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Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation (1993)

Chapter: Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information

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Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 91
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 92
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 93
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 94
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 95
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 96
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 97
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 98
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 99
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 100
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 101
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 102
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 103
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 104
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 105
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 106
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 107
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 108
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 109
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 110
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 111
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 112
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 113
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 114
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 115
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 116
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 117
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 118
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 119
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 120
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 121
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 122
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 123
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 124
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 125
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 126
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 127
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 128
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 129
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 130
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 131
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 132
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 133
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 134
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 135
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 136
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 137
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 138
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
×
Page 139
Suggested Citation:"Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information." National Academy of Engineering. 1993. Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/2127.
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Page 140

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Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering. 1993 Pp. 91-140. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Municipal Waste Combustion and New Source Performance Standards: Use of Scientific and Technical Information Suellen W. Pirages and Jason E. Johnston The release in 1992 of a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency report, Safeguarding the Future: Credible Science and Credible Decisions (EPA, 1992), signaled a renewed interest in and concern about application of sci- entific and technical information in the regulatory process. The develop- ment of scientifically based and technically sound regulations requires evaluation of a broad range of factors, including: · Risks posed if an activity is unregulated; · Benefits achieved if an activity is regulated; · The feasibility of controlling risks; · Costs incurred by a regulated community and the nation both with and without a specific regulatory program; and · Ranking of risks and costs within national environmental priorities. Information regarding these factors is continually changing as research efforts within scientific, technical, and medical communities are completed and as national environmental priorities are reevaluated. This case study evaluates the use of technical and scientific information in the development of proposed and final new source performance standards for new municipal waste combustors. Promulgation of these standards was mandated by amendments to the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §7411~. Although the focus is limited to performance standards developed for new (not existing), large facilities (i.e., greater than 250 tons per day unit capacity), we believe that the extent to which scientific and technical information was used by EPA is typical of many environmental regulatory programs. 91

92 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON Municipal waste combustion (MWC) takes place both with and without energy recovery. Combustion with energy recovery, through generation of steam or electricity during incineration, is termed waste-to-energy (WTE) or resource recovery (RR). Combustion without energy recovery is termed incineration. In the past, both incineration and WTE facilities have been built in the United States. Currently, new MWC facilities almost always include energy recovery. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS There are two points in any regulatory decision-making process where scientific and technical information can be used. The first is during the initial debate about whether a regulatory program is necessary, technically feasible, and cost-effective. The second point is during the development of a rule. In an ideal world, determining the need for a regulatory program would depend strictly upon analysis of scientific and technical data and informa- tion. However, such a world does not exist. Instead, tensions develop between politics and science, both within regulatory agencies and among the different stakeholders in a regulatory outcome. Even once a decision about need has been made, tensions within agencies and among stakehold- ers continue until a final rule is promulgated, and these tensions may very well persist. In evaluating whether, and to what extent, EPA used scientific and technical information at these two points in the decision-making process, our analysis focused on the following questions: · How did the regulatory system respond to scientific and technical understanding? · What factors contributed to the acceptance (or lack of acceptance) of new information by the risk management and regulatory community? · What incentives and disincentives existed in the risk management and regulatory system to seek new information? · What differences, if any, exist in perspectives among federal, state and local levels of government when evaluating new information? We reviewed documentation available in EPA public dockets for the proposed and final rule and identified additional literature containing scien- tific and technical information about MWC. In addition, we interviewed representatives from the regulated industry, state and local governments, and EPA. We reached the following conclusions: · Scientific and technical information was applied in developing par- ticular sections of the proposed and final new source performance standards . ^

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 93 for municipal waste combustion. However, politics often influenced regula- tory decisions, resulting in neglect of available and relevant scientific and technical information. Such information was ignored in determining the need for a federal program specific to municipal waste combustion. Scien- tific and technical information was dismissed during EPA debates on whether a materials separation requirement should be included in operating permits for individual facilities. · The perspectives of federal, state, and local governments vary. For example, the stringency of regulatory requirements depends upon the breadth of application in a regulatory program, that is, requirements for a single facility can be more stringent than those applied at a state or federal level with variable environmental conditions and waste management needs. . Incentives and disincentives for development of new technology are perceived differently among various stakeholders in any regulatory program. THE MWC INDUSTRY Municipal waste combustion facilities-with or without energy recov- ery are not a recent phenomenon. Nor did the development and imple- mentation of air pollution control technology occur only in response to congressional mandates or agency regulations. Historical Development Waste-to-energy and resource recovery facilities have been used as waste management options in the United States for several decades. The nation's first facility constructed with the intent to recover energy began operation in New York City in 1905 (Walsh, 1991~. It represented the first attempt at an integrated waste management system, incorporating incineration, recycling, and materials separation at a single facility. Municipal waste was burned in a hand-stoked furnace and energy was recovered with water-tube boilers. The electricity generated was used to light the Williamsburg Bridge. The plant operated for eight years, burning approximately one-fifth of the waste generated in Manhattan and the Bronx while achieving a 60 percent separa- tion and recycling rate. Despite economic success, the facility was closed in 1913 because of maintenance problems (Walsh, 1991~. Subsequent in- cineration facilities built in the 1920s did not include resource recovery and recycling. In the l950s, MWC became a recognized waste management tool and source of electricity in Europe. At this time, European vendors were begin- ning to apply pollution control technology to reduce potentially harmful stack emissions. By the 1960s, MWC reemerged in the United States with the installation of European-developed pollution control technologies. Pol

94 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON lution controls were installed in response to particulate standards promul- gated in the late 1960s through air programs within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) (personal communication with L. Hickman, Solid Waste Association of North America, 1992~. Because of a newly perceived solid waste management crisis in the early 1970s, MWC with pollution control regained a broader acceptance by U.S. communities as a waste management option. As illustrated in Figure 1, use of air pollution control devices predates the development of the 1990 comprehensive new source performance stan- dards. Pollution control devices were first installed in 1957 and became standard for new facilities by the early 1960s. The first energy-recovery plant to incorporate modern technology was constructed in Chicago, Illi- nois, in 1970. This facility followed European designs, featured a waterwall furnace for heat recovery and electrostatic precipitators for pollution con- trol, and provided all of its own operating energy. In 1975 a Massachusetts facility sold energy to outside users, initiating the commercial waste-to- energy industry. Also in 1975 an Iowa facility was retrofitted with electro- static precipitators and fabric filter technology (Waste Age, 1992~. Current Industry Status Figure 2 shows that the use of waste-to-energy as a municipal waste management option has increased dramatically over the past decade. One reason for this increase has been the growing endorsement by government officials of MWC as a legitimate component in national and local waste management plans. For example, in the 1989 EPA report The Solid Waste Dilemma: Agenda for Action, MWC was considered a desirable component of the solid waste management hierarchy (EPA, 1989a). The agency's 1993 goal for municipal waste management, as stated in this report, is to reduce the annual volume of waste generated by 25 percent through recycling and source reduction and to incinerate 20 percent, leaving only 55 percent to be landfilled (Porter, 1990~. These goals are not mandated by a federal regula- tory program. The volume of waste managed through MWC with energy recovery and the rate at which facilities have been constructed throughout the United States attest to local government's acceptance of this technology as a viable waste management option (Figure 3~. Currently, 17 percent of the 196 million tons of municipal waste generated annually is managed at 190 MWC processing and combustion plants (Kiser, 1992~. Of these, 142 facilities are waste-to-energy plants with a total capacity of 101,000 tons per day (t/d) (Kiser, 1992~. These facilities provide sufficient electricity to meet the needs of 1.3 million homes-equivalent to burning 31 million barrels of oil annually (Kiser and Burton, 1992~. _

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS Science and Engineering - First energy recovery facility with integrated - waste management activities in the United States (New York City, NY) _1 905 1955 _ - ESP installed on an incinerator (Euclid, Ohio) - ~ - _ _ 1 960 - ESP on a WTE facility (Queens, N.Y.) ~ ___ _ ~ Policy and Regulation _ - -CleanAirAct(CM) P.L.88-206 - Wet scrubber installed on an incinerator , _ - _ ~ (Sheboygan, Wis.) I ~ 1965 '~ - Particulate standard for all incinerators published $.__' by DHEW - Spray dryer/fabric controls installed on an ~ 1970 incinerator (Framingham, Mass.) - Waterwall heat recovery and ESP on a WTE facility (Chicago, III.) r-- _ - Recognition of ESP as replacement of wet ~ scrubbers for MWC, by replacement at WTE ~ - _ facility (Nashville, Tenn.) ~ 1 519 75 I_ _ - ~- CM Amendment mandating study of all dioxin/furan sources - ESP/fabric filter installed at a WTE facility (Ames, Iowa) - Odor problems at Hempstead, N.Y. facility led ~ - _ to detection of dioxin/furans 19 80 1 9185 - First use of selective noncatalytic reduction ~ for NOx control - Spray dryer/fabric filter and continuous monitoring required at a WTE facility (Marion County, Ore.) 95 -- CM Amendment requiring air emission standards - Formation of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) I - Revised standards for particulate controls by EPA - Legal ruling about EPA authorities in PSD regulatory programs - EPA determines level of dioxin emissions at MWC are not a public health risk - NRDC, New York, and Florida petition for 1977 mandated study - NRDC, New York, Rhode Island, and Connecticut petition for determination of health effects - EPA Report to Congress on MWC - EPA advanced notice for rulemaking for MWC - EPA determines that acid gas scrubbers are best available technology 1 990~ L lintMA/ V^rl, one ~l~rirlo n~`titi~n tar r. alien en ~ vie vet v · ivy van vet ~ ivy ~ us y vat ~ materials separation and lead-acid batteries; US Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit ruling on petition - EPA proposes new source performance standards for MWC - EPA promulgates final new source performance standards for MOW FIGURE 1 Timeline of significant technical, legal, congressional, and regulatory events in combustion of municipal waste.

96 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON 250 _ 225 200 <~ 1 75 150 125 100 75 50 25 o OWTE Incineration Recycling Landfills Reliance on WTE will increase dramatically an 1960 1980 1988 2000 FIGURE 2 Changing trends in managing muncipal waste. <~ ' , ' / Bin , . , ~ 3/0~ fib - 1/0 1/0 1 2/1----\ my> .~'-9i4 6/3 2/0 4/3 1/0 ~~ it= 1~ at) ~1 ~1 5/1 ~ so o [A 1/0 2/1 8/1 -\ \2~0r 2/0 ~ 1/1 by ~1 5/2 X = Number of operating MWC facilities Y = Number inactive, planned, and under construction FIGURE 3 Distribution of operating and projected municipal waste combustion facilities. . - ,

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 50 45 40 2 o ~ 25 .O 35 30 20 15 10 5 o States in each EPA region Inactive, in planning, under construction Operational capacity l 1 l l I -CT, ME, MA, NH, Rl, VT 11 -NJ, NY, PR lil -DE, DC, MD, PA, VA, WV IV -AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN V -IL, IN, Ml, MN, OH, Wl Vl -AR, LA, NM, OK, TX VII-M, KS, MO, NE VIItCO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY IX -AZ, CA, Hi, NV X -AK, ID, OR, WA _ = Vl11 111 IV V Vl Vl1 EPA Region IX X FIGURE 4 Total operating and projected MWC capacity by EPA region. 97 In addition, projects under construction or being planned could bring total waste volumes managed with MWC to 53 million tons per year (t/y) by the year 2000 (Kiser, 19911. Figure 4 indicates that operational and pro- jected MWC capacity is concentrated in the eastern portion of the United States (EPA Regions I, II, III, and portions of Region IV). For example, 34 percent of operational capacity and 38 percent of projected new capacity are located in EPA Regions I and II alone. Despite recent increases, however, the level of use in the United States is below that in other nations. Switzerland incinerates 80 percent of its municipal waste, Denmark 60 percent, and the Netherlands 40 percent. Ja- pan incinerates 72 percent of that volume of municipal waste remaining after separation for recycling (Integrated Waste Services Association, 1992a). The increased reliance on MWC in these countries is undoubtedly due to shortages of areas suitable for landfills. Technology Used Between 1975 and 1989 A major finding of this case study is that between 1975 and 1989, new facilities were being constructed with best available pollution control tech

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MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 99 nology and operated with sound combustion practices. These stringent pol- lution control and good combustion practices were required as part of the CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD) program that was managed by state agencies and implemented by local (i.e., county or city) environmental agencies. With few exceptions, these early PSD requirements led to use of the same technologies used by EPA to establish the 1990 new source performance standards. Combustion Design Municipal waste combustors consist of three basic types: mass burn, modular, and refuse-derived fuel (EPA, 1989b; National Solid Waste Man- agement Association, 1991~. Combustion chambers are similar among these types, with major differences being size of a facility, combustion condi- tions, and degree of waste processing necessary before combustion. Figure 5 shows the design of a large, mass burn facility. Mass burn facilities handle mixed waste streams, generally without any precombustion processing other than removal of overly large items and those items included in local source separation programs. Individual units range in capacity from 50 to 1,000 t/d. Facilities can be constructed with more than one combustion unit. Combustion occurs at temperatures ranging from 1,800 to 2,000°F. Typical mass burn technology uses hydraulic rams or pusher grate sections to move waste mechanically onto a grate. Combus- tion is enhanced by agitating the fuel bed; waterwalls are used to cool the combustion chamber and to recover heat for steam or generation of electric- ity. Modular facilities are similar to mass burn plants but are prefabricated and smaller. Individual units range in capacity from 5 to 120 t/d. A modu- lar facility can be constructed with two or more combustion chambers in either of two designs: modular excess-air or modular starved-air. These units are constructed with refractory walls, and most new facilities recover heat with waste-heat boilers. Refuse-derived fuel facilities use processed waste to ensure a uniform fuel during incineration. Waste processing involves removing materials that can be recycled or are not combustible; remaining wastes are shredded. In these units, shredded waste is generally fed by a stoker onto a moving grate and transported into the combustion chamber. These units range in capacity from 270 to 900 t/d. Virtually all plants are constructed with waterwalls and employ heat recovery systems. A fourth system under development employs fluidized bed combustion. In these units, waste is burned within a turbulent bed of heated noncombus- tible material, usually sand or limestone. These units generally burn pro- cessed waste, sometimes mixed with other fuels. Design plans generally

100 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON range in size from 200 to 500 t/d. Heat recovery is generally a component of the design. Composition of Air Emissions Several different compounds can be generated and released to the air as a result of combustion activities, for example, operation of motor vehicles, wood-burning stoves, forest fires, and operation of municipal waste com- bustors. The composition of air emissions formed during combustion de- pends on the type of material being burned. In an MWC facility without any air pollution controls, the type of air emissions generated can vary (DePaul and Crowder, 19881. ~ ~ r ~ · pounds may be formed during combustion: For example, the following types of com · Particulate matter consisting of noncombustible material such as metals, light ash escaping through an exhaust system, or organic material that has not fully been incinerated. · Sulfur dioxides formed from combustion of items such as paper, rub- ber, wallboard, and grasses. · Nitrogen oxides resulting from the combustion of materials contain- ing nitrogen, for example, yard wastes and textile materials. · Carbon monoxide as a product of incomplete combustion. · Hydrogen chloride may result from combustion of materials contain- ing chlorides. · Chlorinated organics can result from incomplete combustion. MWC Air Pollution Control Technology A major difference between facilities constructed after the 1970s and older existing facilities was the extent to which air pollution control was incorporated. In general, local or state environmental agencies have not always required older facilities to retrofit (i.e., to add more efficient air pollution controls). In some instances, agencies perceived retrofits as creat- ing major technical and economic problems that could result in closures of older facilities and disrupt an essential component of the locality's waste management plan. In contrast, new construction designs included require- ments for state-of-the-art combustion designs and air pollution controls. Figure 6 shows the increased use of add-on air pollution control devices over the past two decades. By the time EPA's new source performance standards were proposed for new MWC facilities in 1989, a substantial proportion of new facilities already included the proposed level of air pollu- tion control. The Appendix provides a brief description of the different control technologies. . . .

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 80 70 60 50 ° 40 E 20 10 101 MWCs with APC APC type not available MWCs without APC ·: I. ~ ~ l Date N/A t50-'55 t56-~60 '61-~65 '66-'70 71-'75 '76-~80 .81-~85 '86-'90 '91 + Year of Start-Up FIGURE 6 Use of air pollution control technology by year of start-up. Initially, wet scrubber technology was used to control particulates, but this technology soon became obsolete because it could not achieve the par- ticulate standards of the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, low- energy, wet scrubbers at a Nashville, Tennessee, facility were replaced in the mid-1970s with electrostatic precipitators (ESP) because of the increased removal efficiency and enhanced ability to function at high temperatures (Gaige and Halil, 1992~. This change at a large existing commercial facility signaled the end of wet scrubber installations at new units. Later, industry switched to fabric filters and large multifield ESPs for even greater effi- ciency in pollution control. In addition to particulates, acid gases (i.e., sulfur oxides and hydrogen chloride) are found in MWC flue gas. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) removal tech- nology was in its second generation at coal-fired plants during the 1970s; therefore, based on operational information from these plants, this removal technology was easily installed at MWC facilities. For example, in the 1970s, following three PSD permit remands concerned with appropriate acid gas controls, EPA declared that acid gas scrubbers used in conjunction with fabric filters were to be considered "available" control technology in the PSD permit program. By 1987, most new plants were being constructed

102 40 35 30 ._ E a) In ._ o I 15 in 25 20 o SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON Units with Acid Gas Scrubbers Total MWC Units Permitted 1 983 1 984 1 985 1 986 1 987 1 988 1 989 1 990 1991 FIGURE 7 Comparison of total MWC units permitted with the number of units constructed with acid gas scrubbers. SOURCE: Gaige and Halil (1992~. with acid gas scrubbers as a result of permit changes for existing facilities (Gaige and Halil, 1992~. The rapid use of acid gas scrubbers in the late 1980s is shown in Figure 7. Emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOX) can be controlled either by chang- ing combustion conditions or installing add-on controls. Before the 1989 new source performance standards were proposed, combustion practices were used to control NOX emissions. These consisted of staged combustion with flue gas recirculation and low levels of excess air. This practice can reduce NOX emissions by 35 percent without add-on controls (Gaige and Halil, 1992~. EPA INVOLVEMENT IN MWC REGULATION Federal attention to municipal waste combustors began before the cre- ation of EPA. In response to the passage of the first federal statute provid- ing authority to regulate air quality in 1963,2 officials in the DHEW air program promulgated a particulate standard to be enforced at all incinera- tors. Federal activity at that time was limited to oversight of state imple- mentation and enforcement of this standard.

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 103 Activity at the federal level increased during the 1970s. The 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) included a provision for prevention of significant deterioration of air quality. Because the statutory language was unclear regarding EPA's authority, controversy arose about the agency's role in PSD activities (Pederson, 1987~. Litigation brought against EPA by the Sierra Club in 1973 resulted in a decision that EPA had the authority to require regional air quality standards above national levels and to issue implement . . ng regulations. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s there was strong public demand to develop stringent air pollution control requirements for MWC within the PSD program. This demand arose in part from legitimate concerns about potential emissions of dioxins and other harmful compounds from uncon- trolled MWC air emissions. More recently, this demand has been strength- ened by a concern that allowing anything less than the best available control technology (BACT) for MWC facilities could undermine national goals for waste reduction and recycling. For example, public concerns have centered on a perception that "artificially" low combustion costs, resulting from use of less than BACT in PSD permits, would reduce the likelihood that com- munities could or would be motivated to develop strong waste reduction and recycling programs. Over the years, Congress responded to public pressure with enactment of several statutes directly affecting MWC: · 1970 CAA Amendments (P.L. 91-604) mandated new particulate standards; · 1977 CAA Amendments (P.L. 95~95) required identification of all sources of potentially harmful air emissions; e 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA; P.L. 98-616) required evaluation of risks associated with dioxin emissions from MWC; and · 1990 CAA Amendments (P.L. 101 -549) required new source perfor- mance standards for MWC. sections. The regulatory response to these mandates is discussed in the following Chronology of Legislative, Legal, and Regulatory Activities EPA has a long history of involvement in MWC, as illustrated in Figure In response to mandates of the 1970 CAA Amendments, EPA issued new source performance standards for particulate emissions for general combus- tion units larger than 50 t/d and constructed after December 1971. The new standards were issued under the authority of Section lll~b) of the CAA (40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart E).

104 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON In 1974 the agency issued final regulations for a PSD program. The PSD regulatory program was created as a partnership among federal, state, and local agencies, and became a vehicle for more stringent air pollution control at MWC facilities. The program was delegated to state and local agencies for the implementation and enforcement of air quality standards. State and local agencies were responsible for reviewing proposed new con- struction or modifications to existing sources. A main component of a PSD permit was a demonstration that BACT would be employed. This demon- stration comprised a determination for each new facility that maximum re- ductions would be achieved, while considering such factors as cost, energy use or development, and nonair environmental impacts. The 1977 CAA Amendment contained a number of mandates for the agency to address. Among the provisions was a requirement for EPA to investigate all air emission sources of specific compounds, including diox- ins and furans. Given the vast number of mandates in the new statute, this investigation did not receive high priority, and EPA resources were allo- cated to other more pressing mandates (Porter, 1992~. In 1979 EPA's attention was directed to complaints of an odor problem at an MWC plant in Hempstead, New York. Emissions from this facility were monitored, and chlorophenol was detected (Cheremisinoff, 1987~. Additional analysis of emissions identified dioxins and furans. Investigations were initiated at five different facilities to determine whether dioxin was com- monly emitted from MWC. Based on the results of the investigation, EPA concluded in 1981 that MWC did not pose a threat to human health if dioxin emissions at all MWC facilities did not exceed those identified in the investigation (Cheremisinoff, 19871. Following announcement of EPA's findings regarding dioxin emissions, environmental groups filed suit against the agency for failing to conduct a full-scale dioxin investigation as mandated in the 1977 Amendments. As part of an out-of-court settlement, EPA agreed to initiate a broader study. Through this subsequent effort, MWC was identified along with other ac- tivities as a source of dioxin/furan emissions (personal communication with F. Porter, EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, 19921. How- ever, the agency did not comment on the level of potential risk that may or may not have been posed by dioxin emissions from MWC compared with the other identified sources, and ignored its previous finding of no health threat. No regulatory action was initiated at this time. Public concern about dioxin emissions persisted. Congress responded to this concern with additional legislative action in 1984. Section 102 of the HSWA required EPA to prepare a report evaluating risks posed by di- oxin emissions from MWC and to identify operating conditions appropriate for controlling these emissions. The EPA subsequently began its investiga- tion and chose to expand its evaluation to include information on other ..,

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMB USTION AND NSPS 105 types of MWC air emissions. New regulatory action, however, was limited to promulgation of a more stringent standard for particulate control in 1986. This action was the third change in the particulate standard since the 1963 CAA. Concerned about the perceived growth in the MWC industry and the lack of a strong federal involvement in the PSD regulatory program, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a petition requesting de- velopment of regulations aimed specifically at controlling air emissions from MWC (Goldstein et al., 1986~. The states of New York, Rhode Island, and Connecticut also filed petitions seeking regulations under new source per- formance standards (NSPS) authority (Abrams et al., 1986~. The states were prompted to take this legal action by a belief that the requested new source performance standards (to be developed by EPA) would match an existing program in the New York State (Nosenchuck, 1992~. The report mandated in the HSWA was not delivered to Congress until 1987 (EPA, 1987a). In this report, EPA concluded that control of toxic emissions from MWC could be achieved by the use of good combustion practices, implementation of alkaline scrubbing devices with either electro- static precipitators or fabric filters, and installation of controls for nitrogen oxides. As EPA acknowledged in the report, the recommended pollution control strategy was representative of those practices and controls already being implemented by state and local governments at many new facilities. In response to the 1986 petitions filed by NRDC and the three states, EPA announced its intent to develop regulatory requirements for MWC new source performance standards under Section 111 of the CAA. In the ad- vance notice of proposed rulemaking (EPA, 1987b), EPA concluded that, "emissions from MWC may reasonably be anticipated to contribute to the endangerment of public health and welfare." However, the assessment of health risks performed by EPA did not support this conclusion and no other scientific information was cited in the advance notice. At this time, the agency was also providing guidance to state and local PSD permitting agencies about pollution control and combustion technolo- gies that EPA considered to be BACT (EPA, 1987c). This guidance en- dorsed those control devices and technologies already being implemented by state and local agencies in constructing and operating new facilities. In 1989 EPA proposed NSPS regulations for operation of new facilities that matched the 1987 guidelines (EPA, 1989b). In addition to standards for controlling MWC emissions, two other provisions were proposed: a ban on combustion of lead acid batteries and a requirement for materials in munici- pal waste streams to be separated before combustion of wastes. These two provisions were not included in the final rule in 1991 (EPA, 1991a). These and other changes made between the proposed and final rule are discussed in a later section.

106 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON Legal proceedings related to the final rule were brought against the agency in February 1992. The NRDC and the states of New York and Florida challenged EPA's elimination of materials separation requirements and its ban on burning lead-acid batteries in the final rule. A court decision was rendered in July 1992, supporting the agency in its elimination of a materials separation requirement. However, the court supported the peti- tioners on the issue of lead acid batteries (U.S. Court of Appeals, 1992~. Need for a Regulatory Program In its evaluation of the need for a federal regulatory program, EPA has an opportunity to evaluate a range of information and data. The types of material include information about potential national impacts of the activity of concern compared with other industrial activities, data pertaining to po- tential health and environmental risks posed by the activity of concern, and information about alternative options for regulating the activity. The information available suggests that EPA either limited its develop- ment of this type of information or ignored its existence when evaluating the need for a federal MWC regulatory program. Such agency action may have been the result of limited resources; it certainly was a response to political pressures both within and outside the agency. For example, the agency compiled data and information on the likely compounds and emis- sion rates, and conducted two separate risk assessments. However, it did not provide sufficient data or other information that could have presented these rates and potential risks within a national environmental context. In addition, senior officials in the agency apparently chose to disregard the results of the risk assessments. Projected National Impact In the advance notice of proposed rulemaking, EPA published estimates of emissions based on projections about the extent of new MWC develop- ment (EPA, 1987b). The baseline estimates for "projected facilities" incor- porated two assumptions: · All projected facilities would have efficient particulate removal sys- tems, such as electrostatic precipitators, which were assumed to result in a control efficiency of 99 percent. · These facilities would be operated using good combustion practices. Two points must be emphasized to put these assumptions in perspec- tive. First, these baseline assumptions were PSD-required operating condi- tions, which had been implemented at newly constructed facilities since the mid-1980s (see Figures 6 and 7~. This fact was noted by EPA in its report .

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 107 (EPA, 1987a). In addition, some newly constructed (i.e., by 1989) MWC facilities already had been operating with technologies far superior to those noted in the advance notice. Second, EPA made these estimates based on a projection that 210 new facilities (100 percent increase between 1990 and 1995) would be con- structed after promulgation of new source performance standards. The source of this projection is not clearly identified in EPA documents; our analysis suggests that it was an exaggerated number. Considering currently renewed public opposition to incineration, fewer projects may be initiated. Industry data for 1992 supports a conclusion that new development will be much less than the EPA estimate (Kiser, 1992~. The number of operating WTE facili- ties increased only 11 percent between 1990 and 1992. In addition, three facilities are under construction and only 37 are in planning stages. In contrast, 11 MWC facilities have closed since 1990, and 24 proposed projects have been cancelled. While there are more MWC facilities in operation today than in 1989, industry data do not reflect the magnitude of new devel- opment projected by EPA. Having calculated estimates of projected emission volumes, EPA failed to put these estimates in a national context. For example, one component of sound decision making on the need for additional federal air regulations is evaluating the proportion that MWC emissions contribute to total national releases for specific compounds of concern. Information on the relative contributions to national or regional air quality problems would lend scien- tific credibility to any decision. Using such information, EPA could have ranked the need for additional federal regulations for MWC among the range of environmental issues facing the agency. In a climate of limited resources, EPA (and Congress) must be able to identify priorities that would provide the greatest health and environmental protection in a cost-effective manner. A preliminary comparison of MWC emissions with other industrial re- leases suggests that failure to conduct such an analysis hindered a sound decision about the need for an MWC federal program. Industry estimates of new development are only about one-fourth of those projected by EPA. For our comparison, we conservatively assumed that there might be a 50 percent increase in new facilities by 1995. Using this projection and EPA emission rates, the following examples illustrate the impact of MWC compared with other industrial activities. For example: · MWC air emissions of cadmium could represent 7 percent of the total amount released by the metals industry; · MWC polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) emissions might be equiva- lent to 6 percent of total PCB releases by the electrical industry; · Chromium releases from MWC could represent 1 percent of total chromium releases by the electrical industry;

108 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON · Chlorobenzene emissions from MWC might correspond to 0.1 per- cent of reported releases by the chemical industry; and · SO2 emissions could represent less than 0.1 percent of these emis- sions from utilities (Reisch, 1992~. Using current mercury emission data, MWC is estimated to contribute less than 1 percent of total mercury released to the environment (Kiser and Sussman, 19914. This limited comparison suggests that the basis on which new development is projected becomes a critical factor in analyzing regula- tory needs. If EPA had applied the results of a comprehensive, comparative analysis of projected air emissions, its decision about a federal regulatory need might have been much different. In the absence of reliable and verifi- able data, EPA staff had no ability to balance diverse political pressures. The expected reductions in air emissions associated with implementa- tion of the proposed standards (EPA, 1989b) had little scientific credibility. For example, estimates of projected reductions were based on expected achieve- ments by mid-1990, assuming that all 210 new facilities would be con- structed and operating. In developing these estimated reductions, EPA did not acknowledge that facilities constructed since the mid-1980s already in- cluded these proposed technologies. Two factors influence the agency's effectiveness in making critical na tional decisions. The first concerns limited resources and timing of neces sary decisions. Resource and time constraints hinder EPA's ability to de- velop sufficient data with which to make decisions; thus, its decision-making effectiveness is weakened and general acceptance of final decisions is jeop- ardized. Second, rarely does the agency assume a necessary leadership role in making tough decisions that are counter to public fears, even when the agency's own information indicates that these fears are without basis. The EPA could have insisted that an additional program was unnecessary be- cause the available information indicated that MWC emissions posed no national threat and because state and local agencies were addressing local potential risks. If appropriate data had been developed early, it might have affected the congressional debate in the early 1980s. Knowledge about the magnitude of perceived threats and the potential for enhanced protection, evaluated within a national context, also might have balanced political pressures for federal action. With sound data on MWC industrial development, evidence of lim- ited risks to public health, and increasing local community acceptance of these facilities, the agency could have placed itself in a leadership role in the debate about the need for an additional federal program. Instead, EPA placed itself in the unfortunate position of being only one of several stake- holders, all of which had information of limited scientific or technical cred- ibility.

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS Evaluation of Risks 109 A second type of information necessary to evaluate the need for a fed- eral regulatory program concerns potential risks to human health and the environment posed by exposure to MWC emissions. As part of its 1987 Report to Congress, EPA conducted risk assessments of MWC emissions (EPA, 1987d). The results suggested that individual risks (i.e., those posed by a single facility to residents of a host community) were not above the then-informal, national acceptable risk range.3 The agency evaluated poten- tial risks under two exposure conditions: · Projected facilities would use electrostatic precipitators to control particulate emissions and implement good combustion practices to mini- mize emissions of other constituents; this was designated the baseline sce- nario. · Projected facilities would use dry alkaline scrubbers in conjunction with particulate control technology and good combustion practices equiva- lent to the baseline condition; this was designated as the controlled sce- nario, which was being installed at many new facilities in 1987. the L;PA estimated an individual lifetime cancer risk from direct inha- lation for the baseline scenario as a range of 1 in 100,000 (10-s) to 1 in 10,000 (10-4) for organic compounds and 1 in 1,000,000 (10-6) for metals; these risks are within acceptable ranges (i.e., 10-6 to 10-4~. In this assess- ment, EPA indicated that the primary contributor to any risk associated with organics was the level of estimated dioxin and dibenzofurans emissions. Actual data obtained during EPA's 1981 investigation of five facilities were counter to these new estimates. The discrepancy between estimated emission levels and actual monitor- ing data can be explained. For example, the assumptions and values for exposure variables used by the agency in this assessment are extremely conservative (Roffman and Roffman, 1991~. The EPA assumed a stack height that is unusually low and might not have been acceptable under 1989 state and local PSD permits. In addition, estimates of emission rates for selected constituents may not have reflected the level of pollution control also being required by state and local governments at that time. Therefore, given the level of conservatism in EPA exposure assumptions, this risk estimate is likely to overestimate any real risk. The EPA indicated in its advance notice of proposed rulemaking that "tilt is not likely that the true risks would be higher than the estimated risk, and they may be considerably lower" "emphasis added] (EPA, 1987b, p. 25404~. Because the agency's estimates of potential risk are within the acceptable risk range and because EPA believed that actual risks would be lower than the estimate, there is no justification for its view that regulation was warranted.

0 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON During the course of preparing proposed standards for new MWCs, EPA conducted a second risk assessment (Morrison, 1989~. In this analysis, emission data were collected by the agency directly at newly operating facilities. The baseline and control scenarios, as well as the assessment methodology, were the same as in the previous study, but the quality of data was better in the 1989 analysis. The EPA indicated that emission data used in 1989 were "generated using prescribed testing, analytical and Q/A ~qual- ity/assurance] procedures" (Morrison, 1989, p. 2~. Such standard collection and analysis precautions were apparently not followed in the 1987 effort. Results of this second analysis estimated an overall worst-case indi- vidual lifetime cancer risk of 7 in 1,000,000 (7 x 10-6) for the baseline scenario. Estimates of noncarcinogenic hazards associated with air emis- sions for hydrogen chloride, lead, and mercury were below health param- eters enforced in 1989.4 Therefore, facilities with pollution control technol- ogy as defined in the baseline scenario do not pose unacceptable carcinogenic risks or noncarcinogenic hazards. Agency officials chose to ignore these studies. More recent publications discussing risks associated with MWC emis- sions support these 1989 estimates, suggesting that risks from exposure to MWC emissions are minimal for host communities. For example, dioxin levels (the reason for much of the public concern) from new facilities have been measured at less than 1 percent of estimated background intake. Con- centrations of inorganic and metal emissions are similar or lower than those detected as background levels in rural environments (Greim, 1990~. Options for EPA Involvement in Air Regulatory Programs In 1985 EPA unveiled a new National Air Toxics Strategy to address regulatory needs (EPA, 1985~. In this strategy, the scope of any national regulatory program was to target those "sources of complex toxic emissions that appear to account for a significant portion of the controllable health risk" (EPA, 1985~. In this strategy report, the agency identified those sources of air emissions meriting priority attention for regulatory development. MWC facilities were not mentioned. In testimony to Congress, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas emphasized a desire in EPA to make choices between the need for developing new national programs or for greater cooperation with state air-toxics control programs (Thomas, 1985~. A decision for greater cooperation with state programs could be based on the recognition that the potential risks posed are local (or regional) in nature and do not represent a major national public health risk. The EPA appeared committed to assisting states in addressing these more local problems. Therefore, at the time that decisions about controlling MWC emissions

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 111 were being debated, the agency had two options. The EPA could develop a new federal regulatory program, or it could enhance EPA cooperation and assistance, both financial and technical, to state regulatory programs. Infor- mation available to EPA at that time suggests that the latter option could have been preferable. For example: · MWC facilities were (and still are) "clustered" in the northeastern section of the nation. This technology was being used as an alternative at those locations where landfill capacity was most severely limited. . New facilities constructed in the mid-1980s generally included state- of-the-art air pollution controls in response to state and local PSD permit requirements. . Emission levels estimated by EPA under its baseline scenario repre- sented a small percentage of national emissions for specific constituents and were of a much lower magnitude than those emissions from other industries. Therefore, these facilities did not pose a major national public health threat. · The EPA's own risk estimates for projected facilities indicated that risks associated with these new facilities were within the range of accept- able risks. At this point, many state and local environmental agencies were devel- oping stringent requirements for new facilities. A more efficient process that could be supported with existing scientific and technical information might have been to leave the regulatory response at the state level with continued assistance from EPA. Using this information, EPA could have justifiably concluded that the most cost-effective means of regulating these facilities would be to strengthen state and local environmental programs. Constrained federal resources could have been directed at developing regu- lations for more significant national pollution problems. Choice of Regulatory Authority Two problems were presented to the agency. One was the fact that its own data suggested that there were no unacceptable health risks associated with MWC emissions. The second problem was the public pressure for federal regulations beyond those already included in the PSD permit pro- gram. In addition, there was evidence that once Congress addressed amend- ments to the CAA, it would mandate development of new source perfor- mance standards for MWC facilities. Thus, ignoring the scientific and technical data at hand, EPA proceeded to seek a legislative mechanism that did not depend on health- or risk-based standards as the foundation for its regulatory program. Two authorities exist for development of air emission standards in the

2 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON New Source Performance Section of the Clean Air Act: Section 111 and Section 112. Section 111 specifies that standards of performance for new stationary sources are to be developed based on best demonstrated technol- ogy. Standard of performance is defined in the statute as (42 U.S.C. §7411, Sec. 111 (a)(l)~: . . . reflecting the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator de- termines has been adequately demonstrated. In contrast, Section 112 requires development of compound-specific or category-specific, health-based standards. Constituent concentrations de- veloped for these standards must be related to scientifically developed threshold levels representing no adverse health effects. The 1986 petition by NRDC and three states specifically requested that EPA use the Section 112 authority for regulating MWC emissions (Abrams et al., 1986; Goldstein et al., 1986~. However, both EPA and industry preferred to use Section 111. The EPA believed that: . . . in view of the broad range of health effects and the multiple constitu- ents of MWC emissions, the use of section lllfb) and llltd) constitutes the most appropriate, comprehensive regulatory strategy for control of these emissions (EPA, 1987b, p. 25399). Industry concurred. Thus, by selecting Section 111, the agency could use a combination of design, equipment, and work practice or operational performance as the standards of performance. This choice removed the scientific and technical dilemma for the agency, that is, the inability to justify a regulatory program based on potential public health risks. Stan- dards developed under Section 111 do not have to be supported by risk analyses, nor are they required to have a health basis. Factors Leading to Federal Involvement Since the early 1970s, MWC has been viewed by many states and local governments as a viable alternative to landfilling. However, because of public concern about potential risks associated with these facilities, local regulatory agencies have been motivated to implement state-of-the-art tech- nologies as a means of gaining community acceptance of proposed facili- ties. Unless these officials are able to show that the best available air pollution controls will be installed, their communities do not approve con- struction (personal communication with D. Gatton, U.S. Conference of Mayors, -

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 113 1992~. Consequently, most new facilities being permitted before develop- ment of an EPA regulatory program employed the type of technologies discussed earlier. Our analysis indicates that internal and external political pressures were the single most important factor influencing EPA's decision about a federal regulatory program. The agency ignored and disregarded available informa- tion that was counter to these political pressures. For example: . The EPA suggested that the number of new projects and amount of waste to be managed at these facilities could be expected to grow signifi- cantly as landfill capacity declined. While some projection was acknowl- edged by industry, the agency discounted available information that pro- jected development would not be uniform across the United States. The economic costs of MWC cannot be borne by all communities or regions. Therefore, the expected pattern of development would be dependent on the availability of landfill capacity and cost-effective recycling programs as a means of reducing disposal volumes. Available information indicated that MWC development was highly regional and much more local than sug- gested by EPA. · The EPA provided no basis to discount the expectation that state and local regulatory agencies would continue requiring stringent PSD permit regulations. In addition, there is no reason to expect that EPA oversight of these requirements and resulting permits could not continue and would not be effective. The agency did not follow its own 1985 National Air Toxics Strategy, which could have increased financial and technical assistance to state environmental programs. · EPA estimates of increases in overall MWC air emissions, without a new federal regulatory program, were not supported by any information available in the mid- to late-1980s. In fact, these estimates were based on less efficient technology and less rigorous operating practices than were already being required by state and local regulatory officials at new facili- ties. Also, the agency did not attempt to place estimates within a national context as a means of determining whether they were a major contributor to public health and environmental risks. In addition, a new administration was taking office at the time EPA was debating its decision. This new administration had emphasized a commit- ment to the environment. Therefore, MWC became an easy and very vis- ible target to demonstrate this federal commitment, regardless of the lack of scientific support for a need to develop another federal regulatory program. Too often, pressures from public interest groups and Congress over- whelm any attempt by the agency to develop regulatory programs that incor- porate sound scientific and technical information. Unfortunately, there are

4 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON examples in other regulatory programs where political pressure negated an EPA decision to develop regulations heavily weighted toward scientific and technical information. In such situations, conflict with Congress appears inevitable5 and EPA is prevented from taking a leadership position armed with sound scientific and technical information. NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS A second stage at which scientific and technical information can be applied in a regulatory context is during development of a proposed and final rule. For the most part, EPA relied on these types of information in the new source performance standards for MWC emissions for new facili- ties. The following sections provide examples of the information used and various points where new information emerged. rule: The purpose of the NSPS was clearly stated in the preamble of the final The intended effect of these standards is to require new, modified, and reconstructed MWCs to control emissions to the level achievable by the best demonstrated system of continuous emission reduction, considering costs, nonair quality health and environmental impacts and energy require ments (EPA, 1991a, p. 54881. In developing these standards, EPA must determine which control tech- nology or technologies can be considered as best demonstrated. Therefore, it must gather control data for each pollutant, or class of pollutants, of concern by sponsoring new research and by requesting data from operating facilities. Section 111 emphasizes that the control achieved by these tech- nologies must be obtainable in a consistent manner across all facilities. Numerical standards presented in the NSPS rule are based on the capa- bilities of specific technologies. Although specific control technologies are identified as the basis of particular standards, there is no requirement that these technologies must be used. Any control technology that will achieve the numerical standards can be implemented (EPA, 1991a). Provisions of Section 111 make use of scientific and technical data in a rather straightforward manner. As indicated previously, the definition of "standard of performance" in Section 111 is the best demonstrated technol- ogy (BDT) available to control emissions of concern. However, even with an emphasis on a technology-based standard, political pressure can affect this stage of regulatory development rather rapidly and forcefully, as illus- trated in the following discussion of the materials separation requirement. As noted there, politics worked against using available information in the proposed rule, but was the driving force (in support of available informa- tion) in changing the provision in the final rule.

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 115 Development of Specific Standards The EPA did, indeed, use scientific and technical information as the basis for the majority of these standards. In addition, changes from the proposal to the final version were supported by new data and information acquired through the public comment process. This information included new technical performance data generated at and provided by operating facilities, results of economic analyses received during public comment, and questions about the validity of data used by EPA in developing the proposed rule. Often such questions of validity prompted the agency to reevaluate the relevance or credibility of information in its data base. Table 1 lists the changes made between the proposed and final rule. The extent to which technical and scientific information has been used is illustrated below for good combustion practices and emission controls for particulates, metals, acid gases, organics, and nitrogen oxides. TABLE 1 Comparison of Proposed and Final NSPS for MWC Standard Proposed Rule Final Rule Applicability Separate requirements for <250 and >250 t/d Only >250 t/d Good combustion 50, 100 or 150 ppmv CO? Same limits as proposed, but practices (GCP) depending on technology some averaging times (4-hr averaging time) revised to 24 hours 100% maximum MWC unit 1 10% maximum MWC load determined during unit load dioxin/£uran test 230°C at PM control 17°C above maximum device inlet temperature at PM control device inlet Metals (PM) 34 mg/m3 at 7% O2 10% opacity Acid gases 80% reduction or 30 ppmv SO2 95% reduction or 25 ppmv HC1 34 mg/m3 at 7% O2 10% opacity (6-min average) 85% reduction or 30 ppmv SO2, at 7% O2 (24-hr block geometric mean) 95% reduction or 25 ppmv HC1, at 7% O2 (annual stack test) Organics 5 to 30 ng/m3 total dioxins 30 ng/m3 total dioxins and furans and furans Nitrogen oxides 120 to 200 ppmv 180 ppmv at 7% O2 (24-hr block average)

116 Good Combustion Practices SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON The term good combustion practices (GCP) refers to a set of operating principles and procedures that ensure optimal operation of MWC facilities. This optimization maximizes complete combustion of organics and mini- mizes formation of dioxins and furans. Components of GCP include identi- fication of (EPA, 1991b): · Limits for carbon monoxide (CO) emission levels; · Site-specific maximum inlet temperature for particulate control de- vices, demonstrated during a dioxin/furan performance test; · Maximum load level demonstrated during a dioxin/furan performance test; and · Certification for supervisor and operator training and use of training manuals for other personnel. Changes made in these components and published in the final rule re- flect the incorporation of new information provided through public com- ment. For example, the proposal required monitoring CO levels to verify correct implementation of GCP. The proposed CO limits and averaging times were based on data from existing facilities (EPA, 1991a), but data from newer facilities indicated that lower limits, as eventually promulgated in the final rule, could be achieved (EPA, l991b). Similarly, new data were the basis for changes in maximum tempera- tures at particulate control device inlets. The single temperature proposed for particulate control devices was changed to a site-specific maximum (EPA, l991a,b). Several alternative temperature limits were recommended by industry during the comment period in an effort to improve metals emis- sion control. However, EPA indicated that the purpose of this standard was to prevent formation of dioxins/furans rather than to control metals emis- sions. Because temperature variability influences the generation of dioxins/ furans, the final rule established a maximum variance (e.g., + 17°F) for these temperatures based on new industry information (EPA, 1991b). The EPA changed the performance standard for maximum steam load in response to new data about technological feasibility. The objective of this standard is to limit flowrates of flue gas, maximize control of particulate emissions, and reduce formation of organics. The agency enforces a maxi- mum steam load requirement because flue gas flowrates, themselves, cannot be measured accurately. Equipment vendors are developing systems to measure flue gas flowrates; once one is validated as best demonstrated by EPA, actual measurement of flowrates can be incorporated into the standard (EPA, 1991a). This final standard clearly illustrates EPA's acceptance of limita- tions in both technical achievability and monitoring capabilities when de

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 117 veloping regulations. Because Section 111 requires EPA to periodically review all standards, there will be future opportunities to revise the basis of new source performance standards as new technology becomes available. Particulate and Metal Controls The standard for particulate and metal controls was not changed in the final rule. However, some commenters felt that the proposed standard was too stringent or not achievable. In response to these comments, EPA sought and reviewed data from 10 plants with state-of-the-art control devices. These data indicated that average particulate emissions could be controlled to be- low 23 milligrams per dry standard cubic meter (mg/dscm). One set of data, however, indicated emissions of 32 mg/dscm. The best demonstrated technology is defined as that technology which can consistently achieve certain emission concentrations. Therefore, EPA selected a final standard of 34 mg/dscm (EPA, 1991a). Acid Gas Controls Acid gas standards were the source of some controversy during public comment; concerns were directed at questions about what could be consid- ered an appropriate designation of best demonstrated technology. Some of those contesting the proposed standard suggested that more long-term data were needed and that it would be preferable to establish design standards (e.g., flue gas temperature entering the control equipment or stoichiometric ratios) rather than numerical limits (Walsh, 1990~. However, EPA main- tained that its data were sufficient to demonstrate that acid gas limits could be met. Between publication of the proposed rule and promulgation of the final rule, EPA reviewed additional data supplied by commenters and changed its standard for acid gas emissions. The SO2 standard was revised as noted in Table 1 (EPA, 1991a). Considerable new information was put at EPA's disposal some indicating that more stringent standards can be achieved and other data suggesting that greater stringency was not possible. Infor- mation about marginal costs, increased volumes of lime necessary to achieve greater control, and trade-offs between incremental acid gas reductions and increased landfilling of lime wastes was provided to EPA. To resolve the controversy, the agency evaluated SO2 emissions data from a new facility equipped with spray dryer/fabric filter controls and determined that an 80 percent reduction could be achieved consistently and continuously. In this case, a change in a final standard was based on statis- tical analyses of data from an actual facility (EPA, l991a,b). Although some commenters believed that the standard for hydrochloric

8 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON acid (HCl) was too stringent, EPA did not agree. Tests from a number of facilities with spray dryer/fabric filter controls indicated that 95 percent reduction could be consistently achieved (EPA, 1991a). The agency deter- mined that HCl control technology, tested annually, was sufficiently devel- oped, and therefore demonstrated, to meet the standard consistently (EPA, 199 lb). There also was some controversy associated with monitoring for acid gases. Sulfur dioxide emissions can be monitored continuously; however, continuous HCl monitors are not yet "demonstrated." Available data indi- cated that the HCl standard (95 percent reduction) is achieved when SO2 is reduced by 80 percent. Therefore, EPA determined that continuous HCl monitoring represented a redundant requirement. The agency supported this determination with statistical correlations between HCl and SO2 re- moval (EPA, l991b). Rather than a numerical concentration limit, EPA selected a percent reduction performance standard because it could be demonstrated as most accurate and representative of performance for acid gas control systems. Requiring intermittent, high emissions to be reduced to a specific numerical level could have unnecessarily increased the complexity and costs of con- trol systems (EPA, 1991a). The agency applied information on technologi- cal capability in setting these standards. Organic Controls The EPA proposed to control emissions of organics by using dioxin/ furan emissions as a surrogate measure of formation of organics. The pro- posed rule indicated a concentration range and stipulated that a single limit would be promulgated in the final rule (EPA, 1989b). In finalizing this standard, EPA analyzed data generated at ten facilities. Emissions were below 10 nanograms (ng)/dscm at eight facilities, but concentrations of up to 29 ng/dscm were observed at two (EPA, 1991a). The final standard for MWC organic emissions is 30 ng/dscm, a level that EPA determined could be consistently achieved. This standard generated some controversy during public comment. First, there was concern whether dioxins and furans are suitable surrogates for organic emissions. Second, the agency was proposing to measure total concentrations of dioxins and furans, which does not account for differ- ences in toxicity among the different congeners and isomers. Third, the methodology proposed for analyzing dioxin/furan concentrations was con- sidered inadequate for the task. Suitability as Surrogates. Measures of dioxins/furans were selected by EPA as a surrogate for organic emissions for several reasons: - , .

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 119 · Results of the 1987 risk assessment indicated that potential carcino- genic risk was predominantly due to the presence of dioxins/furans and no other organics (EPA, 1987d). . Carbon monoxide (CO) levels are indicators of incomplete combus- tion and the potential for formation of organics and dioxins/furans; rank order correlation of data from the 1987 MWC study indicated a positive relationship between these variables; thus EPA believes that CO limits, in addition to limits on dioxin/furan, would ensure complete combustion and minimal formation of organics (EPA, l991a,b). · Data indicated that CO concentrations greater than 200 parts per million by volume (ppmv) are associated with uncontrolled formation of dioxins/furans (EPA, 1989b); because dioxin/furan emissions are tested only during an annual compliance test, CO limits serve as a continuous basis to determine if there are excessive dioxin/furan emissions. Total Dioxin Measurements. In the proposed rule, the agency noted that although it was theoretically possible to measure all components of flue gases, it would be very burdensome, expensive, and impractical to perform such analyses repeatedly (EPA, 1989b). Therefore, the agency relied on total dioxin levels as the best method of control. The International Toxicity Equivalency Factors (I-TEF) is an example of methods used to estimate relative toxicity of various dioxin and furan congeners and isomers (EPA, 1989c). Using the I-TEF concept, linear re- gression of emissions data obtained in the MWC study indicate that "mass emission measures based on either TCDD concentration or PCDD/PCDF concentration can be used as surrogates for toxic equivalency measures in analyses of PCDD and PCDF emissions" (EPA, 1987b). The EPA used these data to justify application of total dioxin measurements. In addition, EPA based its decision on information that there was no demonstrated method to control emissions of various isomers selectively. The agency also indi- cated that allowances would be necessary for differences in TEF values used by different agencies and for emerging new information (EPA, 1991a). In addition, EPA considered it inappropriate to use toxic equivalency as a basis for a standard developed under Section 111: . . . emission limits for total dioxin/furans reflect the achievable perfor mance levels of specific types of control technologies, and are not derived from any target levels of health risks (EPA, 1991a, p. 5504~. Analytical Methodology. Comments on the proposed rule expressed con- cern about EPA's choice of an analytical method to detect dioxins. The method was believed to be inaccurate and result in overly high concentra- tions for particular congeners. Without evaluating new information, EPA maintained its provision to require Analytical Method 23 and asserted that it was adequate to determine compliance with the standard (EPA, l991b).

120 Nitrogen Oxides SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON The agency based its decision to promulgate a standard for NOx emis- sions on information about the availability of technology, the projected rapid growth of new facilities, and the fact that control costs for this pollutant are not unreasonable. Furthermore, Section 129 of the 1990 CAA Amendments requires EPA to regulate NOx emissions at new and existing facilities. Therefore, because BDT exists for NOx control, limits were established (EPA, l991b). The EPA initially proposed a range for NOx emissions. Following the proposal, the agency evaluated extensive continuous monitoring data from a grate-fired mass burn facility with Thermal DeNOx controls. The EPA concluded that a single numerical limit could be consistently achieved. Data from 35 other facilities, representing different types of combustion technol- ogy, supported this conclusion (EPA, l991b). The EPA also believed that some designs might even meet the standard without add-on control (e.g., water-cooled rotary mass burn MWC). A controversy emerged during public comment about whether selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR) is a demonstrated, developing, or experi- mental technology. At that time, the only NOx controls in use were at three facilities, and opponents contended that data from three facilities did not constitute best demonstrated technology. The agency responded that SNCR had been in use since 1987 and that available data were sufficient to estab- lish this technology as BDT (EPA, l991b). Issues about potential toxicity of a detached ammonium chloride plume observed when SNCR is used were raised by commenters. The EPA does not consider ammonium chloride emissions to be environmentally signifi- cant; in addition, it contends that formation can be controlled with proper operation. Materials Separation In contrast to the extensive application of scientific and technical data used by EPA in formulating the other provisions of the proposed and final NSPS, the proposed materials separation requirement was developed in the absence of supporting scientific or technical information. Inclusion of this requirement was driven by internal political considerations. The debate concerning a materials separation requirement is discussed at length here because it is the most dramatic example of a conflict between political desires and supporting scientific, technical, and economic information. Rationale for Proposed Requirement The materials separation provision mandated separation and removal of certain materials from municipal waste streams before combustion. Under .. . .

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 121 the proposed rule, an MWC facility's NSPS operating permit would include a specific requirement that 25 percent (by weight) of waste received at the permitted facility must be diverted from the combustion process. If at any time during the permit life, this diversion requirement was not met, the facility would not be in compliance with the permit. The EPA's justification for this provision followed two lines of reasoning (EPA, 1989b). The first line incorporated a belief that: · Most separated materials could be recycled, thereby preserving natu- ral resources, reducing volumes of waste to be landfilled, and potentially providing communities with income from these recycling activities to par- tially offset MWC operational costs; and · Reducing the amount of waste combusted would reduce both total MWC emissions and those of specific constituents. The second line of reasoning indicated that certain environmental ben- efits could result from implementation of the provision (EPA, 1989b). For example, separating paper and paperboard would: · Reduce specific metal emissions because lead-based inks and mer- cury-based fungicides would not be burned; · Lower carbon dioxide emissions because less material would be available for combustion; . Preserve forestry resources by recycling paper products; · Reduce HC1 emissions by removing bleached paper; and · Reduce SO2 emissions by removing combustion of sulfur-laden pa- perboard. Furthermore, EPA suggested that reduced combustion of paper would result in the downsizing of MWC units because lower volumes of waste would require incineration (EPA, 1989b). However, the agency provided no information to support the concept that downsizing of facilities would result in an environmental benefit. Scientific and Technical Data The 1990 report Municipal Waste Combustion: Background Informa- tion for Materials Separation presented EPA's evaluation of data to support its claims about reduced emissions associated with materials separation (EPA, 1990~. Emissions monitoring data for several constituents were presented, including data for total metals, mercury, lead, dioxins and furans, paper, and yard waste. These data were derived from three mass burn facilities located in Nashville, Tennessee; Salem, Virginia; and Gallatin, Tennessee. Emis

22 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON sion samples were collected upstream from pollution control devices to represent uncontrolled emissions and did not reflect concentrations or quan- tities emitted from the stacks. Data were analyzed on the basis of the total amount of waste processed, not the amount burned. These data did not demonstrate that a consistent reduction in MWC emissions would be achieved. Table 2 shows the range of variability in EPA's data for compound- specific emissions. For example, lead concentrations following materials separation varied from a decrease in emissions of 52 percent to an increase of 5 percent over baseline emissions. More startling, carbon monoxide levels ranged from a decline of 65 percent to an increase of 468 percent over baseline emissions (EPA, 19901. At the time of proposal, EPA acknowledged this lack of consistency in the data concerning emission reductions as well as the problems inherent in the basic study design. For example, data representing emissions when waste streams were not separated and those representing separated wasted streams were collected months apart at a single facility without any control for variations in the types of wastes collected. In addition, data for nonseparated and separated wastes were not always collected from the same facility. Such collection practices undoubtedly contributed significantly to observed variations in emissions. The result of this data collection effort was that EPA could not provide supporting evidence for its theory about the impact of materials separation on MWC emissions (EPA, 1990~. For example: TABLE 2 Comparison of Emission Changes Associated with Materials Separation Pollutant Range of Change Nashville, Salem, Gallatin, (percent) Tenn. Va. Tenn. Particulates+20 Arsenic-70 --5 Cadmium-73 --22 Chromium-63 -+68 Lead-52 -+5 Mercury -71 - +260 Carbon monoxide -65 - +468 Nitrogen oxides -42 - +8 Sulfur dioxide -1 - +11 Hydrogen chloride -79 - +17 Total hydrocarbons -74 - +214 SOURCE: Adapted from EPA (1990).

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 123 · Levels of dioxins/furans appeared to be unaffected by the removal of polyvinyl chloride from combusted waste; HC1 emission levels appeared to be correlated with this removal. . The EPA acknowledged that "there are no data to demonstrate what quantity of mercury, cadmium, or other metal emissions from MWCs are due specifically to the combustion of batteries." The actual impact of re moving metals before combustion could be quite small, given that all new facilities must have highly efficient air pollution controls. · Removal of over half of the total lead content from waste, on aver- age, did not provide consistent net reductions in lead emissions. . The agency acknowledged that "tnjo data are available on the posi- tive or negative effects of paper separation on MWC emissions." · The EPA could only speculate that removal of yard waste would result in reduced NOx emissions; the basis of this speculation was that higher NOx concentrations are observed in summer, when the waste stream contains more yard waste. Nevertheless, EPA ignored the lack of consistent evidence to support its theory on the environmental benefits of materials separation and persisted in including a materials separation requirement in the proposed rule (EPA, 1 989b). Political Debate Concerning Materials Separation Although all stakeholders in the final rule for new source performance standards have been extremely supportive of recycling programs, many of them opposed requiring materials separation as a component of MWC per- mits. These latter included state and local governments, the MWC industry, and particular offices within the executive branch. Only environmental groups expressed strong support for continued inclusion of this provision. The comments made by these groups are summarized in the following sec- tions to illustrate the different perspectives of all stakeholders and the type of new information uncovered during the public comment period. The "influencing factors" in this debate were concerns about legal au- thority, lack of evidence that the requirement could be implemented, and lack of evidence that emissions could be consistently reduced. The core argument against the provision, however, was a concern that a better mecha- nism for initiating recycling programs existed, that is, the regulatory pro- gram for new source performance standards- which is aimed at preventing air pollution-was not an appropriate vehicle to mandate community recy- cling programs. The EPA never fully explored any other mechanisms and made little, if any, effort to obtain information about actual coexistence of MWC facilities and community recycling programs.

24 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON A recent survey by the Integrated Waste Services Association illustrates the type of information that should have contributed to EPA's decision about materials separation (IWSA, 1992b). This survey indicated that recycling programs and MWC combustion are compatible waste management activi- ties and coexist without regulatory requirements being included In MWU operating permits. For example, in those counties and cities with operating MWC facilities, recycling rates generally exceed the proposed 25 percent goal. These recycling rates range from 24 to 46 percent. This industry survey suggests that communities are able to develop successful recycling programs without mandating materials separation as part of a NSPS permit. The survey does not address the impact of these recycling programs on emissions from facilities. ~' ~¢~= T A_ State and Local Governments. In comments submitted to the Public Docket, state and local governments contended that the CAA was not an appropriate authority under which to require materials separation and recycling pro- ~rnms Most commenter.s expressed a preference that such provisions were ~- best handled within authorities of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or by a presidential initiative (EPA, 1991b). While state and local officials generally supported recycling as a major component in the solid waste management hierarchy, they objected to hav- ing this requirement as part of MWC operating permits. The materials separation provision could result in numerous difficulties for local commu- nities, such as certifying that 25 percent of the waste stream had been separated and problems associated with maintaining consistent recyclable waste volumes. In the latter case, facilities would have to cease operation until the target recycling rate was possible. A major factor influencing achievability of specific recycling rates is the lack of or uncertain markets for recyclable materials. In the absence of markets, local governments and operators of a facility would be faced with the need for long-term stockpiling of separated materials. Although EPA proposed a waiver provision for burning nonrecycled materials should mar- kets not be available at particular times, local officials emphasized the cum- bersome nature of the waiver process. In addition, contracts between local governments and operators of these facilities generally cannot be adjusted readily. These contracts usually in- clude a cost penalty placed on local governments when specified combus- tion volumes are not met. Therefore, any delays in obtaining these waivers would place financial burdens on local governments. The contracting pro- cess for operation of MWC facilities is not conducive to a materials separa- tion requirement as part of an NSPS permit (Curling, 1990; Martineau, 1 990a; National Association of Counties, 1990~. Echoing many of these local issues, state officials also emphasized their -

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 125 concerns about quantifying and certifying materials separation rates. They questioned whether there are methods that can provide consistent defini- tions for quantifying baseline levels and subsequent reductions. If these methods are not available, documentation of compliance with a materials separation standard is not possible (Nosenchuck and Bruckner, 1990; Walsh, 1990). Environmental Groups. Environmental groups were extremely supportive of all aspects of the materials separation provision and raised two issues in their comments on the proposal (Hershkowitz, 1990; Martineau, l990b; Ruston, 1990~. First, they suggested that the presence of metals can catalyze forma- tion of dioxins/furans; however' no supporting data were provided. Second, they suggested that removing chlorinated plastics would reduce emission levels for HCl and dioxins/furans, again without including any supporting documentation. Additional benefits of materials separation cited by the Natural Resources Defense Council included (Doniger, 19901: · Reduction in air pollution by burning less waste and removing items that may produce toxic emissions; Savings of millions of barrels of imported oil; and · Reduction in future incineration ash landfill capacities. Information with which to evaluate these claimed benefits, however, was not available. MWC Industry. Representatives of the MWC industry echoed state and local government concerns about the lack of data demonstrating reduced emissions. They also questioned the legal authority of using the CAA to regulate materials separation and recycling. Industry believed that existing or new RCRA authority or a presidential recycling initiative would be more appropriate vehicles for increasing national recycling efforts (Institute of Resource Recovery, 1990; Martineau, 1990c). Executive Branch. Within the executive branch, there also was a lack of agreement with EPA regarding anticipated benefits of the materials separa- tion provision. The Council of Economic Advisers argued that EPA failed to establish evidence that separating materials would result in air pollution benefits. It is also noted that, as proposed, the materials separation require- ment constituted a goal of the new source performance standards, not a tool that operators could use to meet a performance standard (Gruenspecht, 1990~. The President's Council of Competitiveness (PCC) joined the debate on this issue. In correspondence, the Council (PCC, 1990) affirmed its support for voluntary and market-based recycling programs. The Council expressed full support for stringent new standards for air emissions as required in the

126 new source performance standards. separation provision to be inconsistent with the administration's regulatory principles. The Council's reasons for this position included: SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON However, it considered a materials . The materials separation requirement was not performance based, because it did not allow flexibility to select the most efficient ways for meeting the standard; · A nationwide, uniform requirement violated the Federalism Execu- tive Order (E.O. 12612), which required agencies to avoid federal regula- tions in areas reserved for state and local governments; and . Benefits of this requirement did not exceed costs of implementing the program, thus failing to meet the criterion of E.O. 12291. In response to these public comments, EPA stated in the preamble to the final rule that achievability was not an issue in its decision to remove the materials separation requirement. Rather, because of uncertainty over the net benefits of materials separation (i.e., reductions in pollutant emis- sions) and the potential economic impacts of the requirement, the decision was made not to include the provision in the final NSPS rule (EPA, 1991a). The agency clarified its opinion that emission benefits would result from reducing the amount of waste combusted, but acknowledged that these ben- efits could not be measured (EPA, 1991b). OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE USE OF INFORMATION As indicated earlier, a regulatory agency has two stages at which it can apply current scientific and technological information in the regulatory pro- cess. The first stage is deciding whether a federal regulatory program is necessary. The second stage is development of proposed and final rules. The information available to an agency can be obtained from published literature, commissioned studies, or supplied by the regulated community. In the case of MWC, EPA was not consistent in its use of information. In making a decision that federal new source performance standards were needed for municipal waste combustion, the agency actually ignored exist- ing information about the potential risks associated with emissions from these facilities and about the sophistication of the technology being re lJnfortunatelv. the agency also ignored quired under the PSD program. ~ ~7 ___ ~ ~ scientific data when it proposed a materials separation provision. However, EPA did use a range of technical and scientific information in proposing standards for air pollution controls. Although scientific, technical, and eco- nomic information relevant to all aspects of the regulatory process was available to the agency staff, there is clear evidence that political forces influenced decisions about the scope of the regulatory program. -

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS Findings of this case study indicate that: 127 · Scientific, economic, and technical data related to regulatory deci- sions are necessary to balance political considerations; to counter political influences effectively the agency must have comprehensive and sound data at its disposal. · Perspectives of governments about the use of these types of infor- mation vary among federal, state, and local officials and depend on the strength of political influence. · Incentives for identifying new information also vary among the stake- holders in a regulatory process. We would emphasize, however, that these findings presuppose that the agency is prepared to take a leadership role in opposing the political forces internal and external to it when available scientific, technical, and economic information indicates no justification for a specific political position. Un- fortunately, there is little evidence to date that EPA can, or is willing, to be a strong leader against political tides. Science versus Politics In reaching an initial decision to proceed with a federal regulatory pro- gram for municipal waste combustion (i.e., giving this activity priority over development of regulations for other sources), EPA ignored available scien- tific and technical information. For example: · Available information clearly indicated that permits issued by states and local regulatory agencies for construction and operation of new MWC facilities required installation of the best demonstrated technology and op- erating practices. · These requirements had received limited opposition from industry and considerable support from host communities. Despite local concerns, there was no evidence to conclude that new facilities with state-of-the-art pollution control technology actually posed unacceptable risks to host communities or the surrounding environment. The EPA's own assessments indicated that risks associated with operation of these facilities were acceptable. · No evidence existed to suggest that emissions from new MWC facili- ties would constitute a major national public health threat. . The EPA relied only on a contracted study that was narrowly focused on MWC practices. The Agency made no attempt to generate or compile more comprehensive data, for example, current relationships of recycling

28 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON programs with MWC and comparisons of MWC emissions and risks within a national environmental context. In some instances, EPA ignored existing information, such as results of agency risk assessments. Throughout the history of political actions related to MWC, EPA has lacked control of its agenda. In developing this rule, the agency was at the "mercy" of political forces from within and from outside. The use of any scientific or technical data took second place to these political forces. However, the political factors surrounding MWC were conflicting in nature. Concern about management of solid waste began to gain momen- tum at this time. Landfill space was becoming scarce. Municipal wastes were being transported across state boundaries for disposal. The desire of communities to use incineration was increasing. In contrast, there also was growing dissatisfaction with the lack of pollution controls on existing mu- nicipal waste facilities. Supporters of recycling and waste reduction pro- grams were becoming increasingly concerned that construction of new MWC capacity would have a detrimental impact on new recycling and reduction efforts. In this political climate, the agency did not have the internal com- mitment to make decisions based on scientific and technical information. The second point at which EPA ignored science and technology was in its decision to propose a materials separation requirement as part of a facil- ity permit. At the time of development of the proposed rule, no data existed to support a claim that separation of materials would reduce toxic emis- sions. Agency staff have suggested that newly appointed EPA decision makers wanted to use a major rule to illustrate its commitment to recycling and reduction programs for solid waste management. Technical staff at EPA had no means to balance this internal political goal. While politics shaped this part of the proposed standards, politics also led to the elimination of the materials separation provision in the final rule. Only through the intervention of offices in the executive branch was the internal agency conflict resolved. This political influence, combined even- tually with an acknowledgement by EPA of the insufficiency of the data, resulted in the withdrawal of the materials separation requirements. With- out strong political backing, however, scientific and technical information about the inadvisability of the provision would have continued to be ig- nored. Different Governmental Perspectives Our findings suggest that the type of technical and scientific informa- tion used may be different at each level of government. However, it is clear that decisions about the need for a regulatory program are dictated by po- litical forces regardless of the jurisdiction. Once a need has been estab- lished, the range of stringency in regulatory requirements may differ. For

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 129 example, local regulatory agencies have the most to gain by seeking and requiring stringent air pollution controls and the highest standards for op- eration of facilities, regardless of actual risks associated with these facili- ties. Local agencies and political leaders are responsible for meeting the waste management needs of their community and must have the community's support in any action aimed at addressing these needs. Without applying the best available technology, communities in which these facilities are to be sited do not give this support. In addition, local site conditions and specific community demands are driving forces behind implementation of most standards for pollution control at MWC facilities. As a result, local environmental agencies have a major incentive to identify new data and information about risks, demonstrated technology, and implementation costs. This information enhances the credibility of the local agency's choice for regulatory requirements. At the state level, it appears that there may be less urgency than that perceived at the local level. Waste management is not the responsibility of state agencies; however, protection of public health, broadly defined, is. State agencies must evaluate all conditions within their jurisdiction to deter- mine feasible and cost-effective protection throughout their state. There- fore, the need to specify a level playing field through state requirements for MWC must be balanced with a need for communities to be able to make potentially difficult waste management choices. The federal perspective must be even more broadly defined than that of the state. The EPA must develop standards that can be implemented at a national level but do not constrain local options for waste management. If national regulations are overly stringent, some communities could be pre- cluded from using MWC as a viable alternative to other management op- tions. However, the federal agency must also balance this need for state and local flexibility with a need to maximize protection of public health and the environment, both within and among states. Thus, there are different perspectives among federal, state, and local governments when it comes to promulgating regulations. State and local officials can identify the most appropriate and often most stringent require- ments on a case-by-case basis. Differences among facilities and locations might be justified. A federal regulatory program, however, must promulgate national standards; therefore, case-by-case analysis is not appropriate. For most regulatory programs, rules based on best demonstrated technology at the federal level constitute the "best that can consistently and easily be achieved." There is necessarily a need to "average" these requirements to provide maximum national protection at reasonable costs. If state and local environmental programs are given responsibility (with federal guidance), then facility requirements can be as stringent as local conditions make nec

130 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON essary. Given the extent of public scrutiny of MWC activities, it is unlikely that minimal health and environmental protection will be imposed in host communities. Incentives for Seeking New Information Incentives for seeking new information vary throughout the regulatory process and among the various stakeholders. The basis of the Clean Air Act, that is, implementation of technological and operational standards, should provide maximum incentives for EPA to seek out the best available informa- tion. To a limited extent, the agency did seek new information during the initial stages of evaluating MWC by commissioning a large multifaceted study. However, once political factors begin to intrude, new information either was not sought or was ignored. For example, the risk evaluations performed in 1987 and 1989 suggested that MWC did not pose major risks at either a national or local level. The EPA did not use this information as a means of balancing political pressure and, thus, had little influence on the decision about the need for a regulatory program. A major incentive for regulators in seeking comprehensive and new information is to enhance their credibility and the enforceability of a regula- tory program. The materials separation requirement in the proposed rule is an excellent example of the influence of limited and less credible data. Acceptance by state and local governments and industry was not forthcom- ing because inclusion of this provision was not based on sufficient support- ing data. If the agency had used scientific and technical information in reaching its decision about the advisability of the provision, a major contro- versy in the development of the NSPS rule might have been avoided. Un- fortunately, political pressures forced it to ignore such information. Should the agency desire to revisit a materials separation requirement in other rules or in future revisions to this rule, it will be necessary to seek appropriate data to support assumptions about the reduction in air emissions associated with materials separation and the impact on public health and the environ- ment. The CAA itself inhibits to some extent the incentive to identify new data about new and cutting-edge technological innovations. The act specifi- cally requires a standard of performance that is defined as the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction . . .) the Administrator determines has been ade quately demonstrated BAA 42 USC 7411, Section lllta)]. If a technology has not been used sufficiently to demonstrate consistent emission reductions, it is unlikely to be considered "demonstrated" because there is no opportunity for the agency to search beyond systems currently in -

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 131 operation. Statutes such as the CAA result in the development of techno- logically driven regulations. By specifying consistent achievements as the definition of performance, EPA can only look at those technologies used at existing facilities. The agency cannot promulgate technology-forcing regu- lations those that force development of new technologies capable of achieving emissions standards beyond what is possible with current technology un- der the CAA. To some extent the agency does attempt to force new tech- nologies by setting standards at the upper bound of margins of achievability. However, the definition of BDT limits this option. Industry also has limited incentives to develop new technology. In conversations with industry representatives, it was emphasized that indus- trial incentives for technological improvements in air pollution or opera- tional control systems are to reduce operation and compliance costs.6 Re- duced emissions may be an added benefit of any cost reduction, but they are not the primary goal of new technical research. If a new technology can reduce emissions but is more costly to operate, industry would be less likely to implement it voluntarily. Until all facility operators are required through rulemaking to install the same, more costly equipment, such voluntary ac- tions place operators with more advanced thinking at an economic disad- vantage. The main reason that there was so little opposition to most of the provisions in the proposed new source performance standards is that most new facilities were already being required to implement the equipment and practices recognized as BDT in the proposed rule. Thus, the rule simply equalized the playing field within the regulated community. Environmental groups probably have the greatest incentive to seek new information. In general, the agenda of these groups is to drive regulations to ever more stringent levels in a desire to maximize protection of public health and the environment. These groups often are not constrained by concerns for technical feasibility or economic factors. Therefore, they can identify new developments before a technology is considered to be techni- cally or economically viable. Unfortunately, these groups may become so focused on a perceived need for more stringent requirements that they may not support their allegations about technical feasibility or risks posed by unregulated facilities with sound scientific and technical information. CONCLUSIONS The environmental regulatory agenda has always been shaped by politi- cal forces. Since the inception of EPA in 1970, Congress, industry, and public interest groups have identified various industrial activities thought to require a regulatory program. For example, in the early 1970s, Congress seemed to identify a different pollutant every year, which, in its opinion (or the opinion of a few members), would lead to dire public health and envi

32 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON ronmental problems without the immediate and rigorous attention of EPA. Industry and environmental groups often were sources of information that supported such urgency. Environmental and other public interest groups also have used specific environmental issues to further membership drives or to force a change in national policy, for example, the recent Alar contro- versy. Likewise, industry has lobbied Congress and EPA for regulatory programs that would provide more uniform regulations across the country, thus preventing uneven economic advantages or enhancing the ability to implement better technology. In all such instances, regardless of the origination of an initiative, we are left with the impression that scientific and technical information rarely plays a determining role in the debates. Unfortunately, all stakeholders attempt to limit full use of scientific and technical information in the regu- latory decision-making process, particularly if the information is counter to the stakeholder's agenda. The outcome of this political struggle is an increased likelihood that significant problems, and important scientific data, are ignored. This point has been emphasized by the Expert Panel on the Role of Science at EPA (EPA, 19921. The panel stated in its report: Science is also key to determining which environmental problems pose the greatest risks to human health, ecosystems, and the economy. In the ab- sence of sound scientific information, it is likely that high-profile but low risk problems will be targeted, while more significant threats are ignored. . . . Strong science provides the foundation for credible environmental deci- sionmaking (EPA, 1992, p. 15-25~. There is no question that politics both shaped the decision about whether a federal regulatory program was necessary for MWC and influenced provi- sions in the proposed and final new source performance standards. Whether, and how, such political forces can be curbed is questionable and may not be altogether desirable. However, based on the findings of this case study, certain suggestions emerge that may facilitate a better balance between po- litical considerations and use of scientific, technical, and economic infor- mation in the regulatory decision-making process. First, politics should be balanced with scientific, economic and tech- nical information. In this case study, EPA evaluated such information related to MWC and published its findings in the 1987 report to Congress. However, the agency evaluated MWC as a single issue divorced from the broader national environmental context. Thus, while the agency estimated emissions from existing and projected facilities, it is not apparent that these emissions were compared with other industrial sources to determine their significance from a national perspective. Similarly, when the risks from exposure to these emissions were calculated, they were not compared - .

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 133 with risks associated with other sources of these same chemicals and met- als. The EPA's economic analysis also failed to put the MWC issue into a national context The agency considered costs for controlling emissions only. There was no attempt to compare costs of the federal program in broad terms with national environmental and public health benefits. The EPA should conduct a cost-benefit analysis using several competing envi- ronmental issues to determine if a specific problem (i.e., MWC) merits a federal program or whether there are alternative and less costly regulatory options. Analysis of the relative national priority, evaluating consequences of not having a federal program, the cost of a federal program, and other problems competing for limited resources may result in a more effective balance of political pressure. A stronger foundation for balancing political influences might have been achieved if EPA had conducted such analyses when reaching a decision about the need for a federal MWC regulatory program. As it turned out, EPA staff had little real information with which to counter effectively the political pressures being brought to the MWC debate. A second recommendation concerns a mechanism to enhance the qual- ity of information available to the agency for use in developing regulatory requirements. Both government and industry agree that, for the most part, EPA used available information in formulating the proposed and final rules for new source performance standards. As indicated in an earlier discus- sion, the standards are largely based on the technological capability of the best demonstrated technology. However, conversations with EPA officials indicate that the information-gathering process might be enhanced (per- sonal communication with R. Brenner and J. Democker, EPA Office of Air and Radiation, 19921. At present, EPA believes that stakeholders are play- ing a passive role in the agency's search for necessary information. Only in limited instances do stakeholders voluntarily provide information before a rule is proposed. Much information often appears to be withheld until the public comment period for a proposed rule. Furthermore, state and local governments, environmental groups, and industry often complain that information used by the agency is not always of the highest quality. This complaint is supported by an observation of the Expert Panel on the Role of Science in EPA: EPA program offices often conduct scoping studies or other preliminary assessments in the early stages of regulatory development. These studies are frequently carried out without benefit of peer review or quality assur- ance. They sometimes escalate into regulatory proposals with no further science input, leaving EPA initiatives on shaky scientific ground and af- fecting the credibility of the Agency (EPA, 1992; p. 371.

34 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON The EPA did conduct a large-scale study of MWC. However, to our knowledge, with the exception of an EPA Science Advisory Board review of only the methodology used in the risk assessment work, it was not peer reviewed (Hartung and Nelson, 1987~. During development of a proposed standard, the only opportunity for any interested party to provide EPA with better information is to provide data informally and voluntarily. The extent and quality of information provided in this manner depends on the aware- ness of different stakeholders about directions the agency may take, or is taking, in developing a proposed rule. In general, EPA provides limited information about policy choices while a proposed rule is being developed, thus stakeholders are not always aware of gaps in the agency data base. Once a rule is published for public comment, additional information can be forthcoming, and EPA can apply it in revisions for the final rule. This seems to be an inefficient process that fosters adversarial positions rather than constructive comments. A more effective mechanism is needed through which the agency can request and receive new information during development of a proposed rule, rather than waiting to receive information submitted voluntarily or during the public comment period. The Expert Panel on the Role of Science has provided extensive suggestions for enhancing the use of better information (EPA, 1992~. An additional recommendation is to employ regulatory negotiations or some version of these negotiations to enhance acquisition of better informa- tion. Regulatory negotiations have been used by EPA over the past five years in selected rulemaking to reduce adversarial reactions to proposed rules. The concept is to bring together representatives of all major interest groups for a specific rule and to develop a proposal to which all representa- tives can agree. Some of these negotiating attempts have been successful, resulting in proposed rules that enjoyed the consensus of all stakeholders. However, even when an acceptable proposal is not negotiated, there is still some success in terms of the amount of scientific and technical information that is brought into the negotiation process early. To illustrate, a regulatory negotiation was attempted in developing RCRA regulations for deep-well injection of hazardous wastes.7 Because of philo- sophical differences among the various interests at the negotiation table, consensus on a proposed rule was not achieved. ' However, most partici- pants in this particular process acknowledged that a wealth of information was brought to the agency's attention. In the absence of these regulatory negotiations, it is questionable whether the full extent of pertinent informa- tion would have been presented through the normal voluntary mechanisms. One reason that there is an increase in the volume of new information provided during such negotiations is that all participants are able to learn firsthand the basis for any opposing views. Thus, new information relevant _

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 135 to specific issues can be brought to the negotiating table as a counter to such objections. If negotiations were to become a standard component of a regulatory process, stakeholders would have a more controlled and focused opportunity to provide EPA with information in an atmosphere of coopera- tion. In addition, the quality and direct relevance of the scientific and technical information might be substantially enhanced. The ultimate result would be a stronger foundation for the development of scientifically and technically sound regulations. As our findings suggest, EPA can benefit from implementing a process that enhances not only the quality of data collected but also the range of information. If informed regulatory decisions are to be made, current scien- tific and technical information is needed to balance political influences. At the first stage of the regulatory process, this information must be evaluated in a national context. At the second stage of regulatory development, the scope of information must be sufficiently broad to allow development of sound, achievable, and enforceable regulatory standards. While these recommended options offer other mechanisms for enhanc- ing the availability of new scientific and technical information to the agency, they do not address the underlying and extremely critical problem inherent in a regulatory process: the influence of political factions to the exclusion of scientific and technical information. The MWC rule for new source performance standards is not unique in the role that politics played in deter- mining the need for and the scope of the regulatory program. Politics have "interfered" in many of the agency's activities. Such political pressure arises externally and internally to EPA. Until political factors are placed on an equal, rather than superior, footing with scientific, economic, and techni- cal factors, EPA and all regulatory agencies will not be able to function effectively. Unfortunately, the resolution of this problem is not simple and will require a commitment on the part of all stakeholders to allow such information to play a more prominent role. APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIONS OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROLS Electrostatic Precipitators Electrostatic precipitators (ESPs) are used to remove particulate matter from flue gas streams. A typical ESP consists of an alternating array of negatively charged grids of wires and positively charged collection plates. Incoming particles are given an electrical charge through contact with gas ions. Charged particles pass through a strong electronic field, which causes these particles to migrate to a collection electrode with an opposite charge. .

36 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON The precipitators are divided into sections called fields; adding fields in- creases the collection efficiency (Frillici and Schwartz, 1991~. Fabric Filters Fabric filters (FFs) mechanically separate particles from flue gas streams, greater than 99 percent removal (Gaige and Halil, 1992~. They . . ac sieving consist of a filter medium, (i.e., tubular bag), a cage to support the bags, a gas-tight enclosure, and a mechanism to remove accumulated particles peri- odically. As the particulate-laden gas passes through the filter medium, collected material forms a porous cake, which acts as an additional filtration medium. Fabric filters are categorized according to how they are-cleaned: shaker, reverse-air, and pulsejet. The fabric of the filters may either be woven or felled and may consist of fiberglass, Teflon or Nomex, which will withstand entering flue gas temperatures of up to 300°F (Frillici and Schwarz, 1991). Acid Gas Scrubbers Acid gas scrubbers operate by bringing acid gases into contact with alkali reagents, forming a neutralized salt solid that can be removed by ESPs or FFs. Acid gas scrubbers are categorized as wet scrubbers, dry scrubbers, or wet-dry scrubbers. Wet scrubbers use lime, limestone, or an alkali reagent and produce a wet bottom catch; their design might include venturi, spray, baffle, or packed tower. Dry scrubbers inject dry sorbent into the flue duct, resulting in a dry catch (Frillici and Schwartz, 1991~. In wet-dry scrubbers, commonly referred to as spray dryer absorbers (SD), flue gas enters the reaction vessel, where it is dispersed and put into spiral motion. A water-based slurry of alkali reagent is sprayed into the flue gas stream; the water evaporates and the reagent reacts with SO2 and HCl to form salts. Use of FFs in conjunction with an SD results in a cake where the reagent and gases can react further, increasing efficiency (Frillici and Schwartz, 1991; Gaige and Halil, 1992~. Although acid gas scrubbers are intended primarily to remove HC1 and SO2, they also remove some organic and heavy metal pollutants (Brna and Kilgore, 1991~. Reduced flue gas temperatures associated with scrubbers cause many volatilized metals and organics to condense, thus increasing removal efficiencies in the ESP or FF (Gaige and Halil, 1992~. Nitrogen Oxide Controls Two main add-on technologies are currently in use across the world: selective catalytic reduction (SCR) and selective noncatalytic reduction (SNCR). . ~ ,

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 137 SCR has been used on coal- and oil-fired power plants in Japan and Europe. Ammonia is injected into the flue gas stream and the mixture is then passed through a catalyst (molybdenum, vanadium, titanium) bed where NOX are converted to nitrogen gas. SCR operates at temperatures ranging from 500 to 800°F. Fouling caused by high particulate loading limits the potential for application of this technology (Frillici and Schwartz, l991~. SNCR involves postcombustion injection of ammonia or urea to contact the flue gas. SNCR is most effective between 1600 and 2000°F, so the injectors are located in the upper portion of the furnace. The gas phase reaction between the NOX and the injected ammonia or urea results in the production of nitrogen gas and water. Potential disadvantages include the difficulty of maintaining the optimal flue gas temperature in the injection zone. Also, ammonia may react with acid gases to form ammonia salts, which may corrode and foul downstream equipment or exit the stack as a visible plume (Frillici and Schwartz, 19914. NOTES 1. We interviewed staff of particular MWC companies and the Integrated Waste Services Association, the trade association for the industry. Discussions were held with representatives of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials. Staff of the EPA Office of Air and Radiation and Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards were interviewed. 2. The first legislative action for Clean Air occurred in December 1963 (P.L. 88-206), and was amended eighteen times between 1963 and 1990. 3. An acceptable risk range of 10-6 to 10-4 was established by the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response for use in the Superfund Program during the mid-1980s. 4. The following health parameters were used in Morrison (1989) for comparison with MWC emissions. HCl: EPA reference dose (RfD) of 7 ,ug/m3; fig: National Emission Stan- dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants guideline of 1 ,ug/m3; and Pb: National Ambient Air Qual- ity Standards of 1.5 ,ug/m3 (quarterly average). 5. The conflict between Congress and EPA over the initial proposal to develop health- based treatment standards for the 1984 HSWA provisions for land disposal restrictions un- doubtedly set a precedent for EPA's decision about a basis for requesting MWC emissions. 6. Personal conversations with representatives of Integrated Waste Services Association, Ogden Martin Systems, and ABB Resource Recovery Systems. 7. Dr. Pirages was a participant in this regulatory negotiation. REFERENCES Abrams, R., H. G. Williams, A. Violet, and J. I. Lieberman. 1986. lion regarding health effects for the establishment of emission regulations under §112 of the United States Clean Air Act. States of New York, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Brna, T. G., and J. D. Kilgore. 1991. The impact of particulate emissions control on the control of other MWC air emissions. Journal of the Air Waste Management Association 40(9): 1324-1330. Cheremisinoff, P. 1987. Resource recovery: A special report. Pollution Engineering, Novem- ber:52-59. Petition for a determina

38 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON Curling, D. S. 1990. Comments on the proposed NSPS for MWCs from the Southeastern Public Service Authority of Virginia, Chesapeake, Va., dated January 29, 1990. EPA Air Docket No. A-89-08, IV-D-77. DePaul, F. T., and J. W. Crowder. 1988. Control of emissions from municipal solid waste incinerators. Prepared for Illinois Department of Energy and Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Affairs Division, Springfield, Ill. ILENR RE-AQ-88/14. Doniger, D. 1990. Letter from David Doniger, Senior Attorney, NRDC to George Bush, President, dated December 27, 1990. Frillici, P. W., and S. C. Schwartz. 1991. BACT, MACT, and the act: What's going on? Waste Age 22(11):65-72. Gaige, C. D., and R. T. Halil, Jr. 1992. Clearing the air about municipal waste combustors. Solid Waste & Power, January-February:12-17. Goldstein, E. A., D. D. Doniger, A. K. Ahmed and M. D. Uva. 1986. Petition to the United States Environmental Protection Agency for the Regulation of Emissions from Municipal Solid Waste Incinerators. Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council. Greim, H. 1990. Toxicological evaluation of emissions from modern municipal waste incin- erators. Chemosphere 20(3/4):317-331. Gruenspecht, H. 1990. Memo from Howard Gruenspecht, Council of Economic Advisers, to James McRae, Office of Management and Budget, dated December 7, 1990. Hartung, R., and N. Nelson. 1987. Letter to Mr. L. M. Thomas, U.S. EPA Administrator. Science Advisory Board, Washington, D.C. Hershkowitz, A. 1990. Letter from A. Hershkowitz, Natural Resources Defense Council, to William K. Reilly, U.S. EPA Administrator, dated December 20, 1990. Institute of Resource Recovery. 1990. Written statement of the Institute of Resource Recov- ery regarding the U.S. EPA's proposed rules fur municipal waste combustors, dated March 1, 1990. Integrated Waste Services Association. 1992a. Waste-to-energy. Washington, D.C. Integrated Waste Services Association (IWSA). 1992b. Survey of recycling and waste-to- energy activities. Washington, D.C. Kiser, J. V. L. 1991. Municipal waste combustion in the United States: An overview. Waste Age 22(11) :27-30. Kiser, J. V. L., and D. B. Sussman. 1991. Municipal waste combustion & mercury: The real story. Waste Age 22(11):41~4. Kiser, J. V. L. 1992. Municipal waste combustion in North America: 1992 update. Waste Age 23(11):26-36. Kiser, J. V. L., and B. K. Burton. 1992. Energy from municipal waste: Picking up where recycling leaves off. Waste Age 23(11):39~6. Martineau, R. J., Jr. 1990a. Memo from Martineau, Attorney, U.S. EPA Air and Radiation Division re: September 12, 1990 meeting of EPA Officials and National Association of Counties. Martineau, R. J., Jr. 1990b. Memo from Martineau, Attorney, U.S. EPA Air and Radiation Division re: September 10, 1990 meeting between EPA officials and representatives of Natural Resources Defense Council. Martineau, R. J., Jr. 1990c. Memo from Martineau, Attorney, U.S. EPA Air and Radiation Division re: November 6, 1990 meeting with representatives of Waste Management Inc. and EPA representatives on proposed MWC rule. Morrison, R. M. 1989. Baseline risk analysis to support municipal waste combustor new source Performance standard and emission guideline development. Memorandum to file. U.S. EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, N.C. EPA Air Docket #A-89-08. National Association of Counties. 1990. Comments of the National Association of Counties

MUNICIPAL WASTE COMBUSTION AND NSPS 139 regarding the Environmental Protection Agency's New Source Performance Standards for Municipal Waste Combustors, Washington, D.C., dated February 28, 1990. EPA Air Docket No. A-89-08, IV-D-116. National Solid Waste Management Association. 1991. Resource recovery in North America. Washington, D.C. Nosenchuck, N. H. 1992. Personal communication. Director, Division of Solid Waste, New York Department of Environmental Conservation, Albany, N.Y. Nosenchuck, N. H., and D. Bruckner. 1990. Comments on the proposed NSPS for MWCs from the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials, dated March 1, 1990. EPA Air Docket No. A-89-08, IV-D-71. Pederson, W. F., Jr. 1987. Air pollution control. Chapter 6 in Environmental Law Handbook, 9th ea., Arbuckle et al., eds. Rockville, Md.: Government Institute, Inc. Porter, J. W. 1990. Municipal Solid Waste Recycling: The Big Picture, speech before the U.S. Conference of Mayors Recycling Conference, March 29. (Reported in IWSA, 1992a) President's Council on Competitiveness. 1990. Fact Sheet re: Recycling Requirement in the Municipal Waste Combustor Rule, dated December 19, 1990. Reisch, M. S. 1992. SO2 emissions trading rights: A model for other pollutants. Chemical and Engineering News 70(27):21-22. Roffman, A., and H. K. Roffman. 1991. Air emissions from municipal waste combustion and their environmental effects. The Science of Total Environment 104:87-96. Ruston, J. F. 1990. Comments of the Environmental Defense Fund on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Proposed Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources; Municipal Waste Combustors, Washington, D.C., dated March 1, 1990. EPA Air Docket No. A-89-08, IV-D- 173. Thomas, L. M. 1985. Statement before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, D.C. U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 1992. No. 91 - 1168, State of New York and State of Florida v. W. K. Reilly, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and No. 9101170, Natural Resources Defense Council v. W. K. Reilly, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1985. A strategy to reduce risks to public health from air tonics. Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1987a. Municipal Waste Combustion Study: Report to Congress. Washington, D.C.: Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Air and Radiation and Office of Research and Development. EPA/530-SW-87-021a. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1987b. Response to petition for rulemaking and advance notice of proposed rulemaking. Federal Register 52(129):25399-25409. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1987c. Operational Guidance on Control Technology for New and Modified Municipal Waste Combustors. Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1987d. Municipal waste combustion study: Assess- ment of health risks associated with municipal waste combustion emissions. Washington, D.C.: Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Air and Radiation and Office of Research and Development. EPA/530-SY`T-87-021g. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1989a. The Solid Waste Dilemma: An Agenda for Action. Final report of the Municipal Solid Waste Task Force. Washington? D.C.: Office of Solid Waste. EPA/530-SW-89-019. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1989b. Standards of performance for new stationary sources; municipal waste combustors; proposed rule. Federal Register 54(243):52251- 52304.

140 SUELLEN W. PIRAGES AND JASON E. JOHNSTON U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1989c. Interim Procedures for Estimating Risks Associated with Exposures to Mixtures of Chlorinated Dibenzo-p-Dioxins and -Dibenzofurans (CDDs and CDFs) and 1989 Update. Washington, D.C.: Risk Assessment Forum. EPA/ 625/3-89/016. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1990. Municipal Waste Combustion: Background Information for Materials Separation. Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Office of Air Qual- ity Planning and Standards. EPA-450/3-90-021. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1991a. Standards of performance for new stationary sources; municipal waste combustors; final rule. Federal Register 56(28):5488-5527. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1991b. Municipal Waste Combustion: Background Information for Promulgated Standards and Guidelines Summary of Public Comments and Responses. Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Office of Air Quality Planning and Stan- dards. EPA/450/3-91 -004. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1992. Safeguarding the Future: Credible Science, Credible Decisions. Expert Panel on the Role of Science at EPA. EPA/600/9-91/050. Walsh, D. C. 1991. The nation's first resource recovery plant. Waste Age 22(11):62-64. Walsh, M. W., Jr. 1990. Comments on the proposed NSPS for MWCs from the Maryland Department of the Environment, Baltimore, Md., dated April 2, 1990. EPA Air Docket No. A-89-08, IV-D-277. Waste Age. 1992. The 1992 municipal waste combustion guide. Waste Age 23(11):99-117.

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Keeping Pace with Science and Engineering: Case Studies in Environmental Regulation Get This Book
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The technical basis of environmental regulation is always at the edge of scientific and engineering understanding. As knowledge improves, questions will inevitably arise about past decisions. Understanding how the regulatory system accommodates changing scientific and engineering knowledge is vital for achieving environmental values.

In this new volume, seven case studies shed light on the interplay between environmental regulation and scientific and engineering understanding, with practical conclusions on how science and engineering should be used for more sound and timely regulatory decision making. The book provides helpful timelines of scientific and regulatory developments for the cases, which include:

  • Factors impeding clean-up strategies in the Chesapeake Bay.
  • Pivotal questions in the regulation of ambient ozone concentrations.
  • How science has been heeded but also ignored in regulation of new municipal waste combustors.
  • Impact of scientific findings on control of chlorination by-products.
  • Acid rain and what can be learned about research and public policy debate.
  • Controversy over the need for formaldehyde regulation.
  • The effect of public perception on management decisions concerning dioxin.

This volume will be of practical interest to policymakers, business and environmental advocates, scientists, engineers, researchers, attorneys, faculty, and students.

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