“The goal of naval forces must be to always find the best reaction to a surprise, using the fullest measure of knowledge, intelligence, experience, and talent that can be brought to bear.”
Responding to Capability Surprise: A Strategy for U.S. Naval Forces, 2013
RESPONDING TO CAPABILITY SURPRISE: A STRATEGY FOR U.S. NAVAL FORCES (2013)
This report, conducted at the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, examines the issues surrounding capability surprise, both operational and technical, facing the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The report selects a few surprises from across a continuum of surprises, from disruptive technologies, to intelligence-inferred capability developments, to operational deployments, and assesses what the Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about them while being mindful of future budgetary declines. The report then examines which processes are in place or could be in place in the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard to address such surprises.
U.S. NAVAL FORCES’ CAPABILITIES FOR RESPONDING TO SMALL VESSEL THREATS (2013)
This classified report, conducted at the request of the former Chief of Naval Operations, examines U.S. Naval Forces’ capabilities for responding to the potential exploitation of small vessels by adversaries. The terms of reference of the study are to (1) characterize known and potential small vessel types that could be potentially exploited by terrorists or small groups acting as agents of hostile governments; (2) identify U.S. regions of interest, both within and outside the continental United States, that could be potentially threatened by the use of small vessels; (3) review and assess the adequacy of current and planned U.S. Naval Forces’ policies, strategies, approaches, and capabilities; (4) identify promising science and technology areas for U.S. Naval Forces’ capabilities for responding to these potential small vessel threats; and (5) recommend any other initiatives, excluding budgetary and organizational, that should be undertaken. An abbreviated version of this report is also available.
IMPROVING THE DECISION MAKING ABILITIES OF SMALL UNIT LEADERS (2012)
This report, conducted at the request of the former Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, recommends operational and technical approaches for improving the decision making abilities of small unit leaders, including potential acquisition and experimentation efforts that can be undertaken by the U.S. Marine Corps. Since the Marine Corps is engaged in hybrid warfare, in which all modes of warfare are employed, such as conventional weapons, terrorism, and disruptive technologies, the report examines the various complex environments, the existing abilities, and gaps in the abilities of the small unit leaders to include technology, skill sets, training, and measures of effectiveness.
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR U.S. NAVAL FORCES (2011)
This report, conducted at the request of the former Chief of Naval Operations, addresses the potential national security implications of climate change for U.S. Naval Forces. While the timing, degree, and consequences of future climate change impacts remain uncertain, many changes are already underway in different regions of the world, such as in the Arctic, and call for action by U.S. naval leadership in response. The report provides both the near- and long-term implications for U.S. Naval Forces of trends such as increases in territorial disputes in the Arctic, elevated demand for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and sea level rise.
INFORMATION ASSURANCE FOR NETWORK-CENTRIC NAVAL FORCES (2010)
This report, conducted at the request of the former Chief of Naval Operations, examines information assurance (IA) in the context of naval mission assurance. Owing to the expansion of network-centric operating concepts across the Department of Defense (DOD) and the resulting threat to information and cyber security from individuals, groups, nation states, and malicious insiders, IA has been a cause for growing importance and concern. This report presents its case for action through a discussion of the following subjects: (1) the threat to IA; (2) the technology trends that contribute to potential IA and mission threats; and (3) a review of DOD and Navy Department initiatives deployed to help mitigate these trends and threats. The report then presents arguments for additional actions that the Navy should undertake in its longer-term operational and technical response to IA-related mission threats.