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11 Training for Emergency Responses Performing well in the transition from routine to emergency situations depends on the complex interaction of a host of environmental, organiza- tional, and individual variables. Team effectiveness in an emergency is influenced by numerous factors such as leadership, personality, unit cohe- sion (Griffith, 1987), physical fitness (Martens and Landers, 1970), and sleep schedule topics that have been addressed in previous chapters. The main focus of this chapter is on training approaches that can be used to offset decrements in performance that might occur in the transition. As discussed in the previous chapters, numerous ways to sustain effec- tive performance have been detailed in the literature: (1) Leadership-soldiers who lack trust in their leadership are more susceptible to battle shock (e.g., Kopstein et al., 1985~. (2) Unit cohesion variables such as crew stability and common expe- rience are linked to resistance to combat stress (Griffith, 1987~. Unit cohe- sion is developed as a result of working and training as a crew over pro- longed periods of time. (3) Personality several experiments involving the use of different motor tasks have demonstrated that individuals with moderate levels of trait anxi- ety perform better than individuals with low or high levels of trait anxiety (Martens and Landers, 1970~. (4) Physical conditioning-fitness may attenuate decrements in cogni- tive work capacity. Pleban et al. (1985) found that physical fitness had a 248
TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSES 249 beneficial effect in an encoding/decoding task requiring prolonged mental effort, particularly as sleep loss and other stresses began to mount. (5) Stress management techniques soldiers who are equipped to man- age stress are likely to be more successful than those not so equipped. FM 26-2, Management of Stress in Army Operations (U.S. Department of the Army, 1983), was written to assist soldiers in managing stress. (6) Systems design technological advances offer the opportunity to enhance the capability of systems, but without the careful consideration of the match of system requirements and cognitive abilities, the promise of technology may not be achieved. The U.S. Army's MANPRINT program (Booher, 1990) has demonstrated that integration of manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, system safety, and health hazard con- siderations in the system design process can enhance soldier performance. Without considering soldier-system interactions, a variety of unforeseen problems can result from the application of technology such as automation (Moray and Huey, 1988~. (7) Job-person match recent research has demonstrated the potential importance of developing classification-efficient multidimensional assign- ment measures for increasing operational performance of soldiers (Johnson and Zeidner, 1991~. The importance of general cognitive ability to job performance has been well documented (Hunter and Schmidt, 1982~. This most recent research on differential assignment theory suggests that impor- tant gains in performance can be achieved through differential classification of individuals and assignment of crews. Furthermore, system designers need more refined information about intraindividual abilities to more ad- equately match equipment and individual capabilities (Zeidner and Johnson, 1991). (8) Human resource management-commanders and soldiers who search for innovative solutions to labor-intensive tasks, who weigh the costs and benefits of taking prudent risks, and who instill the need for work/rest/sleep discipline should survive longer under demanding conditions than those who do not. (9) Training well-learned responses appear less subject to interfer- ence from extraneous environmental influences and the effects of sleep loss than less well-learned responses. Also, soldiers who are well trained are more confident in their abilities (e.g., Adams, 1971) and better able to share task responsibilities than those who are less well trained. The first part of the chapter describes a number of training challenges. The second part provides a training framework and addresses specific find- ings related to the question of how training can increase the probability of adequate performance. The chapter concludes with a discussion of realistic training approaches and potentially important areas for future research.
250 WORKLOAD TRANSITION TRAINING CHALLENGES The generic requirements for competent task performance in an emer- gency situation were outlined in Chapter 1. The specific performance require- ments of monitoring, navigation, situation awareness, decision making, strate- gic planning, communications, procedure following, and perceptual-motor interaction span the continuum from performance of complex, problem- solving tasks to routine, procedural tasks. For example, the crew of any complex system should be capable of performing certain tasks automati- cally, while the crew leader must possess the adaptability to apply multidi- mensional thinking and decision making when appropriate. Because the knowledge requirements are so diverse and evolve as people move up in responsibility, the training demands for these different kinds of activities are also very different. This assertion is supported by a recent article by Glaser (1990), who reviewed research findings from studies of three major aspects of competent performance related to the challenges presented above: (a) proceduralized knowledge and skill, (b) self-regulatory skills and perfor- mance control strategies to foster comprehension, and (c) structured knowl- edge and mental models for problem solving. He speculates that procedural skills that are "knowledge lean" may be learned in one way, whereas cogni- tive skills may be learned in different, more complex ways. TRAINING AND SKILL RETENTION The goal of training for emergency responses is to ensure that the method of training induces rapid, accurate performance. It is reasonable to assume that one of the best criteria to guarantee such performance is that the skills called on are retained well. In this regard, a host of variables are known to influence the retention of skills (Adams, 1987; Schendel et al., 1978; Wells and Hagman, 1989~. Some of the key variables include: type of task, amount of practice, type of practice, testing, and level of original learning. These variables are discussed in the following paragraphs. Type of Task Not all tasks are forgotten at the same rate. For example, procedural tasks are forgotten in days, weeks, or months, whereas continuous control tasks typically are remembered for months or years. Rose et al. (1985) and Shields et al. (1979) found that task characteristics that are readily available from existing documentation are accurate predictors of retention perfor- mance. This information can be used to determine the amount and kind of refresher training required to maintain skilled performance. Based on reviews of the literature and extensive field tests, Rose et al.
TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSES TABLE 11.1 Task Characteristics Related to Retention Job/Memory Aided Length Built-in Logic to Steps Number of Facts Movement Demands Quality of Job/Memory Aids Definite Step Sequence Mental Requirements Complexity of Facts Time Demands 251 (1985) identified and evaluated a large set of variables that could be used in a model to predict retention loss for specific tasks. The final set of task characteristics is shown in Table 11.1. Operational definitions of these task characteristics were developed and compiled to form a model. In tests of over 300 individual soldier tasks, these characteristics have been found to reliably predict proficiency levels for individual tasks. In similar research, Rossmeissl and Charles (1988) developed a model to predict the cognitive requirements of human task performance. They identified 12 factors that were particularly important in determining job or task difficulty. These factors, listed in Table 11.2, were found to be significant predictors of task difficulty in tests using Army subjects. The approaches described above can be used to predict training require- ments, and also as a design aid to assist in allocation of functions or tasks between humans and machines. In short, they can be used to "design out" the most difficult training tasks. Amount of Practice A skill will not be acquired until it is practiced (Hinrichs, 1976~. Ob- servations drawn from a review of the literature on exceptional performance indicate that such performance depends most heavily on enormous motiva- tion and continued practice over a period of years (Schendel, 1987~. How TABLE 11.2 Cognitive Requirements Model Evaluation Factors Working Memory Quantity of Data Multiple Processing Time Psychomotor Long-Term Memory Task Repetition Decision Making Data Interpretation Problem Solving Environment
252 WORKLOAD TRANSITION ever, as Schneider (1985) points out, "practice makes perfect" may be an . . Overgeneral~zat~on. Schneider (1985) developed guidelines for training high-performance skills based on the proposition that performance results from the interaction of two qualitatively different forms of processing: controlled and auto- matic. Controlled processing is slow and requires attention from the per- former to deal with novel tasks or task rules that are inconsistent over time. Automatic processing is fast and requires little or no attention on the part of the performer. For perceptual tasks, Schneider (1985) found that under conditions of prolonged practice, the processing of information moves from controlled processing to automatic processing, when the task has consistent components. The rules and findings were developed out of basic research on developing visual skills, in which Schneider found that skill develop- ment relates to the heterogeneity of components. A consistent task compo- nent is one in which the performer makes the same response to a stimulus every time (i.e., the performer pushes the same button every time a red light comes on). A varied component is one in which the performer may respond one way to a signal under certain conditions, and another way under a different set of conditions. Performers show large improvements with prac- tice on consistent task components, but not on varied task components. Subsequently, Schneider's dichotomy of controlled processing (and incon- sistent mapping) and automatic processing (consistent mapping) has been extended to accommodate cognitive rule-based skills as well (Kramer et al., 1990~. In an extensive review of the effects of repetition and practice, Wells and Hagman (1989) conclude that repetition, necessary or even desirable, is the key factor in learning, retention, and transfer of skills, but the required amount of repetition depends on the training requirements. They found that, if the goal is to enhance performance of a specific task, then the more repetitions, the better. If the goal is to enhance problem solving and trans- fer to new tasks, then fewer specific repetitions are recommended along with an increase in variety. Type of Practice By systematically altering practice to encourage information processing activities, one can generate enhanced performance capabilities (Schmidt and Bjork, 1989~. Experimental evidence shows that conditions that make per- formance during the acquisition phase most effective are often least effec- tive for learning, as measured by retention and transfer tests (Wickens, 1992~. In contrast, conditions that force more elaborate processing during acquisition and that may slow the rate at which performance improves dur- ing acquisition often lead to more and better learning and better retention.
TRAINING FOR EA/IERGENCY RESPONSES 253 An example is guided training, in which the learner is consistently led through the correct sequence of responses. While error-free performance will result during training, the fact that the learner will not have been al- lowed to choose the responses on his own will depress later transfer. Some guidance will be useful, but too much can be counterproductive. Additional research is needed to understand the processes underlying these empirical findings. Testing Testing has been shown to improve the long-term retention of skills better than study alone. For example, in one experiment on the long-term retention of verbal materials, researchers found that an immediate test trial performed after 10 study trials reduced error frequency nearly 50 percent as compared within 10 study trials without the test trial (Allen et al., 1969~. Another important reason for testing is that it motivates learners to study by demonstrating to the individuals their skill levels. People are not very good at estimating and reporting their own skill levels. Most studies find low correlations between how well people say they are going to perform and how well they actually perform. In addition, most people overestimate their skills. In one study conducted for the Army, over 75 percent of the soldiers tested predicted higher scores in a rifle marksmanship test than they actu- ally obtained (Schendel et al., 19841. Level of Original Learning All of the variables discussed above have been linked to performance after retention. However, the single most important determinant of reten- tion is level of original learning. As an example, Fleishman and Parker (1962), using a three-dimensional flight control task, found high positive correlations (.80 to .98) between learners' initial learning levels and later retention. More important, the strength of these correlations was high and unchanging over retention intervals ranging from one month to two years. Given that the single most important determinant of skill retention is level of original learning, the key is to ensure a high degree of original learning. Knowledge of results or feedback (externally provided informa- tion about the correctness of a response), is commonly regarded as the single most important variable for learning (Winstein and Schmidt, 1990~. It is a critical source of information and motivation during learning. To assure high levels of original learning, overtraining (or mastery training) may be more effective than proficiency training (that is, training one to successful performance). This was demonstrated by Schendel and Hagman (1982), who trained reserve soldiers to perform an assembly/disassembly
254 WORKLOAD TRANSITION task. Mastery training was found to be superior to proficiency training across an eight-week retention interval. In addition to increasing the probability of competent performance after the retention interval, other advantages are associated with higher levels of original learning. These are the ability to perform tasks with minimal men- tal effort (automatic processing) at lower levels of perceived workload and with less interference from the effects of stress. These advantages are discussed below. TRAINING AND WORKLOAD Gopher and Donchin (1986) point out that practice has an important impact on the perception of workload. As parts of task performance be- come automatic, there is a reduction of resource costs in a system driven by automatic compared with controlled processes. Therefore, the level of prac- tice that an individual has at the time of performance may dramatically reduce perceived workload or increase it instantly when novelty is encoun- tered. Lysaght et al. (1989), in their review of workload methodologies, point out that training and specific skill acquisition extend an individual's capa- bility to handle workload. However, they go on to point out that certain contributors to high workload, such as the necessity to perceive faster, are not amenable to training. Many of these factors are related to and limited by an individual's cognitive abilities. This is an area of research that re- quires greater study. To some extent, training reduces workload at the same time that it improves performance. However, in order to achieve the expected improve- ment of performance during training, workload reductions may occur at a slower rate than performance improvements. Each time a transition from one position or vehicle to another occurs, workload may be quite high until new skills are mastered, and unfamiliar tasks, procedures, and responsibili- ties become familiar. Even for crew members who are highly experienced in their current position, transition to a new environment (e.g., being trans- ferred from the United States to a foreign country or from peacetime to wartime conditions) will create a temporary increase in workload and may affect performance. TRAINING APPROACHES In the study of complex human performance, Glaser (1990) found that (1) learning takes place by active application of knowledge in the context of working on specific problems, (2) the key to learning complex cognitive tasks was the explication and modeling of the appropriate problem-solving
TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSES 255 structure and procedures or strategies entailed in competent performance, (3) strengthening of existing knowledge was enhanced by practice that minimized error, and (4) failure or conflict triggered new learning, except for the auto- matic process of knowledge compilation. Although Glaser (1990) found these commonalities, he found a dichotomy in instructional approaches. In one, the mastery approach, the instructor controls and builds the specific learning sequence. In the other, the learner is in control of the problem- solving approach and shapes his or her experience in an environment that assists and supports his or her performance. This dichotomy may be due to differences in subject matter (cognitive and problem-solving skills versus proceduralized knowledge) as well as a difference in research traditions and values. Since the learning of complex tasks and performances occurs over weeks and months and goes through many stages, both the mastery and problem- solving approaches to training of complex tasks is required. In a previous section, evidence was presented that the level of original learning is a key determinant of later performance. Assuming this is the case, training ap- proaches must be developed that optimize retention of the array of tasks that must be performed in an emergency situation. For the tank crew, the challenge is how to structure training to ensure that: (1) the crew performs as a coordinated, interactive team; (2) the commander makes the correct decisions given the specific conditions; (3) the crew communicates inter- nally as a team and externally as a member of a larger unit; (4) each mem- ber is prepared to fill roles of missing members in the case of undermanning or combat casualties; and (5) each member performs his individual and team roles and tasks in the context of the battlefield environment (external stressesJ. The primary decision maker, or commander, must have the op- portunity to practice emergency problem-solving and decision-making as well as routine proceduralized tasks. Practice under realistic? challenging conditions will allow better use of mental resources for the nonroutine ele- ments of the emergency situation. The following paragraphs describe three training approaches that ap- pear to have particular relevance for the training of tank crew members, as well as other teams or crews that may be required to respond to emergency situations. While considerable research has addressed the potential dangers in seeking excessive realism in simulator environments (Hawkins, 1987; Jones et al., 1985), the three approaches discussed below are noteworthy because their developers have sought to incorporate those specific elements of realism that encourage positive transfer to operational environments. The three approaches, Simulation Networking (SIMNET), embedded training, and crew or cockpit resource management (CRM) training, provide realistic training and testing to promote the long-term retention of skills. CRM training is discussed in the previous chapter. We discuss below the advan
256 WORKLOAD TRANSITION sages and disadvantages of the other two training approaches and suggest recommendations for research. Training Complex Tasks Through Simulation Networking (SIMNET) Realistic training improves a soldier's ability to withstand combat stress (Frank, 1982~. The realistic sights and sounds of the battlefield help to develop the soldier's knowledge of himself, his enemy, and his weapons. In the earlier examination of the performance processes involved in tank crew performance, it was noted that the tank commander position involves the greatest training and performance demands. Decision-making and problem- solving skills, in addition to procedural knowledge, appear to be the pre- dominant skill requirements for successful performance. This analysis im- plies that the highest payoff for training in the tank crew environment would involve enhancing the cognitive skills of the commander. In other words, training should enhance the commander's skill to recognize and respond appropriately to new or uncommon problems or create more effective ways to solve old problems. SIMNET provides this opportunity (Ropelewski, 19893. It represents the leading edge in realistic, large-scale, low-cost com- bat training exercises. SIMNET was developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Army. Training is achieved through a net- work of disbursed combat simulators. Fully manned and separated, tank platoons and companies can fight battalion-size battles. The battles can involve the full range of command and control and supporting elements, including helicopters and fixed-wing air support. SIMNET allows trainees to practice the range of communication and decision-making tasks and roles in a realistic environment. Its most significant advantage is that it provides the opportunity for interactive training of large numbers of commanders of air and ground units operating from different sites. SIMNET is a giant whole-task trainer for fighting multiple units. In the SIMNET system there are no reset buttons to allow crews to pause or start over again if something goes wrong. The commanders must plan, commu- nicate? and execute decisions in real time. SIMNET allows individual crew members, as well as battalion commanders, to practice tasks and roles as individuals and units. The low cost and flexibility of SIMNET compared with most simula- tors makes it reasonable for use on a routine basis. The system can be used to simulate joint and combined warfare or small unit engagements. It is used on a daily basis at Fort Knox, and was used in Germany to train for the Canadian Army Trophy tank-gunnery competition (Ropelewski, 1989~.
TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSES 257 The advantages of SIMNET as a realistic trainer are clear. It also provides the opportunity to study learning in a natural setting as suggested by Glaser (1990~. The technology permits the conduct of carefully de- signed experiments to study issues such as: (1) the appropriate type and sequencing of feedback to trainees; (2) the acquisition of decision-making skills; (3) the interaction of individual differences and the acquisition of decision-making skills; (4) the principles underlying the design of training programs to maximize performance in emergency situations; and (5) the interaction of training, workload, and stress variables on performance in a combat-like environment. A major technical challenge for SIMNET is to conduct experiments and provide appropriate feedback without degrading the dynamic, realistic simulation. In the initial development of SIMNET, the emphasis was placed on the technology of producing a realistic, low-cost simulator. From a training perspective, the value of SIMNET as a trainer would be greatly enhanced if the trainee could receive process feedback as well as battle outcomes. This information would provide the learners with an assessment of the direct outcome of their decisions, as well as an assessment of the processes and procedures used to obtain the outcome. The importance of process informa- tion has been confirmed in an extensive body of research that shows that the way in which executives think and make decisions greatly influences their success (Streufert and Swezey, 1986~. SIMNET provides the opportunity to give commanders information about the quality of their problem-solving approaches and thereby enhance the probability of adequate performance in emergency situations. Embedded Training for Practicing Procedural Tasks in the Operational Setting Embedded training presents an excellent opportunity for the practice and retention of tasks and skills that should be performed automatically in the course of battle. Embedded training is a training capability built into or added onto operational systems. Advances in the sophistication of the tank systems, such as the use of electronic display screens, high-speed integrated circuits and solid-state computers, make it possible to embed training sub- systems in the operational equipment. This would allow the tank systems themselves to provide refresher training. New tanks have the potential to integrate embedded training applications into gunnery, tactics, driving, and maintenance training (Hardy, 1988~. Currently, the Main Battle Tank does not have embedded training capa- bilities. Tank crewmen can practice the tasks associated with preparation for gunnery, but there is no feedback. Embedded training for the Block III
258 WORKLOAD TRANSITION Tank is required to support four principal areas: (1) tank gunnery, (2) tactics, (3) maintenance (i.e., fault isolation/diagnostics), and (4) tank driv- ing. Embedded training must: (1) train individual job tasks through force- level collective tasks (crew through battalion) as required; (2) be capable of providing a series of training exercises for all levels previously mentioned that can be used to train to doctrinally acceptable standards; (3) be able to store and retrieve data; (4) provide realistic computer-generated imagery simulation training exercises that are programmable for individual, crew, platoon, team, and task force level tactical and gunnery training; (5) have the capability to network two or more vehicles into the same computer- generated imagery data base to support specific training exercises; and (6) have the capability for precision laser force-on-force training aboard the vehicle. An advantage of embedded training is that it can provide high-quality, standardized training tailored to an individual's needs. The embedded train- ing system can assess the proficiency level of the soldier, provide feedback, and keep records of the learner's progress. Another advantage of embedded training in the operational environment is that it can be designed to operate without an instructor. It provides the opportunity to practice the highly perishable skills identified by Rose et al. (1985~. Embedded training is better suited to provide refresher training than to provide training for new skills (Oberlin, 1988~. Embedded training as it is currently configured does not provide the opportunity for the commander to practice the complex decision-making tasks required in combat. An important disadvantage is that embedding full-task training exercises may require too much textual instruction be- cause learners' tolerance for reading lengthy screen messages is low. The whole-task training necessary for the commander is better accomplished in a SIMNET-like environment. Nevertheless, given the long periods of underload that often characterize the pretransition phase of teams in transition, it is reasonable to conclude that embedded training could, if properly structured, achieve these important goals: (1) maintain a level of arousal sufficient to guard against vigilance decrements (Chapter 6~; (2) maintain or induce situ- ation awareness of the status of the vehicle and the environment (Chapter 7~; and (3) achieve the primary goal of delivering knowledge. Training to Improve Communications and Coordination The SIMNET system should be adaptable to the investigation of social psychological issues surrounding crew communications and crew resource management, as discussed in the previous chapter. Aware of the potential benefits of reducing and controlling crew errors resulting from poor leadership and crew coordination, many airlines and
TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSES 259 units of the military have developed programs to provide training in these areas programs that have come to be known generically as Crew Resource Management (CRM) training. Primary CRM training programs (often de- scribed as the initial awareness phase of training) typically are conducted in a seminar format and include modules on leadership, interpersonal commu- nications, decision making and problem solving, conflict resolution, and stress effects and stress management. Emphasis is placed on the need for open communications despite status and role differences. Military training programs also focus on the need to overcome barriers imposed by military rank structure and officer-enlisted, status differentials without eroding leader authority. Early programs in aviation were largely derivative from traditional man- agement training and organizational development courses. Later programs tend to focus more directly on issues related directly to flight deck prob- lems and are tailored to highlight issues raised by analysis of operational incidents and surveys to determine baseline attitudes regarding leadership and flightdeck management. The emphasis is on experiential rather than didactic instructional techniques. Many courses employ role-playing of conflict resolution situations, briefings, and post-mission critiques, often employing videotape to record interactions and provide feedback. A number of strategies are employed to ensure that CRM training has a lasting impact. One is to demonstrate complete organizational commitment to the concepts taught by providing positive role models, incorporating CRM concepts in formal doctrine and operating manuals, and by requiring adher- ence to the concepts (making failure to practice these concepts and to show effective leadership grounds for termination from flight status). A second is to provide formal recurrent training in CRM concepts and techniques rather than giving only a single training experience. Third, and perhaps most important, is to provide recurring opportunities to practice the concepts and receive reinforcement and feedback. This is accomplished through full mission simulations (LOFT) that have scenarios designed to elicit problem- solving behavior and decision making in abnormal flight situations that have no simple, book solution and no clear optimal course of action. The training impact is also enhanced by making the training without "jeopardy." Crews are free to practice different behaviors without placing their licenses to fly at risk. Perhaps the most successful innovation has been videotaping the sessions and using the tape for post-mission debriefing of crew behav- iors. The fourth strategy is to provide regular feedback and reinforcement of CRM concepts during regular performance evaluations. This is accom- plished by giving designated evaluators (check airmen) special training in the evaluation and debriefing of leadership and crew coordination practices. Crews are then observed and critiqued following regular evaluations (line checks).
260 WORKLOAD TRANSITION Preliminary data from a NASA-sponsored, longitudinal study of flight crew performance before and after CRM training demonstrates that such training can have a significant positive impact on crew performance, if well implemented (Helmreich, 1991; Helmreich and Foushee, in press; Helmreich and Wilhelm, in press). Multiple measures of training impact are employed and all show consistent, positive change. Dependent variables include: (1) systematic observations of crew performance in line operations and full mission simulations, (2) changes in attitudes regarding crew-related issues; (3) case studies of crew communications from the cockpit voice recorder tapes of relevant aircraft incidents and accidents; and (4) self-reports by crew members of the efficacy of training. The data indicate that training both improves the performance of less effective crews and further enhances that of competent crews. Although the project is still in the data collection phase, the following findings have been obtained and replicated: (1) Observational data collected on the previously described NASA/UT Line/LOS Checklist show significant improvements in overall performance and crew effectiveness as well as in specific behavioral categories. (2) Highly significant, positive changes in attitudes regarding leader roles, interpersonal communications, and awareness of stressor ef- fects are found. (3) Although the number of accidents involving flightcrews trained in CRM concepts is small, the cockpit voice recorder transcripts of these catastrophes form a slowly increasing data base from which informa- tion on crew behavior can be analyzed in a case-by-case fashion (Predmore, 1991~. During the past year, two major accidents occurred involving crews with formal CRM and LOFT training. One involved the loss of a cargo door and two engines, the second loss of all hydraulic systems associated flight controls. Both crews faced novel, life-threatening situations for which no standard procedures existed; both crews were faced with extreme stress for an extended period of time. Examination of the communications pat- terns shows the high workload imposed by the situation and the practice of inquiry, advocacy, critique and careful decision making, even under great stress. One of the captains attributed his crew's survival to CRM training. While not conclusive evidence, these data combined with other evidence represent encouraging evidence. (4) Self-reports of participants overwhelmingly support the utility of CRM training. Specific items on a post training evaluation form ask for ratings of (a) the potential of the training for safety; (b) personal usefulness of the training; and (c) extent to which the training has (or will) change personal behavior on the flight deck. Survey results regarding the value of LOFT are equally positive. Crews find the experi- ence to be an extremely valuable setting in which to put together what they have learned regarding effective crew performance. Participant endorse- ment of such programs is a necessary but not sufficient indicator. If crews did not perceive the training as useful, it is unlikely that the practices advocated would be internalized.
TRAINING FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSES 261 One negative finding is that a small subset of crew members reject the training both in self-reports of reactions and, attitudinally, in terms of less acceptance of positive crew coordination practices. As previously noted, one determinant of negative training outcomes is crew member personality (Helmreich and Wilhelm, 1989~. It appears that personality characteristics may form one of the limiting factors on the efficacy of CRM training. As yet, little progress has been made in determining if additional training or peer pressure can elicit behavior change among those who reject the train- ing. In particular, it is not known whether training strategies and interven- tions can effect change in personality related behaviors. The above data suggest that enhancements in crew coordination pro- vided by CRM training may prove to be effective countermeasures against the stress of workload transitions. As previously noted, effective crews employ behavioral strategies that would appear to utilize the combined re- sources of the group which can serve to compensate for stress-induced individual attentional and cognitive deficits (see Chapter 8~. However, full scientific validation of the impact of crew coordination training has in- volved assessment of crew performance during normal operations and simu- lated flights with abnormal conditions. Adequate systematic data on the performance of crews during highly stressful, real inflight emergencies are not yet available, beyond the two case studies described above. Although unlikely, the possibility exists that improvements noted after CRM train- ing might disappear in a stress-induced reversion to earlier patterns of behavior. SUMMARY In summary, extensive training on those procedures and actions that may need to be taken in an emergency situation may mitigate the negative effects of stress and workload. Training to automate performance of certain tasks may be accomplished through embedded training devices in the tank or on the equipment. Training to enhance the probability of adequate deci- sion processes and crew coordination and leadership issues could be accom- plished through a SIMNET environment. Consideration of the appropriate training methodology is based on an analysis of the specific requirements in the emergency situation. In the long run, the optimal role of training must be established by a careful evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of training versus design in im- proving system performance (Rouse, 1985~. The nature of these tradeoffs (and that involving a third factor abilities) is beyond the scope of this report but is addressed specifically by the Army's MANPRINT program. The reader is referred to the detailed treatment by Booher (1990) for discus- sion of these issues.
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