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The Electric Industry's Response to Current Events JOHN D. SELBY* I am pleased to be here today at the invitation of the Annual Meeting Committee and look forward to participating in what should surely be a lively discussion on the outlook for nuclear power in the wake of the March 28 incident at Three Mile Island. I have been asked specifically to outline the industry's response to Three Mile Island and the reaction of the utilities that are engaged in nuclear power production, or are planning to engage in it. At this time, with the Kemeny Commission report hitting the news, intense interest in the subject is not only expected but most welcome. In my remarks today, I will list only the highlights of a whole series of actions taken by the electric and nuclear industries beginning immediately following Three Mile Island. Keep in mind that the complete text of the Kemeny report, and the detailed analysis that might be entailed by it, are not the focus of these remarks today. Rather, we are concerned with bringing you up to date on industry activity from March 28 onward. My remarks will cover briefly a number of continuing efforts, all of which would bear more lengthy discussion, if the time allowed. Further, I should like to make it clear that the reaction of the industry was twofold: One, the cause of the accident and the events surrounding it should be openly examined throughout the industry on the basis of factual information and without bias. Two, lessons to be learned as a result of the incident should be promptly identified and given the widest possible publication. It was increasingly apparent from the early hours of the Three Mile Island excursion that we in commercial nuclear power were being con- fronted with perhaps the most unusual event of its kind in the history of our industry. And we faced the reality that in related termsâin terms of public interest and concernâthe shock of this accident will be felt for a long, long time. *John D. Selby is Chairman and President of the Consumers Power Company, Jackson, Michigan. 45
46 I believe the sense of urgency that gripped us increasingly in the days surrounding Three Mile Island served to unify the entire industry in its determination to spare neither the manpower nor the expense that would be necessary to solve whatever technical and operational problems had been presented by the accident. It was immediately obvious that the nuclear option was on trial, probably for its life. Those of us who recognize the option as a major solution to world energy problems, to say nothing of domestic energy problems, were aware that not to react in a positive and responsible manner to that event would only further perplex a great many Americans who already had their confidence in this technology severely shaken. Now I will take the four or five major subsequent developments within the industry in the days since Three Mile Island roughly in sequence, although, in fact, almost all of our coordinated activities occurred more or less simultaneously, once we had formed the Oversight Committee. This committee was formed in April on the initiative of the Edison Electric Institute. Its full name is the Three Mile Island Ad Hoc Nuclear Oversight Committee. It consists of eight senior utility execu- tives and provides direction to and coordination of the utility indus- try's response to Three Mile Island. Its chairman is Mr. Floyd Lewis, chairman and chief executive officer of Middle South Utilities, inc. The Oversight Committee receives input from all sectors of the nuclear industry, including utilities, suppliers, and trade associations. To this it adds the input of electric utilities in the nuclear field. Esentially every utility with nuclear power programs has initiated an internal review effort for self-evaluation of its activities. Internal changes are being made to assure that technical and managerial struc- tures are arranged to provide the proper balance between safety, relia- bility, and costs. These individual internal utility efforts are expected to continue, in addition to the industrywide activities, with the knowledge gained individually shared with all other interests under the Oversight Committee's leadership. Also, the Oversight Committee asked and authorized the Electric Power Research Institute to set up a Nuclear Safety Analysis Center to deter- mine independently not only what happened at Three Mile Island, but why. The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (commonly referred to as N-SAC) is to make recommendations for corrective action and is to act as the coor- dinator for the industry with regard to the technical responses. It also will help guide the implementation of programs rising out of the lessons learned in its Three Mile Island investigation. Mr. Edwin L. Zebroski, of the Electric Power Research Institute, is director of N-SAC. A third key activity is under way. This grew out of the early real- ization that Three Mile Island raised questions as to whether or not the industry programs for selection, training, and evaluation of plant operators and nuclear operations were adequate. So, simultaneously with the Oversight Committee and N-SAC, the Policy Committee on Follow-up to the Three Mile Island Accident was formed, under the aegis of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF). As you perhaps know, the forum is an associa- tion of public and private organizations devoted to the utilization of the atom for peaceful purposes, with an emphasis on the word "peaceful." Mr. Byron Lee, of Commonwealth Edison Company, Chicago, is its chairman.
47 The Policy-Follow-up Committee early reconized the operation questions raised by Three Mile Island and recommended that an Institute of Nuclear Power Operations be established by the electric utility industry to provide a long-term solution to the problems of plant operations. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, commonly called INPO, is guided by a steer- ing committee appointed by the Three Mile Island Oversight Committee. This steering committee is chaired jointly by W. S. Lee, of Duke Power Company, and A. J. Pfister, of Salt River Project, to guide the develop- ment of INPO. In addition, the AIF Policy Committee further addressed such issues as emergency response planning, postaccident recovery, control room design considerations, unresolved generic safety issues, and related matters. Other industry efforts are under way concerning the matter of insur- ance, a result of the financial consequences of Three Mile Island to the owners, and the matter of public information. Neither subject is a new one, but the implications of Three Mile Island in the financial sense, and the problems arising as a result of much public confusion during and after the accident, both require increased attention and detailed involvement toward solutions on the part of everyone in the industry. This introduction to the major developments in the industry since Three Mile Island does not include areas of great concern to the various committees mentioned, including the areas being covered by a number of investigations into Three Mile Island on the part of others. For exam- ple, the President's investigation under Dr. John Kemeny precedes, apparently, a continued congressional investigation. And the Nuclear Regulatory Commission itself has been conducting a thorough, detailed inquiry, not only into Three Mile Island events, but also into related events that have taken place, or might conceivably occur, elsewhere in the industry. But I think it is safe to say in the context of my assignment for today that I have highlighted the industry's response fairly and accurately. I would like to bring you up to date, in the few minutes remaining, more specifically on the activities of the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (N-SAC), the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and finish by highlighting certain activities of the Atomic Industrial Forum's Policy Committee. For example, N-SAC put together an initial draft report analyzing the events at Three Mile Island by the end of June. It differs from the other sequence-of-events reports in that it contains extensive appen- dixes that analyze in detail what happened physically. The report makes no reliance on people's recollection. The instrument charts and the computer records were the main sources of data, together with a data- logger something like a flight recorder, which provides a more complete record of what was happening than the operators had. An initial report of 380 pages and l7 appendixes was published at the end of July and is being supplemented. N-SAC reported that there are roughly two dozen different contributing factors that can be identified. If almost any one of these factors had
48 been a little different, there would have been no damage. The physical capability of the system to operate without damage is clear. However, the idea that the whole problem implied by Three Mile Island can be cured by treating just one of those factors is not plausible, consider- ing classes of accidents like this. On the other hand, changing all two dozen factors may not be productive, even though there is some ten- dency to require this by regulation. Some remedies can preempt or con- flict with others, and even useful ones may have widely different benefits and priorities. Somewhere in between these extremes there are a few very important remedies that can apply to most plantsâand a few more that may apply selectively to some plant designs but not to others. Many other proposed remedies may range from convenience to cosmetic or even can be counterproductive or in conflict with existing systems. It is vital that a small number of the most meaningful remedies be implemented effectively without the dilution or diversion by a large number of less meaningful "do something" remedies. The industry involvement of N-SAC has been to act as a clearinghouse at a technical level for the various owners' groups, industry committees, and technical working groups. This includes technical support to all seven of the AIF committees on Three Mile Island response, six utilities owners' groups, and the EPRI technical task forces. Utilities in turn have designated "N-SAC Coordinators" from 60 companies. Generally, these are the people who are in charge of the Three Mile Island response within each company. Fifteen additional utility people were designated for their interest in the health effects studies. N-SAC has since then run or cosponsored a series of technical workshops. These include a group of people in the United States, and some overseas, who, along with N-SAC, have attempted to do the thermal-hydraulic analy- sis of the Three Mile Island accident. They met for several days to review status of these calculations and methods. A "Disturbance Analysis System" workshop was held to cover possible information aids for reactor operation. A workshop was held at Three Mile Island on the plant status and recovery plans and included a visit to the Three Mile Island plant. A valve-function monitoring workshop covered the use of acoustic monitors. The N-SAC report is available to those who might want it, and mean- while N-SAC continues exhaustive activities in many related areas. To take just one example, N-SAC and EPRI have established large and readily accessible archives of Three Mile Island-related data and infor- mation. Many utilities use material developed by N-SAC in their studies and in submittals to local and federal agencies. The archives are stored on microfilm with computer searchable indexing, which can be accessed by any utility. There is also a monthly newsletter printing 5,500 copies that covers current work, key developments, and general information related to the progress to the Three Mile Island accident. N-SAC has started operation of the "NOTEPAD" Information System. This is a report medium providing daily update capability, but which doesn't add to the stack of papers on the desk. The terminal provides easy selectivity of just that information relevent to the user. It is available nationwide and provides an added vehicle for timely alerting of statistics to significant events. In the matter of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO),
49 the institute is charged with ensuring a high quality of operation in nuclear power plants. Its purposes in brief are to establish industry- wide benchmarks for excellence in nuclear operation and to conduct independent evaluations to assist utilities in meeting the benchmarks. It will determine educational and training requirements for operating personnel and will accredit training organizations. The philosophy of the institute is to: l. Promote an improved level of professionalism in nuclear power operation. 2. Involve plant operating staffs in the development of bench- marks in training systems for the conduct of the operation eval- uations . 3. Use the best-available techniques and methods to develop operating and training practices and the human factors aspect of design in operation. 4. Utilize the best-available independent professional advice and counsel towards accomplishing the institute's objectives. 5. Support and improve existing practices and training sys- tems wherever possible rather than supplanting them. 6. Help the utilities to help themselves rather than preempt their management responsibilities. 7. Encourage excellence. The institute's Advisory Council is composed of distinguished persons in areas related to the institute's objectives, including prominent educators, scientists, engineers, industrialists, and health specialists. The day-to-day affairs of the institute will be managed by a president, and it is estimated that the functions of the institute will require a staff of about 200. It is anticipated that the president of the insti- tute will be selected before the end of the year and that the institute will be fully operational in l980. As I indicated earlier, the industry is investigating a plan for improving nuclear insurance protection, and it is anticipated that par- ticipation in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations will be a condi- tion of obtaining such insurance. Thus, although participation in the institute will be voluntary, it is anticipated that there will be suffi- cient incentive to assure that the goals of the institute are achieved industrywide. Meanwhile, as the work of N-SAC and INPO accelerate, the Policy Committee has assigned a number of subcommittees to specific critical issues, including Emergency Response Planning, Operations, Systems and Equipment, Post-Accident Recovery, Safety Analysis Considerations, Con- trol Room Considerations, and Unresolved Generic Safety Issues. These subcommittee issues and the subtopics being addressed in each resulted from an early, intensive review of a massive list of Three Mile Island- evoked concerns that were culled for priority consideration. In addi- tion, the utilities have formed reactor owners' groups to work with their respective vendors in order to expedite timely response to regulatory- generated requirements. A primary purpose of this Policy Committee is to provide a broad
50 coverage of the lessons learned at Three Mile Island. Under this approach, specific tasks are assigned to subcommittees, and a wide involvement of both people and organizations has been encouraged. This facilitates the exchange of information among utilities, archi- tect-engineers and constructors, and nuclear steam supply manufacturers. It also permits a general position to develop in a reasonably short time. The positions developed through the subcommittees are meant to provide a common basis for individual utility action and permit suffi- cient flexibility for satisfying specific company or site-related needs. Using the preliminary input of these subcommittees, the Policy Commit- tee as a whole developed an August 2, l979, letter of comment on the first phase of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's "lessons learned" task force report. With few exceptions, the committee found the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff recommendations generally acceptable. All of the activities under the Policy Committee embrace a central postureâthe intent to learn as much as possible from the Three Mile Island accident and to modify practices to incorporate important lessons. This openness to change will supplement but not erase the reliance and confidence that will continue to be placed on the framework for design, construction, and operation established over the last 20 years. We want to give careful scrutiny to the entire process, making improvements where needed. The recommendations of each of these subcommittees are now being reviewed for final approval by the Policy Committee. A serious effort has been made to keep both the industry and the NRC informed of our activities. Our final work product will receive wide distribution. The sum of these activities is a general attitude toward constructive improvements derived from the lessons of Three Mile Island. While the regulatory process indeed has a specific role in assuring reactor safety, it is, in our opinion, subordinate in its effect on real safety to the efforts of the individual utilities and the industry that supports them. The industry efforts I have outlined, I would hope, should be a sign of encouragement to you and the public that nuclear safety can and will be improved. I think I can commend to you the thought that the industry's response to Three Mile Island was positive and immediate. I think, or at least I hope, that your impression of this industry and its ability to stand to the issue and handle it straightforwardly encourages your support of the people to whom you've entrusted the nation's commercial reactor program. It is an ever-changing, viable program, and I believe you can agree with me that so long as we are alert, open, and responsive the leadership of this industry merits your continued trust and encouragement.
