The key issues noted here are some of those raised by individual workshop participants, and do not in any way indicate consensus of workshop participants overall.
• Every person, from a custodian to a technician to a scientist to a guard in the protection forces, needs to believe in and support the nuclear security program for it to succeed. This is nuclear security culture.
• The driving motivations for the Indian Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) are first global cooperation and second the technical issues of safety, security, and proliferation resistant design as the three pillars on which the Centre will stand.
• Specifically, the GCNEP School for Radiological Safety Studies is designed to contribute significantly to nuclear security, particularly in the area of radiation sources.
• Unless we update ourselves, unless the security forces, the response forces, the guard forces, and the security operators update themselves with the current threat scenarios, with current practices, with current systems, and techniques used, and also with required regulatory procedures or other requirements, it will not be possible to maintain proper and effective nuclear security.
Promising Topics for Collaboration Arising from the Presentations and Discussions
These promising topics for collaboration arising from the presentations and discussions are not those representing the consensus of the participants, but are rather a selection of those topics offered by individual participants throughout the presentations and discussions.
• There are several training and licensing issues, particularly for the protective forces, still to be addressed or improved.
• A pathway to success in cooperation is training, and there are many opportunities for cooperation between India and the United States on multiple issues associated with the human aspects of nuclear security.
The Important People: An Indian Perspective
Ranajit Kumar began his remarks by stating that it is important to train personnel on security procedures. Physical protection security (PPS) technologies—hardware, detection, access control, assessment, surveillance and other technologies—must be backed by appropriate security policies and procedures (see Figure 5-1). Training is vital for effective implementation of nuclear security. In most cases, training is neglected. In fact, the time has come to be very stringent on the aspect of training qualification and licensing issues, he said.
There are certain guidelines and there are many efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to take this training aspect of nuclear security to all member states, but the member states also have a significant role to play. During the course of the presentation, Kumar highlighted some of the activities that have been carried out in India and to which India is committed, including participation in the IAEA effort to take nuclear security training to different member states and to make it really global. It is important that nuclear security concerns are addressed globally. One state cannot address this problem and consider itself out of danger from nuclear terrorism or other nuclear security concerns. Kumar reiterated that nuclear security issues have the potential to have effects beyond the border of the originating state. Nuclear security concerns are not limited by any geographical or political borders, therefore, they should be taken seriously and much more effort needs to be taken globally to ensure effective nuclear security.
FIGURE 5-1 Integrated Security Approach. SOURCE: Kumar, 2012.
Nuclear security is very multidisciplinary. There are science and technology components, which are always a part of nuclear security issues, for example in the usual nuclear material accounting procedures and processes, and instruments and systems. In addition, there are various social science elements which need to be understood, analyzed, and applied. This pertains, for example, to human or personnel reliability programs. A personnel reliability program is a program in which one looks at the social background or the societal aspects of a person; how he is living, how his behaviors are changing. Several studies address these issues that go beyond science and technology issues. These are societal issues that are under active research. There is a broad range of social science aspects, including public policy and political science issues, international relations, and international law. There are also obligations as well, such as United Nations Security Council Resolutions. A state analyst for international transport should also come into the picture in such instances. There are questions about what to do if there is no budget for these studies. The essential point is that nuclear security is a multidisciplinary subject and it requires the right mix and the right attention to differences among the social science and physical science issues.
Why do we need training? Training is required to increase awareness. Based on his experience, Kumar observed that perhaps 10 to 15 years ago, if one would have asked most of the people present here whether they would be sharing advice about nuclear security, they would have said that it is the guard forces’ responsibility. “Let them bother about it.” But mostly the response would have been something like this: “Security incidents will take place in some other place. There is no belief that a threat really exists.” This is something that people needed to be made aware of.
With respect to specific training, one has to address the requisite skills. For example, when one is doing a search, what is the search, what are you looking for, how is the search to be carried out without becoming too much intrusive? Similarly, when one is talking about an operator who is in the central alarm station, what are the requisite skills needed that can be developed specifically by providing training? Skill sets also need to be upgraded when required - training just once does not help. One must train and retrain, qualify and requalify; that is what is required.
For safety issues, training is also a regular process. Operators are trained and then they are retrained, reexamined, and revalidated for licenses. This is also the requirement for nuclear security operators and for the response forces. There are several training and licensing issues.
One needs to assist in capacity building, training, and finally in human resource development. Continuous training and improvement is key to effective nuclear security. Nuclear security is a very dynamic issue. Threats are also dynamic.
In order to make the training more fruitful and to incorporate global participation in training, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, stated during the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, “I am happy to announce on this occasion that we have
decided to set up a Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) in India. We visualize this to be a state of the art facility based on international participation from the IAEA and other interested foreign partners.”1 His remarks go on to state, “The Centre will conduct research and development and design of systems that are intrinsically safe, secure, proliferation resistant and sustainable. We welcome participation in this venture by your countries, the IAEA and the world to make this Centre’s work a success.”
The main driving forces for the Centre are: 1) it is for global cooperation and, 2) the technical issues of safety, security, and proliferation resistant design are the three pillars on which GCNEP will stand (see Figure 5-2).
Five schools have been established in GCNEP, around which these activities will occur:
1. School of Advanced Nuclear Energy System Studies
a. Objective: to pursue design studies and analysis of advanced nuclear energy systems with intrinsically-enhanced safety and security for proliferation resistance and sustainability.
b. Training Focus: Risk assessment studies, emergency planning and management, sustainability parameter assessment, different aspects of safety, security, and proliferation resistance, evaluation of performance indicators and safety, security and proliferation resistance, regulatory process, safety culture, radiation protection, and nuclear law.
FIGURE 5-2 The Three Pillars of the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership. SOURCE: Kumar, 2012.
1 Statement by Prime Minister Manrnohan Singh at Nuclear Security Summit, Washington D.C. 13 April 2010. The Hindu. Available at: http://www.thehindu.comlnews/resources/statement-by-prime-minister-manrnohan-singh-at-nuclear-security-summit-washingtondc/article396372.ece. Accessed on September 21,2013.
c. Program Modules: reactor systems and applications, fuel cycle studies, accelerator driven systems, risk assessment studies, emergency planning and management, and sustainability parameters assessments.
2. School of Radiological Safety Studies
a. Objective: to carry out research and development in radiation monitoring including development of detectors and systems; to develop the system to support nuclear emergency management; to contact radiation transport, selling, dispersion modeling and impact assessment studies, and to impart training and certification of personnel in radiation protection principles and safety practices. To maintain and update radiation protection standards.
b. Program Modules: formal education, training, and public awareness, response to a radiological dispersion device, a radiation exposure device and other radiological emergencies, radiation mapping by mobile monitoring systems, source search, detection, identification, assessment and recovery, lessons learned from nuclear and radiologic al accidents, studies on dispersion of atmospheric and aquatic releases.
3. School for Studies on the Application of Radioisotopes and Radiation Technologies
a. Objective: to provide state of the art research and development and demonstration and training facilities in the application of radioisotope and radiation technologies.
b. Program Modules: formal education and training, radiation processing of food commodities, value addition to healthcare, medical and herbal products, radiation induced enhancement in properties for creating advanced materials, industrial radiography and tomography using gamma and x-rays, radiotracer and isotope use for high technology systems and managing water resources, waste water treatment.
c. Training Focus: food irradiation, material processing, waste-water treatment, x-ray, gamma radiography, tomography, radiotracer and isotope instruments, nuclear forensics.
4. School of Nuclear Material Characterization Studies
a. Objective: to promote research and development (R&D) activities for evolving new methodologies to detect and ascertain the causes for unaccounted losses of nuclear materials on a timely basis; to establish a teaching and training facility for the effective implementation of safeguards including nuclear material accounting and control (MC&A) and its practices at national as well as international levels; to establish an advanced infrastructure and demonstration facility for human resource development in the practices of nuclear material accounting and control; to create a versatile secured data management system for MC&A.
b. Program Modules: methodology for destructive and nondestructive analysis of nuclear material; formal education and training on MC&A; development and validation of trace elemental analysis techniques;
and development of methodologies for low level detection of radionuclides.
5. School of Nuclear Security Studies
a. Objective: to impart training on application of physical protection system and response procedure, enhanced physical security of nuclear facilities by developing and deploying most modern technological tools including information security and to provide facilities for test and evaluation of sensors and systems used for physical security.
b. Program Modules: formal education and training; technological tools for physical security; personnel reliability studies; vulnerability studies; seismic monitoring; and test and evaluation of sensors and systems.
Kumar expanded in more detail about the School of Radiological Safety Studies (SRSS), which is designed to contribute significantly to nuclear security, particularly in the area of radiation source security. The mission is to carry out R&D on radiation detection systems and dosimetry. A great deal of work is being carried out at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), in Kalpakkam, and in several other institutes across the country. GCNEP is an effort to consolidate some of these activities and to encourage global participation.
The goals of the school are to: affect the assessment of radioactivity releases integrated with geographical information systems with nationwide radius and background mapping; ensure the safety of radioactive nuclear material; address emergency preparedness and response, medical management of radiation emergencies, and conduct fixed field exercises on radiological safety, and emergency response. Specifically, different program modules (formal education) are envisioned. Studies on radiological dispersion in the atmosphere are also planned, as are studies on indigenous systems already developed, such as in searching for orphan sources. Similarly, the SRSS will work on the indigenization of systems for assessment of large area contamination, detection of smuggling or inadvertent movement of radioactive sources or nuclear materials in scrap, cargo, or vehicles. Most of these systems have been developed and deployed on a pilot scale at some of Indian ports, which are the systems for entry and exit control. Not all areas are currently covered.
The SRSS will also house an emergency response center. There are currently 12 emergency response centers across India, and they are monitored by the emergency response monitoring network, and have all the modules for mobile and aerial searches, monitoring at ports, and a facility for air monitoring of stand-alone detectors, which communicate using the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) or Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) networks. There are more than a few hundred: Kumar estimated that around 500 such detectors have been deployed all across the country. There are plans to expand this significantly. They will report to the regional centers, and then they will report to the Emergency Response Center in Mumbai.
Kumar reported on the radiation safety training courses currently provided by BARC (see Table 5-1).
Kumar provided more description of these courses. For example, a course for first responders to nuclear and radiological emergencies would include training of trainers, and management of crime scenes involving radioactive material. Similarly, on the order of 45 training courses are conducted for radiation therapy technologists. Some of them go for a one-year radiation therapy degree leading to a diploma. Some of the training courses conducted in radiological safety are for the National Disaster Response Force, state police, firefighters, civil defense, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) Emergency Response Team, and medical professionals. In the middle of October 2012, there was a training course on medical emergencies in Mumbai. Similarly, import and export agencies, frontline officers such as customs officers, and radiation safety officers of nuclear facilities, medical institutes, industry, and researchers. Kumar noted that they are trying to extend these courses as far as possible, including to the universities under the Homi Bhabha National Institute (HBN1).
In cases where conventional explosives were used, there is an India National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) that could be called at the request of the state authorities or of the Indian national government. The NDRF conducts analysis to determine whether a radiological dispersal device (RDD) element was present. In many cases, other teams would also help in carrying out analysis. There are many developments, particularly in the area of radiation emergencies, specifically on how to handle radiological materials, how to do first response, and how to conduct medical responses.
The School for Studies on the Application of Radioisotopes and Radiation Technologies is included because of the desire to make GCNEP a complete Centre also addressing other activities apart from nuclear security or safety. In order to be viable, the GCNEP has to take the technology, and in particular the application of nuclear technology, to the public and to the regional level. Established near New Delhi in Haryana, the Centre envisions being an applied center so that the people in nearby communities can benefit from the application of such techniques.
In particular, Kumar said that there are many applications of radiation in sterilization of medical products and in processing food, such as spices. Therefore, they wanted to include those issues in the particular training courses and train local people as well as address global health should it be required. Many of the courses offered are organized in association with the IAEA, particularly nuclear medicine and food and agricultural processing.
The School of Nuclear Material Characterization Studies aims to promote R&D activities, to establish a teaching and training facility and to establish an advanced infrastructure and demonstration facility for nuclear MC&A and to create a versatile, secure data management system for MC&A.
The School of Nuclear Security Studies plans to provide formal education
TABLE 5-1 Radiation safety training courses currently provided by BARC.
|Serial No||Name of the Course||Duration||Eligibility (Science Graduates)|
|Emergency Preparedness and Response for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies|
|1.||Response to Nuclear Disaster/Radiological Emergencies||4 days||Defense Officers|
|2.||First Responders training workshop on response to nuclear/radiological emergencies||One week||Paramilitary Forces|
|3.||Training of Trainers course for Paramilitary Officers||3 weeks||Paramilitary Forces|
|4.||Prevention and response to radiological emergencies and Standard Operating Procedures||One week||Police Officials|
|5.||Prevention of malicious acts using nuclear/radioactive materials||Ten days||Forensic officers, Police, NSG, Defense officers|
|6.||Aerial survey and field exercises||4 days||Defense Forces|
|7.||Nuclear and radiological emergency management||3 days||NSG and other security agencies|
|8.||Training workshop for Emergency Response Teams of DAE||3 days||DAE officers|
|9.||Radiation Safety Aspects for RSO in Nucleonic Gauges||7 days||Degree in Science or Degree/Diploma in Engineering|
|10.||Industrial Radiography Testing Level-I||15 days||High school diploma with two years of prerequisite education, science/diploma in engineering, and 6 months of work experience|
|11.||Industrial Radiography Testing Level-II||15 days||RT-I and 36 months of work experience|
|12.||Radiation Safety Aspects for RSO in Radiation Processing Facilities||3 months||Degree in Science|
|13.||Radiation Safety Aspects for Operators in Radiation Processing Facilities||3 months||Degree in Science|
SOURCE: Kumar, 2012.
DAE: Department of Atomic Energy
RSO: Radiation Safety Officer
and training programs in this area. Kumar noted that a graduate level program would be started in the future, but a beginning will be made with formal education in this field. Use will be made of the technological tools for the study of physical security, as well as personnel reliability studies, vulnerability analyses, seismic monitoring, and the test and evaluation of sensors and systems. The R&D focus will be on research in the frontier areas of security equipment, systems, and sensors. The proposal is to address performance testing and evaluation of systems and sensors, particularly the applicability of these technologies in India and countries of the region. Training and exercises will also be undertaken for security and guard forces, training of plant personnel on security issues, and the development of table-top and near-real-time simulations and field exercises. The plan is to set up computer and information security training as well.
The R&D activities of the school will emphasize cybersecurity, particularly applicability for secured information exchange and to PPS. Kumar noted that they have already conducted several departmental training courses in system design, and training for plant maintenance personnel and operational training to security personnel. A great deal of experience has been accumulated in conducting international training courses. Over approximately the last 10 years, eight to 10 training courses have been held in association with the IAEA primarily on the aspects of design of physical protection systems and vital-area identification and the like.
In conclusion, Kumar stated that nuclear security is a national function, however, its implications extend beyond the states’ borders. Effective nuclear security requires continuous training, and improvement is a must. Nuclear security and safety measures lead to a strong culture where improvements are an ongoing, regular process. India contributes significantly to the IAEA on issues related to nuclear materials security, and the new Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership will take this farther by providing training to people in India and around the world.
Training on Nuclear Materials Security: A U.S. Perspective
Michael O’Brien began by reiterating that training is an extremely important subject. It is essential in all aspects of security. Through the years, its importance has grown throughout the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and therefore O’Brien presented the U.S. domestic program for security training within the DOE complex and how that has brought forth international cooperation and related training.
The National Training Center (NTC), located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, provides security and technical training. It does not provide a formal education, but serves the purpose of keeping all personnel within the DOE complex up to date on modern technologies and techniques. The NTC has classroom facilities and they also conduct remote learning via the web. They will also do mobile training, so if a facility has a training need and sufficient numbers of students, an
instructor will actually come to one of the laboratories and teach a class. They also offer correspondence courses for those people who may want to migrate into a different field of security.
In addition to the NTC, all DOE sites have their own training programs. They are all fairly uniform. The primary focus of security training is on the protective force. There are many requirements for the protective force. Employees themselves are also trained. There are security awareness programs for people who work within the DOE complex, which are required annually as refresher courses on security awareness. O’Brien commented that as he listened to Kumar’s presentation, he began to consider whether computer-based courses are the best way to take annual refresher courses given the importance of security awareness training and security culture. In years past, guest speakers came to the labs and provided real-world experiences and maybe that has a greater impact. The U.S. national labs also have on-the-job training that is very consistent with the tasks performed by people who service U.S. systems. These employees are usually mentored in their jobs, which is referred to as training. There is also commercial vendor training, if there are new tools involved. Recently, a vendor came to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to look at a vulnerability assessment tool that could be exported internationally.
The NTC focuses on the management of security, so there are some courses that supervisory personnel can attend and learn about managing security at U.S. sites. But they also train the instructors themselves. Therefore, these are good courses specifically in the field of training on how to develop curriculum and provide the training. Again, the NTC has an extensive area for protective forces for the mandated Training Approval Program, and all of the protective forces must meet certain training requirements. DOE assesses these training programs on a periodic basis.
In addition to that training, they offer a full complement of training on the core elements of security within the DOE complex, such as classes on vulnerability assessments, physical protection, protective force, personnel security, and what is called the survey, analogous to the inspection programs—a local DOE office would conduct a survey whereas headquarters might conduct an inspection, and the site would conduct a self-assessment. They are all analogous and follow the same methodologies. Finally, there are courses on MC&A. Courses include the following:
Vulnerability analysis (VA). These courses cover all aspects of VA. They have a fundamentals course, which is good for anyone in the security business, someone who is not necessarily going to be a VA analyst. Besides some entry level courses, they have courses on some of the computer modeling software that is used throughout the DOE complex.
Physical security. These courses cover the Design and Evaluation Process Outline, including all aspects of physical security systems: design, installation, operation, maintenance, inspection, performance testing, and security systems assessment.
Protective force. This is an extensive area of training that goes into some of the tactics necessary, such as protection strategies developed at the sites, firearms, and operations. Firearms training is done routinely at all of the sites. Employees are required to maintain their qualifications for firearms.
Personnel security. This is germane to other discussions during the workshop. This is actually a DOE program for all people who conduct work related to access approval, such as background investigations, clearances, and the Human Reliability Program as well. Training is conducted at the NTC.
Survey. These are excellent courses for those people who may participate in an inspections program throughout the DOE complex. They often use technical experts from the national laboratories as instructors, and the national laboratories are also required to conduct their own self-assessments and to develop methodologies on how to conduct an inspection. Some of the testing techniques, sampling techniques, and the methodologies of conducting the inspections themselves are covered in these courses.
Nuclear Material Control and Accounting (MC&A). There are multiple disciplines involved in MC&A, both at the entry level and beyond. Some entry level courses are designed to create an awareness and understanding of the nuclear field for people who do not necessarily work in MC&A, but who need to understand nuclear materials and some of the associated concepts.
Overall, in DOE, there is a systematic approach to training and that permeates through all of the domestic as well as the international work. It is a rather universal process of analysis design, development, implantation, and evaluation.
The first aspect of analysis is determining who will be trained and the means of conducting that training. This front-end, analytic work needs to be completed before even starting to expend the funds to develop training. Designing the training itself, formalizing the training process, understanding the objectives of training, understanding the various models that would go into a course and the objectives for each of those models, enabling the objectives and incorporating practical exercises, laboratory work, and so forth, depends on the type of course being taught.
Next, one must develop the training material itself. Even those who have developed material, especially for international courses, may have to go through several iterations of the materials. It is always best to have a pilot delivery of the course once it is completed. Courses are constantly evaluated as they are developed into regularly implemented courses. Observers and students should also evaluate the class to provide feedback as it is being implemented. At the end of the course, O’Brien said, it should be formally evaluated again, getting feedback from the students and others involved in the course. Another aspect of many of the courses developed by the DOE complex is special software applications. Technical support is needed after the students take the course so that they have some contact with the instructors or someone who can provide assistance when they actually try to apply the knowledge that they attained.
O’Brien transitioned to international training, having provided the domestic backdrop for training. Through the last several decades, cooperation with
various countries has continued to evolve. NNSA has an extensive program of reaching out and conducting training, sometimes jointly with various entities, sometimes in partnership with the U.S. State Department, and sometimes in partnership with the IAEA.
Often cooperation starts with a technical exchange in a forum such as this workshop where ideas and methodologies are exchanged, and common ground is identified. This exchange is generally followed by a technical workshop, where more detail is discussed on agreed subjects. If there is a joint desire to develop training in a joint manner, then the parties go forward with a training needs assessment and the development of actual formal training. Technical workshops come in any variety of shapes and sizes. Often they are one week in duration, sometimes two weeks. They cover all of the various aspects of nuclear security. Examples include technical workshops on protective force tactics, inspection methodologies, radiation portal monitoring, secure transportation, and VA software tools. It is a very rewarding experience for both entities as they progress down the path and identify common ground on where it is possible to advance technologies in the field of security. The point is that this cooperation is joint cooperation that could lead to formal training in any number of ways. If the cooperation is bilateral, a training course could be held in each country, for example. There could be a composite number of students, either from the United States or from the other country, but it can be done in any number of ways.
Examples of training cooperation from the past few decades include those on VAs, insider analysis, nuclear material monitors, secure transportation, configuration management, physical protection systems, physical protection system performance testing, protective force performance testing, inspections, and security culture. Vulnerability assessment training has always been a keen interest over all the years of cooperation. More recently there has been more emphasis on insiders, leading to the development of actual insider courses, aside from general VA courses. Even secure transportation-type VA courses have been developed. Nuclear material monitors of all shapes and sizes, such as special nuclear material portal monitors have also been discussed in training courses.
Configuration management is something that has been more recently developed, and that deals with the management aspects of maintaining proper configuration over systems, managing change in operational facilities and how to conduct that change while maintaining the integrity of security. Physical protection systems dealing in general with technologies and performance testing is another example. Performance assurance programs and the means to test systems to assure consistent effectiveness are also provided. Protective force performance training is also of interest. Some of these courses have not been conducted in the partner country, but people from the partner country have actually traveled to the NTC and been trained there. Training could also be conducted at any of the U.S. national laboratories that are participating in the cooperation.
Finally, domestic inspection issues, meaning oversight inspections that a government agency would conduct at the sites to provide effective oversight, and security culture issues, also come in all different shapes and sizes. If one
approaches all of these things properly, good security culture will be instilled, but it does not hurt to add some awareness activities as well.
O’Brien summarized by stating that he hoped that he had provided a helpful overview of how DOE approaches training domestically, and how training is designed and has evolved into some of the international cooperative efforts that the U.S. undertakes with partners. He stated that he truly believes that the pathway to success in any cooperation is in training because it is a very common element for all of us.
V.S. Ramamurthy, asked if it would be a good idea for security personnel to be licensed only by the facility they serve. Another asked if something happens at a plant, what should be the response in the public domain? Would that be undertaken by a totally different agency, or does the VA or design basis threat provide some kind of an input for the emergency response as well?
Previously in the workshop, there was an inquiry as to whether or not a conventional bomb attack would be assessed with radiation detectors to check if there is any radioactive material laced with a chemical explosive. The training capability exists but is it then routinely used or is it used only if someone asks for that particular assistance? Who provides the assistance and in what context would they ask for assistance? How would these questions be addressed from the American side?
Regarding the GCNEP, a participant noted that there are several global centers of excellence being established around the world. Is the GCNEP envisioned as a Global/Asian Centre? Who is envisioned as attending besides Indians? Who will be the student body and the instructor body of the GCNEP? How global will it be in terms of the actual participants and contributors to the Centre?
A workshop participant replied that India has entered into a cooperative agreement with the United States and with the IAEA and other countries like France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, so they will endeavor to cater to the regional audience and to regional countries as well as to make it a Centre for particular issues such as health care on a case-by-case basis. But the formal educational program as of today has not been initiated. It will take some time to determine how this formal education program will be implemented and who will be the student body, but most probably it will be established under the HBNI. For this a global audience and a global presence will be sought. With regard to the student body, it will not be large, but topical experts in the respective fields will be invited as instructors drawn from within the country as well as from other countries.
A workshop participant noted that “seismic monitoring” was listed as part of the security module. What is the relevance of this topic? Another workshop participant replied that seismic monitoring is relevant from the point of view of nuclear security event detection.
Phillip Gibbs noted that one of the emerging issues in the last couple of years seems to be measurement control methodology and statistical methods in MC&A. Kumar’s presentation listed MC&A, but it did not specify measurement systems, methodology, or statistical methods. Gibbs asked how this topic is covered in this environment.
Kumar replied that there is a training program for MC&A. There was a group operating in the 1970s for nuclear material accounting and control at the facilities. There are now two, the one listed in the presentation and one for DAE-controlled and IAEA facilities. With regard to IAEA facilities, samples were previously analyzed there as well as by IAEA. They also had to have international inter-comparison experiments. In 1972, samples from two reactors were analyzed, but this is no longer being done. MC&A is being done with respect to nuclear material like plutonium and uranium. It is being done by nuclear scientists, both in BARC as well as at Kalpakkam.
A participant asked whether CISF is largely responsible for the physical protection of the nuclear facilities in India. Kumar replied that most of India’s civilian nuclear facilities are guarded by Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). The participant then replied that unfortunately the recruiting pattern of CISF or the allure in the ranks of the CISF are not very technology-oriented, and nuclear security requires a great deal of technical capability. In this regard, he asked whether CISF personnel are trained after two and a half years, and then moved on only to have to train some other personnel? Why can’t one create a specialized nuclear security force since many more civilian nuclear power plants are going to emerge independently?
Kumar responded that there is a special police force which has been selected from the lower rank personnel of CISF to form a separate category of people trained for deployment in DAE installations. This is not a formal agreement, but typically they will be there for at least 10 years, although not at one installation. They will be rotated among the nuclear installations. So there is a move toward making such policies. He speculated that perhaps an agreement should be reached and more stringent requirements should be established.
A workshop about sensors for dirty bombs. The development of explosives sensors for dirty bombs has already been done and this could go farther.
A workshop participant noted that the Centre is an impressive, very ambitious undertaking and asked whether the funding to create this Centre is at adequate levels per the organization laid out. And, second, how many staff are envisioned to run the Centre in its final form?
Kumar replied that, yes, it is totally funded by the Government of India, and it comes under the current, 12th Five Year Plan Project. The construction site has already been selected and procured, and construction activity has already started. The first level of construction is already complete and DAE is confident that we will be able to complete it entirely. The second question was about the staffing. Initially, the staff will be from DAE. Experts from various institutions, BARC, Mumbai, Kalpakkam, or other institutions will hold joint positions, and it is expected that once the institution becomes operational at its
site near Gurgaon in Haryana, initial staffing will be on the order of 100, which will subsequently increase to 250 or 300. This is the projection given to the Government of India.
A workshop participant responded to the comment about CISF security. First, 90 percent of security at nuclear establishments is no different from any other sensitive industrial installation. The only difference is the radioactive material inside the nuclear establishment. CISF essentially addresses access control. CISF forces are given very clear instructions regarding who is to leave, how they are to leave, and what kind of card they have to see to allow them to leave. Many of them are graduates. One would be very surprised given the employment position in this country. They are quite intelligent and aware of what they need to do. One cannot expect them to know the difference between uranium-235 and plutonium-239, but this is not needed. Second, beyond access control, the rest of security has to be conducted by intelligence or red alerts, at which time the higher echelons of the atomic energy establishment as well as the security in Delhi and in the state come into the picture.
A workshop participant continued this discussion by adding that there is a level of induction for the CISF staff specific to a nuclear installation at the level of entry. Retraining is also conducted. What CISF is directly responsible for what is known in the United States as weapon qualification criteria. CISF reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs, therefore DAE has no role except that CISF depends on their own institute for the training and retraining mechanisms and for their qualification. There is also a very good training institute in Hyderabad. They are also trained on electronic systems and gadgets and their performance levels are increasing. They are very bright students.
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