Pilat, Los Alamos National Laboratory

• Gary Rochau, Sandia National Laboratory

• David Sweeney, Texas A&M University

Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
×

FUNDAMENTALS

Comparison Criterion TOPS JAEA SAPRA TAMU MAUA RIPA PRPP
Who developed the methodology and when? DOE/NE Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee
Developed in 2000-2001. Subsequent development in the form of SAPRA and JAEA
Japan Atomic Energy Agency [nee Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC)]
Developed to support Japanese decisions on NESs (Inoue 2003).
French Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection
Developed as part of a French multi-agency effort (Greneche 2007).
Texas A&M University
Developed for AFCI and some predecessor programs (Krakowski 1999; Charlton 2007). Continues to be upgraded (Giannangeli 2007; Metcalf 2009)
Sandia National Laboratory
Developed as part of a lab-funded project to address some weaknesses in TOPS (Rochau 2002).
Gen IV Industrial Forum (GIF)
Development started in 2002, first public release in 2005. Continues to be upgraded.
What is its stated purpose? Identify near- and long-term technical opportunities to further increase the proliferation resistance of global civilian nuclear power systems Characterize relative proliferation risk of NESs (and possibly technical options for steps in a NES) Identify near- and long-term technical opportunities to further increase the proliferation resistance of global civilian nuclear power systems. Aid in the assessment of the effectiveness of safeguards implementation at facilities within a large-scale fuel cycle and the ability to choose proliferation deterrant technologies. Develop a process capable of conducting a simple dynamic analysis to compare and outline probable outcomes of feasible proliferation pathways and forecast those pathways by creating likely scenarios. Develop and demonstrate a methodology for the systematic evaluation of Generation IV NESs respect to proliferation resistance and physical protection.
Who are its intended users? Decision makers and the public Decision makers and the public Decision makers and the public Fuel cycle facility designers Decision makers and the public Decision makers and the public Fuel cycle designers if enough detail is included.
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
×

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY CHARACTERISTICS

Comparison Criterion TOPS JAEA SAPRA TAMU MAUA RIPA PRPP
Overall approach Barrier attribute analysis Barrier attribute analysis Barrier attribute analysis. Barrier attribute analysis with a focus on nuclear materials moving through facilities Analyzes hypothesized proliferation scenarios using PRA-derived Influence diagrams to characterize the scenarios and techniques Utilizes a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)-like (fault tree) approach to identify pathways.
Factors considered (Figures of Merit) Material Barriers, Technical Barriers Material Barriers, Technical Barriers Material Barriers, Technical Barriers, Institutional Barriers Measures are attractiveness level, concentration, handling requirements, type of accounting system, and accessibility. Production time, cost, probability of non-detection and probability of success and project observability (Rochau et al. 2012) Measures considered: technical difficulty, cost to proliferator, time to overcome barriers, fissile material type, detection probability, detection safeguards cost.
Expert judgment used? Yes Yes Yes res Yes Yes
Output Matrix of H-M-L. Results not aggregated into a single FOM Normalized numerical values for barrier attributes. Graphical results for each barrier. No attempt to provide a single FOM. Normalized numerical values for barrier attributes and angle FOM. Numerical output typically in the form of normalized proliferation values for each scenario step Numerical values for each of four metrics and a single FOM. A number of display options were been proposed. Ranking of alternatives or a matrix Of H-M-L. Results not aggregated into a single FOM
Types of threats considered State threats Nation (covert), sub-national group (theft) Covert host state diversion, non-host-state theft State threat, sub-national/terrorist theft State threat, sub-national/terrorist theft State threats, non-host-state-theft
Considered country-specific factors? No. Could assuming experts are given proper context No. Could assuming experts are given proper context No. Could assuming experts are given proper context No. Could assuming experts are given proper context No. Could assuming experts are given proper context No. Could assuming experts are given proper context
Considered time dependence of proliferation? No Yes in the sense of time to acquire SNM but not changing long-term context unless a time-lapse snapshot approach is used Yes in the sense of time to acquire SNM but not changing long-term context unless a time-lapse snapshot approach is used Yes Can calculate a time-dependent FOM through the fuel cycle and disposal Yes in the sense of time to acquire SNM but not changing long-term context unless a time-lapse snapshot approach is used Yes in the sense of time to acquire SNM but not changing long-term context unless a time-lapse snapshot approach is used
Does the methodology lend itself to sensitivity/uncertainty analysis? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Do the examples indicate that uncertainty (U) or sensitivity (S) analysis has been performed? No, neither S S No, neither No, neither No, neither
Is the methodology related to/built on another methodology? Key differences? A precursor to SAPRA and JAEA Yes: JAEA extended TOPS by using “expert grading” to quantify most attributes Built on JAEA approach which was built on TOPS. Key differences are including four steps to proliferation and more metrics This methodology is an extension and adaption of SAPRA. It adds additional layers Of information and a new aggregation approach. No No
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
×

APPLICATION OF METHODOLOGY

Comparison Criterion TOPS JAEA SAPRA TAMU MAUA RIPA PRPP
What organization has used the example predefined framework methodologies as part of the basis tor a decision Seminal work that impacted DOE’S R&D program at the time including development of better proliferation assessment methodologies None known; possibly in Japanese internal programmatic decisions None known; possibly in French internal programmatic decisions Factored into DOE/NE's AFCI programmatic decisions in the early 2000s None known No evident use by country-specific decision makers
Used in DOE documents concerning programmatic decisions
Examples of predefined framework assessments performed using the methodology: Initial development (NERAC 2001) used method to identify R&D needs.
Separate comparison of proliferation resistance of 10 fuel cycles (Hassberger 2001). Unclear whether this factored into any decisions.
Two trial applications in the early 2000s. Eight case studies were considered in (Greneche 2007): four for theft by an effort sponsored by a non-host state, four for host state, four for host state diversion Used by AFCI via NERAC to compare a number of fuel cycles (Waltar and Omberg 2004)
Used by Metcalf (thesis) to evaluate uranium and thorium fuel cycles for fast reactors (Metcalf 2009)
Used by TAMU to assess fast reactors with closed fuel cycles (Chirayath 2010). Unclear whether this factored into any decisions.
None known Used in the draft GNEP Non-Proliferation Assessment [NNSA 2008] supporting the draft GNEP PEIS [DOE 2008].
A series of assessments was performed on various reprocessing technologies (Bari et al. 2007, 2008b, BNL 2009)
Assessments were performed on an example sodium-cooled fast reactor, grid-appropriate (small modular), and the six GEN-IV reactor designs (DOE 2009, DOE 2011b, Bari 2008a)
AECL assessed safeguards-by-design for an advanced CANDU reactor (Whitlock 2010)
Belgium assessed the proliferation resistance of a proposed spallation device (van der Meer 2010)
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
×
Page 68
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
×
Page 69
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
×
Page 70
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
×
Page 71
Suggested Citation:"Appendix B: Evaluation of Predefined Frameworks." National Research Council. 2013. Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18335.
×
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The material that sustains the nuclear reactions that produce energy can also be used to make nuclear weapons—and therefore, the development of nuclear energy is one of multiple pathways to proliferation for a non-nuclear weapon state. There is a tension between the development of future nuclear fuel cycles and managing the risk of proliferation as the number of existing and future nuclear energy systems expands throughout the world. As the Department of Energy (DOE) and other parts of the government make decisions about future nuclear fuel cycles, DOE would like to improve proliferation assessments to better inform those decisions.

Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles considers how the current methods of quantification of proliferation risk are being used and implemented, how other approaches to risk assessment can contribute to improving the utility of assessments for policy and decision makers. The study also seeks to understand the extent to which technical analysis of proliferation risk could be improved for policy makers through research and development.

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