Guidebook for Air Cargo Facility Planning and Development (2015)

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76 7.1 Air Cargo Security Overview Since 9/11 there have been numerous security changes in the industry to implement anti- terrorism requirements. These changes include restrictions of the “known shipper” rule that have made it more difficult for shippers and forwarders to use different business partners and grow their businesses. Forwarders now hold shipments as long as they can prior to a flight, resulting in a large number of trucks arriving at the airport in a 2- or 3-hour time frame. At some airports, cargo complexes now have separate parking areas for trucks and cars, and many per- form checks of the driver and cargo manifest at the cargo area entrance. A number of operating guidelines and technological innovations have been developed that have made air cargo facili- ties more secure. In addition, personal and vehicle access to the aircraft operating area is con- tinuously being examined, and limitations on who is eligible for access are in flux. This section addresses the policies and outcomes of air cargo screening for air cargo transport and provides guidelines regarding security considerations when planning air cargo facilities. Changes in these policies would affect several of the integrated carriers. 7.1.1 Air Cargo Security Trends 7.1.1.1 Security Impacts Air cargo security issues affect airline operations and the airport facilities used by air cargo carriers. Cargo screening is now mandated for all cargo loaded onto passenger aircraft. These mandates require refitting cargo facilities at airports to accommodate screening equipment and personnel. 7.1.1.2 Air Cargo Security Related to Passenger Aircraft In the United States, the TSA is responsible for transport security, which includes air cargo. The legislation that mandates the air cargo security regulations is the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007, also known as the 9/11 Act. The act directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a system to enable industry to screen 100% of cargo transported on passenger aircraft at a level of security commensurate with the level of security of passenger checked baggage within 3 years. The legislation set interim milestones for the industry to screen 50% of all cargo shipped on a passenger aircraft by February 2009, with 100% screen- ing by August 2010. The TSA implemented three programs to meet the air cargo screening goals. The first, narrow- body aircraft screening, became effective in 2008. This program required that all cargo on narrow-body aircraft must be 100% screened individually before it is netted, containerized, or shrink-wrapped. The second, the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), allows freight C H A P T E R 7 Air Cargo Facility Planning— Security Considerations

Air Cargo Facility Planning—Security Considerations 77 forwarders and shippers to pre-screen cargo. Scanning equipment can cost between $30,000 and $100,000 (Morrell 2011), which can be cost-prohibitive for smaller forwarder and ship- per firms. The third program was international collaboration. International collaboration has been initiated with the European Union (EU), Canada, and Australia. By mid-2010, almost all domestic and outbound U.S. cargo on passenger services complied with the act. The TSA, along with CBP and international partners, also developed risk-based targeting to increase screening of air cargo. Among the risk-based strategies is to use the Known Shipper Program. This program established an industry-wide Known Shipper Database (KSDB) for vetting all shipments placed on passenger aircraft. Shipments from parties that do not appear on the database cannot be placed aboard passenger aircraft, even if they are screened or inspected physically. This applies to inbound international as well as domestic flights. 7.1.1.3 Air Cargo Security Related to Freighters While there are currently no statutory or regulatory requirements mandating screening all cargo loaded onto cargo-only aircraft, the industry has been proactive in developing internal processes and protocols for accepting and screening of cargo prior to loading onto aircraft. The TSA extensively regulates aviation security through rules, regulations, and security directives that are designed to prevent unauthorized access to passenger and freighter aircraft and the intro- duction of prohibited items, including firearms and explosives, onto an aircraft. Combi carriers and all-cargo carriers operating freighter aircraft currently operate pursuant to a TSA-approved, risk-based security program that, carriers believe, adequately maintains the security of their per- sonnel and aircraft in their fleets. These carriers work closely with the TSA to ensure that they have available security research and intelligence information to assist them. Many carriers and trade organizations representing the industry indicate that any additional security requirements imposed by TSA or by the U.S. Congress will impose substantial costs on the carriers and will have an adverse effect on freighter operations and customer commitments. To mitigate any such increase, carriers work closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies to ensure that a risk-based management approach is used to target specific at-risk cargo. This approach will limit any exposure to regulation that would require 100% screening of all cargo and the cost of this to the industry. 7.1.2 Airside Air Cargo Security–Related Infrastructure 7.1.2.1 Security ID Display Area Many of the air cargo operations facilities are considered secured areas on the airport and must include an area where security identification badges on air cargo personnel are displayed and attendant security practices are performed. These areas are called Security Identification Display Areas (SIDAs). Areas of the airport that are not included in the secured area but are within the airport perimeter are identified as AOAs. Some AOA areas require SIDA protocols such as locations where cargo is loaded and unloaded. Other areas, such as the general aviation operations area on the airport, do not require a SIDA. 7.1.2.2 Air Cargo Apron Area Security of air cargo aprons is largely controlled by ensuring that only authorized individuals or vehicles are provided access through security gates (see Figure 7-1) at the edges of the AOA or cargo buildings. The threat of intrusions onto an airport through a perimeter fence line or secu- rity access gate has resulted in many airports using closed-circuit television (CCTV) to provide views of aprons to security personnel. Coordination with the TSA and airport operations staff is recommended to ensure that air cargo facilities planning and design do not introduce security weaknesses or vulnerabilities.

78 Guidebook for Air Cargo Facility Planning and Development Beyond this, security on cargo aprons and in cargo buildings is largely the responsibility of airline personnel and security personnel monitoring the cargo building and apron area. Per- sonnel assigned with security badges at most airports are required to challenge individuals not displaying proper security badges and to report any suspicious or unusual behavior. 7.1.2.3 Air Cargo Perimeter Fence Considerations for the installation of a perimeter fence depend largely on the location of the facility, access control, and space designated for air cargo operations. Perimeter fencing must be continuous, with fencing creating a barrier for all airport facilities such as the passenger ter- minal and general aviation areas. The fence line needs to meet or exceed requirements of the airport sponsor’s standard security fence height and fabric gauge. Chain-link fences are often constructed with 7 ft of fabric plus one or more coils of stranded barbed wire on top, which may be angled outward at a 45-degree incline from the airside (TSA 2011). 7.1.2.4 Air Cargo Area Access Points Fences require adequate pedestrian (see Figure 7-2) and vehicle access points to support routine operations, maintenance operations, and emergency access. The number of through-the-fence access points should be kept to a minimum for both cost-effectiveness and security reasons. Devices such as turnstiles, roll gates, pop-up barriers, or a remotely operated drop barrier gate may be used to impede passage through the fence until access authority is verified either by secu- rity staff or a card reader/pin-pad device. In the case of vehicle access points, gates and barriers should provide the same or a greater standard of security than any adjacent fencing to maintain the integrity of the area. 7.1.2.5 Security Guard Stations When high volumes of air cargo traffic are anticipated, a staffed guard station may be appro- priate to control access to a security area. Guard stations provide a point of entry at which personal identification can be established and persons and vehicles can be permitted to enter the AOA or even high-activity air cargo truck parking areas. Vehicle search programs may be required by the air carrier operating the facility or the airport sponsor. Airport planners need to allow sufficient space to direct a vehicle driver to the side for further inspection without blocking access for other vehicles. There should also be: • Turnaround space for non-permissible vehicles, • A sufficient quantity of vehicle lanes to meet the expected traffic volumes, • Space for the largest vehicle entering the checkpoint, and • Special expedited clearance lanes for recognized deliveries. Source: Google Earth Pro street-level view. Figure 7-1. Apron area automated electric security gate at Dayton International Airport.

Air Cargo Facility Planning—Security Considerations 79 7.1.2.6 Air Cargo Area Security Lighting Since air cargo operations on air cargo aprons often take place at night, ample lighting is needed for workers and crews to load and unload aircraft as well as prepare aircraft for flight. Lighting is also necessary in the air cargo area near gates and selected areas of fencing for security purposes. Lighting can ensure that fence/gate signage is readable and that card readers, keypads, phones, intercoms, and other devices at the gate are visible and usable. Similarly, sufficient light- ing is required for any area in which a CCTV camera is intended to monitor activity. For energy conservation and sustainability programs, sensor-activated lighting is acceptable for areas that have minimal traffic throughput in the off-peak hours. 7.1.3 Landside Air Cargo Security–Related Infrastructure 7.1.3.1 Cargo Building Facility access must be tightly controlled. Public access to a facility should be limited to a counter area that is separate from the actual warehouse and has direct landside access that allows for the transaction of any business but prevents unauthorized access to such restricted areas as administrative offices, the ramp, cargo screening areas, and screened or unscreened cargo within the warehouse. At one air cargo handler’s facility at Washington Dulles International Airport, the separation of the non-sterile area from the sterile area is accomplished with a service counter arrangement that allows visitors to interact with badged cargo staff so that cargo and paperwork can be pro- cessed while maintaining the sterile environment (see Figures 7-3 and 7-4). Adjacent to this space in the warehouse, third-party security providers screen anyone accessing the sterile area. This staff also screens all cargo passing through the sterile area prior to loading it onto aircraft. A combination of trace detection and large x-ray equipment is used to provide 100% package screening. Source: CDM Smith. Figure 7-2. Pedestrian turnstile allows access to the cargo area.

80 Guidebook for Air Cargo Facility Planning and Development 7.1.3.2 Security Related to Truck Docks and Doors Cargo facilities, with their extensive truck bays, offer a number of points of entry that must be controlled by observation and physical barriers. Control can be as basic as keeping the bay doors closed until a truck is in the dock, or monitoring and enforcement of the SIDA demarca- tion line, which is usually a painted yellow line on the floor and is typically parallel to the front of the building. This line is usually 20 ft from the bay doors and defines the point beyond which unauthorized personnel may not pass. This concept is generally recognized by the trucking Source: CDM Smith. Figure 7-3. Cargo sterile office areas and screening equipment at Washington Dulles International Airport. Source: CDM Smith. Figure 7-4. Cargo building diagram.

Air Cargo Facility Planning—Security Considerations 81 industry, whose drivers need to be inside the cargo building to load and unload the vehicles. Truck drivers picking up or delivering air cargo may not have SIDA badges at the airport they are visiting. 7.1.3.3 Security Screening Equipment Security screening technology related to screening both large and small pieces of air cargo is rapidly changing. As a result, when designing air cargo buildings, airport planners need to keep in mind that security screening equipment dimensions, flows, and processes may change. The airport planner’s task will be easier if the original design incorporates flexibility by providing ample space for adjustments and expansion.