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Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations (2014)

Chapter: 11 Findings and Recommendations

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Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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11

Findings and Recommendations

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee’s overall priorities are set out in the Key Recommendations, which represent the committee’s identification of the actions that it believes need to be taken to reduce the logistics burden and improve the efficiency of Army logistics. The first Key Recommendation carries the highest priority. The subsequent Key Recommendations follow the structure of the report and are essentially equally important. They address technologies, operating procedures to include resourcing, decision-making, education, joint and special operations support. If there is going to be substantive improvement in the logistics system the Army relies on for its sustainment, all of the Key Findings accompanying these recommendations must be recognized and all of the Key Recommendations addressed. They are substantively intertwined.

Key Findings and Recommendations either rest on one or more underlying findings and recommendations in the report body or represent a finding and recommendation drawn from the substance of the report or a section as a whole. Where the former is the case, the pertinent findings and recommendations are noted in brackets.

The committee’s priorities for R&D investments are given in Tables S-2 and 9-1 and represent the professional judgment of the committee in assessing the technologies behind the technology-based recommendations in the report. High priority investment areas represent a coalescence of a promise of a substantial reduction in logistics burden and/or a reduction in resource demands and a committee judgment that the programs are achievable within the next decade or sooner and meet an immediate operational need identified by the Army. However, these priorities are closely tied to the force structure the Army chooses or is directed to implement.

General

Key Finding 1. Logistics activities within the Army do not receive the attention necessary to ensure the effective sustainment of operational forces on the battlefield over the long term. This is because, unlike things that directly affect combat effectiveness, it is difficult to understand the ultimate impact of logistics activities on Army capability. In R&D, analyses, exercises, and planning, logistics challenges are often minimized or postponed to be addressed another day. As a result, when systems are developed or plans are executed, the logistics enterprise is placed in a catch-up position, significantly reducing its ability to support the ongoing operations. Capability requirements, along with off-the-shelf solutions that create logistics burdens, are outpacing the development and fielding of burden-reducing logistics and logistics-related technologies.

Key Recommendation 1. Senior Army leadership should ensure that adequate resources and priorities are given to logistics activities across the spectrum of Army activities, including research and development, analytical support, force structure, military education, and operational planning.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Water

Key Finding 2. As a matter of doctrine, bottled water is used in the initial stages of operations until the bulk purification, storage, and distribution of water can be established. The use of bottled water weighs heavily on the logistics systems, puts soldiers and civilians at risk to deliver it, and generates a significant waste burden. Because of the availability of contractor-provided bottled water in Iraq and Afghanistan, earlier peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, the Army reduced its organic active force capability to provide water at the point of need and is now heavily reliant on the use of bottled water.

Key Recommendation 2. The Army should rely on its existing water technologies, and adopt or develop appropriate additional technologies, to satisfy water demand at the point of need and limit the use of bottled water except where the situation dictates its use e.g. for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Fuel and Energy

Key Finding 3. Emerging technologies such as the improved turbine engine program and high-efficiency drive systems would provide significant reductions in fuel demand for aircraft, the M1 Abrams, and the M2 Bradley and increases in system efficiencies. Selective use of hybrid and electric vehicles in rear areas would reduce fuel demands. Use of high-efficiency auxiliary power units could not only reduce fuel demands but could also enable use of electric systems in vehicle design. Advancements in fuel cell design, micro- and smart-grid employment, and battery efficiency would similarly reduce the demand for fuel. Use of small modular nuclear reactors in rear areas could provide large-scale power sources. [This is based on Findings 3-12, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 3-17, 3-19, and 3-22.]

Key Recommendation 3. The Army should strongly support continued development and fielding of a portfolio of promising technologies to reduce fuel and energy demand, including acceleration of the improved turbine engine program and more fuel-efficient engines for the M1 Abrams and the M2 Bradley or their replacements, recognizing that it will take success in several areas to reduce the overall demand. [This is based on Recommendations 3-12 and 3-14.]

Ammunition

Key Finding 4. Precision munitions potentially offer significant reductions in required munition expenditures and qualitative improvements in effectiveness, thereby reducing ammunition demand and its logistics burden. The additional costs of precision munitions must be weighed against the total costs of employing nonprecision munitions in the aggregate, from the ammunition plant to the target. Similarly, initial tests of directed energy weapons have indicated both their effectiveness and the reduction in logistics support required for their employment. [This is based on Findings 3-25 and 3-27.]

Key Recommendation 4. The Army should adopt the use of precision munitions as widely as practical within mission requirements, and should use directed-energy weapons systems if ongoing tests are successful. [This is based on Recommendations 3-21 and 3-23.]

Key Finding 5. The planning of Army production, transportation, maintenance, storage, and expenditure of ammunition are carried out as relatively independent activities that have successfully supported military operations and has improved the efficiency of several elements of the ammunition supply chain. However, there is no indication that the Army is taking advantage of usage data from the past 25 years,

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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experience from changes in weapons technology over past decades, or future opportunities that may exist to lessen the ammunition burden. There has been no significant effort to examine ammunition as a system or which ammunition mixes will provide the optimum combination of fires effectiveness and logistics burden minimization. The recent “Improve/Lean & Control Phases (Combined) Gate Review” by the Program Executive Office Ammunition could provide the baseline for the development of the optimum mix of weapons system effectiveness and logistics burden reduction.1

Key Recommendation 5. As one of the largest logistics burdens faced by the Army, it is imperative that the Army maintain cognizance over all aspects of the ammunition supply chain and identify steps that could be taken to ensure the effectiveness of the support provided to combat units and the potential for reductions in the ammunition tonnages that needs to be moved in battle situations. The Army should conduct a comprehensive analysis of the ammunition system with a view toward linking analysis of battlefield experience with the operations of the system as a whole.

Soldier Systems

Key Finding 6. Over the past decade, the effectiveness of the individual soldier has been increased by on-person combat support systems. However, at the same time, the weight the soldier must carry has increased. Technologies for effectively meeting power demands for individual soldiers are emerging and offer the potential to reduce soldier load and increase soldier trust in the power reliability of carried systems. [This is based on Findings 3-28, 3-29, 3-30, 3-31, 3-32, 3-34, and 3-35.]

Key Recommendation 6. The portfolio of projects under way to reduce the weight of power supplies for an individual soldier should be given emphasis, and the resulting equipment should be fielded as soon as possible. [This is based on Recommendations 3-25, 3-26, 3-27, 3-29, and 3-30.]

Mobility

Key Finding 7. The Army will be dependent on its organic watercraft capabilities for much of its intratheater transportation in many areas of the world. The age and capabilities of the watercraft currently in the inventory will limit such support. They are slow, have insufficient capacity, are too few in number, are highly sensitive to sea state, and could be impediments to efficient and effective logistics in the Asia-Pacific theater. [This is based on Findings 4-2 and 4-4.]

Key Recommendation 7. The Army should maintain priority support for the acquisition of the Maneuver Support Vessel (MSV) (Light) and concurrent development of the MSV (Medium) and the MSV (Heavy). It should also consider the acquisition of the Ship-to-Shore Connector vessel under the Navy program. [This is based on Recommendations 4-2 and 4-3.]

Key Finding 8. Autonomous vehicle technologies offer a significant opportunity to automate military operations in an effort to improve logistics operations. Unmanned and remote-controlled helicopters and precision air drop systems can significantly reduce the demand for ground-based resupply of forward areas in high-risk or limited-access situations. Resupply operations over the last tactical mile could be efficiently performed by autonomous vehicles to reduce the risks to supply vehicle operators and lighten the load that small units currently must carry. Autonomous vehicles are ready to be deployed in

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1 Improve/Lean & Control Phases (Combined) Gate Review, September 12, 2012. Provided by Chris J. Grassano, Deputy Program Executive Officer Ammunition to Leon Salomon, committee member, by e-mail on May 16, 2014.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

constrained settings with limited obstacles and established routes. They are not yet ready to deploy in operational settings with rough terrain or unpredictable routes. Unmanned and remote-controlled helicopters have been effectively employed by the Marine Corps for resupply in Afghanistan on a test basis, and development continues. [This is based on Findings 4-9, 4-11, 4-12, and 4-13.]

Key Recommendation 8. Autonomous vehicle technologies should be implemented in phases, starting with what is possible now using semiautonomous technologies, such as leader-follower, so that incremental improvements to logistics can be realized as the technology matures. Research and development should be continued to develop these technologies for use in challenging, unpredictable environments that are currently beyond the capabilities of these technologies. The Army should work with the Marine Corps to combine research and development efforts to develop a common autonomous aerial support capability for logistics. The Army should continue to support rapid development and fielding of precision airdrop for sustainment to forward areas and pursue a helicopter-borne Joint Precision Airdrop System capability to expand its overall sustainment options and capabilities. [This is based on Recommendations 4-7, 4-10, and 4-11.]

Additive Manufacturing

Key Finding 9. Additive manufacturing provides an emerging capability to produce components in support of Army logistics system needs at the point of need and to improve the responsiveness of the Army maintenance system. Present additive manufacturing efforts are ongoing across the Army and are close to the state of the art. However, additional development is required to (1) fully realize the benefits of additive manufacturing and (2) make it widely useful forward of fixed facilities, such as depots, given the current heavy power demands and challenges in base material management and standard setting. [This is based on Findings 5-1 and 5-2.]

Key Recommendation 9. The Army should leverage the industry investments in additive manufacturing and support technology areas that map to the Army’s specific needs and implementation constraints. The Army should support standards development that would form the basis for qualifying components produced by additive manufacturing. [This is based on Recommendations 5-1 and 5-2.]

Logistics Enterprise Information System

Key Finding 10. The Army Logistics Enterprise System, which includes the Army Enterprise Systems Integration Program Hub, the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A), and the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP), is a viable approach to support efficient and effective logistics for the Army. The Army has expended considerable resources on implementing what may be the largest enterprise resource planning system ever. The other Services have a mixed record of success in implementing such systems. Successful implementation of the program will require strong and continuous support and an understanding by Army leadership of the challenges and opportunities that the continuously evolving systems will face. In addition to the ever-present technical issues that will develop, there will be a need to develop new decision support tools and applications that can utilize GCSS-A and LMP data and to pay attention to cybersecurity issues as the threats evolve. [This is based on Findings 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, and 6-4.]

Key Recommendation 10. To ensure that the Army Logistics Enterprise Systems is fully implemented and operated efficiently over its life, the Army should provide constant resource and organizational support for the Army Enterprise Systems Integration Program, the Global Combat Support System-Army, and the Logistics Modernization Program, even after full implementation of the initial systems and related

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

tools and applications. Without such support, the overall system will rapidly atrophy. [This is based on Recommendation 6-2.]

Key Finding 11. The U.S. Army logistics network has made considerable progress in improving in-transit visibility to the supply support activity and the unit motor pool. Estimated shipping dates and advanced shipping notices are routinely provided, which has improved availability and readiness. More confidence in the system might be realized by also letting the end user/soldier know about the availability of the item he or she requested from the supply system. The benefit of this would be a reduction in the current practice of placing redundant orders due to a lack of confidence in the supply system.

Key Recommendation 11. Using the capabilities of Global Combat Support System-Army and the Logistics Modernization Program, the Army, in conjunction with industry, should compare the costs and benefits of extending the in-transit visibility to the end user/individual soldier to those of the current systems. [This is based on Recommendation 6-5.]

Logistics Decision Support

Key Finding 12. Modeling and simulation and systems analysis capabilities in support of Army logistics are insufficient to evaluate, compare, and contrast various S&T initiatives and their respective impacts on both the force structure alternatives currently under consideration and the outcomes across the spectrum of operations. (This same condition was identified in the 1999 NRC report Reducing the Logistics Burden for the Army After Next. (NRC, 1999)) When systems are being developed, the results of logistics analyses are not quantified in terms of warfighting effects or the impact they might have on the logistics system as a whole (e.g., adding fuel capacity to a vehicle family may result in a need for additional fuel transport vehicles, with the accompanying additions to force structure). As a result, logistics systems and logistics requirements do not fare well when competing with other types of systems or subsystems. Because logistics decisions are complex and often mostly subjective and because they have great impacts on life-cycle cost, investment in decision support systems for logistics could result in significant savings over a system’s life cycle. The Army’s ability to perform informed logistic studies and analyses has eroded over the past two decades to the point where there is little intrinsic capability left to conduct these analyses. [This is based on Findings 6-15, 6-16, 6-17, 6-18, and 6-19.]

Key Recommendation 12. The Army should revitalize its logistics analysis capability by acquiring the necessary tools and qualified military and civilian analysts in quantities commensurate with the number and impact of logistics decisions that need to be made. Modeling, simulation, and analysis tools need to be improved to explicitly include logistics factors. [This is based on Recommendations 6-14 and 6-16.]

Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve

Key Finding 13. Contractors and the Army Reserve represent important elements of the Army and joint logistics team and, given the reductions in active military force structure, must be considered an essential component in the planning and execution of operations. They possess unique knowledge of the functions they may be called on to carry out and, in the case of contractors, on-the-ground experience in potential areas of operations. At present, they are excluded from participation in contingency planning until contracted or invited to do so. [This is based on Findings 7-1, 7-2, and 7-4.]

Key Recommendation 13. Both Army and combatant command leaders should integrate contractors and the Army Reserve into their contingency planning process from the beginning and on a continuous basis. Planners in both the Army and combatant commands should be schooled in the capabilities of contractor

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

organizations and the Army Reserve to assist in contingency planning. For contractors, this may require establishing ongoing contracts for the support of specific combatant commands or regions so they can engage in planning processes within the combatant commands. [This is based on Recommendations 7-1, 7-2, and 7-4.]

Key Finding 14. Guidelines for support of military operations over time by contractors are frequently formulated on the fly as operations evolve. This results in inconsistencies in the provision of services, competition among units and services, and a lack of attention to both potential support costs and the logistical burdens that are created. The necessity for these guidelines prior to the start of operations was a lesson learned in Vietnam. [This is based on Finding 7-3.]

Key Recommendation 14. Army leadership, in coordination with its sister Services, the Joint Staff, and combatant commanders, should establish guidelines for the support to be provided for contingency operations over time as the mission and needs develop. [This is based on Recommendation 7-3.]

Joint Logistics

Key Finding 15. Given the resource constraints that face today’s armed forces and the necessity to develop an effective joint fighting force, jointness in logistics is an imperative. The committee recognizes that transformation takes time and that moving to joint logistics represents a significant change in culture. However, it has been over a decade since the military community began serious discussions of joint logistics and nearly 5 years since the Joint Staff articulated a vision for integrated logistics, and signs of progress are limited. The committee, during its review and its interviews with senior logistics personnel, both retired and active, could not find strong evidence that the Army and the joint community were actively involved in implementing a joint logistics effort. There remains a strong belief among the leadership of the Services that their Title X responsibilities trump the authorities of the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to require the conduct of joint logistics operations. There was clear articulation that, absent directives from the Secretary of Defense, the services will not move rapidly to embrace joint logistics activities or aspects of joint operational activities. It is this committee’s opinion that the trump card for jointness should be held by the combatant commander since the execution of the strategy is the combatant commander’s responsibility.

Key Recommendation 15. Wherever possible and appropriate, the Army should strongly support and become a part of joint logistics and related research and development activities. As a starting point, the Army should review the status of implementation of Appendix B of the Joint Concept, Key Indicators of the Military Problem, along with the operational issues described in 2011 by the G-4 of the Army.

Logistics Support of Special Operations

Key Finding 16. Based on lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the Army’s new thrust to become more expeditionary, and the additional focus on geopolitical areas beyond the Middle East, an extraordinary opportunity has arisen for the Army and Special Operations Command to jointly revisit and redefine their working relationships in the areas of logistics and sustainment for their mutual benefit. [This is based on Findings 8-1 and 8-3.]

Key Recommendation 16. The Army G-4 should initiate discussions with Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to revisit existing logistics and sustainment support policies, agreements, and capabilities (including linked databases) with the stated objective of revising them for their mutual benefit. In parallel, the Army G-4, working in conjunction with the individual geographic combatant commands and

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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SOCOM, should determine the feasibility and acceptability of designating each Theater Army as the primary logistics and sustainment support organization for special operations forces in each geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility. [This is based on Recommendations 8-1, 8-3, and 8-4.]

Taking Advantage of Technology Innovation

Key Finding 17. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, and commercial organizations remain heavily involved in material development and technology innovation in areas directly relevant to Army logistics operations and sustainment goals. (1) Continuous monitoring of these efforts outside the Army and (2) collaborative efforts with other organizations offer opportunities for reductions in military expenditures for needed technologies and the early acquisition of systems that have been proven in the private sector. [This is based on Finding 8-4.]

Key Recommendation 17. In carrying out its material development programs, the Army should continue and, where appropriate, increase close collaboration with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, and commercial organizations in science and technology areas where these organizations are pursuing programs similar to those required by the Army. The Army should avoid duplication of efforts underway in other sectors wherever possible. [This is based on Recommendation 8-5.]

Logistics Science and Technology and R&D Strategy

Key Finding 18. There is no explicit strategy for Army investment in logistics and related goals, such as a 25 percent reduction in fuel consumption for a given system. Such a strategy is needed to guide efforts to reduce logistics requirements and to guide the non-logistics material development efforts that increase the logistics burden of the Army in the field. Without such a strategy and goals, the Army G-4 and the Army sustainment community are unable to effectively influence critical decisions in S&T and R&D. In addition, there is no explicit effort by the Army logistics community to closely monitor the S&T and R&D activities of the other elements of the Department of Defense or the defense industry to capitalize on S&T and R&D successes in those organizations and to integrate their new capabilities into consideration of a future joint logistics environment. [This is based on Findings 9-1 and 9-2.]

Key Recommendation 18. The Army, through the G-4 and with the support of the Combined Arms Support Command, should develop, staff, publish, and annually update an Army Logistics Science and Technology (S&T) and Research and Development (R&D) Strategy that clearly defines the long-range objectives for Army logistics, the programs that influence the attainment of these objectives, and the actions that will be taken to ensure the close integration of Army logistics enhancement activities with those of the joint and Department of Defense community and related industry. The Army Logistics S&T and R&D Strategy should include specific burden reduction goals, such as a 25 percent reduction in fuel consumption for a given system. Development of the Army Logistics S&T and R&D Strategy should be followed by development within the entire R&D community of a roadmap specifying the responsibilities and actions that need to be taken to ensure accomplishment of the objectives of the strategy. [This is based on Recommendations 9-1 and 9-2.]

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE CHAPTERS

Chapter 3—Reducing the Major Logistics Demands

Water

Finding 3-1. Specialized water generation ships have been designed by industry and could provide a useful expeditionary water capability in areas near oceans or seas.

Recommendation 3-1. The Army, working with the U.S. Transportation Command, should consider converting one or more small tankers for desalination of seawater to produce bulk potable water.

Finding 3-2. In appropriate climates, use of rain and atmospheric water may satisfy a significant portion of the water demand at the point of need. This can be accomplished with available equipment such as tarps, nets, and rain barrels, and simple changes to tents to collect water.

Recommendation 3-2. The Army should implement and, where necessary, develop methods to harvest water from the local environment, including rain and fog, to meet soldier water needs at the point of need.

Finding 3-3. Distillation may be a simpler, more efficient method of water purification than systems currently used by the Army. It can produce pure drinking water from any water feedstock with any sort of contaminant, including black water. Similarly, nanotechnology solutions may be able to effectively address Army water purification needs in appropriate settings.

Recommendation 3-3. The Army should develop distillation methods to meet soldier water needs at the point of need. The Army should also explore the use of existing nanotechnology solutions for water purification.

Finding 3-4. Current water filtration systems are focused at the Army’s company level and above. There is a need to develop and field individual water purification filters. Individual water filters would reduce the amount of water that has to be shipped forward.

Recommendation 3-4. The Army should field individual water filters as soon as possible.

Finding 3-5. Training soldiers in tactical units to perform water quality testing and providing them with suitably simple field equipment would enhance the timely production of safe water in the field.

Recommendation 3-5. The Army should develop a simple, portable water testing device that a squad can use to ascertain whether water is potable without having to wait for specialists to test it.

Finding 3-6. Water from exhaust is not yet ready to be used as drinking water. There are still many challenges to overcome, not least its taste. Still, it could be used to meet some of the demand for nonpotable water, and if the taste challenge can be overcome, it could have a very great positive impact on the provision of water on the battlefield.

Recommendation 3-6. The Army should continue its research on extracting water from diesel exhaust. It should also explore the use of water recovered with this technology for nonpotable uses. Specific goals, including affordability, minimal weight and power impact, and good taste should be provided to the research community. The Army should also suggest to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) that this may be a problem whose difficulty justifies their involvement.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

Finding 3-7. There is a wide variety of simple cultural and behavioral changes that could produce significant water savings.

Recommendation 3-7. Rather than relying solely on technical solutions for water conservation, the Army should aggressively pursue cultural and behavioral changes that would save water at no additional cost.

Finding 3-8. There is a wide variety of technical water conservation solutions. These range from commercially available devices to the system that the U.S. Army’s Engineer Research and Development Center is developing to recycle water in the field.

Recommendation 3-8. Commercially available water conservation devices should be adopted for use as widely as possible. Additionally, development work such as that of the U.S. Army’s Engineer Research and Development Center should be supported and the resulting water recycling systems fielded as quickly as possible.

Finding 3-9. Installing water meters on all water tanks and bladders would allow for the more effective monitoring and management of water usage.

Recommendation 3-9. The Army should install water meters on all water tanks and bladders.

Finding 3-10. Using flexible bladders to transport water could simplify the task of returning empties, increasing efficiency, providing greater utilization of flats, and reducing logistics demand for fuel.

Recommendation 3-10. The Army should consider replacement of water tank containers and hippos by more versatile flexible bladders riding on flats.

Finding 3-11. Where appropriate, pipeline is the most efficient method to deliver water to troops and bases. New pipeline systems are under development that will greatly increase the rate at which pipeline can be laid. Also, current pipelines are vulnerable to enemy action. There are commercial solutions available to address pipeline integrity and security, and these might prove useful for the Army to adapt to its needs.

Recommendation 3-11. The Army should develop self-monitoring pipelines that report interdiction, intrusion, tampering, and other detrimental activities. The Army should begin by exploring commercially available applications for pipeline monitoring to see if they can be adapted to its needs.

Fuel and Energy

Finding 3-12. The committee believes that the Improved Turbine Engine Program will provide significant reductions in aircraft fuel consumption and increases in aircraft engine efficiencies.

Recommendation 3-12. The Army should accelerate development and fielding of the Improved Turbine Engine Program.

Finding 3-13. The Air Force’s ADVENT program technologies have the potential to reduce fuel consumption, and their high-efficiency components may also reduce maintenance cost. These engines are likely to have high power density and high fuel efficiency. While the ADVENT program is directed a producing a fighter engine, there may be turbine engine technology synergies that could aid the Army’s Improved Turbine Engine Program.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

Recommendation 3-13. Without slowing down fielding of the Improved Turbine Engine Program, the Army should explore the possibility of working with the Air Force and industry partners to combine the relevant technologies of the Adaptive Engine Technology Development program and the Improved Turbine Engine Program to further reduce fuel consumption and improve performance.

Finding 3-14. Developing more fuel-efficient engines for the M1 Abrams and the M2 Bradley would result in significant fuel savings for the Army. As indicated in the discussion above, a diesel engine that uses approximately 50 percent fuel has been tested. The M2 uses a diesel engine. The Improved Turbine Engine Program is developing an engine with 25 percent greater fuel efficiency. The M1 uses a turbine engine.

Recommendation 3-14. The Army should develop more advanced engines for the M1 Abrams and the M2 Bradley, with a goal of 25 percent greater fuel efficiency as envisioned by the Improved Turbine Engine Program.

Finding 3-15. Hybrid propulsion offers significant improvement in fuel economy over conventional vehicles. Hybrids could also be used to transfer power to off-board applications or a base camp microgrid.

Recommendation 3-15. The Army should continue to develop hybrid drive technology and should adopt technologies that have been developed for commercial hybrid vehicles for use in military vehicles.

Finding 3-16. Auxiliary power units, particularly those based on fuel cells, are more fuel-efficient than engine-driven generators for onboard power generation, driving down fuel demand.

Recommendation 3-16. The Army should continue its efforts to implement auxiliary power units (APUs) on conventionally propelled vehicles. Moving to non-fossil-fuel APUs such as fuel cells when possible will result in greater efficiencies.

Finding 3-17. Pure electric vehicles might have some application in forward logistics bases and may further reduce the amount of fuel that must be brought forward to support operations at these bases.

Finding 3-18. Microgrids provide energy security for military facilities to assure reliable power without relying on a larger utility grid.

Finding 3-19. Microgrids and smart grids reduce the amount of fuel required to generate electric power by networking generators into a system in order to maximize efficiency, reducing fuel demand. Microgrids can also be used to help integrate renewable energy resources (e.g., wind and solar) into the grid, further reducing fuel demand.

Recommendation 3-17. The Army should expand its microgrid and smart grid deployment activity, focusing on incorporating fuel cells and renewable energy sources such as photovoltaic-based power generation systems for on-site power generation applications.

Finding 3-20. The Army is appropriately engaged in fuel cell research for onboard power generation in transportation applications.

Recommendation 3-18. The Army should continue to explore the possibility of using fuel cells wherever appropriate and to deploy them in the field.

Finding 3-21. Flexible photovoltaic cells could be an integral part of the electricity supply for a wide variety of applications, including tensioned awnings of photovoltaic cells and spools that are delivered in

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

containers. This could improve expeditionary operational energy capabilities and reduce the requirements for fuel delivery to a given location.

Finding 3-22. Deployable small modular reactors offer the promise of game-changing impacts to Army logistics if deployed at large bases in rear areas.

Recommendation 3-19. The Army should stay abreast of Department of Energy and Department of Defense research and development initiatives for small modular reactors (SMRs). Army logistics planning should include the possibility that SMRs will provide abundant electrical power, fuel, and water for its deployed forces.

Ammunition

Finding 3-23. A 50 percent reduction in ammunition weight will have an associated reduction in logistics demand.

Recommendation 3-20. As the Army considers replacing small-caliber arms, it should pursue caseless, polymer-cased, or case-telescoped small-caliber ammunition.

Finding 3-24. Increasing the shot-to-shot consistency of small-caliber ammunition increases its effectiveness, potentially reducing the amount of ammunition that needs to be used and the logistical demand for ammunition.

Recommendation 3-21. The Army should consider new bullet technology in concert with its evaluation of a lighter caseless round. The ideal outcome would be a more consistent, more effective round that weighs less, reducing both the number of rounds that need to be used and the per-round weight, thereby reducing the logistical demand for this ammunition.

Finding 3-25. Precision munitions offer the potential for significant reductions in munition expenditures and qualitative improvements in effectiveness. A reduction in munitions expended also has benefits in other areas, such as a reduction in fuel used to transport munitions and in the number of convoys necessary to do so. As noted in the 1999 NRC report on logistics, the effectiveness of precision munitions is directly related to the ability of the force to locate and precisely identify targets (NRC, 1999). Significant progress has been made in this regard.

Recommendation 3-22. The Army should adopt the use of precision artillery munitions as widely as practical within mission requirements.

Finding 3-26. Using conventional materials with innovative, redesigned packaging, the weight of transportable, packaged ammunition has been significantly reduced. Redesign can also be used to minimize the amount of waste left over from packaging.

Recommendation 3-23. The Army should consider replacing conventional ammunition packaging materials with advanced ones, such as carbon fiber tubes, as widely as possible. Also, packaging design should be examined with an eye to reducing leftover waste that needs to be disposed of.

Finding 3-27. Among the many programs with a wide variety of applications across several domains (maritime, space and missile defense, ground-based air defense, etc.), one Army program in particular has achieved significant success: the High Energy Laser–Mobile Demonstrator (HEL-MD). The interacting

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

effects of system effectiveness (lethality) and logistics reduction potential are so significant that the cost exchange ratio can actually be reversed.

Recommendation 3-24. The Army should accelerate the remaining HEL-MD test schedule. Pending success, and consistent with risk mitigation strategies, the Army should expedite production, deployment, and fielding of systems derived from the HEL-MD.

Soldier Power

Finding 3-28. Reduction in the number and types of batteries soldiers have to carry and better management of the power to the equipment and tools they carry would ease the demand on logistics systems by reducing the demand for batteries.

Finding 3-29. State-of-charge indicators on batteries would allow soldiers to have confidence in the actual state of charge of their batteries and, with appropriate command guidance, would allow fewer batteries to be used.

Recommendation 3-25. The Army should require that the batteries it uses have state-of-charge indicators so soldiers can have more confidence in their batteries.

Finding 3-30. Flexible photovoltaic cells emplaced on soldier’s clothing could reduce the number of batteries soldiers have to carry.

Finding 3-31. Lithium–air batteries have a very high energy density, longer life span, and higher power density than lithium-ion and conventional batteries. This technology holds the potential to significantly reduce the number of batteries soldiers must carry and, accordingly, the number of batteries that must be recharged or delivered fresh to the unit. In addition, in the longer term, they can also be used for vehicle propulsion systems, thus extending the range and reducing total fuel consumption.

Recommendation 3-26. The Army should continue its research in lithium–air batteries for soldier power and other applications and leverage commercial investments in lithium–air battery technologies that can be applied to Army requirements. An emphasis should be placed on rechargeable lithium–air batteries.

Finding 3-32. Small radionuclide power sources could significantly reduce the battery logistics demand and the number of batteries soldiers must carry. This is a long-term effort.

Recommendation 3-27. Given their promise, the Army should closely monitor the research and development of small radionuclide power sources by industry and other government agencies, with a goal of eliminating as many replaceable batteries as possible.

Finding 3-33. Universal battery chargers eliminate the need for having different chargers for different types of batteries. They are lightweight, portable, and can be combined with a variety of power sources.

Recommendation 3-28. The Army should continue to advance the universal battery charger technology and work with the companies engaged in this area to deploy them as soon as possible.

Finding 3-34. Wireless charging has the benefits of improving and automating the battery recharging process and reducing the number of batteries needed for soldier power.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Recommendation 3-29. The Army should develop a plan to evolve to a wireless charging and wireless power distribution system.

Finding 3-35. Although the Integrated Soldier Power and Data System is a step in the right direction, it still does not solve many of the problems related to weight, ease of use, recharge time, and the significant number of batteries that would still have to be carried by the soldier. The Fully Connected Power and Data Architecture proposed by Draper Laboratory has the potential to solve many of these problems.

Recommendation 3-30. The Army should continue to work with the Draper Laboratory to advance the research on the Fully Connected Power and Data Architecture and implement these systems as soon as possible.

Finding 3-36. There has been little discipline in reducing the number of different batteries now used.

Recommendation 3-31. The Army should identify a small set of battery types and develop a strategy to incentivize the use of these battery types in future equipment development.

Chapter 4—Logistics Mobility

Mobility Into and Within the Theater

Finding 4-1. There is a critical need to enhance the ability to deploy and sustain Army units and their heavy equipment to austere environments using a variety of vessels and platforms. This necessitates that Army leadership support expansion and rapid execution of the current and follow-on programs.

Recommendation 4-1. The Army should continue to work with the Navy to bring the synergy of the large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ship; the Joint High Speed Vessel; and mobile landing platform together into an operational system to enhance its flexibility in responding to contingency operations. This necessitates that Army leadership press forward on achieving closure in this area by continued involvement in the U.S. Navy 30 year ship building program and pursuing congressional funding to execute procurement of these vessels and programs.

Finding 4-2. The landing craft currently in the inventory are an impediment to efficient logistics in the Asia-Pacific theater. They are aged, slow, have insufficient capacity, are too few in number, and are highly sensitive to sea state.

Finding 4-3. The three planned classes of the Maneuver Support Vessel are an important step forward in Army landing craft capabilities. It is vital that these improved capabilities be introduced into the Army as soon as possible.

Recommendation 4-2. The Army should proceed with the development of the Maneuver Support Vessel (MSV)-Light with all speed and should proceed with the MSV-Medium and MSV-Heavy concurrently with the MSV-Light.

Finding 4-4. Existing aging Landing Craft Air Cushion require considerable maintenance, though they are undergoing a service life extension program, and they have limited capacity. Their maximum speed is very sensitive to sea state.

Finding 4-5. The existing ship-to-shore connector acquisition program is targeted to meet the needs of the U.S. Marine Corps, with 72 units planned.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Finding 4-6. The ship-to-shore connector program presents an opportunity for the Army to modernize its landing craft fleet.

Recommendation 4-3. The Army should ensure that its needs are reflected in the ship-to-shore connector acquisition program.

Logistics Over the Shore

Finding 4-7. Many elements in the Army’s maritime logistical chain, including causeways, are sensitive to sea state and do not function in sea state 3 or higher. Also, performance in complex surf environments is not well characterized.

Recommendation 4-4. The Army should support or conduct research and development efforts to improve ramp interfaces, causeway connectors, causeway motions, crane heave compensation, and other components to permit operations in sea states of 3 or more.

Recommendation 4-5. The Army should monitor work to develop methods, systems, and/or procedures to create a lee or otherwise dampen waves and swell to reduce the sea state.

Finding 4-8. The Military Sealift Command has only one offshore petroleum distribution system vessel. Without having port facilities accessible by tankers, the Army could be highly dependent on this one vessel. There is thus great risk to this capability from breakdown, damage, or enemy action.

Recommendation 4-6. The Army should press for the Navy and/or U.S. Transportation Command to procure additional vessels of this type, and for the acquisition of equipment in modular packages to rapidly convert tankers or other suitable platforms into offshore petroleum distribution system vessels.

Mobility Ashore

Finding 4-9. Autonomous vehicle technologies offer a significant opportunity to automate military operations in order to improve logistics operations. They are ready to deploy in constrained settings with limited obstacles and established routes. They are not yet ready to deploy in operational settings with rough terrain or unpredictable routes. This capability could be achieved in 2-5 years, given a properly funded and implemented research and development program.

Recommendation 4-7. Autonomous vehicle technologies should be implemented in phases, starting with what is possible now using semiautonomous technologies such as leader-follower so that incremental improvements to logistics can be realized as the technology matures. Research and development should be continued to develop these technologies for use in challenging, unpredictable environments that are currently beyond their reach.

Finding 4-10. Convoy operations are highly repetitious tasks that could utilize today’s existing autonomous vehicle technology to reduce manpower requirements and reduce risk to the vehicle operators.

Recommendation 4-8. The Army should implement secure leader-follower vehicle technology (a vehicle follows a fiducial on the vehicle in front of it), which does not require 360-degree awareness and can be done with low-cost sensors using Autonomous Mobility Appliqué System technology.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Finding 4-11. Autonomous vehicle technology could be utilized to lighten the load dismounted warfighters currently must carry. Also, resupply operations in the last tactical mile could be efficiently performed by autonomous vehicles to reduce the risks to supply vehicle operators.

Recommendation 4-9. The Army should develop and field autonomous platforms to provide logistical support in the last tactical mile by assisting in carrying supplies and equipment to the warfighter in the field.

Finding 4-12. Unmanned and remote-controlled aerial assets have been utilized by the Marines to provide logistics support.

Recommendation 4-10. The Army should work with the Marines to undertake research and development on a common autonomous aerial support capability for logistics.

Finding 4-13. Precision air drop of sustainment materiel could significantly reduce the demand for ground-based resupply of forward areas. It could take trucks off the road and reduce personnel risk. A helicopter-based Joint precision air drop system capability is being developed that could both reduce Army dependence on other Service assets and expand the number of assets that can be used in a sustainment role, adding flexibility to the sustainment mission.

Recommendation 4-11. The Army should adopt precision air drop for sustainment to forward areas as widely as practical. It should also pursue a helicopter-borne Joint precision air drop system capability to expand its overall sustainment options and capabilities.

Chapter 5—Maintenance, Retrograde, and Waste

Maintenance

Finding 5-1. Additive manufacturing provides a capability for producing components in support of Army logistics system needs at the point of need. Additive manufacturing efforts are ongoing across the Army and are close to the state of the art. However, further technology development is required to fully realize the benefits of additive manufacturing. Owing to its particular energy and materiel demands, additive manufacturing will happen at the depot level for the time being.

Recommendation 5-1. The Army should leverage the industry investments being made in the field and support technology areas that map to the specific needs and implementation barriers of the Army. The Army should support standards development that would form the basis for qualification of components. The Army should work with the other services to address standards for additive manufacturing and certification of parts for procurement.

Finding 5-2. The Rapid Equipping Force’s Expeditionary Additive Manufacturing Laboratory is a solid foundation on which to introduce additive manufacturing capabilities into the Army’s logistics enterprise, as appropriate.

Recommendation 5-2. The Army should continue to support activities initiated by the Rapid Equipping Force to develop a distributed additive manufacturing network that makes use of both organic and commercial capabilities. This network would be utilized to determine the applicability of additive manufacturing to critical Army components as well as to qualify procedures. It would include depots and

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

both academic and industrial laboratories. It could also be a test-bed for integrating field-based maintenance requirements into a distributed design and manufacturing network.

Finding 5-3. Condition-based maintenance–plus (CBM+) supports the goals envisioned in force-multiplying technologies for logistics by enabling the reduction of process costs in the logistics enterprise.

Finding 5-4. CBM+ has the potential to significantly reduce the Army’s logistics expenditures.

Recommendation 5-3. The Army should require the implementation of CBM+ on all future Army major system acquisitions without the possibility of waivers.

Connecting CBM to the Supply Chain

Finding 5-5. Connecting CBM+ demand information directly to the supply chain could enable advanced scheduling of line reparable unit replacement and preclude replacement before needed. This approach could identify the need to replace a part before it fails. Field testing has demonstrated that such a connection to the inventory system can significantly reduce the requirement for forward stocking of repair parts and dramatically reduce customer (i.e., tactical unit) demand uncertainty.

Recommendation 5-4. As prognostic credibility and accuracy for CBM+ advances, the Army should adopt connecting CBM to the supply chain as inventory management policy, as described above.

Retrograde

Finding 5-6. The potential for further improvement in retrograde seems considerable. The various depot-level reparable (DLR) network links and flows, including reverse pipeline flow, depot production and scheduling operations, and forward supply chain flow, must be connected and afforded in-transit visibility. Then the Army’s extensive investment in DLR assets can be reduced and, through better management within a synchronized, closed-loop supply chain, both current readiness and future capability can be improved.

Recommendation 5-5. The Army should recognize the potential for efficient retrograde operations to enhance unit readiness. It should adopt a new paradigm of readiness-responsive retrograde as discussed above for the crucial closed-loop retrograde supply chain within the larger logistics enterprise.

Finding 5-7. The potential for retrograde improvement using the Intelligent Collaborative Aging Aircraft Spare Parts Support project and the Visualization of Logistics Data project appears enormous. When used in conjunction with improved reverse logistics, these could pave the way toward a truly synchronized retrograde, enabling a responsive closed-loop supply chain with reduced requirement objectives and improved materiel availability and operational readiness.

Recommendation 5-6. The Army should adopt capabilities offered by both the Intelligent Collaborative Aging Aircraft Spare Parts Support project and the Visualization of Logistics Data project as first steps to incorporate predictive analytics toward a synchronized retrograde closed-loop supply chain. These concepts should be further extended, and adapted as appropriate, to sustain other fleets as well, including ground-based systems.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Finding 5-8. Resurrecting a sea-based maintenance and repair concept would be consistent with the Army’s evolution toward more robust sea-basing as a practical response to the growing anti-access, area denial environment.

Recommendation 5-7. The Army should re-establish a sea-based mobile repair capability for aviation and consider expanding the sea-basing concept to support maintenance and repair for ground systems as well.

Finding 5-9. Regionally aligned multipurpose aviation sustainment brigades would provide more efficient and responsive reverse logistics support to the major combatant commands.

Recommendation 5-8. The Army should adopt a regionally aligned force structure for multipurpose aviation sustainment brigades.

Waste

Finding 5-10. It appears to be possible to reduce the waste burden on the logistics system by redesigning packaging, packaging items more efficiently, and minimizing any unwanted materiel so less waste is created in the first place, as demonstrated by the First Strike Ration.

Finding 5-11. Waste-to-energy technology holds promise for generating energy for forward and contingency operating bases. This technology will probably be less applicable to smaller bases and outposts. A key challenge to implementing such a technology is the presence of small-arms ammunition in the military waste streams.

Recommendation 5-9. The Army should act to eliminate the challenge of small arms ammunition in waste streams for waste-to-energy solutions. This could be done by developing hardened systems that can withstand ammunition cooking off, by developing efficient methods for the removal of ammunition from waste streams, or by training soldiers to not discard unexpended ordnance.

Chapter 6—Logistics Enterprise Information Systems and Decision Support

Logistics Enterprise Information System

Finding 6-1. The Global Combat Support System-Army and the Logistics Modernization Program form a viable approach to address the issues of in-transit visibility and efficient logistics operations, and to form the basis for the development of robust decision aids.

Finding 6-2. The Army has expended considerable resources on implementing what may be the largest enterprise resource planning (ERP) system ever. There is a mixed record of success among the other Services implementing ERPs.

Recommendation 6-1. The Army should make full use of the experience and lessons learned by other Services in implementing its enterprise resource planning systems so as to maximize its chances of success.

Recommendation 6-2. The Army should realize that the enterprise resource planning system will be a continuously evolving product with ever-increasing functionality. The programming and budgeting process should recognize this by providing a continuous funding stream for evolution and upgrades as

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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well as the expected growth in functionality. Army leadership should provide ongoing resource and organizational support for the Global Combat Support System-Army and the Logistics Modernization Program even after full implementation of the system in order to reap the maximum benefits from its investment.

Finding 6-3. There is the need for a redundant computational capability/infrastructure and data backup for the Global Combat Support System-Army and the Logistics Modernization Program.

Finding 6-4. The Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army) and the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) use the SAP enterprise resource planning password system, which may not be sufficient for their security needs.

Recommendation 6-3. Army Enterprise Systems Integration Program leadership should implement further redundancy, data backup, and security measures for the Global Combat Support System-Army and the Logistics Modernization Program.

Finding 6-5. Data integrity is absolutely vital to the success of the Global Combat Support System-Army and the Logistics Modernization Program and for the development of future decision aids. It was not clear from information provided to the committee if the system developers have paid sufficient attention to data integrity.

Finding 6-6. In a Joint environment, the necessity for interoperability among service enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems will become more pressing. It also may be necessary to similarly connect U.S. ERP systems with allied military ERP systems for coalition operations, although this may raise new security issues.

Recommendation 6-4. The Army should continue its efforts to have Global Combat Support System - Army interact with sister Service enterprise resource planning systems. This capability should also include the Logistics Modernization Program. The Army should work on achieving similar, secure interoperability with allied enterprise resource planning systems via federation for coalition operations.

Finding 6-7. Differences of opinion between the public and private sector continue to exist on how far the in-transit visibility system should extend.

Recommendation 6-5. The U.S. Army, in coordination with commercial supply chain companies, should look at the cost /benefits and advantages/disadvantages of extending the in-transit visibility system to the end user/soldier.

Finding 6-8. The Army continues to encounter challenges, posed by the operational shortcomings described above, with use of radio frequency identification technologies, and these challenges are affecting in-transit visibility.

Recommendation 6-6. The Army should develop robust, reliable radio frequency identification tags that address operational shortcomings experienced with current tags.

Finding 6-9. Technology demonstrated recently will allow for better visibility of in-theater fuel supply.

Recommendation 6-7. The Army should continue to develop and field technologies that improve visibility for in-theater fuel supply levels.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Making Better Logistics Decisions

Finding 6-10. The application of advanced analytics, systems analysis, and emerging information technologies (e.g., enterprise resource planning systems) provides a powerful opportunity to create effective enterprise decision support systems.

Recommendation 6-8. The Army should strongly support the application of advanced logistics analytics to develop enterprise decision support systems in conjunction with emerging information technologies, sensor-based technologies, and supply chain simulation technologies.

Finding 6-11. The Army currently has no processes, plans, procedures, funding, people or other resources aimed at encouraging the logistics community to develop and propagate apps and higher level tools using data from the Global Combat Support System-Army, the Logistics Modernization Program, or other data systems to improve the decision process.

Recommendation 6-9. The Army should take advantage of contributors at all levels to develop and distribute apps and other tools to fully realize the potential of the Global Combat Support System-Army. A concept similar to those used in commercial app stores should be implemented to distribute such tools and provide ratings for them.

Finding 6-12. The Army lacks a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan incorporating effective decision support analytical tools (i.e., operations research) along with the appropriate IT required to enable and provide the decision support needed to achieve cost-effective, performance-oriented results. In this era of dramatic resource constraints, the Army logistics community must better harness and apply operations research and strategic analytics across the materiel enterprise.

Recommendation 6-10. To obtain the full decision support potential of the integrated logistics enterprise, the Army should ensure that enterprise resource planning system data transactions and management information systems are complemented by the operations research capabilities needed to conduct modern analytics. The goal should be effective integration of analytics into organizational decision making.

Recommendation 6-11. The Army should develop an engine for innovation for the logistics community and adopt, apply, and refine management innovation as a strategic technology (see Appendix F).

Finding 6-13. Inadequate attention has been focused on the long-standing need to correct numerous problems in supply chain management, including persistent deficiencies in demand forecasting, inventory policy, and strategic resource planning.

Finding 6-14. Unlike pre-Milestone C technology readiness levels for major acquisition programs, there are no Joint and/or Army requirements for post-Milestone C sustainability assessments.

Recommendation 6-12. The Army should adopt critical supply chain management policies—catalysts for innovation—and apply a sustainment readiness level (SRL) maturity model concept to both currently fielded systems and new systems in development. The Army should further extend the SRL concept, particularly mission-based forecasting, beyond Class IX to other classes of supply as well, especially III and V.

Finding 6-15. When systems are being developed, the results of logistics analyses are not quantified in terms of warfighting effects. As a result, logistics systems and logistics requirements do not fare well when competing with other types of systems or subsystems.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Recommendation 6-13. The Army should develop and implement methodologies to quantify the warfighting effects of logistics in analyses.

Finding 6-16. Because logistics decisions are complex, are often mostly subjective, and often have great impacts on life-cycle cost, an investment in logistic decision support systems could result in significant savings over a system’s life cycle.

Finding 6-17. Modeling and simulation resources (personnel and tools) are insufficient at Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center-Fort Lee to evaluate, compare, and contrast various science and technology initiatives and their respective impacts on both the force structure alternatives currently under consideration and operational outcomes across the spectrum of operations.

Finding 6-18. Institutional enterprise-wide modeling, simulation, and analytical capacity for conducting strategic logistics is fragmented and is inadequate to provide the cause-and-effect understanding essential for designing the force of the future.

Recommendation 6-14. The Army should revitalize its logistics analysis capability by acquiring the necessary tools and qualified people in quantities commensurate with the number and impact of logistics decisions that need to be made.

Recommendation 6-15. The Army should educate its leadership about what is possible in logistics analysis, and about the importance of demanding analyses of alternatives using common metrics.

Finding 6-19. The Army’s ability to perform logistics studies and analyses has eroded over the last 25 years to the point where there is inadequate organic capacity left to conduct the rigorous analyses required to responsively support fact-based decision-making. An analytical renaissance is desperately needed, long overdue, and a precondition for achieving the significant improvement that is not only possible but also can be realized within a relatively short time frame (a few years rather than decades).

Recommendation 6-16. The Army should make an appropriate investment in organizing the Army analytical community to better support the materiel enterprise. Such an investment is a precondition for sustainment excellence.

Recommendation 6-17. In addition to rebuilding analytical capacity within the materiel enterprise, the committee strongly suggests a more comprehensive assessment of the state of operations research across the entire Army using an evaluation construct that includes analytical capacity, capability, utilization, organization, and contribution.

Chapter 7—Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve

Integrating Contractors into Planning and Operations

Finding 7-1. Contractors are frequently seen by the combatant commands as outsiders who are brought into military planning only after critical decisions are made rather than beforehand, so they can be part of the planning process. Indeed, contractors are an important element of the logistics team and, given the reductions in active military force structure, must be considered as an essential component in the planning and execution of operations.

Recommendation 7-1. Both Army and combatant command leaders should formulate plans and operations to integrate contractors into these operations from the beginning.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Finding 7-2. Contractors have indicated to the committee that they are prepared to be active participants in planning military operations and that they possess not only knowledge of the functions they may be called on to carry out but also ground experience in the potential areas of operations. At present they are excluded from participation in contingency planning until contracted to do so.

Recommendation 7-2. Planners in both the Services and the combatant commands should be schooled in the capabilities of contractor organizations to assist in contingency planning. The contracting organizations should provide for the continuous participation of contractors in the military planning process. This may require establishing on-going contracts for support of specific combatant commands or regions within the combatant commands.

Finding 7-3. Standards for support of military operations by contractors are frequently formulated on the fly, as operations evolve. This results in inconsistencies in the provision of services and a lack of attention to both potential support costs and the logistical burdens that are created.

Recommendation 7-3. Combatant commanders, in coordination with the Services and the Joint staff as part of contingency planning, should establish a uniform level of support to be provided over time for each contingency operation.

The Army Reserve

Finding 7-4. The Army Reserve is an indispensable element in the conduct of Army sustainment operations, but their employment must be carefully orchestrated to ensure that their capabilities are put to use in a timely and efficient manner. Army Reserve planners can provide accurate information on the response times for units being considered for employment in expeditionary operations. The opportunity to involve Army Reserve expertise in the planning process for contingency operations is often not exercised.

Recommendation 7-4. Combatant commands and theater Army components should include Army Reserve elements in their planning for contingency operations, especially when elements of the operation may require the use of specialties present only in the Reserve element.

Chapter 8—Optimizing the Logistics Effort

Logistics Support of Special Operations Forces

Finding 8-1. There are opportunities to more tightly integrate Army and special forces logistics. For instance, it may be practical and desirable to designate each theater Army as the primary logistics and sustainment support organization for special operations forces in each geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility.

Recommendation 8-1. The Army G-4, working in conjunction with the individual geographic combatant commands and special operations command (SOCOM), should determine the feasibility and acceptability of designating each theater Army as the primary logistics and sustainment support organization for special operations forces in each geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility. A good test case for such an arrangement would be to examine the recent redeployment of special operations forces to Iraq to assess the feasibility of the concept and obtain valuable lessons learned in the process. Doing so would enable all parties (e.g., the Army, SOCOM, and Central Command) to build on previous efforts and experiences gained in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Giving Logistics Its Due

Finding 8-2. Logistic activities within the Army do not receive the attention necessary to ensure the effective sustainment of operational forces on the battlefield over the long term. Currently there is no management tool that allows the G-4 to track the resources allocated to logistics across the program evaluation groups. A logistics-centric look at those programs that reduce the logistics burden and make the logistics system more efficient—across the science and technology, research and development, procurement, operations and maintenance, and procurement phases—would provide the G-4 the information to track all the resources being applied to making logistics more effective and efficient.

Recommendation 8-2. Army leadership should develop a logistics-centric resource management system or program that will allow senior Army leadership to ensure that adequate resources and priorities are given to logistics activities across the spectrum of Army activities, to include research and development, analytical and decision support, force structure, and operational planning.

Finding 8-3. Army personnel not directly engaged in logistics need better training and education about their roles in facilitating logistics support and driving logistics demand. There also needs to be better education of both Army and special operations forces (SOF) personnel about the Army’s role in supporting SOF and improving coordination in this regard. Including logistics activities in training and exercises and war games would be useful in this regard.

Recommendation 8-3. The commander of Training and Doctrine Command should undertake a review of the logistics content of Professional Military Education across all levels to determine where insertion of logistics education would be appropriate. Specific attention should be paid to courses that include individuals likely to be responsible for in-theater contracting activities and support for special operations forces (SOF). Precommand courses should cover how Army Special Forces are employed and how their Service-common and SOF-unique needs are appropriately supported. Consideration should also be given to the inclusion of logistics activities in war games and at the National Training Center.

Recommendation 8-4. If an agreement is reached for the Army to provide primary logistics support to special operations forces (SOF), the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should join with the Special Operations Command-Joint Capabilities organization within the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Joint Special Operations University to create two sets of courses, a TRADOC set and a SOCOM set. The TRADOC courses should enable Army personnel to understand the proper employment of SOF in general and their associated support. Conversely, the SOCOM courses should familiarize SOF personnel with the logistics and sustainment support organizations and associated capabilities that the Army can provide to them when they have been assigned to a Theater Special Operations Command. Establishing a program to teach SOF commanders about the Army supply system and processes and how to effectively integrate themselves into the Army logistics network while they are deployed in a Joint area of operations, may also be necessary.

Taking Advantage of Technology Innovation

Finding 8-4. Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, and commercial activities remained heavily involved in material development and technology innovation in areas directly relevant to logistics operations and sustainment goals. Continuous monitoring of the efforts of entities outside the Army and collaborations with them offer opportunities for reducing military expenditures for needed technologies and for the early acquisition of systems that have been proven in the private sector. The Army should avoid duplication of efforts under way in other sectors wherever possible.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Recommendation 8-5. In carrying out its material development programs, the Army S&T community should continue and increase, where appropriate, close collaboration with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, and commercial organizations in S&T areas where these organizations are pursuing program similar to those required by the Army.

Chapter 9—Logistics-Centric Science and Technology and Research and Development Investment Strategy

Setting an Azimuth

Finding 9-1. There is no explicit Army investment strategy to guide efforts that would reduce the logistics burden of the Army in the field and that would guide nonlogistics efforts that greatly affect the logistics burden of the Army in the field. Without such a strategy, the Army G-4 and the Army sustainment community are unable to effectively influence critical decisions in science and technology and research and development.

Finding 9-2. There is no explicit effort by the Army logistics community to closely monitor the science and technology (S&T) and research and development (R&D) activities across other Department of Defense components, or to capitalize on the S&T and R&D successes in those organizations and to integrate any new capabilities into considerations of possible future joint logistics environment.

Recommendation 9-1. The Army, through the G-4 and with the support of the Combined Arms Support Command, should develop, staff, publish, and annually update an Army strategy for science and technology and research and development that clearly defines the long-range objectives for Army logistics, the programs that will influence the attainment of these objectives, and the actions that will be taken to ensure the close integration of Army logistics enhancement activities with those of the Joint and DoD-wide community.

Finding 9-3. Establishing specific, quantitative objectives is an effective tool in any successful science and technology and research and development strategy. This needs to be followed by a roadmap of actions and required resources, responsibilities, and time lines.

Recommendation 9-2. A strategy for Army logistics science and technology and research and development should include specific objectives for the reduction of the logistics burden. It should also include a roadmap laying out the responsibilities and actions the overall research and development community needs to take to ensure that the strategy objectives are accomplished.

Taking Advantage of Industry Work

Finding 9-4. The Army would benefit from monitoring and leveraging industry work on technologies and systems that would reduce logistics burdens.

Recommendation 9-3. When developing the science and technology and research and development strategy and the related roadmap, the Army should identify and include areas for potential industry-military partnership, whereby progress by one party will accelerate progress by the other.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Implementing Logistics Science and Technology and Research And Development

Finding 9-5. Many logistics-related science and technology and research and development programs seem to be stuck in continual development without proceeding to the field. Faced with diminishing resources and the need to field equipment to meet current and future demands, waiting until the perfect solution is discovered is no longer a feasible approach.

Recommendation 9-4. The Army should work to rapidly identify the logistics-related science and technology and research and development programs that best support current and projected needs and adequately fund them to ensure fielding sooner rather than later. Where major breakthroughs could occur in the future, low-level science and technology work should also continue.

REFERENCE

NRC (National Research Council). 1999. Reducing the Logistics Burden for the Army After Next: Doing More with Less. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Suggested Citation:"11 Findings and Recommendations." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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The mission of the United States Army is to fight and win our nation's wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders. Accomplishing this mission rests on the ability of the Army to equip and move its forces to the battle and sustain them while they are engaged. Logistics provides the backbone for Army combat operations. Without fuel, ammunition, rations, and other supplies, the Army would grind to a halt. The U.S. military must be prepared to fight anywhere on the globe and, in an era of coalition warfare, to logistically support its allies. While aircraft can move large amounts of supplies, the vast majority must be carried on ocean going vessels and unloaded at ports that may be at a great distance from the battlefield. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, the costs of convoying vast quantities of supplies is tallied not only in economic terms but also in terms of lives lost in the movement of the materiel. As the ability of potential enemies to interdict movement to the battlefield and interdict movements in the battlespace increases, the challenge of logistics grows even larger. No matter how the nature of battle develops, logistics will remain a key factor.

Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations explores Army logistics in a global, complex environment that includes the increasing use of antiaccess and area-denial tactics and technologies by potential adversaries. This report describes new technologies and systems that would reduce the demand for logistics and meet the demand at the point of need, make maintenance more efficient, improve inter- and intratheater mobility, and improve near-real-time, in-transit visibility. Force Multiplying Technologies also explores options for the Army to operate with the other services and improve its support of Special Operations Forces. This report provides a logistics-centric research and development investment strategy and illustrative examples of how improved logistics could look in the future.

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