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Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations (2014)

Chapter: 7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve

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Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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7

Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve

Contractor support for military operations has been part of the history of the armed forces since the Revolutionary War. The Army Reserve is a 20th century addition to the military forces of our nation. Under the law, the reserve forces are a federal entity to “provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components” (10 U.S.C. 10102). This report does not consider the relative merits of using contractors versus Reserve capabilities. This would be a complex matter to address and whether to use contractors or Reserve capabilities in a given situation would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

HISTORICAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

Contractor roles have been varied. They have supplied materiel needed to support U.S. and allied forces and their activities. They have maintained and repaired equipment, built and operated camps and bases, and provided basic logistics support (e.g., power, food, and sustainment services) to those in those camps and bases. As technology has become more complex, contractor personnel are performing maintenance and repair of high-tech equipment (e.g., helicopters) in the theater of operations beyond the unit level.

This contractor support is provided by U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and local nationals. This support is administered through three types of contracts: theater support, external support, and system support. Theater support contracts are handled by contracting personnel deployed to the theater operating under the military services, special operations commands, or joint contracting authorities. External support contracts are administered by contracting organizations that do not derive their authority directly from theater support or system support authorities; they include the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracts, which since the early 1990s have provided nearly $15 billion in support to deployed U.S. forces, primarily base support. System support contracts are put in place to “provide support to newly fielded weapons systems, including aircraft, land combat vehicles, and automated command and control systems” and are normally administered by Service system materiel acquisition program offices (DoD, 2011). Figure 7-1 indicates the size of the contractor workforce in Iraq from 2008 to 2012 and the breakdown among functions performed by the contractors.

Figure 7-2 shows the size of the contractor workforce, by functional area, in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2012. In 2014 a different breakout was used, and that is shown in Table 7-1.

Table 7-2 provides the breakdown in Afghanistan of the contractor workforce among U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and local personnel.

In March 2014 the ratio of contractors to military personnel for the U.S. and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan was 1.34:1. In July 2012, it was approximately 0.97:1 (Livingston and O’Hanlon, 2014). In Iraq there was an average of 1.1 contractors per deployed Service member (DSB, 2014).

Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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images

FIGURE 7-1 Contractor personnel and their functions in Iraq, 2008-2012. SOURCE: DSB (2014).

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FIGURE 7-2 Size of the contractor workforce, by functional area, in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2012. “Other” includes Defense Logistics Agency, Army Materiel Command, Air Force External and Systems Support contracts, Special Operations Command, and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. SOURCE: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Support, CENTCOM, Quarterly Contractor Census Reports, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/CENTCOM_reports.html.

TABLE 7-1 Contractor Support Breakout in Afghanistan, 2014

Support Function Number of Contractors Support Function Number of Contractors
Base support 6,834 Translator/interpreter 4,889
Communications support 2,451 Transportation 5,064
Construction 7,877 Medical/dental/social services 283
Logistics/maintenance 20,568 Management/administrative 5,316
Security 5,591 Other 791
Training 1,788    

NOTE: “Other” includes Defense Logistics Agency, Army Materiel Command, Air Force External and Systems Support contracts, Special Operations Command, and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.
SOURCE: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Support, CENTCOM, Quarterly Contractor Census Reports, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/CENTCOM_reports.html.

Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

TABLE 7-2 Breakdown of Contractor Personnel in Afghanistan in 2010, 2012, and 2014

Date Total Contractors U.S. Citizens Third Country Nationals Local and/or Host Country Nationals
April 2014 61,452 20,865 19,235 21,352
April 2012 117,227 34,765 37,898 44,564
May 2010 112,092 16,081 17,512 74,499

SOURCE: Livingston and O’Hanlon (2014).

STUDIES OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

The contracting process and the effectiveness of contracting have been the subject of several major studies and commission reports over the last decade, including the following:

• Congressional Budget Office, Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces, October 2005;

• Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, October 2007;

• Defense Science Board, Improvements to Services Contracting, March 2011;

• Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, August 2011;

• Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting: DOD Initiative to Address Audit Backlog Shows Promise, but Additional Management Attention Needed to Close Aging Contracts, December 2012; and

• Government Accountability Office, Contractor Performance: DOD Actions to Improve the Reporting of Past Performance Information, June 2013.

In July 2014, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations released a report that was a follow-up to the above-referenced reports and studies and was an independent review of the subject by the task force. The report reviewed increasing contractor participation in activities in the theater of operations, noting that

The growth of contracted support per member of the military committed to a mission in the major conflicts is driven by many factors. Clearly, more sophisticated weapons systems drive the need for specialized support and highly skilled personnel. Improvements in the scale and scope of military living standards have also driven up the number of support personnel. Political constraints can also affect the allocated uniformed force strength and this uncertainty can drive the use of contracted support.

The extent that contracted support was used in recent conflicts is remarkable. For the majority of the duration of each contingency conflict, the number of contractor personnel was equal to or larger than organic military personnel. At one point there were over 160,000 contingency contractor personnel in Iraq (DSB, 2014).

The report also found that “over 2,600 fatalities and 22,400 serious injuries were reported for contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011” (DSB, 2014, p. 12).

After completing its review of the previous findings and conducting its own interviews and analysis, the task force found that

• Strategic leadership across the Department does not yet recognize OCS (operational contract support) as a critical component of combat readiness.

Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

• Contractor support is critical to military performance during all types of military and humanitarian contingency operations, and has been since the Revolutionary War.

• Planning for deployed contractor support is essential.

• Risk management assessment needs to be part of planning and readiness.

• Execution and management of contingency contracts is crucial, often complex, and costly in both wartime and peacetime missions.

• The capability to audit contingency contracts in a timely manner is essential, and is far more important than the existing emphasis in the Department. (DSB, 2014, p. 3)

Based on its findings, the task force identified the need for DoD to do the following:

• Establish the role of contracted support of deployed military operations within the total force mix;

• Ensure leadership accountability across the Department and in the combatant commands for operational contract support in their area of responsibility;

• Institute a readiness measurement capability and institute accountable measures of success for operational contract support as a component of combat readiness;

• Develop and implement a risk management plan for operational contract support; and

• Ensure timely audits of contingency contracts that are useful for contract management. (DSB, 2014, p. 14)

INTEGRATING CONTRACTORS INTO PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

While this committee did not examine contracting procedures in detail, it did find that contracting has become an essential part of logistics operations, and that conducting Army operations under current force structure conditions without contractor support would be extremely challenging. The Army has accepted the fact that contractors will be present in operational areas to provide maintenance and repair services for complex equipment, carry out many logistics functions, and provide other services as necessary to U.S. and allied forces. In many potential contingency areas, contractor personnel are already working with the local population to carry out other (commercial) missions. They have experience operating in these areas and have established contacts with key organizations and personnel who will be needed in the event of military activity in that area. They are also able to rapidly mobilize for support of military contingency needs. In areas where distance plays a large factor, contractors can become available days, if not weeks, before military units can carry out critical sustainment operations.

This committee found that contractors are frequently seen by combatant commands as outsiders who are brought into military planning only after, not before, critical decisions have been made and are not part of the planning process. Thus there is a lack of understanding on the part of both service personnel and combat command staff about the role of contracting in a theater of operations (this is also cited in the Defense Science Board report). This results in inefficiencies in the provision of support, unnecessary costs, and poorer performance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff J-4 has prepared templates that could be used to plan contractor support and which might provide a useful starting point for defining standards of sustainment in different situations.

Finding 7-1. Contractors are frequently seen by the combatant commands as outsiders who are brought into military planning only after critical decisions are made rather than beforehand, so they can be part of the planning process. Indeed, contractors are an important element of the logistics team and, given the reductions in active military force structure, must be considered as an essential component in the planning and execution of operations.

Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

Recommendation 7-1. Both Army and combatant command leaders should formulate plans and operations to integrate contractors into these operations from the beginning.

Finding 7-2. Contractors have indicated to the committee that they are prepared to be active participants in planning military operations and that they possess not only knowledge of the functions they may be called on to carry out but also ground experience in the potential areas of operations. At present they are excluded from participation in contingency planning until contracted to do so.

Recommendation 7-2. Planners in both the Services and the combatant commands should be schooled in the capabilities of contractor organizations to assist in contingency planning. The contracting organizations should provide for the continuous participation of contractors in the military planning process. This may require establishing on-going contracts for support of specific combatant commands or regions within the combatant commands.

Contractors respond to client requests and generally do their best to meet these requests within the limits of the contracts. Since contractors are also evaluated based on performance (and penalized for client complaints), they logically go out of their way to ensure client satisfaction. Their goal, however, is to make the customer happy, not to ensure the most efficient provision of logistical support. It is up to the combatant commander to set the guidelines for what is and is not to be provided to deployed soldiers.

During the early stages of an operation, when the focus is on support of ongoing combat operations, the support requirements are battle oriented. As an operation transitions from the initial crisis to longer-term operations (e.g., counterinsurgency, stabilization, and nation building) and the client seeks to improve the conditions under which military personnel operate, support requirements change. In the absence of theater standards for logistics support—for example, what foods are served, the number of meals per day, the amount of air conditioning and power generation required, and standards of maintenance—client requests can become open-ended.

Under open-ended conditions, competition among contractors and their logical desire to please the clients not only increases the cost of contractor support but can dramatically increase the logistics burden of meeting these demands. A failure to establish reasonable theater standards for sustainment not directly related to combat (i.e., nonexpeditionary) sustainment can have significant negative effects on logistics operations in a theater. The reverse situation, clearly established standards, can reduce not only the logistics burden but also the casualties that result from the necessity of assigning more personnel to satisfy increased logistics burdens (e.g., more convoy operations). Establishing support standards in a Joint way, together with the other Services and in conjunction with the Joint staff, would provide the greatest benefit and ensure commonality across the operational area. The necessity for preoperational establishment of these standards was a lesson learned in Vietnam (Dunn, 1991).

Finding 7-3. Standards for support of military operations by contractors are frequently formulated on the fly, as operations evolve. This results in inconsistencies in the provision of services and a lack of attention to both potential support costs and the logistical burdens that are created.

Recommendation 7-3. Combatant commanders, in coordination with the Services and the Joint staff as part of contingency planning, should establish a uniform level of support to be provided over time for each contingency operation.

Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

THE ARMY RESERVE

The Force

As of September 2013, there were 198,209 soldiers in the selected Army Reserve. The selected Reserve includes units and individuals within the Reserve structure designated as essential to initial wartime missions. Reserve soldiers typically are assigned to units near their home location and participate in monthly weekend drills and summer exercises. They may be involuntarily called to active duty under a number of circumstances, the most normal of which are related to wars or armed conflicts. Prior to 1990, Reserve call-ups were infrequent, but, according to a recent Congressional Research Service report (2014), the picture has changed. During the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), 238,729 reservists of all the Services in the National Guard were involuntarily activated. During Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn (2001 to May 27, 2014), 896,815 Reserves and Guard personnel were involuntarily and voluntarily activated (Kapp and Salazar Torreon, 2014).

Sustainment Challenges

Approximately 50,000 individuals in the Reserve force are assigned to sustainment units or specialties. As the Army adjusts its force structure to increase the number of soldiers in direct combat, more sustainment troops are moved into the Reserve force. Certain military specialties and types of units, such as those dealing with water production, petroleum pipelines, strategic transportation management, and terminal operations, are found primarily or almost totally within the Reserve force, and it is this type of organization that is critical to the ability to rapidly sustain combat operations. When all is working well, an Army Reserve unit that is being called up is given 30 days’ notice of their deployment. This is followed by field training at U.S. installations to ensure that the mobilized forces are adequately prepared for their assignments. The total time between notification and the appearance of a unit at an embarkation location may range from two to several months.

While the Reserve forces have proven their capabilities time and time again, once they arrive in a theater of operations, the tyranny of time and distance can have significant impacts on their ability to provide the sustainment operations. In some cases the absence of their unique skills can delay or severely impede operations requiring these skills. For this reason, the Army Reserve has initiated programs to make available to combatant commands and Army theater components planning teams whose members not only will be able to assist in developing computer contingency plans but also will provide to the planners information about the capabilities of the specialized reserve units. It is not unusual to find that within a higher-level headquarters there is limited knowledge about the types of units and their capabilities involved in complex logistical operations such as those that occur at ports and critical transit locations. Unfortunately, the offer by the Army Reserve to provide planning assistance is often overlooked by the combatant commands and Army theater components.

Finding 7-4. The Army Reserve is an indispensable element in the conduct of Army sustainment operations, but their employment must be carefully orchestrated to ensure that their capabilities are put to use in a timely and efficient manner. Army Reserve planners can provide accurate information on the response times for units being considered for employment in expeditionary operations. The opportunity to involve Army Reserve expertise in the planning process for contingency operations is often not exercised.

Recommendation 7-4. Combatant commands and theater Army components should include Army Reserve elements in their planning for contingency operations, especially when elements of the operation may require the use of specialties present only in the Reserve element.

Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×

REFERENCES

CBO (Congressional Budget Office). 2005. Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces. http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/10-20-militarylogisticssupport.pdf.

Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations. 2007. Urgent Reform Required: Expeditionary Contracting. http://www.army.mil/docs/Gansler_Commission_Report_Final_071031.pdf.

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 2011. Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks. http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929213820/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf.

DoD (Department of Defense). 2011. Operational Contract Support. DODI 3020.41. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302041p.pdf.

DSB (Defense Science Board). 2011. Improvements to Services Contracting. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA550491.pdf.

DSB. 2014. Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/CONLOG_Final_Report_17Jun14.pdf.

Dunn, C.H. 1991. Base Development in South Vietnam 1965-1970. http://history.army.mil/books/Vietnam/basedev/index.htm.

GAO (Government Accountability Office). 2012. Defense Contracting: DOD Initiative to Address Audit Backlog Shows Promise, but Additional Management Attention Needed to Close Aging Contracts. GAO-13-131. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-131.

GAO. 2013. Contractor Performance: DOD Actions to Improve the Reporting of Past Performance Information. GAO-13-589. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-589.

Kapp, L., and B. Salazar Torreon. 2014. Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30802.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-73,94.

Livingston, I.S., and M. O’Hanlon. 2014. Afghanistan Index. Also including selected data on Pakistan. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20140514.pdf.

Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
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Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×
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Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×
Page 131
Suggested Citation:"7 Use of Contractors and the Army Reserve." National Research Council. 2014. Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/18832.
×
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The mission of the United States Army is to fight and win our nation's wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders. Accomplishing this mission rests on the ability of the Army to equip and move its forces to the battle and sustain them while they are engaged. Logistics provides the backbone for Army combat operations. Without fuel, ammunition, rations, and other supplies, the Army would grind to a halt. The U.S. military must be prepared to fight anywhere on the globe and, in an era of coalition warfare, to logistically support its allies. While aircraft can move large amounts of supplies, the vast majority must be carried on ocean going vessels and unloaded at ports that may be at a great distance from the battlefield. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, the costs of convoying vast quantities of supplies is tallied not only in economic terms but also in terms of lives lost in the movement of the materiel. As the ability of potential enemies to interdict movement to the battlefield and interdict movements in the battlespace increases, the challenge of logistics grows even larger. No matter how the nature of battle develops, logistics will remain a key factor.

Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations explores Army logistics in a global, complex environment that includes the increasing use of antiaccess and area-denial tactics and technologies by potential adversaries. This report describes new technologies and systems that would reduce the demand for logistics and meet the demand at the point of need, make maintenance more efficient, improve inter- and intratheater mobility, and improve near-real-time, in-transit visibility. Force Multiplying Technologies also explores options for the Army to operate with the other services and improve its support of Special Operations Forces. This report provides a logistics-centric research and development investment strategy and illustrative examples of how improved logistics could look in the future.

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