Naval Communications Architecture (1994)

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2 Naval Communications Requirements Naval satellite communications requirements are driven by the missions that naval forces are called upon to execute and by the operational doctrine developed to fulfill these missions. The mission determines what needs to be done, and the doctrine determines the equipment, personnel, and communications required to execute the mission. 2.1 MISSION AND DOCTRINE The post-Soviet world, as discussed in the previous chapter is a substantially different and more complex military environment. As a result, both doctrine and mission are changing. The doctrine of an apocalyptic battle with the Soviets has been replaced with numerous small actions against regional military threats. These conflicts may have limited scope and objectives. Also, whereas earlier some U.S. losses were acceptable, now such losses are unacceptable. This change in attitude, and the simultaneous requirement to minimize even enemy civilian casualties, greatly increases information requirements. For example, stopping and boarding a particular ship require more information (and less ordnance) than preventing all shipping from transiting a choke point. The information flow has to be two ways: the operating forces need access to databases and rules of engagement; the National Command Authority (NCA) needs near-real- time information on the precise situation as it occurs to determine an appropriate plan of action. The doctrine is evolving to keep pace with the changes. The Commander-in-Chief (CINC), U.S. Pacific Forces (USCINCPAC), has developed a two-tier concept in which a Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) is designated to deal with a particular situation, reporting directly to USCINCPAC; the component commanders (in this case, Pacific ground, air, and fleet commanders) are out of the operational chain of command but provide administrative and logistical support. Although this change simplifies the decision-making process, it places the decision maker away from much of his supporting infrastructure, such as intelligence and communications facilities. This separation imposes additional communications requirements of its own. The requirements discussed are taken in part from the Navy's input to the Joint Staff Integrated Satellite Communications Requirement Document on Doctrine Based Requirements.1 The Navy's input reflected the requirements for global operations but did not incorporate the requirements of expanded strike operations discussed by Task Group 1. Those expanded requirements are added to the global operations requirements in this report. 'Joint Staff Integrated Satellite Communications Requirement Document on Doctrine Based Requirements (SECRET), April 1992. 10

2.2 REQUIREMENTS HIERARCHY FOR GLOBAL OPERATIONS Communications requirements can be segmented into four tiers consistent with the command structure. At the highest level are the connections between the National Command Authority (NCA), national agencies, and the CINC. This is the global level, since similar connections must be available to support all CINCs. At the second level are the connections between the CINC and the CJTF, referred to as the theater level. The third level involves the connections between the CJTF and JTF elements and is referred to as the regional level. The fourth level involves the connections between JTF elements and individual ships and aircraft. The requirements at this level are tactical communications requirements to support the operating forces and are referred to as tactical-level requirements. Each requirement can be satisfied by one or more communications links. These links may differ in the protection of the C3 function they provide. Generally, there is a tradeoff between communications rate and vulnerability level. Higher integrity levels are obtained at the expense of reduced communications rates. At the highest level of integrity, called hard core, links are protected against nuclear scintillation effects, high levels of jamming, and interception by hostile forces. Hard-core links are required where message delivery must be assured. If delivery of a message can be delayed until the jamming threat decreases, then soft-core or even general-purpose links may be all that is necessary. Soft-core links provide moderate antijam capability. General-purpose links provide the highest capacity but give no protection against jamming or intercept and detection. One requirement that all links share is the need for communications security; that is, the data elements that pass over the link must not be exploitable by hostile listeners. J£ach link may be described in terms of the type of service it provides, the data rate passed over it, the length of time to establish the link, and the degree of protection required. Table 2.1 shows the definition of the terms for low, medium, and high data rates. It also shows the definition of the terms used to describe how rapidly a circuit should be established—near real time, moderate, slow, and very slow. Finally, it reiterates the terms for link integrity. For each of the levels, the types of services required were examined and translated into a bit rate. The conversion values used are contained in Table 2.2. The nature of the links required and their number were examined to estimate the aggregate bit transfer rate required and the degree of protection required. 11

TABLE 2.1 Requirements and Key to Terms DATA RATE LDR Low data rate Data rate < 9.6 kbps MDR Medium data rate 9.6 kbps < data rate < 1.54 Mbps HDR High data rate 1.54 Mbps < data rate < 44 Mbps VHDR Very high data rate 44 Mbps < data rate < 274 Mbps TIMELINESS NRT Near real time Delay < 1 second MOD Moderate 5- to 10-second delay S Slow 1- to 5-minute delay vs Very slow 30- to 60-minute delay THREAT ENVIRONMENT1 (LPI AND AJ) GP General purpose LPI R^ < 2; AJ R./Rj < 2 SC Soft core LPI Rs/Rj 2 to 10; AJ RJR, 2 to 10 HC Hard core LPI R./R, > 10; AJ R^/Rj > 10; Nuclear Scintillation aThe ratios of communications range to interceptor range OVRj) and communications range to jammer range (R../R,) are typically used to illustrate the degree of threat protection associated with specific communications links. For example, RC/R, = 2 means that the range from the communicator to the intended receiver is equal to twice the range from the communicator to the interceptor, and thus the low probability of intercept (LPI) capability of such a link would be low. If the ratio R7R, > 10, then the LPI capability is high, and similarly for the ratio of communications range to jammer range (R^TR,). The antijam (AJ) margin is low if RJRj < 2 and high if R^/R, > 10. TABLE 2.2 Requirements and User Services VOICE LDR, MDR (2.4 to 64 kbps) DATA LDR, MDR (75 to 300 bps; 1.2 to 56 kbps) FAX LDR, MDR (2.4 to 64 kbps) IMAGERY LDR, MDR, HDR, VHDR (2.4 to 56 kbps; 5 to 274 Mbps) VIDEO MDR, HDR, VHDR (64 kbps; 1.5 to 274 Mbps) Data rates are derived from Navy and commercial usage. 12

2.2.1 Global Level At the global level, communications are required to exchange information between the NCA, CINCs, and national agencies. The services required to support a CINC staff include voice, facsimile, data, imagery, and video. Much of this support can be satisfied by commercial terrestrial and satellite communications. The required connectivity changes very slowly, so links are established and disconnected infrequently. An overall information throughput in excess of 100 Mbps is required at the global level. CINCs are located near the mid-latitudes; only a limited requirement exists for polar coverage. Some of the communications, such as threat-warning conferences, strategic coordination and planning meetings, and dissemination of emergency action and report-back messages, requires integrity protection at the hard-core level. Other tactical information, such as operational plans, requires protection at the soft-core level. The remainder of the links may operate at the unprotected or general-purpose level. Links at the global level may be characterized as high capacity between a limited number of fixed users. 2.2.2 Theater Level Communications links between the CINC and his CJTFs and among the CJTFs, including allied field commands, represent the theater-level network. The aggregate data transfer rates required are high (in excess of 1.5 Mbps) but significantly less than required at the global level. The same overall services are required as at the global level (i.e., voice, data, facsimile, imagery, and video), but the connectivity changes more often as task forces are formed and disestablished. No more than three CJTFs are expected in a theater at any one time. This level of operations introduces new requirements: polar coverage in addition to mid- latitude coverage and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) connectivity to mobile users. Since the CJTFs may be afloat or mobile, and at considerable distance from the CINC and each other, their support requires high-volume BLOS links. 2.2.3 Regional Level Links at the regional level are links between the CJTF and his JTF element commanders. Operational messages, such as the air-tasking order (ATO) would be passed at this level. This level is characterized by a number of medium data rate links, none of which is large individually. Similar services are required at this level as at the higher levels (i.e., voice, data, facsimile, and imagery), but video teleconferencing is not required. The connectivity requirements, including polar region coverage, may change rapidly, as smaller task forces are formed and disestablished. No more than 10 task forces per CJTF at any one time are expected. 13

Because of the generally smaller scale of operations within a region, many of the links will require line-of-sight (LOS) connectivity. The communications requirements may be satisfied by a combination of LOS and BLOS links. 2.2.4 Tactical Level At the tactical level, communications are required between JTF element commanders, ships, aircraft, and ground units that carry out the operations. Under some proposed concepts, cruise missiles may transmit and receive information while in flight. Data rates are generally modest—approximately 64 kbps between mobile users. Services required will include voice, data, imagery, and facsimile transmission. Connectivity is very dynamic at this level, as individual units enter and exit various networks. A large number of platforms are involved, possibly more than 100 at any one time. Fortunately, many of the communications requirements may be satisfied by line-of-sight links. Communications at this level require the greatest degree of threat protection. Most tactical operations require timely exchange of information at close proximity to the enemy. The hard-core requirement is still low, approximately 10 percent, but the soft-core requirement rises to 60 percent. It is estimated that only a moderate requirement exists for general-purpose communications. 2.2.5 Global Operations Summary Requirements Table 2.3 summarizes the services, data rates, link establishment times, and protection required for each of the four levels. The data rates shown are for individual data links. The number of data links depends on factors such as the size and composition of the JTF. As can be seen from the table, slow or very slow link establishment times are acceptable for all cases. The degree of threat protection required increases as one moves from the global to the tactical level. The services required stay remarkably stable, except for video, which drops out at the regional level. The data rates required over an individual link decrease from the global to tactical levels, and the number of links between entities decreases rapidly. 14

TABLE 2.3 Requirements: Global Operations Summary Global Level Theater Level Regional Level Tactical Level Voice LDR S HC MDR SC GP LDR S HC SC GP LDR S HC SC GP LDR S HC SC GP Data LDR S SC MDR LDR S SC LDR S SC MDR LDR S SC MDR GP MDR Fax LDR S GP LDR S GP LDR S GP LDR S SC Imagery MDR VS GP HDR MDR S SC MDR VS SC MDR VS SC HDR VHDR Video MDR VS GP HDR MDR VS GP None None Legend: Data Rate Timeliness Low data rate Near real time Medium data rate Moderate High data rate Slow Very high data rate Very slow Threat Protection Hard core Soft core General purpose 2.3 ENHANCED STRIKE OPERATIONS As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Space Panel also conducted a parallel study, entitled Space Support to Naval Tactical Operations, in which a number of enhanced strike options or constructs were examined. Each of these constructs would likely impose additional communications requirements at the regional and tactical levels. They are treated in this section to develop a more complete set of communications requirements. 15

Construct 1, called Deep Strike, addresses the requirement to suppress critical stationary targets at long range. It uses cruise missiles and stealthy long-range strike aircraft. A possible development within this construct is a cruise missile that provides sensor data and/or battle damage assessment (BDA) on its way to the target. The missile may also be redirected in flight. Figure 2.1 illustrates the Deep Strike concept. SATCOM SYSTEMS NATIONAL SYSTEMS TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT DEEP STRIKE AIRCRAFT 200 nmi LONG RANGE -H FIGURE 2.1 Construct 1—deep strike. 16

Construct 2, called Control of the Coastal Zone, is designed to provide continuous defense suppression and close air support to 250 nautical miles inshore. It uses a mix of stealthy and conventional strike aircraft and relies on an aircraft carrier (CV)-based tactical surveillance aircraft. This aircraft may also provide a communications relay to strike aircraft prosecuting targets. Figure 2.2 illustrates the Coastal Zone concept. SATCOM SYSTEMS NATIONAL SYSTEMS CV BASED TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT StRJKE AIRCRAFT ' FIGURE 2.2 Construct 2—control of the coastal zone. 17

Construct 3, called Control of the Extended Coastal Zone, is designed to expand the Construct 2 concept to 800 nautical miles from the coast for strikes against targets far inland. This concept introduces long-endurance aircraft as sensor platforms and as communications relays. Figure 2.3 illustrates the Extended Coastal Zone concept. SATCOM SYSTEMS NATIONAL SYSTEMS HALE/UAV SENSOR PLATFORM CV BASED TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT 200 nmi •***- 800 nmi -H FIGURE 2.3 Construct 3—control of the extended coastal zone. 18

Construct 4, called Control of the Extended Coastal Zone with Added Space Capability, adds improved space sensors and extends the penetration range beyond 800 nautical miles. Figure 2.4 illustrates this Added Space Capability concept. IMPROVED SATCOM SYSTEMS (SHF/EHF) MULTI-MODE SURVEILLANCE ID/BDA CV BASED TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT 200 nmi LONG RANGE -H FIGURE 2.4 Construct 4—control of the extended coastal zone with added space capability. 19

The communications requirements imposed by these enhanced capabilities are summarized in Table 2.4. For each construct, there are four phased functions. The first phase, which is essentially peacetime planning and training, is characterized in Constructs 1 and 4 by modest voice, data, and imagery links. Constructs 2 and 3 introduce airborne sensor platforms that require high data rate video links. All these communications need to be beyond the line of sight to mobile users. TABLE 2.4 Requirements for Expanded Strike Operations (Regional/Tactical Level) Nv Construct 1 Deep Strike (1,000 M) 2 Ground Targets Suppression Alt. to (2) 3 Ground Targets Suppression 4 Space-Based Targeting Phased N. Functions N^ (250 M) (800 M) (1,000 Ml Day-to-Day Training and Exercises and Mission Planning Voice. LDR, VS, GP Data LDR/MDR, Voke. LDR, M, GP Voice, LDR, M, GP Voice. LDR, VS. GP Dsta MDR/HDR/VHDR, M, GP Daa MDR/HDR/VHDR, Data tDR/MDR, VS, Gp M, GP Jmageiy. . LDR/MDR, ln»g«y, MDR/HDR/VHDR, M.GP Imageiy, MDR/HDR/VHDR , M,GP Imagery, LDR/MDR. VS. GP video, MDR/HDR/VHDR, Video, MDR/HDR/VHDR, Rapid Retargeting Daet, LDR/MDR, Data, MDRmDRA'HDR, NRT, GP Data, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Daa, MBR/HDR, M, •/vssc i • '::, '• ;'| Imagery, MDR, VS, Imagery, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Imagery. MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Imagery, MDR/HDR, M,SC SC . :| ;;: f| Video, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Video, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Execution Voice, LDR.;$.SC Voice, LDR, M, SC Voice, LDR, M, SC Voice, LDR, M, SC Data, LDR, M, SC Data, LDR, M, SC BDA Data, LDR/MDR, Data, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Data, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Data, LDR/MDR, M, : SG Imagery, MDR. VS. SC Imagery, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Imagery, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Iroagejy, MKR/HDR, M, SC Cruise Missile J3ftta, IPR/MPR, Video, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT. GP Video, MDR/HDR/VHDR, NRT, GP Legend: 20

In the next phased function, rapid retargeting, strike assets may be diverted on their way to the target. Again, Constructs 1 and 4 require modest BLOS data and imagery links. Construct 4 requires more because of the increased data collection volume of improved satellite systems. Constructs 2 and 3 require rapidly established, nigh-data-rate, unprotected LOS links for data, imagery, and video. In these constructs the airborne communication relay relieves the BLOS requirement. For the execution phase, Constructs 1 and 4 require protected beyond-line-of-sight voice links. Constructs 2 and 3 require soft-core line-of-sight voice and data. For the battle damage assessment phase, Constructs 2 and 3 require the same capabilities as the rapid retargeting phase. Constructs 1 and 4 also require the same capabilities as the rapid retargeting phase, except that in the case of the advanced cruise missile, a low or medium data rate link is required to pass BDA and way-point data to and from the missile. This link must be protected at the soft-core level. 2.4 OBSERVATIONS Several observations concerning the naval communications requirements follow: • The capacity requirements change from a few high-capacity users at the global and theater levels to many low-capacity users at the tactical level. • Most users at theater level and below are mobile, require links beyond line of sight, and must be able to establish and disestablish links rapidly. • The requirement for antijam and LPI communications increases from the global to the tactical level and is especially important at the regional and tactical levels. • Interoperability among U.S. forces and with allied forces is required at all levels of command. • Expanded strike operations increase the need for imagery at the tactical level. The introduction of new sensor systems will increase the data rates required to take advantage of new capabilities. • Some of these sensors may integrate their own line-of-sight links, but many strike assets will require high-capacity beyond-line-of-sight connectivity. 21