Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
UTILIZATION AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT The federal government influences the deployment and utilization of scientific and engineering manpower in three principal ways. (1) At the policy level, it initiates major programs requiring a heavy investment of scientific and engineering talent. (2) In implementing its programs it purchases a major share of the nation's research and development effort, and of its end products. (3) It directly employs many scientists and engineers. In addition, the federal government is the largest sup- plier of information about scientists and engineers, and about the activi- ties, such as research and development, in which they engage. As the initiator of major national programs, over the past 15 years the government has determined the deployment of hundreds of thou- sands of scientists and engineers. Its decision to invest heavily in the development of missiles and of other advanced weapons systems, and more recently its decision to carry through the manned lunar project by 1970, are together largely responsible for the high proportion of scientists and engineers now engaged more or less directly in national security and space efforts. Through contracts and grants, the government has an indirect but powerful influence on the utilization of a large fraction of the nation's 12
scientific and engineering manpower employed by industry and the universities. This influence is exerted by the government in its defini- tions of work to be funded, its selection of the institutions where the work will be done and the individuals who will do it, in the conditions it writes into contracts and grants under which work will be performed, and in the skill and intelligence with which the work is supervised by government scientists, engineers, and administrators. Finally, the government directly employs more than 120 thousand scientists and engineers, of whom one third are engaged in research and development. The following series of recommendations is intended to help the government improve its performance in each of these roles. THE GOVERNMENT AS AN INITIATOR OF MAJOR PROGRAMS 1 Before the government reaches a decision to undertake a great technological program (e.g., the lunar landing or the supersonic transport projects), it should make a careful assessment of the impact of the decision on the deployment and utilization of scientists and engi- neers. In view of the way in which certain government decisions have radically altered the pattern of deployment of scientists and engineers in recent years, it might be supposed that major decisions had been preceded by careful studies of their probable impact on the market for scientific and engineering manpower, and, more broadly, of their effect on the general direction of scientific and technological effort in the United States. Yet, so far as we can learn, no adequate studies of the impact of these decisions were in fact made before the decisions were taken. Indeed, meaningful studies probably could not have been made, partly because the information on which to base them was not available. Common sense suggests that there should be a careful calculation of the requirements for scientific and engineering manpower that will flow from each major decision of the federal government. When these requirements are large, the government should make an estimate of what the resulting redeployment of the nation's manpower is likely to cost in money and in scientific and engineering manpower diverted from other objectives. Such calculations and estimates are difficult to obtain. At the present time, many different units of the federal government are in- volved in the collection, analysis, and publication of information on scientific and technical personnel. Even though considerable progress 13
has been made toward the coordination of these disparate activities, officials at the top levels of the government still lack the kind of coordi- nated information they need if they are to assess accurately the impact their decisions are likely to have on the deployment and utilization of scientific and engineering manpower. Responsibility should be assigned to a unit within the Execu- tive Office of the President for (a) stimulating and coordinating planning by federal departments and agencies with respect to scientific and engineering manpower; (b) promoting research, both inside and outside government, that is likely to facilitate such planning and the solution of manpower problems; and (c) taking the lead in developing an integrated program for the continuing collection and analysis of informa- tion, relevant for operating and policy purposes, on scientific and engi- neering manpower. While the Committee does not recommend a specific location for this unit in the Executive Office, it notes the feasibility of placing it in the Office of Science and Technology. Executive Office leadership and coordination are clearly essential, both to assess the impact of major decisions and to promote continuing improvement in the utilization of scientists and engineers. The Com- mittee does not propose that the collection of information about scientific and engineering manpower be accomplished by a single agency; centrali- zation of this kind, in fact, is to be avoided. It does propose that the data now being collected from various sources be made more compatible. In some areas, additional data must be obtained. In support of this objective, extensive and continuing analysis is needed to ensure that information related to scientific and engineering manpower is both adequate and useful for making major decisions in all sectors, and especially in the federal government. Another task of Executive leadership should be to strengthen research in the field of scientific and engineering manpower. A con- siderable increase in expenditures for development of organized informa- tion would yield a high return in better utilization of scientists and engineers. Particularly urgent is the need for research that will identify and help to resolve certain critical problems. For example, convertibility and occupational mobility of scientists and engineers critically affect their utilization; yet there is little useful information on this subject. The machinery and the precise arrangements required for the development of an integrated federal policy on all manpower are not the proper concern of this Committee. Nevertheless, it sees an acute need 14
for a continuing assessment of the total impact of government policies and activities on the development and utilization of manpower in the United States. The Committee is encouraged by the recent establishment by the President of a cabinet-level Committee on Manpower. THE GOVERNMENT AS PURCHASER Each department and agency charged with major scientific or engineering activities should assign to one of its top officials re- sponsibility for improving the utilization of civilian scientists and engi- neers, both those the agency employs and those whose work it finances. The duties of that official should include: (a) participating in govern- ment-wide scientific and engineering manpower planning activities; (b) bringing to the attention of his colleagues the implications, in terms of scientific and engineering manpower, of proposed new programs; (c) assessing the impact on manpower of cancellation, curtailment, or alter- ation of major programs; (d) analyzing the influence of various man- agement practices and policies on the effectiveness with which scientific and engineering manpower is utilized; (e) providing for the collection and analysis of the information he needs to meet his other responsibili- ties. Specifically, the Committee recommends that an official be assigned these responsibilities in the Department of Defense in order to improve the utilization of civilian scientists and engineers working on defense programs both within and without the department. Decisions made within the departments and agencies of the govern- ment are of key importance in determining how effectively a very large proportion of the nation's scientific and engineering manpower outside the government is utilized. At the present time, the direct attention paid to the utilization of scientific and engineering manpower varies widely from agency to agency. The National Aeronautics and Space Admin- istration, for example, as required by statute, has actively sought and organized information on the numbers and kinds of scientific and engi- neering personnel that are involved in its programs, including those employed by its contractors. The Department of Defense has very little information of this kind. It has, however, actively examined the impact of various management policies and practices on project effectiveness, although not directly on utilization of manpower. Responsibility for efficient use of scientific and engineering manpower tends to be widely 15
diffused within most agencies, and is regarded by most program man- agers as incidental to other tasks. If this responsibility is to be fulfilled effectively, it must be made the principal concern of designated officials at the highest level of department and agency management. 4 The Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other agencies with major technological pro- grams should continue to place great emphasis on improving the man- agement of major projects by assigning to these projects identifiably top-quality managers with both technical and administrative skills, and giving them authority, responsibility, and resources necessary for suc- cessful completion of projects. We particularly commend measures already taken to give both mili- tary and civilian personnel special training in project management; to form project teams that cut across conventional organizational lines; to use formal management techniques for the better coordination of com- plex programs; and to increase the technical competence of government project-management teams by encouraging them to draw on the re- sources of industrial contractors, non-profit companies, and universities. More than half of all scientists and engineers employed by private industry in research and development are working on projects financed and supervised by the federal government. The effectiveness of their efforts depends in very large degree upon the skill with which the gov- ernment manages these projects. A single unwise decision in the fixing of design objectives may delay by a year the development of a space vehicle or a weapons system, and add a thousand man-years of scientific and engineering effort to its cost. Conversely, an alert and technically competent project-management team can effect enormous savings in time and effort by skillfully coordinating the activities of contractors working on different but related phases of a major space or weapons system. It appears that the successful development of two particular weapons systems, for which the Committee had case studies prepared, can be traced in part to skillful management for both the government and industry by strong project offices. Many large government research and development projects have in fact been handled most competently. But we believe that the quality of management could be substantially improved by wider use of techniques such as those recommended above and by recognition and reward of exceptional work. It would be improved further by the passage of legislation raising the salaries of scientists and engineers in the upper 16
civil service grades, from whose ranks the members of project-manage- ment teams are in large part recruited. The military services, also, need to give more attention to the development and retention of this kind of engineer-manager in their officer corps. Government agencies responsible for development programs should continue to place great emphasis on accurate estimates of their cost and feasibility, and on the use of multi-phase contracts. The Committee is impressed by evidence of the government's grow- ing skill in estimating the cost of projected programs, and in determining their technological feasibility before large amounts of money and man- power have been committed. The government is also to be commended for increased use of multi-phase contracting, a system under which several companies, chosen in competition, are awarded contracts calling for preliminary study and task definition. The company that performs best in this early and relatively inexpensive phase is then awarded a development contract. One of the several advantages of multi-phase contracting is that it tends to reduce the number of prospective con- tractors submitting major proposals for a development program, thus reducing the investment of scientific and engineering talent in the preparation of proposals. Sin development programs, the use of fixed-price and incentive contracts instead of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts is to be com- mended. Great care must be taken by government agencies to estab- lish meaningful and realistic performance criteria. In general, the Committee favors the increasing use of fixed-price and incentive contracts for development work. It is clear that the payment of higher fees to contractors whose performance is superior is likely to result in over-all improvement in the efficiency with which scarce technical talent is utilized in government-financed research and development programs. There is a danger, however, in overemphasizing objective performance criteria in contracts, in such a way that a com- pany's profits become related to the achievement of goals irrelevant to the central objective for which its services are secured. For example, early operational capability and low cost are usually desirable charac- teristics for military systems. But if the need is for a highly dependable back-up to a system already in the field, care must be taken lest a premium paid for speed of contractor performance, or an undue penalty for a cost overrun, divert attention and effort from the primary goal of reliability. 17
The Committee commends federal contracting agencies in the fields of defense and space for their increasing ability to act at an early stage to cancel, curtail or materially alter major programs that do not appear to be worth their cost. Because of the necessarily speculative nature of development, it may often prove impossible to reach a desired goal by continuing to move along a particular line, or to reach it soon enough at an ac- ceptable cost. Significant reductions in waste of money as well as man- power can be achieved if responsible government organizations are alert to the desirability of terminating or drastically modifying projects, or even entire programs, whenever there is convincing evidence of probable failure. Carefully considered action to terminate or redirect a program under such conditions is more often a sign of strength than a sign of weakness in the government's research and development management, and should be so interpreted by Congress and the public. Such action can be an important means of conserving scarce scientific and engi- neering manpower. Federal departments and agencies should work with industry to develop plans and programs for minimizing the dislocation and consequent malutilization of scientists and engineers as a result of pro- gram cancellation or redirection. Early cancellation or curtailment of major programs will not, by itself, improve utilization of scientific and engineering personnel unless the personnel inactivated by these decisions can go to work on other productive activities immediately. If they are thrown out of employment by the cancellation, or assigned to busy-work projects, their usefulness is actually reduced, of course, although money may be saved by reduced need for materials and facilities. As noted at the beginning of this report, scientists and engineers can play a key role in creating new opportunities for the nation. If the burden of defense lightens, they should be involved in the conversion of defense industry to other national objectives or to civilian purposes. If their potential is to be utilized productively, cooperative action will be needed to facilitate the transition. Provisions are required to enable existing defense industrial contractors more readily to utilize their scientists and engineers in diversifying and transforming the enterprise. Incentives to facilitate the formation of new enterprises, based on the 18
capabilities of creative groups wishing to apply technology with which they are familiar to the civilian economy, will also be of value. It would be in the national interest if, during the periods of transi- tion, attractive opportunities could be provided for individual scientists and engineers to replenish and augment their professional value through education and training, possibly at university centers as well as within the organizations in which they work. The Committee recognizes that these objectives are difficult to achieve, and hastens to express its view that programs designed to minimize dislocation should not involve coercive methods that would curtail the freedom of individuals or encroach upon the proper preroga- tives of responsible free enterprise. 9 Federal support of contractor-initiated technical effort by gov- ernment industrial contractors should be maintained at a sub- stantial level. Incentives should be developed for encouraging corporate managements to emphasize quality and continuity, and to orient work toward long-run objectives. Companies engaged in research and development or production under government contract are usually permitted to devote some portion of their total effort to what has been called independent research and development, or, as it has more recently been designated, contractor- initiated technical effort. Its objectives are, as a rule, denned only in general terms, and it is treated as a recognized business cost. Independ- ent research and development has provided scientists and engineers employed by industrial contractors the opportunity to develop advanced concepts that, in many cases, have been of great value to the govern- ment. In the current efforts to strengthen government contracting pro- cedures, it would be unfortunate if government funding in this area were to be eliminated or even substantially reduced. While the Commit- tee recognizes the need for limits on government funding for this pur- pose, it believes that the public interest would be better served by an increase than by a decrease in current allowances. The government should seek to develop incentives to encourage the most effective use of the manpower supported by the funds it supplies. While detailed government controls over the specific activities of in- dividual contractors are not desirable, a periodic review by responsible and competent technical people would be useful to determine whether the results of independent research and development effort are commensu- rate with its cost. 19
THE GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER Greater emphasis should be placed on assuring a high level of professional competence in the federal scientific establish- ment. In support of this objective, the administration proposals for higher salaries at the upper levels of government service should be promptly enacted by the Congress. Since World War II, the government's large and important scientific establishment has had continuing difficulty competing with industry and the universities for the services of talented scientists and engineers. Many groups, both inside and outside the government, have studied this problem and made recommendations. A number of the recommendations have now been adopted, and the government's competitive position is consequently stronger today than at any time in the past 18 years. But, as Table 1 shows, the salaries paid to scientists and engineers at the upper levels of government career service are far below those prevailing at comparable levels in private industry. The discrepancy is even greater in the top policy positions. Ironically, the government is often in the position of reimbursing a contractor for salaries the contractor has paid to scientists and engineers that are very much higher than the salaries the government can pay its own employees. Enactment of pending legislation authorizing higher salaries at the upper levels of government service would improve the government's competitive position. TABLE 1 COMPARISON OF TOP GOVERNMENT CAREER SALARIES WITH THOSE IN PRIVATE BUSINESS FOR COMPARABLE WORK CORRESPONDING LEVELS IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PRIVATE BUSINESS GS-16 $16,000-$18,000 $20,000-$30,000 GS-17 $18,000-$20,000 ?27,500-$37,500 GS-18 $20,000 $32,500-$45,000 Source: THE COMPETITION FOB QUALITY. Vol. 1 Federal Council for Science and Technology. 1962. (The federal government salaries listed here reflect upward revisions enacted since that report.) Raising salaries is only one of several measures that must be taken if the government is to attract and retain its fair share of the nation's best scientific and engineering talent. Managers of some federal labora- tories should strengthen their recruiting programs, particularly at col- leges and universities. The government should also take more positive steps to provide scientists and engineers employed in federal laboratories with a wider variety of opportunities for continuing their education and developing their professional competence. These opportunities should 20
include work in private industry, at other government establishments, and at universities, and they should be available to scientists and engi- neers at reasonable intervals throughout their professional careers. Federal laboratories and agencies should also encourage their scien- tists and engineers to participate in activities of professional societies. The personnel of these establishments have not always had the oppor- tunity to participate on study groups and advisory panels, and in scien- tific missions representing the United States. They should be called upon more than they are now, and their participation should be en- couraged by their employers. They have much to contribute. As part of its study, the Committee had case studies made for it on the utilization of scientific and engineering manpower in the develop- ment of two military systems â Titan II and the Naval Tactical Data System. The first such comprehensive studies so far made, they high- lighted the superior opportunities for advanced technical study that are given to military officers, in contrast with relatively meager oppor- tunities available for civilian employees. «The U. S. Civil Service Commission should take the lead in working with government departments and agencies to im- prove the working environment of scientists and engineers employed by the federal government. It should also help to foster improved fore- casting of their future requirements for scientific and engineering per- sonnel. Although improved utilization of scientific and engineering man- power is primarily the responsibility of agency and departmental man- agers, there is need for action that will cut across departmental lines. The Civil Service Commission should assist the individual agencies in their planning of how many scientists and engineers â of what types â the government is likely to require in the future. The Civil Service Commission should, in addition, carefully review government personnel policies to determine which ones have or can have a significant effect on the environment in which research and develop- ment is carried out in government laboratories. Where changes in such policies seem advisable, authority to make them should be promptly sought. At the same time, the commission should aid and encourage agency heads and laboratory directors fully to use all existing authority to improve working environments. The Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commis- sion, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Department of 21
Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, and other government de- partments and agencies should periodically review the missions and programs of the mission-oriented research laboratories they finance in full, both those they operate directly and those operated under contract, in order to make sure (a) that their resources continue to serve high-priority national needs and objectives, (b) that the arrangements for their management and location provide them maximum opportunity to be strong and creative, and (c) that their programs and administrative arrangements are compatible with the objectives of the institutions with which they may be linked. The Committee suggests that the resources of the President's Science Advisory Committee could be called upon in conduct- ing these reviews and in arriving at decisions. The great national research centers financed by the government utilize large numbers of scientists and engineers. The missions of some of them, especially of those related to defense, have changed since their establishment. It is important that their present and future missions be clear-cut and of high priority, and that their use of scientists and engineers be unmistakably in the national interest. In maintaining these major concentrations of manpower, the government has a special respon- sibility to appraise them in terms of both their contributions to urgent government needs and their impact on the over-all utilization of scientists and engineers, taking into consideration the needs of the private sector of the economy. New ways to manage and house the large research laboratories of the federal government are needed. Some laboratories can be handled directly by the government, others by industry, by universities, and by non-profit corporations. It may be necessary to handle some of them in new ways. In the long future, it will probably be wise not to expect universities to manage such establishments unless there is no alternative for the government.
