Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs (2016)

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

22 3.1 Introduction Prior to conducting case studies on intercity passenger rail service, the NCRRP Project 07-02 research team developed a conceptual framework of the process for implementing intercity passenger rail service. This conceptual framework outlines the various roles and responsibilities necessary to complete all phases of project delivery from visioning through to operations and maintenance. This framework served as an important foundation for the case studies because it led to the identification of potential roles and responsibilities for developing and providing intercity passenger rail. 3.2 Conceptual Framework for Implementing Intercity Passenger Rail Service The conceptual framework for implementing intercity passenger rail service is shown in Figure 4. The left side of the framework presents a simplified construct of an intercity passenger rail project development process. The four phases identified are visioning, planning, design and construction, and operations and maintenance. For each phase, the framework identifies six primary factors that generally must be addressed (at varying levels of detail) as a project advances through development. The six factors are the following: • System concepts: how intercity passenger rail interfaces with other modes within the trans- portation network. • Network components: the core infrastructure of the intercity passenger rail service, such as vehicles, tracks, and ancillary facilities. • Administrative structure: how an intercity passenger rail service or program is managed. • Partnerships/stakeholders: the parties involved in project planning and delivery. • Finance: how capital and ongoing operating and maintenance costs are funded. • Governance concepts: the structure for defining roles and responsibilities across the various stakeholders. In addition to the detailed, project-specific questions that must be addressed as a project pro- gresses through design, there are also broader questions to consider in establishing a realistic and implementable project. These are captured on the left side of Figure 4 as “Setting the Boundaries,” “Creating the Reality,” and “Realizing the Vision.” The right side of the graphic outlines specific issues that must be focused on as a project advances through the four phases of project development. These focus issues inform the selection of an appropriate institutional model for a multi-state passenger rail effort. Case studies were selected to illustrate lessons learned from as many of the focus issues as possible. C H A P T E R 3 Case Studies

Case Studies 23 3.3 Selection of Case Studies The purpose of the case studies was primarily to identify examples of best practice that might ultimately lead to recommendations that are supported with evidence from the field. Rigorous case study design requires a good sense of the overall approach (that is, how the pieces fit together), the criteria that will be used to select the case studies (which relate to the ultimate use of the case study results in the context of desired products), the approach to obtaining data and information from case study participants, and the means by which case study results will be generalized to broader applications. 3.3.1 Criteria for Case Studies The literature review revealed several potential case studies for this research effort. The universe of options was narrowed to 10 case studies that represent the diversity of institutional model experiences needed to generalize across case-study-specific instances. The long list of options was narrowed based on input from the focus group. One of the case studies focused on instances in non-transportation sectors where the combination of strategies used or barriers faced were considered germane to this research. Figure 4. Conceptual framework for implementing intercity rail passenger service.

24 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs The final list of recommended case studies was selected based on the following four criteria: 1. Demonstrated experience with case study focus issues identified in the conceptual frame- work for implementing intercity passenger rail programs, e.g., joint vehicle procurement and maintenance, joint service provision, cost sharing, etc. (which are part of the case study focus issues of contractual arrangements and procurement). 2. Availability of data/information on the implementation process and the lessons learned from the experience. 3. Degree of transferability of experience to other locations in the United States. 4. Diversity with respect to institutional models, project development status, and geographic distribution. 3.3.2 Case Study Selection U.S. Passenger Rail Case Studies For U.S. passenger rail case studies, the research team focused on identifying case studies that represented both regional efforts to plan and/or deliver passenger rail across multiple corridors as well as single intercity corridors that cross two or more states. All of the passenger rail efforts outlined in Table 3 were considered as potential case study candidates. For the purposes of case study selection (see Table 4), the passenger rail efforts were classified as “regional” or “corridor” based on the research team’s understanding of the individual efforts, recognizing that this may be a simplified classification in some cases. Criterion 1: Demonstrated Experience with Case Study Focus Issues. The research team sought to select case studies that could offer rich lessons learned, both positive and negative, across multiple focus areas. Table 4 highlights whether individual candidate case studies offer experience across the case study focus issues. Corridor Exisng Arrangement Role/Responsibility Gulf Coast Corridor • Southern High-Speed Rail Commission Under interstate compact between Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, develops and promotes plans for high-speed rail in Gulf states, promotes economic development, provides transportaon choices, and facilitates alternave evacuaon routes for region. • Amtrak Federally chartered corporaon operang exisng passenger rail service. Midwest (Chicago Hub Network) • Midwestern Regional Rail Iniave Voluntary working group of nine state DOTs that developed vision and implementaon plan for integrated Chicago Hub regional rail system. • Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission Under interstate compact, elected officials of 12 states collaborate to promote, coordinate, and support regional passenger rail. • Midwest High-Speed Rail Steering Group Under memorandum of understanding (MOU), eight states (led by governors) and the City of Chicago promote regional coordinaon in preparing federal grant applicaons, communicate the regional strategy in the federal government, and create opportunies for economic development in the Midwest. • Northern Indiana Commuter Transportaon District Owner/operator of passenger rail service between South Bend, Indiana and Chicago, Illinois. • Amtrak Federally chartered corporaon operang exisng passenger rail service. • Chicago-St. Louis • Twin Cies-Milwaukee • Chicago-Detroit • Chicago-Quad Cies • Chicago-Omaha Corridor-level agreements to advance high-speed and intercity passenger rail. Table 3. Potential U.S. intercity passenger rail corridors for case study.

Case Studies 25 Table 3. (Continued). Pacific Northwest • Washington-Oregon Cascades Rail Corridor MOU Joint operation of Washington and Oregon rail services as a single corridor and development of the Cascades Rail Corridor Management Workplan. • Washington-Oregon Cascades Rail Corridor On-Time Performance Task Force Voluntary working group represen ng Washington, Oregon, Bri sh Columbia, Amtrak, Sound Transit, and two freight railroads tasked with improving on- me performance. • Amtrak Federally chartered corpora on opera ng exis ng passenger rail service. South Central Corridor • Amtrak Federally chartered corpora on opera ng exis ng passenger rail service. Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor • Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor Coali on Voluntary coali on of seven states to plan, develop, and implement a high-speed line in the Southeast. • Virginia-North Carolina Environmental Studies MOU Secure environmental approvals for high-speed rail segments in Virginia and North Carolina. • Virginia-North Carolina Interstate High-Speed Rail Compact Examine and discuss strategies to advance mul -state high-speed rail ini a ves, including advoca ng for federal funding. • Amtrak Federally chartered corpora on opera ng exis ng passenger rail service. Southwest • DesertXpress LLC Private corpora on established to construct, own, operate, and maintain high-speed rail between Victorville, California and Las Vegas, Nevada (XpressWest). • Southwest Mul-State Rail Planning Study Stakeholder Group Voluntary working group to develop vision for high-speed and intercity passenger rail in the Southwest. • Amtrak Federally chartered corporaon operang exisng passenger rail service. Other • Illinois (in cooperaon with California, Michigan, Missouri, Iowa, Oregon, and Washington) Procurement of NextGen Locomoves Mul-state procurement of new diesel-electric locomoves. • California and Illinois Procurement of NextGen Bi-Level Rail Cars Joint procurement of 130 new bi-level rail cars built to “next generaon” specificaons. Northeast Corridor • NEC Commission Established by PRIIA to facilitate cooperaon and planning among NEC stakeholders for intercity, passenger, and freight rail. • NEC Master Plan Working Group Voluntary working group of 28 enes that developed the Amtrak Infrastructure Master Plan for the NEC. • Long Island Rail Road • Metro-North Railroad • New Jersey Transit • Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportaon Authority • Massachuse•s Bay Transportaon Authority • Maryland Area Regional Commuter • Shore Line East Operators of commuter rail service . • Amtrak Federally chartered corporaon operang exisng passenger rail service. Northern New England • NNEPRA Under state legislaon in Maine, oversees operaon of Amtrak’s Downeaster passenger rail service between Portland, Maine and Boston, Massachuse•s. • Amtrak Federally chartered corporaon operang exisng passenger rail service. Corridor Exisng Arrangement Role/Responsibility Criterion 2: Data and Information Availability. Two measures were assessed to determine the level and availability of supporting materials to conduct the case studies. First, the research team conducted a cursory review of documented resources. Efforts with the most data and infor- mation availability were characterized by one or more of the following: an active, dedicated website; inclusion in a previous academic or applied research effort; or the existence of specific documentation of a formal multi-state structure (e.g., interstate compact or MOU). Second,

26 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs the research team considered whether the study’s strategic advisors or focus group participants were direct participants in the passenger rail effort and thus could provide direct institutional knowledge as well as connections to other appropriate individuals and resources not publicly accessible. Criterion 3: Degree of Transferability. Each of the regional- and corridor-level efforts offer lessons learned that can be applied to other multi-state corridor efforts. Most corridors were assigned the same rating for transferability, but the Midwest and the NEC were rated slightly lower because these corridors present unique circumstances with respect to the planning and delivery of intercity passenger rail service. The NEC presents a diverse and complex array of owners and operators with a direct role in provision of intercity rail services, the maturity of existing intercity passenger rail service, and a greater propensity for intercity passenger rail service relative to other Candidate Case Studies W hy ? (c om pe lli ng n ee d) Id en ti fi ca ti on o fr es po ns ib ili ti es Co st a nd re ve nu e sh ar in g G ra nt a pp lic at io ns Ro le of re gu la to ry a ge nc ie s Pu bl ic e xp ec ta ti on s R el ati on sh ip w ith h os t r ai lro ad o r o th er se rv ic e pr ov id er M od al c om pe ti ti on st ra te gy Pr oc ur em en t O w ne rs hi p of c or rid or a nd lia bi lit y Br an di ng , m ar ke ti ng a nd c us to m er se rv ic e Im pa ct o f P RI IA S ec ti on 2 09 In te ro pe ra bi lit y an d/ or sa fe ty st an da rd s Regional Efforts Midwest Northeast Southeast Southwest Gulf Coast Corridor/Corridor Segment Efforts Chicago-St. Louis Twin Cities-Milwaukee Chicago-Detroit Chicago-Quad Cities Chicago-Omaha Albany-Rutland Boston-Portland New Orleans-Atlanta New Orleans-Mobile New Orleans-Houston Portland-Seattle Tulsa-Oklahoma City-South Texas D.C.-Richmond-Raleigh- Charlotte Victorville-Las Vegas *Please note that in this table some heading columns include two case study focus issues. Table 4. Focus issues associated with candidate case studies.*

Case Studies 27 regions. The Midwest has established Chicago as the clear hub for intercity passenger rail efforts. Providing connections to this hub is a driving factor behind many of the planning efforts to date. While this approach could be viable for other passenger rail efforts, reaching consensus on the central hub could be challenging and, in some cases, controversial. In the case of the Midwest, the importance of providing connections to Chicago builds on historical patterns of development. Criterion 4: Diversity of Final Case Study List. The final list of case studies was selected to represent a reasonable distribution across institutional models, status of project development, and geographic location. Table 5 summarizes how candidate case studies address the first three selection criteria. A rating was assigned for how well a candidate case study met each of the first three selection criteria. In Candidate Case Studies Demonstrated experience with case study focus issues Data/information availability Degree of transferability Overall contribution Regional Efforts Midwest: Midwest Regional Rail Initiative, Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Compact, Midwest High- Speed Rail Steering Group +++++ +++++ ++ 12 – Tier 1 Northeast: NEC Commission, NEC Master Plan Working Group ++++ +++++ ++ 11 – Tier 1 Southeast: Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor Coalition ++ ++++ +++ 9 – Tier 2 Southwest: Southwest Multi- State Rail Planning Study Stakeholder Group +++ +++ +++ 9 – Tier 2 Gulf Coast: Southern High- Speed Rail Commission ++ +++ +++ 8 – Tier 2 Corridor/Corridor Segment Efforts Chicago-St. Louis +++++ ++++ ++ 11 – Tier 1 Twin Cities-Milwaukee ++ +++ ++ 7 – Tier 2 Chicago-Detroit ++++ ++ ++ 8 – Tier 2 Chicago-Quad Cities ++ ++ ++ 6 – Tier 3 Chicago-Omaha ++ ++ ++ 6 – Tier 3 Albany-Rutland +++ ++++ +++ 10 – Tier 1 Boston-Portland (NNEPRA) +++ +++++ +++ 11 – Tier 1 New Orleans-Atlanta + ++ +++ 6 – Tier 3 New Orleans-Mobile + ++ +++ 6 – Tier 3 New Orleans-Houston + ++ +++ 6 – Tier 3 Portland-Seattle (Cascades) ++++ +++++ +++ 12 – Tier 1 Tulsa-Oklahoma City-South Texas (South Central) ++ +++ +++ 8 – Tier 2 D.C.-Richmond-Raleigh- Charlotte (Southeast High Speed Rail) +++ +++++ +++ 11 – Tier 1 Victorville-Las Vegas (XpressWest) +++ ++ +++ 8 – Tier 2 (+++++ = strongest correspondence between case and criterion; + = weakest correspondence between case and criterion) Table 5. Summary of how candidate case studies address the first three criteria.

28 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Table 5, these criteria are listed in the column heads. The number of marks in a particular cell indicates the degree to which a potential case study meets that criterion (with five marks indicating the strongest correspondence between a candidate case study and the criterion and fewer marks indicating a weaker correspondence). The resulting ratings are presented in tiers based on the total number of marks scored by each candidate case study. This approach was utilized because, in previous experience, the research team has found that most scoring systems have problems distinguishing between candidates when their scores are separated by a small amount. In the tiered system, for example, the Midwest Region and the NEC are both considered as recommended candidates even though the Midwest scores are slightly higher. While a Tier 1 rating was a strong indicator that a candidate case study should be included in the final selection, the need to meet Criterion 4, diversity, and the limited number of case studies that could be included meant that some Tier 1 candidates were not chosen for the final list and some Tier 2 candidates were. The research team determined that the case studies representing the best overall contribution to the research objectives were the following: • Midwest Regional Efforts • Northeast Regional Efforts • Chicago-Detroit Corridor • Boston-Portland Corridor Segment • Portland-Seattle Corridor Segment • D.C./Richmond-Raleigh-Charlotte Corridor Segment • Tulsa-Oklahoma City-South Texas Corridor International Case Studies and Case Studies from Outside of the Intercity Passenger Rail Sector The research also identified potential international case studies and case studies outside of the intercity passenger rail sector. The potential case studies were identified based on a review of the literature and input from the focus group and were the following: • Trans-European Transport Network: the TEN-T rail component provides a range of institutional models for delivering high-speed rail. • Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA): this regional transit authority includes both the multi-state and federal participation. • Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC): this federally established, multi-state agency provides an example of a model for delivering transportation infrastructure that crosses multiple states with the Appalachian Highway System. Full documentation of the case studies developed for NCRRP Project 07-02 is presented in NCRRP Web-Only Document 3, which can be found at TRB.org. Each of the final case studies is summarized below. 3.4 Regional Studies 3.4.1 Midwest Passenger Rail Development Background Several states have been involved in the development of the Midwest passenger rail system over the last two decades. This case study focuses largely on what has become known as the “Chicago Hub Network.” This network would have Chicago at the center of a hub-and-spoke system, with lines extending to and connecting some of the largest and most densely populated cities of the Midwest (see Figure 5).

Case Studies 29 Beginning in 1996, nine state transportation agencies—Illinois DOT, Indiana DOT, Iowa DOT, Michigan DOT, Minnesota DOT, Missouri DOT, Nebraska Department of Roads, Ohio Rail Development Commission, and Wisconsin DOT—initiated the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) to help meet future regional travel needs through improvements to the level and quality of regional passenger rail service. A secondary purpose of the MWRRI was to position and unify the states’ interests to ensure that the region received a fair share of federal funding. The nine states collectively formed the MWRRI Steering Committee and, with support from Amtrak and consultants, developed a 2004 plan to create an integrated Chicago Hub regional rail system that would connect the nine partner states. The Midwest Regional Rail System (MWRRS) included $6.6 billion of infrastructure improvements along 3,000 route miles of existing rights- of-way shared with existing freight and commuter services. The plan explored institutional models to provide system-level oversight, including creating ad hoc, multi-state committees; establishing committees by multi-state agreements; or creating a joint powers authority through legislative authority. As of the date of the case study, no consensus has been reached on a governance mechanism to provide system oversight. Still, under the vision Figure 5. Proposed Midwest Regional Rail System.

30 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs articulated by the MWRRI, each state retains sovereignty, and the ultimate implementation of the projects is the responsibility of the states. In response to the potential for funds for high-speed rail from the ARRA of 2009, eight states and the mayor of Chicago signed an MOU where each signee agreed to • Establish a high-level, multi-state steering group with a representative from each signatory to the MOU. The purpose of the Midwest Rail Steering Group will be to coordinate the region’s applications and work associated with all ARRA applications to provide guidance, leadership, and a single advocacy voice in support of the region’s collective high-speed rail priorities. The Steering Group shall identify a point of contact between MOU participants and the U.S. DOT. • Coordinate and cooperate fully in support of each MOU participant’s individual state appli- cations for high-speed and intercity rail funding. • Coordinate and negotiate with the major railroads to sign agreements for the development of high-speed rail corridors and the identified individual projects by stated priority. • Be free to pursue individual memoranda of agreement or understanding among MOU par- ticipants related to specific projects involved in support of the overall application and vision for the Midwest corridor. • Be separately responsible for any and all work taking place within their respective state boundaries. • Allow other Midwestern or contiguous states the opportunity to join in this MOU at any time if they are willing to support all aspects of the agreement in place. Nearly 50 studies have been completed in corridors throughout the Midwest since the develop- ment of the MWRRI in 1996. To better organize and prioritize project implementation efforts for the MWRRS, an SDP was published by the MWRRI in September 2009. The 2009 SDP proposed moving specific corridors forward in a phased approach, giving highest priority to corridors with greater ridership potential, who were most advanced in planning, and posed the lowest amount of risk. Phases were broken out as follows: • Phase 1: Chicago-Madison (Wisconsin as lead state, who later withdrew), Chicago-St. Louis (Illinois as lead state), and Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac (Michigan as lead state) • Phase 2: Chicago-Minneapolis/St. Paul (Minnesota as lead state) • Phase 3: Chicago-Iowa City (Iowa as lead state) Nature of the Partnership Midwestern states wishing to partner with other states to advance passenger rail corridor projects employ various types of agreements to assign roles and responsibilities, handle financial commitments and procurement, and to manage other matters. The instruments most commonly used by states participating in the MWRRS to formalize their agreements were the following: MOU/Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). These instruments are agreements between two or more people or organizations working toward a common objective. The use of an MOU/ MOA is significant for two main reasons: (1) generally these agreements are not legally binding, and (2) they do not involve the exchange of money. MOUs have the advantage of formally defin- ing roles and responsibilities without creating the legal obligations of a contract. Agreement in Principle (AIP). Like an MOU, an AIP is not legally binding. An AIP is gener- ally used between parties to come to agreement on specific terms that could form the foundation of a future contract. The AIP serves as a way to come to a basic understanding of contentious issues and develop a level of consensus between parties. An AIP between the Iowa DOT and the Illinois DOT was used to establish the two agencies’ roles, responsibilities, risks, and other

Case Studies 31 important details of work needed to initiate the analysis of high-speed passenger rail between Chicago, Illinois, and Iowa City, Iowa. This AIP can be found in Appendix B. The AIP identi- fies all parties entering into the agreement, summarizes the scope of the project, and identifies a series of terms and definitions on which the parties mutually agree. In this example, the AIP defines Iowa DOT as the lead agency and FRA grant recipient, defines how future equipment costs will be shared between the states, details how cost overruns are to be managed for the project, and elaborates on several other critical issues. Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA)/Interlocal Agreement (ILA). IGAs and ILAs, as their names imply, are agreements made exclusively between two or more governmental bodies. In the case of the MWRRS, IGAs have been used between state DOTs and communities where stations are to be located to come to agreement on construction and maintenance costs related to the community’s planned passenger rail stations. (In most cases, local municipalities are responsible for the maintenance and operational costs of their stations.) Service Outcome Agreement (SOA). To help mitigate risk to grantees, FRA requires long-term SOAs among the grantee, the service operator (in many cases Amtrak), and the host railroads on whose track intercity passenger or high-speed rail projects would operate. SOAs define the intended benefits of new or improved passenger rail service and demonstrate the rail-owning entity’s commitment to the achievement of those benefits. Specifically, SOAs address passenger rail service frequency, schedule and trip time, and maximum delay minutes. SOAs are used to detail precisely what improvements will be made along the host railroad’s right-of-way and how progressive phases of the passenger rail project will improve service in the project corridor. In many cases, development of, and agreement on, an SOA can be challenging. Differences in agency goals can make the SOA negotiations complex and difficult. In Missouri’s SOA with the Union Pacific Railroad, organizations other than the Union Pacific Railroad (Missouri DOT, Amtrak, and FRA) had different priorities and goals. For the FRA, travel time reduction for the total trip was paramount, whereas the Missouri DOT and Amtrak were focused on increasing the on-time performance percentage to make service more reliable. These different agency goals can make the agreement process more complicated and time-consuming. Challenges and Barriers • The Midwest currently does not have a single entity responsible for coordinating regional, ongoing, long-term technical planning or for ensuring that the political and educational functions necessary for future regional passenger rail implementation will be coordinated. In addition, a number of issues loom on the horizon that may be managed best by a new or expanded governance entity—including oversight and coordination of the Midwest’s Next Generation equipment, better uniformity of Section 209 pricing, and priorities and cost sharing for major infrastructure improvements. • Changing political goals and priorities make it difficult to move large capital projects forward that will be completed only in the long term. It is especially difficult to form and maintain the long-term multi-state agreements needed to see such projects through. • Separation of political and technical bodies in development of the regional rail vision has resulted in uneven participation and support among stakeholders. Although a formal compact has been established between states (at the gubernatorial level) for the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Compact (MIPRC) with authority to oversee rail projects, the disparate develop- ment of corridor studies by separate partnerships of specific state DOTs limited the potential for the region to use the compact as mechanism to formalize buy-in for the regional vision. • The lack of a committed, long-term, stable funding source for construction, operation, and maintenance of passenger rail systems can be challenging.

32 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs • Unlike the NEC, which is owned entirely by public entities, most of the railroad network in the Midwest is owned by private freight railroads whose primary concern is preservation and expansion of their freight service and not development of a robust and expansive passenger rail network. Lessons Learned • Developing agreements involves a great deal of time and effort. The detailed 234 (and counting) agreements that have been produced as part of the Chicago-St. Louis high-speed rail projects are evidence of the number of agreements required to implement passenger rail service. Agreements can directly impact the critical path of project implementation. Delays caused by agreements have the potential to drastically slow projects and put projects at financial risk if not given a high level of priority. • Early, frequent, and open communications with all partners, particularly host railroads, FRA, and Amtrak, are essential to overall success. • The long-term nature of such large-scale infrastructure projects poses a challenge to project leaders in terms of maintaining momentum and the priority of their projects with their state’s elected leadership. Several project leaders contacted for this study expressed the need to be flexible and expect change as projects evolve. • Formal guidance on what elements are to be included in SOAs and how agreements are to be structured would provide needed clarity for all parties involved. Project stakeholders found the SOA negotiation process to be a time-consuming process of trial and error in which multiple versions of agreements were rejected by other parties to the agreement. • High-level state government involvement and consensus is essential, including at the governor level, as the lack of buy-in by new administrations can undermine decades of work to build agreements and a shared vision. Correspondence to the Conceptual Framework A summary of how the various multi-state arrangements in the Midwest correspond to the conceptual framework is presented in Table 6. Table 7 focuses on how one corridor-level effort (involving the Iowa and Illinois DOTs) corresponds to the conceptual framework. 3.4.2 Northeast Passenger Rail Development Background Extending across eight states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland) and the District of Columbia, the NEC is a critical part of U.S. transportation infrastructure. By a wide margin, the NEC is the busiest passenger rail corridor in the United States, serving approximately 750,000 people on more than 2,200 pas- senger trains daily. It is a strong economic driver, supporting more than $50 billion annually in the nation’s economy. The spine of the NEC is a fully electrified railway line owned primarily by Amtrak from Boston, via New York and Philadelphia, to Washington, D.C., with several branches. This spine, which closely parallels Interstate 95 for most of its length, is the busiest passenger rail line in the United States in ridership and service frequency. The NEC is unique in terms of its long history of providing passenger rail service and supporting regional growth in the United States—surviving two legacy owners and deeply competing inter- ests, the near-collapse of the private systems and passenger rail in particular, and government assumption of control as the private entities stepped away. Fragmented ownership and decades of insufficient investment in the NEC’s infrastructure have resulted in a large backlog of deferred capital needs that increasingly impact system reliability (see the discussion of Amtrak’s history (text continues on p. 37)

Case Studies 33 Focus Issue Multi-State Entities (Visioning and Planning Phases) Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission Midwest High-Speed Rail Steering Group (2009 MOU for Implementation of High-Speed Rail Passenger Service and Connections Involving Corridors Linking Cities in Partner States) Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Steering Committee Stakeholders States of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas , Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin. States of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin. City of Chicago. States of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Wisconsin. Amtrak, FRA. Institutional Relationships Established through the MIPRC. Established through 2009 MOU entitled Implementation of High-Speed Rail Passenger Service and Connections Involving Corridors Linking Cities in Partner States (signed by eight Midwestern states and the City of Chicago). Voluntary working group. Identi�ication of Responsibilities MIPRC identi�ies responsibilities: advocate for funding and authorization necessary to make passenger rail improvements a reality for Midwest; seek to develop ways states can form partnerships with rail industry and labor to implement improved passenger rail; develop long-term interstate plan for high-speed passenger rail service; and cooperate with other agencies, regions, and entities to ensure Midwest adequately represented in national plans for passenger rail development. MOU requires parties to cooperate to the maximum extent to ensure projects are developed in full compliance with federal and state requirements. No formal agreement, but steering committee, composed of key staff from each state agency and Amtrak, provided oversight and direction to the consultant team retained to conduct the study. Wisconsin DOT served as Secretariat for the steering committee. Amtrak provided administrative support and administered contracts. Role of Regulatory Agencies MOU states partnering with FRA is key requirement. FRA for oversight, environmental reviews, provide capital funding. Political Foundation Participation in MIPRC demonstrates support by state legislature. Participation in MOU demonstrates support at gubernatorial level. Table 6. How multi-state entities involved in passenger rail development in the Midwest address focus issues from the conceptual framework (visioning and planning phases). (continued on next page)

34 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Modal Competition Strategy MWRRS envisioned a network of feeder bus routes to connect smaller communities to high-speed rail lines in theMidwest.Decision-Making Process Commission members have equal voting rights. Commission to meet annually at minimum. Steering committee members have equal voting rights. Motions approved by a two-thirdsmajority of committee members.Corridor Ownership Multiple Class I railroads. Multiple Class I railroads. Multiple Class I railroads.Lead Agencies/Groups The Commission annually elects from its membership a chair, vice-chair, and other of�ices to provide leadership. The Midwest Rail Steering Group is de�ined as the coordinating group and point of contact between MOU participants and the U.S. DOT for ARRA applications. The steering committee provided direction and oversight to consultants conducting planning for the Midwest Regional Rail System Plan, 1998. Legal Authority Authorized by U.S. Congress, enacted by state legislatures. MOU was signed by the governors of each of the participating states as well as the Mayor of the City of Chicago. Cost Sharing Member states of MIPRCsplit general operations cost of Commission equally. Report was �inanced largely by Amtrak, with contributions fromIllinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio,and Wisconsin, with limited funding from the FRA. Focus Issue Multi-State Entities (Visioning and Planning Phases) Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission Midwest High-Speed Rail Steering Group (2009 MOU for Implementation of High-Speed Rail Passenger Service and Connections Involving Corridors Linking Cities in Partner States) Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Steering Committee Why? (Compelling Need) MIPRC formed to help the Midwest advocate for federal funding for improved passenger rail in a uni�ied and coordinated manner. Coordinating and documenting individual applications tothe FRA for funding from ARRA to develop the Chicago Hub High-Speed Rail Corridor. Meet future regional travel needs through signi�icant improvements to the level and quality of regional passenger rail service, reduction in travel times, and improve economic development in the region. Table 6. (Continued).

Case Studies 35 Liability Issues If a compacting state is to withdraw from this compact, the withdrawing state is liable for any obligations which it had incurred prior to the effective date of withdrawal.Procurement Procured consultant support for study,administered by Amtrak.Contractual Arrangements Legal agreement serves contract between the participating states and governing documentation for the Commission. Blank cells indicate no correspondence with the focus issue. Oversight Each state has oversight FRA.authority for funds allocated to the Commission.Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providers of Service The Steering Group expresses critical importance of working with host railroads for the successful implementation of the MWRRS. Focus Issue Multi-State Entities (Visioning and Planning Phases) Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission Midwest High-Speed Rail Steering Group (2009 MOU for Implementation of High-Speed Rail Passenger Service and Connections Involving Corridors Linking Cities in Partner States) Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Steering Committee Funding Sources State appropriations. Largely Amtrak.Interaction with Others Commission is charged with interacting with other non-member states, local municipalities, and federal agency of�icials. Group makes assumptions for the involvement of private sector in assistance with project �inancing. Table 6. (Continued).

36 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Focus Issue 2010 AIP between the Iowa DOT and Illinois DOT (Visioning, Planning, and Design and Construction Phases) Stakeholders Iowa DOT and Illinois DOT. Institutional Relationships AIP signed August 5, 2010. Identi�ication of Responsibilities AIP participants agree to submit joint HSIPR grant for passenger rail service between Chicago, IL, and Iowa City, IA; conduct environmental analysis and planning for rail service; share costs of equipment procurement and operations; share bene�its and risks; and share cost overruns. Role of Regulatory Agencies While not expressly stated in the AIP, the HSIPR program through which the AIP is seeking funding would be overseen by the FRA and U.S. DOT for grant management and environmental review. Political Foundation Iowa Governor, Chet Culver, and Illinois Governor, Pat Quinn, signed an MOU on July 27, 2009, concerning the coordination of planning and implementation of passenger rail service between Chicago and Iowa City. Why? (Compelling Need) Bene�its of new passenger rail service between Chicago and Iowa City are listed in the AIP as “mobility options, fuel savings, cleaner air, and economic development.” Lead Agencies/Groups The Iowa DOT is de�ined as the lead agency for management of any grant funds awarded and would lead the overall project. Legal Authority AIP states that “The relationship between Iowa DOT and Illinois DOT is based on legislation established within both states which focuses on national principles of formal coordination.” Cost Sharing • Equipment maintenance costs split: 73% Illinois/27% Iowa (based on mileage in each state). • Equipment purchase: 80%/20% federal/local split. Local funds to split 73%/27%. • Project cost overruns split: 73% Illinois/27% Iowa. Funding Sources The AIP is seeking grant funding through the HSIPR program. The exact source of local matching funds from each state is not speci�ied (i.e., general revenue, fuel tax revenue, etc.). Oversight U.S. DOT and FRA. Liability Issues AIP states that “Liability issues with this project will be mutually handled by Iowa DOT and Illinois DOT.” Procurement Costs of funding equipment procurement are to be split between the states based on track mileage percent in each state: 73% Illinois/27% Iowa. Contractual Arrangements • AIP in effect until early 2015. • Iowa and Illinois DOT agree to mutually resolve all con�licts and disputes. Agencies are jointly responsible for addressing and correcting substandard work. • Agencies can amend the AIP to develop any additional provisions that are determined necessary. • Iowa DOT and Illinois DOT agree to complete the project in full compliance with federal and state requirements. Table 7. How the 2010 AIP between the Iowa DOT and Illinois DOT addresses focus issues from the conceptual framework (visioning, planning, and design and construction phases).

Case Studies 37 in Chapter 2). What was never resolved in this fragmented ownership and oversight was how to address conflict and share potential opportunities for improvements to intercity and commuter rail. Nature of the Partnership The complex structure of the NEC as it stands today is a byproduct of various legislative acts to salvage passenger rail and freight operations following the decline of the private railroad industry in the mid-20th century. The relationship among Amtrak, the states it serves in the Northeast, and the various commuter rail operators who operate on and off Amtrak track is also complex and varies by state. The NEC mainline tracks are owned primarily by Amtrak, with portions also owned by the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut and the New York MTA. A large number of railroads operate on the NEC—including Amtrak, six commuter railroads, two Class I freight railroads, and one shortline railroad—resulting in high levels of activity on the NEC. On a daily basis, approximately 750,000 trips are made on the NEC, either on Amtrak or one of the commuter railroads. More than 2,100 passenger trains and 60 freight trains operate on some portion of the NEC every day. For the most part, Amtrak retains the responsibility for infrastructure maintenance and improvement. Figure 6 shows the different operating entities along the NEC. Historically, each railroad on the NEC separately negotiated its infrastructure access and service agreements for use of NEC infrastructure with the infrastructure owner, with no stan- dardized method for determining the pricing structure of these agreements. Over time, this has resulted in disparate arrangements throughout the corridor, and, according to those inter- viewed, this circumstance is one of several factors contributing to chronic underinvestment in NEC infrastructure. The following entities have access-to-infrastructure agreements with Amtrak to support commuter rail service that crosses state lines: • New Jersey Transit (NJ TRANSIT)—to provide service between Trenton, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania Station in New York, New York, and service between the 30th Street Station in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Atlantic City, New Jersey. • Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA)—to provide service from 30th Street Station in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Trenton, New Jersey (this agreement also covers SEPTA regional rail service on a portion of Amtrak’s Keystone Line). • Virginia Railway Express (VRE)—to provide service from Manassas and Fredericksburg, Virginia, to Union Station in Washington, D.C. • Maryland Area Regional Commuter (MARC) train—to provide service on all three commuter lines from Perryville and Baltimore, Maryland, and Martinsburg, West Virginia, into Union Station in Washington, D.C. These agreements address topics such as trackage rights, operating rights and windows, service levels and expansion, control of maintenance and dispatching, liability allocation, and construc- tion coordination. In addition to agreements between commuter rail operators and Amtrak, the arrangements between various commuter rail operators and/or states add to the intricacy of operations on the NEC. Challenges and Barriers • Chronic underfunding of the current system on the NEC is combined with a countervailing imperative to expand the network to respond to growing demand. • Lack of clear direction and priorities for investment of scarce funding leads to localized benefits from projects without consideration for corridor-wide impacts or needs. (Continued from p. 32)

38 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs • Competing interests (given the multitude of commuter, intercity, and freight uses of the NEC spine) hinder stakeholders’ ability to identify and reach consensus on key issues and have resulted in questions of equity and parity among these entities. • Oversight relationships and requirements of various U.S. DOT entities result in confusion and inefficiencies for NEC owners and operators, with commuter and intercity rail treated differently under federal law. • The history of the NEC ownership and operation contributes to the complexity of operations, interrelationship among the key participants, and federal reporting. • Competing demands on the corridor as capacity constraints in many segments of the NEC limit the ability to expand all rail services and provide for an equitable balance among the various passenger services, as well as between passenger and freight movements in general. Source: http://nec.amtrak.com/content/nec-and-connecting-corridors-map Figure 6. Owners and operators in the NEC.

Case Studies 39 • A complicated and intricate allocation of risk between owners and operators is often based on the provisions within historic agreements. Liability and indemnity obligations are two of the most contentious issues among parties operating jointly on rail lines. Lessons Learned • A common ground emphasizing shared interests, priorities, and vision should be established early among stakeholders. • Consensus requires patience and relationship building. • Some centralization is required to focus and facilitate decision-making. • Independence and transparency are essential; the NEC Commission needs to be autonomous from Amtrak in order to be viewed as a truly fair broker over the longer term and to build trust for the effective investment of federal and state monies on the NEC. • Funds generated by increased commuter railroad and Amtrak financial contributions cannot replace existing federal funding. Rather, a new approach is needed to leverage higher levels of federal, state, local, and private investment. • Processes and requirements should be synchronized for advancement of projects. Correspondence to the Conceptual Framework Table 8 shows the entities that support the visioning and planning phases in the NEC; Table 9 focuses on multi-state agreements in the operations and maintenance phase. Note that in addition to the stakeholders listed in Tables 8 and 9, two coalitions support the advancement of the NEC: the I-95 Corridor Coalition, a partnership of transportation agencies and related organizations located mainly in the 16 states traversed by I-95, along with affiliated members in adjacent Canadian provinces, and the Coalition of Northeast Governors (CONEG), a non-partisan association of governors from seven northeastern states that addresses a broad range of issues of regional importance. 3.5 Corridor/Segment Studies 3.5.1 Northern New England Passenger Rail Authority and Amtrak Downeaster Service Background The NNEPRA is a quasi-public entity created by the Maine state legislature that is respon- sible, along with partners, for rehabilitating the rail corridor between Boston, Massachusetts, and Portland, Maine; expanding service in Maine from Portland to Brunswick; and managing Amtrak’s Downeaster rail service. The passenger service operates across 3 states and serves 12 stops, including its termini at Boston’s Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) North Station and the Brunswick rail station in Maine. Massachusetts and New Hampshire are each home to three stops along the line, and Maine has six stops. The Downeaster is notable in that it is a reinstatement of passenger rail service that was provided between Boston and Portland for over a century, but was discontinued from the mid-1960s to 2001. Despite the fact that service within Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitute half of the Downeaster’s stops and that residents from both of these states accounted for 42 percent of all ridership in FY 2012, these states do not contribute funding to support the service. Addition- ally, the service does not have access to a dedicated source of funding. Since its inaugural run in December 2001, the Downeaster has provided service to over 4.5 million people, operated roughly 367 million passenger miles, and generated $64 million in ticket revenues. The service is operated by Amtrak and managed by NNEPRA. (text continues on p. 45)

40 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Focus Issue Entities Involved in NEC Passenger Rail Service (Planning and Visioning Phases) Amtrak NEC Infrastructure Master Plan Working Group (no longer in place) NEC Commission FRA NEC FUTURE Stakeholders Amtrak, 12 state DOTs and the District of Columbia, 7 commuter rail operators, 3 freight railroads, NNEPRA, CONEG, and FRA. 8 states and the District of Columbia, U.S. DOT, Amtrak, freight railroads, commuter rail operators. FRA, NEC states, and District of Columbia; Amtrak, NEC commuter and freight railroads, federal and state environmental agencies.Institutional Relationships Voluntary partnership led by Amtrak. Established by PRIIA. Voluntary participation from stakeholders led by FRA.Identi�ication of Responsibilities Not governed by any formal processes; rather, the states, stakeholders, and agencies were invited to contribute their own priorities and projects. Charged under PRIIA to facilitate cooperation and integrated planning among the agencies and entities involved in intercity passenger and freight use of the NEC. FRA-driven effort with coordination with other U.S. DOT modal administrators,quarterly meetings with resource agencies in the three project regions. Role of Regulatory Agencies FRA included in stakeholder group. U.S. DOT has 5 of 18 voting members on board. FRA is the lead agency for environmental study; regular meetings with involved state and federal resource and regulatory agencies.Political Foundation Established by Congress. Funded through federal appropriation.Why? (Compelling Need) Creation of NEC master plan that for the �irst time would capture relevant policy and capital plans from each of the Northeast states and District of Columbia involving intercity, passenger, and freight project needs in one document. Established to facilitate cooperation and integrate planning among the agencies and entities involved in passenger and freight use of the NEC. Led by FRA, commenced in 2012 at the request of the states in the NEC to formulate a comprehensive, long-term vision and rail investment program through 2040. Decision-Making Process Meet at least 4 times per year, votes by voting members.Corridor Ownership Majority of corridor owned by Amtrak; portions owned by New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. Majority of corridor owned by Amtrak; portions owned by New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. Majority of corridor owned by Amtrak; portions owned by New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts.Lead Agencies/Groups Amtrak. Board includes representation from 8 states, the District of Columbia, Amtrak, U.S. DOT, 4 freight railroads, states connecting to NEC, and 6 commuter rail operators. FRA, FTA cooperating agency, close coordination with NEC Commission and railroad stakeholders. Legal Authority Under Amtrak’s purview. U.S. Code Title 49, Subtitle V, Under FRA’s purview, NEPA.Part C, Chapter 249. Table 8. How entities involved in NEC passenger rail service address focus issues from the conceptual framework (visioning and planning phases).

Case Studies 41 Focus Issue Entities Involved in NEC Passenger Rail Service (Planning and Visioning Phases) Amtrak NEC Infrastructure Master Plan Working Group (no longer in place) NEC Commission FRA NEC FUTURE Funding Sources Amtrak's budget. Congressional appropriations. Federally funded.Interaction with Others Participation and input from rail stakeholders to develop plan document. Interaction with other stakeholders as part of ongoing NEC Commission meetings. Extensive interaction with NEC Commission and its members and with federal and state resource agencies.Oversight U.S. DOT is voting member,Congress. No of�icial advisory group,large amount of coordination already taking place with NEC Commission and other stakeholders.Interoperability Standards Interoperability a key requirement of the purpose and need.Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providers of Service Part of stakeholder group. Collaborative involvement with Amtrak and other railroads with locally owned portions of the NEC in New York, Connecticut, andMassachusetts. Part of stakeholder group. Revenue Sharing Cost-Allocation Committee developing formula to determine allocation of revenues for activities aside from operations.Liability Issues Cost-Allocation Committee developing potential strategies.Procurement Amtrak procured consultant support for production of deliverable. Can directly contract for consultant support as needed. FRA procured consultant support.Contractual Arrangements Non-disclosure agreements are anticipated, with the cost-allocation policy likely included as an amendment incorporated into existingaccess and service agreements. Blank cells indicate no correspondence with the focus issue. Cost Sharing Members serve without pay,Cost-Allocation Committee developing policy for NEC overall. Table 8. (Continued).

42 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Focus Issue NEC Multi-State Agreements (Operations and Maintenance Phase) Metro-North Railroad Service on New Haven Line Metro-North Railroad Service West of the Hudson River SEPTA Service to Wilmington/Newark, DelawareStakeholders Connecticut DOT, MTA, and Metro-North Railroad. NJ TRANSIT and Metro-North Railroad. SEPTA and Delaware Transit Corporation (DTC).Institutional Relationships Modi�ication of legacy agreement from historical operation by Penn Central and Conrail. New agreement with renewable term superseding prior agreement between the entities to provide service on the Port Jervis and Pascack Valley Lines. Replaces prior agreements dating back to 1989. Identi�ication of Responsibilities • Connecticut DOT: payment of operating de�icits, acquisition of non-moveable capital assets and moveable capital assets. • MTA: payment of operating de�icits,management of capital improvements and capital asset projects. • Metro-North Railroad: day-to-day operation of service, fare collection,annual budget process (lead). • All: capital asset acquisition, amendments to service schedule, consists, allocation and payment of capital costs (depending on state in which operated). • NJ TRANSIT: operation of service, provision of vehicles, maintenance and cleaning of vehicles,emergency repairs of vehicles,recommendations to Metro-North Railroad for major overhauls/ remanufacture of equipment, equipment and facility maintenance,station maintenance, (including Suffern, NY),public address and visual information systems, and ticket vending machines at NY state stations. • Metro-North Railroad: requests for changes in service, maintenance of the right-of-way and facilities beyond the end of NJ TRANSIT ownership,maintenance and operation of other NYstations along the lines,fare policy. • Both: quarterly meetings to review operations, �inances, and other matters related to service. • SEPTA: coordination of operating plan and operating assumptions for additional rail service; management and operation of rail service; vehicle maintenance and storage; adjustment of frequency, consists, and schedules of trains operated. • DTC: access to and use of NEC, personal injury and property damage claims for which it is responsible, operation of at least one sales location in Delaware, coordination of bus operations to serve passenger rail stations to the extent possible. • Both: programmed adjustments to operations south of Marcus Hook, PA; mutual agreement that SEPTA is the operator of record for train service south into DE and that SEPTA is entitled to all federal funding attributable to train service between PA and Wilmington, DE.Role of Regulatory Agencies Subject to requirements of the FTA for �inancial and technical assistance; FRA enforces rail safety and consolidates government support for the rehabilitation of the NEC. Subject to requirements of the FTA for �inancial and technical assistance; FRA enforces rail safety and consolidates government support for the rehabilitation of the NEC. Subject to requirements of the FTA for �inancial and technical assistance; FRA enforces rail safety and consolidates government support for the rehabilitation of the NEC. Table 9. How multi-state agreements on the NEC address focus issues from the conceptual framework (operations and maintenance phase).

Case Studies 43 Focus Issue NEC Multi-State Agreements (Operations and Maintenance Phase) Metro-North Railroad Service on New Haven Line Metro-North Railroad Service West of the Hudson River SEPTA Service to Wilmington/Newark, Delaware Decision-Making Process Joint among Connecticut DOT, MTA, and Metro-North Railroad depending on topic. Joint between NJ TRANSIT and Metro-North Railroad depending on topic. Joint between SEPTA and DTC depending on topic.Corridor Ownership Owned by New York (Metro-North Railroad) and Connecticut. Norfolk Southern. Amtrak.Lead Agencies/Groups State of Connecticut, MTA, and Metro-North Railroad. NJ TRANSIT and Metro-North Railroad. SEPTA and DTC.Legal Authority Service Agreement dated June 21, 1985. Agreement for Operation dated July 27, 2005. An agreement between SEPTA and DTC for the provision of Delaware regional rail service, November 1, 2002.Cost Sharing Costs borne by entities in reasonable proportion to the segment or asset located in each state. Compensation paid via monthly service payment from Metro-North Railroadto NJ TRANSIT. DTC responsible for all costs incurred in provision of service. SEPTA reimbursed by DTC for operating de�icitsresulting from actual services performed. DTC credited by SEPTA for the transport of passengers whose trips originate or terminate in DE.Operating Standards Joint one-time comprehensive review of the service in an effort to improve the ef�iciency of the service. On-time performance. SEPTA responsible forproviding service in a manner and with equipment consistent with the same general standard utilized throughout its transportation system.Oversight FRA provides safety oversight, not speci�ied in agreement. FRA provides safety oversight, not speci�ied in agreement. FRA provides safety oversight, not speci�ied in agreement.Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providers of Service Metro-North Railroadmaintains separate leasing agreement with Norfolk Southern for tracks. DTC maintains an MOU with Amtrak to address access, rate structures, and indemni�ication, and approving SEPTA as DTC’s operating contractor. Why? (Compelling Need) Agreement established after divestiture of Conrail’s Metro-North Railroadassumed responsibility for Need to extend commuter rail service into Delaware.service. operating services west of the Hudson and north of the New Jersey state line following divestiture of Conrail’s services but contracted services to NJ TRANSIT because of physicalconnection to NJ TRANSIT lines. Table 9. (Continued). (continued on next page)

44 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Focus Issue NEC Multi-State Agreements (Operations and Maintenance Phase) Metro-North Railroad Service on New Haven Line Metro-North Railroad Service West of the Hudson River SEPTA Service to Wilmington/Newark, Delaware Revenue Sharing Metro-North Railroadmaintains chart of accounts to re�lect costs and revenues; discussion of service revenues, service costs, and operating de�icits. Metro-North Railroadpayments to NJ TRANSIT for provision of service; additional contribution by Metro-North Railroad for capital improvements. SEPTA charges DTC for service, with rates to be examined annually and adjusted based on the Association of American Railroads Annual Indexes of Charge Out Prices and Wage Rates East; DTC credited by SEPTA for the transport of passengers whose trips originate or terminate in DE.Liability Issues Liability of Metro-North governed by terms of agreements, if any, with the carrier, and the service shall bear its proportionate share of such liability as such costs are allocated to the service. Liability and indemni�ication provisions for employee liability, passenger liability, and third-party liability applicable to operations speci�ied in agreement. DTC agrees to indemnify, defend, and save harmless SEPTA from and against any liability, loss, or expense for any loss or damage to SEPTA’s property, arising out of or related to the provision of services by SEPTA as part of the agreement south of Marcus Hook, PA, and points within the states of DE and/or MD; SEPTA is extended the sovereign immunity of the state of DE and DTC.Procurement Connecticut DOT: acquisition of non-moveable capital assets and moveable capital assets. NJ TRANSIT procures its own vehicles, not covered in agreement. Separate agreement between SEPTA and DTC for purchase of 4 Silverliner V vehicles as part of contract option with manufacturer to provide additional service to DE, 2007.Contractual Arrangements Speci�ied in service agreement through effective date, term, renewal, termination rights, and procedures upon termination. Speci�ied in service agreement through effective date, term, renewal, termination rights, and procedures upon termination. Speci�ied in service agreement through effective date, term, renewal, termination rights, and procedures upon termination. Blank cells indicate no correspondence with the focus issue. Marketing andCustomer Service Not explicitly stated in agreement, but Metro-North Railroad’s purview as operator. Not explicitly stated in agreement, but NJ TRANSIT’s purview as operator. Not explicitly stated in agreement, but SEPTA’s purview as operator. Service Standards Condition of train restrooms, car interior cleanliness, car heating/air conditioning, consist management. SEPTA responsible to provide service in a manner and with equipment consistent with the same general standard utilized throughout its transportation system. Table 9. (Continued).

Case Studies 45 Nature of the Partnership Passenger rail service is facilitated through a series of cooperative agreements between NNEPRA, Amtrak, and the host railroads. No state or local governments are directly involved in the develop- ment or operation of the Downeaster. As each of the agreements is based on the execution of a specific work order, the delegation of responsibilities within the pacts varies considerably depending on the type of project being completed. As manager of the Downeaster, NNEPRA is a party to a specific agreement with the majority of the organizations that support the passenger service, but rarely contracts with any entity other than Amtrak to support operations. Some key agreements cover train operations and maintenance; access to trackage; track maintenance and inspection; and station operations, ownership, maintenance, and staffing. These agreements are briefly summarized below. Train Operations and Maintenance. NNEPRA and Amtrak signed a 20-year operating agreement in 1996. This single agreement covers the operation of passenger rail service along the entire corridor (i.e., Amtrak does not hold separate agreements with the individual states). Under this agreement, NNEPRA reimburses Amtrak for the costs incurred by the operator in all three states related to provision and maintenance of train equipment, fuel, on-board staff, ticketing agents at the Portland station, and general reservations services that support the Downeaster. As part of its agreement with NNEPRA, Amtrak is responsible for maintaining all train equipment and has contracted with a company to maintain, clean, inspect, and repair all train equipment related to the Downeaster service. NNEPRA staff members have a strong working relationship with Amtrak and assist the operator in its development of schedules, revenue management strategies, capital projects, and service improvement programs. Access to Trackage. In order to access the trackage, Amtrak makes payments to the host railroads and is reimbursed by NNEPRA via the annual service fee. NNEPRA is a party to all agreements between Amtrak and the host railroads and has served as a leader in facilitating negotiations for track access within the corridor. All trackage within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is owned by the MBTA. NNEPRA and MBTA have reached an agreement that allows Amtrak to operate service along the MBTA commuter rail segments free of charge, with two caveats: (1) NNEPRA and Amtrak can operate only 10 one-way trips per day out of the MBTA North Station, and (2) only one Downeaster train is allowed in the station at any given point in time. Currently, five trains per day are operated out of North Station. Track Maintenance and Inspection. The host railroads are responsible for ensuring that the track is sufficient for safe operations. Pan Am Railways (freight railroad) performs all track maintenance and inspection for the portion of the corridor within the states of Maine and New Hampshire (i.e., from the northern terminus in Brunswick, Maine, to the Massachusetts– New Hampshire state line), including the last mile in Brunswick that is owned by the Maine DOT. The MBTA, at no charge to NNEPRA, handles the same tasks for its portion—running from the Massachusetts–New Hampshire state line to the Downeaster’s southern terminus at MBTA’s North Station. Station Operations, Ownership, Maintenance, and Staffing. In terms of station operations, liability insurance for all rail platforms in both Maine and New Hampshire is carried by NNEPRA. The three station communities in New Hampshire reimburse NNEPRA for their share of the annual insurance premiums. Insurance coverage for the Maine stations is included as part of NNEPRA’s annual budget. In terms of station maintenance, the majority of communities have formed an agreement with Amtrak that allows the operator to access the facilities and perform any long- term construction or maintenance work that is necessary to support operating passenger service in and out of the station. However, the approach used to provide day-to-day maintenance for the stations varies across the municipalities. (Continued from p. 39)

46 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Challenges and Barriers • Access and cost-sharing negotiations with freight railroad. Disputes between NNEPRA/ Amtrak and one of the three host railroads resulted in years of delay in initiating the Downeaster service. After months of negotiations, the entities could not come to an agreement on distribution of liability, maintenance, capital improvement, and administrative and future incremental costs. While the involvement of the Surface Transportation Board (STB) ultimately pushed the project forward, the reliance on a third party to resolve the majority of disputes did not set a strong precedent for a collaborative working relationship. • Lack of a dedicated funding source for capital improvements for the Downeaster service. The reliance on federal funding results in periods of activity for NNEPRA followed by substantial bouts of inactivity during which the agency is planning future improvements and simply wait- ing on the next grant cycle. • Lack of dedicated operating funding for the Downeaster, which means that the service relies on discretionary state-level funding. Given the ever-shifting priorities of, and political maneu- verings that occur within, state legislatures, the continued future of the Downeaster service is never a given. • Rural station settings that hinder “last mile” connections. Depending on the presence of local bus service and the points of interest served by the route, passengers can be forced to either take a taxi or wait on a poorly timed transfer to a community circulator bus. Lessons Learned • Arbitration can push projects forward. While arbitration should never be the first line of defense for a future operator, the use of a third-party mediator to resolve disputes can be effective at mitigating project inertia in the early stages of corridor development and navigating later critical impasses. • Contentious relationships can develop into partnerships with time and mutual benefits. By providing the owner of the corridor (Pan Am Railways) with free access to the capital needed to improve its infrastructure, NNEPRA finally established the trust necessary to produce a cooperative working arrangement. • State DOT board membership promotes coordination. The Maine Commissioner of Trans- portation’s active involvement with NNEPRA ensures that financial planning for both existing and future NNEPRA passenger operations, as well as service planning for potential Downeaster service expansions, is not done in isolation. The working arrangement between NNEPRA and the Maine DOT for the planning of passenger rail services in Maine promotes concurrency and provides for the development of a consensus related to future capital improvements for passenger rail in the state. • Regional services can provide innovation. The Downeaster service is notable in that it has served as a hotbed for innovation in the provision of passenger rail. Under NNEPRA’s management, it has been the site of many firsts for an Amtrak service, including the rollout of the first on-board Wi-Fi system, point-of-sale cash register system, and on-board café not directly operated by Amtrak. Correspondence to the Conceptual Framework Table 10 shows how this case study fits into the conceptual framework. 3.5.2 Pacific Northwest High-Speed Rail Corridor Background The Pacific Northwest High-Speed Rail Corridor (PNWRC) is one of five originally proposed high-speed passenger rail corridors designated by the U.S. DOT in 1992. The high-speed rail

Case Studies 47 Focus Issue Downeaster(Planning, Design and Construction, and Operations and Maintenance Phases)Stakeholders NNEPRA, Maine DOT, Amtrak, Pan Am Railways, MBTA.Institutional Relationships NNEPRA established by 1995 Passenger Rail Service Act by the Maine Legislature; agreements between NNEPRA, Amtrak, and Pan Am Railways also govern relationships.Identi�ication of Responsibilities NNEPRA to initiate, establish regularly scheduled passenger rail service between points within Maine and other states.Role of Regulatory Agencies FRA provides oversight of grant funding and reviews environmental documentation.STB served as third-party arbitrator between host railroad and Amtrak.Political Foundation Political and legislative support established through passage of 1991 and 1995 Passenger Rail Service Acts. Why? (Compelling Need) Need for increased economic development, improved freight service resulting from publicly funded right-of-way improvements within the operating corridor, and enhanced connections both within Maine and the New England region.Downeaster is reinstatement of passenger rail service that was provided between Boston and Portland for over a century, but was discontinued from the mid-1960s to 2001.Corridor Ownership Segments of the Downeaster’s alignment are owned by the Maine DOT, MBTA, and Pan Am Railways.Lead Agencies/Groups NNEPRA is the lead agency for passenger rail service. Legal Authority 1995 Passenger Rail Service Act.Cost Sharing Amtrak and the Maine DOT share costs for three-state operation of passenger rail service in the corridor. To provide operation subsidies for service, the Maine DOT provides funding through its State Transportation Aviation and Rail account.Funding Sources Ticket revenue, the Maine DOT, Amtrak, and FRA.Interaction with Others NNEPRA interacts with Amtrak, host railroads, MBTA, and local communities.Operating Standards Set by NNEPRA and Amtrak.Safety Standards Set by NNEPRA and Amtrak.Oversight Oversight provided by Maine’s Legislative Council and Maine Commissioner of Transportation.Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providers of Service NNEPRA had contentious relationship initially with Pan Am Railways, requiring STB arbitration to allow for passenger rail services on its tracks; relationship improved following joint infrastructure improvement project.Impact of PRIIA Section 209 In response to changes made by Section 209, Maine committed to provide $8 million in operational funding and allow the service to use state’s debt service over the course of 25 years up to $31.5 million. Table 10. How Downeaster efforts address focus issues from the conceptual framework (planning, design and construction, and operations and maintenance phases). (continued on next page)

48 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs program consists of a series of projects to increase service reliability in the Cascades Rail Corri- dor, with a goal to expand and improve Washington’s Amtrak Cascades service between Eugene, Oregon, and Vancouver, British Columbia. Of the 467 total miles, 300 miles are in the state of Washington, 134 miles are in Oregon, and 33 miles are in British Columbia (see Figure 7). Nature of the Partnership Functional partnerships have played a critical role in the successful operation of passenger rail service between Eugene, Oregon, and Vancouver, British Columbia. Partnerships includ- ing public and private entities, railroads, train manufacturers, and international customs and border control agencies have occurred through continuous collaboration and regularly updated service agreements. Key participants in the corridor include Washington State DOT, Oregon DOT, British Columbia Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure (BCMoTI), FRA, Amtrak, Talgo (Original Equipment Manufacturer), and rail line owners such as Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR) and BNSF Railway (BNSF). Although passenger service is provided almost seamlessly across three jurisdictions, the service has been managed separately by Wash- ington State DOT and Oregon DOT. As a result, separate service agreements currently exist between Amtrak and the two states. Similarly, separate maintenance agreements also exist with Talgo. Traditionally, as service has been managed separately, so have planning efforts, albeit with coordination among the government entities with a role in passenger rail. Washington State DOT submitted a Tier 1 Environmental Assessment (EA) to the FRA evaluating any poten- tial impacts of the proposed railway improvement program on the Washington state segment, stretching about 300 miles on the BNSF north-south mainline from the Columbia River to the Canadian border. For the 125-mile segment in Oregon serving Portland and Eugene-Springfield, (also known as the Oregon Passenger Rail Project), Oregon DOT and FRA are now studying alternatives and preparing a Tier 1 EIS under NEPA. The region has also used state rail plans as a mechanism for coordination. The state rail plans provide a blueprint for meeting the current and future needs of passenger and freight rail in Oregon and Washington. Focus Issue Downeaster(Planning, Design and Construction, and Operations and Maintenance Phases) Revenue Sharing Revenues from ticket sales, advertising, and food sales support operational costs of service; any further subsidies are provided by the Maine DOT.Branding NNEPRA marketing manages branding.Liability Issues For station operations, liability insurance for all rail platforms in both Maine and New Hampshire is carried by NNEPRA.Procurement NNEPRA is empowered to contract for professional services and other third-party services such as food service on the Downeaster.Contractual Arrangements NNEPRA has service arrangement with Amtrak to provide passenger rail service. ServiceMarketing and Customer NNEPRA employs two staff members to direct marketing efforts for the Downeaster.Service Standards Set by NNEPRA and Amtrak. Table 10. (Continued).

Case Studies 49 Washington State DOT and Oregon DOT have committed to the concept of operating the Cascades service as a single corridor by signing an MOU. Following the MOU, a Cascades Rail Corridor Management Workplan was developed and signed by the two states in January 2013. The work plan provided an initial framework for how the two agencies would jointly manage intercity passenger rail service in the corridor and is currently being updated. Objectives for the single corridor operation include delivering consistently on customer expectations for fast, reliable, safe, and affordable higher speed rail; building revenue to cover the cost of operations; growing ridership to and from economic centers; providing a competitive transportation option; pooling resources for increased efficiencies; reducing costs; and ensuring partners share in revenues and costs. In order to effectively define roles and responsibilities in the development of the single cor- ridor, a Cascades Rail Corridor team has been created with participation from the three major governmental entities—Washington, Oregon, and British Columbia. Overall management responsibility for corridor services, however, is wholly sponsored by Oregon and Washington, and the two states jointly coordinate management- and service-related issues through a regular monthly corridor meeting. Further collaboration has taken place through the formation of the Figure 7. PNWRC.

50 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Washington State Rail Caucus, involving representation from the state legislature to discuss issues and policy solutions such as the forthcoming station stops policy. Oregon is considering following suit, and, in the future, it is envisioned that a joint rail caucus will be formed with representation from both states. Challenges and Barriers • Responding to changes from PRIIA Section 209 and creating a financially self-sustaining pas- senger rail service in the Cascades Corridor post PRIIA implementation has been challenging. Previously, Washington State DOT and Oregon DOT jointly funded 80 percent of the Amtrak Cascades service’s operating costs not covered by ticket revenue. Under the provisions of PRIIA, Washington State DOT and Oregon DOT must absorb the additional 20 percent of operating costs that had previously been paid by Amtrak. • Although the rail service is wholly sponsored by Washington State DOT and Oregon DOT, there is a desire to bring British Columbia on as an active funding partner in the future. Cross-country border service provides additional complexities with respect to customs, security, and operations. Lessons Learned • The MOU and work plan as well as application of good program management skills have helped implement the vision, and the established communication platforms and procedures have played a key role in developing joint resolution when issues have arisen. • Budget appropriations for the states and the federal government are not currently aligned, which complicates operational planning. • Understanding the important role of railroads and of the underlying infrastructure owner can help to facilitate balancing of freight and passenger rail to meet service needs. • An incremental approach to corridor improvements has worked well and kept the corridor team committed to achieving long-term goals while also demonstrating visible improvements and benefits to passengers, as shown through the increase in ridership over the years. Correspondence to the Conceptual Framework Table 11 shows how the Pacific Northwest high-speed rail efforts fit into the conceptual framework. 3.5.3 South Central High-Speed Rail Corridor Background In 2000, the South Central High-Speed Rail Corridor (SCHSRC) was officially designated as a feasible corridor for high-speed passenger rail under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). The SCHSRC is a nearly 900-mile network in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas. This high-speed rail corridor would connect the cities of Tulsa and Oklahoma City in Oklahoma; Dallas/Fort Worth, Austin, and San Antonio in Texas; and Little Rock, Arkansas. The most studied portion of the SCHSRC is a 322-mile segment that currently comprises Amtrak’s Heartland Flyer route between Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Fort Worth, Texas (see Figure 8). This portion of the corridor has been analyzed by the Kansas DOT, Oklahoma DOT, and Texas DOT in various arrangements and in different studies. The Texas DOT in partnership with the Oklahoma DOT is conducting the Texas-Oklahoma Passenger Rail Study (TOPRS) to further assess the needs and costs associated with increased and enhanced passenger rail service in this corridor. Currently, Amtrak operates intercity passenger rail service in the SCHSRC via the Heartland Flyer (discussed above) and Texas Eagle routes. The Texas Eagle route provides service 3 days a

Case Studies 51 Focus Issue Washington State DOT/Oregon DOT MOU (Planning Phase) Cascades Rail Corridor Management Workplan (Planning and Operations and Maintenance Phases)Stakeholders Washington State DOT, Oregon DOT. Washington State DOT, Oregon DOT, BNSF, UPRR, Amtrak, Sound Transit, and Province of British Columbia.Institutional Relationships Established through MOU. Established through Workplan.Identi�ication of Responsibilities States agreed to jointly fund and oversee the improvement and expansion of passenger rail service in the PNWRC and develop a Corridor Management Plan to detail funding, planning, equipment, performance measurement, and other key issues. Workplan de�ines how Oregon DOT and Washington State DOT will work together as joint managers of service on the corridor, along with milestones and an interim dispute-resolution procedure; outlines activities that will be explored collaboratively versus those that will be coordinated on but managed separately for 5-year period.Role of Regulatory Agencies Workplan acknowledges FRA’s role in oversight of freight and passenger rail service.Why? (Compelling Need) Washington State DOT and Oregon DOT recognized need to establish agreement to govern development of their joint 5-year Workplan. While the region had been able to advance some planning of corridor improvements, Washington State DOT and Oregon DOT recognized the need for a more structured partnership to establish joint funding and oversight responsibilities to move towardimplementation of improvements, particularly in light of substantial ridership growth.Decision-Making Process The Workplan includes procedures such as dispute resolution and calls for highly structured meetings and correspondence to address any negotiations-, operations-, or service-related issues; also outlines clear organizational chart.Corridor Ownership BNSF and UPRR. BNSF and UPRR.Lead Agencies/Groups Oregon DOT and Washington State DOT are joint leads. Oregon DOT and Washington State DOT are joint leads.Legal Authority The Revised Code of Washington and the Oregon Revised Statute provided each state legal authority to enter an MOU.Cost Sharing MOU called for creation of Corridor Director position to be funded 80% by Washington State DOT and 20% by Oregon DOT. Partners agreed to continue executing separate agreements with Amtrak for operation of the Cascades route; cost shares are allocated based on estimated total route train miles traveled within the Oregon DOT and Washington State DOT service areas. Table 11. How Pacific Northwest high-speed rail efforts address focus issues from the conceptual framework (planning and operations and maintenance phases). (continued on next page)

52 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Focus Issue Washington State DOT/Oregon DOT MOU (Planning Phase) Cascades Rail Corridor Management Workplan (Planning and Operations and Maintenance Phases) Oversight Oversight for the Corridor Management Plan development to be provided by Oregon DOT and Washington State DOT. Washington State DOT/Oregon DOT Staff Leadership Team consisting of managers from Oregon DOT’s Rail Division and Washington State DOT’s Rail Of�ice.Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providers of Service BNSF and UPRR are recognized in the MOU. BNSF and UPRR were important partners in development of the Corridor Management Plan; separate service agreements currently exist between Amtrak and the two states;similarly, separate maintenance agreements also exist with Talgo.Impact of PRIIA Section 209 Major impetus for formalizing relationship. Increased operating costs for Washington State DOT and Oregon DOT but also allows for stronger, more active role in management of service to control costs and increase revenue.Marketing andCustomer Service Workplan assigns responsibility to interagency Communications Group.Service Standards Workplan does not explicitly address service standards but does establish functional working group responsible for data analysis and reporting.Revenue Sharing To be developed in the Corridor Management Plan.Branding Workplan does not explicitly address branding but could fall under purview of Communications Group if changes are explored.Liability Issues The MOU establishes that both partners will indemnify and hold harmless each other from any and all claims, suits, and liabilities which may occur in the collective effort.Procurement Not explicitly addressed in MOU.Contractual Arrangements MOU served as contract between the two states for development of Workplan (MOU expired on September 30, 2013). Workplan serves as agreement governing corridor activities through 2017. Blank cells indicate no correspondence with the focus issue. Funding Sources Funds from each partner state. Funds from each partner state.Interaction with Others Partner agencies agreed in the MOU to work with host railroads, ports, transit agencies, and local governments in development of the Corridor Management Plan. Communications Group plans and executes public information programs; Agreement Group responsible for negotiating and executing agreements. Table 11. (Continued).

Case Studies 53 week from Chicago, Illinois, through Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, with its terminus in Los Angeles, California. The full route is approximately 1,305 miles in length. The Texas Eagle operates on rails owned by the Canadian National, Union Pacific, and BNSF railroads. Nature of the Partnership The major participants in the development of the SCHSRC include the Oklahoma DOT, Texas DOT, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department, FRA, Amtrak, and the freight railroads currently operating in the region. Currently, there is no singular coordinated effort to analyze the entire SCHSRC as a cohesive high-speed rail passenger network integrated across Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas. Various portions of the SCHSRC have been studied or are presently under some level of evaluation for enhanced passenger rail alternatives. Different segments that make up the SCHSRC have been under consideration or studied since the 1980s. The TOPRS, initiated in 2013, is the most recent study. Because much of the study area is within Texas and Texas supplied the matching funds, it was agreed that the Texas DOT would lead the TOPRS and manage consultant contracts with the Oklahoma DOT as a partnering agency. A map of the TOPRS study area is shown in Figure 9. The TOPRS will develop multiple alignments and service alternatives for each of the three sections of the 850-mile study area and then compare all alternatives to a no-build scenario. This information will inform the development of a Service-Level EIS Statement. Supplementing the analysis underway in the TOPRS, a Corridor Investment Plan is under development for the portion of the SCHSRC alignment between Oklahoma City and Tulsa. A Tier 1 EA was completed in 2009 for this corridor. In 2010, the Oklahoma DOT received $2.4 million from FRA to complete the environmental process. Technical teams working for both the TOPRS and the Oklahoma City-Tulsa corridor study are coordinating their efforts to seek ways to integrate both planned services in the Oklahoma City area. Challenges and Barriers • Lack of cooperation by the host railroad in Arkansas has led to delays in work and increases in project cost for the Arkansas portion of the project. Figure 8. Heartland Flyer route.

54 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs • Garnering support for the project from public and elected officials has been challenging because many view the project as unrealistic due to its high capital costs. • There is currently no political or business community champion for SCHSRC project development to offer direction and/or lobby for the project at the state, federal, or local levels (a result of the difficulty in attracting the support of public and elected officials). • There is a need to identify stable, long-term capital and operating funding sources for implementation of higher speed passenger rail service. • States appropriate funds on different cycles, making coordination of investments especially challenging. Lessons Learned • Absent a common vision and set of objectives as well as single coordinating body, individual segments of the overall SCHSRC have advanced in a fragmented and uneven manner. • As seen in Arkansas, lack of a strong working relationship with the host railroad can impede progress in planning and analysis. Well-established relationships in Texas and Oklahoma have allowed for greater progress in project visioning and planning. Correspondence to the Conceptual Framework Table 12 shows how the SCHSRC efforts fit into the conceptual framework. Existing Passenger Rail City Possible Rail Extension Abandoned Rail Other Rail Figure 9. TOPRS study area.

Case Studies 55 Focus Issue SCHSRC (Visioning and Planning Phases)Stakeholders Texas DOT, Oklahoma DOT; Arkansas not included in formal agreement but Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (AHTD) has recently initiated independent efforts. Institutional Relationships Established through agreement between Texas and Oklahoma to develop an SDPacross state boundary lines.Identi�ication of Responsibilities • Texas DOT: Project management and oversight, provide regular monthly updates and draft reports to Oklahoma DOT. • Oklahoma DOT: review of draft reports, provision of data. • AHTD conducting independent study.Role of Regulatory Agencies FRA review and approval of SDP and EIS analysis (not speci�ied in TX/OK agreement).Corridor Ownership It is assumed at this early stage that BNSF and UPRR will maintain ownership of corridor for any planned projects. Lead Agencies/Groups State of Texas established as lead for study.Legal Authority • State of Texas: State Transportation Code §91.036 (authority to conduct rail planning studies); Texas Transportation Commission Minute Order Number 1125123 (authorized Texas to enter into agreements necessary to use FRA funds for corridor study). • State of Oklahoma: Title 66 OS §304 (authority to conduct rail planning studies); Title 69 OS §317 (authority to enter cooperative agreements with adjoining states).Cost Sharing Costs borne by states in reasonable proportion to the segment located in each state.Funding Sources • Texas DOT: FRA grant and Texas state funds, all public meetings and materials (in coordination with Oklahoma DOT for Oklahoma meetings). • Oklahoma DOT: in-kind services and data for portion of project in Oklahoma as outlined in attachment to agreement.Oversight FRA lead federal agency for NEPA.Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providers of Service Within the Texas/Oklahoma portion of the SCHSRC, a strong working relationship exists with the host railroad; the weak relationship in Arkansas is slowing planning progress.Liability Issues Agreement establishes each state as subject to the provisions of their respective Government Tort Claims Acts and liable for any issues arising as a result of their respective employees, agents, or contractors.Procurement State of Texas secured consultant, as per agreement. Contractual Arrangements Legal agreement serves as a contract between the two states for study, effective as long as the project is utilizing a transportation development tool for bene�it of the states; can only be terminated upon written mutual consent of both states. Table 12. How SCHSRC efforts address focus issues from the conceptual framework (visioning and planning phases).

56 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs 3.5.4 Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor Background The Southeast High Speed Rail (SEHSR) Corridor links Washington, D.C., to Richmond and Petersburg in Virginia and to Raleigh and Charlotte in North Carolina. The enhanced rail connection would provide maximum speeds of 110 mph as part of a plan to extend high-speed rail service on the NEC between Boston and Washington to points in the Southeast. As shown in Figure 10, extensions have since been added to the SEHSR Corridor, including a segment linking Richmond with Hampton Roads in Virginia. An additional extension is also envisioned from Charlotte to Atlanta, by way of Spartanburg and Greenville, South Carolina, with onward connections to Macon and Savannah, Georgia, and ending in Jacksonville, Florida. A third extension would continue from Raleigh to Columbia, South Carolina, and then on to Savannah and Jacksonville. The 500-mile segment from Washington, D.C., to Charlotte, North Carolina, is the most advanced, having been the subject of cooperative work between respective state agencies in Vir- ginia and North Carolina. Both states collaborated on a Tier 1 EIS for this section of the SEHSR Corridor. Further work on this section is being approached in segments. As shown in Figure 11, the two states together are completing a Tier 2 EIS on the bi-state segment from Richmond to Raleigh. Virginia is leading the work to advance the Washington, D.C., to Richmond and Richmond to Hampton Roads segments, and North Carolina is advancing work on the Raleigh to Charlotte segment. Although the responsibilities for developing portions of the Washington, Figure 10. East coast high-speed rail network.

Case Studies 57 D.C., to Charlotte corridor have been assigned according to the work that falls within a particular state, there are important operational aspects of the proposed service that apply to all of the seg- ments and that thus require close coordination for the implementation of the SEHSR Corridor within each state’s borders. The impetus for establishing a formal compact between the states came from key legislators and executive branch staff in Virginia and North Carolina who understood that having lawmakers from both states in leadership positions would enhance the ability of a compact to raise funds and show strong state-level legislative support in the event that federal funds were pursued. The bi-state Compact was authorized by Congress under Section 410 of Title 49, which grants consent for the two states to finance and develop the corridor project. The primary result of the legislation was the creation of the Virginia-North Carolina High-Speed Rail Compact Commission, which was “established as a regional instrumentality and a common agency of each signatory party” (North Carolina General Statutes). As stated directly in Chapter 136, Article 18, Section 221 of the State of North Carolina statutes, the Compact Commission is charged with carrying out the following four functions: 1. Study, develop, and promote a plan for the design, construction, financing, and operation of interstate high-speed rail service through and between points in the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of North Carolina, and adjacent states. 2. Coordinate efforts to establish high-speed rail service at the federal, state, and local govern- mental levels. 3. Advocate for federal funding to support the establishment of high-speed interstate rail service within and through Virginia and North Carolina and to receive federal funds made available for rail development. 4. Provide funding and resources to the Virginia-North Carolina High-Speed Rail Compact Commission from funds that are, or may become, available and are appropriated for that purpose. The Commission consists of 10 members and each of the two states has equal representation with five seats. The body is headed by a chair, which serves a 1-year term and is selected by a Figure 11. Richmond to Raleigh bi-state segment of the SEHSR network.

58 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs majority vote of the Commission. In order to promote equity between the states, the chair position is alternately held by each state. While the states are equally represented on the Commission, the manner in which each state appoints its members varies. In Virginia, three members from the House of Delegates are appointed to the Commission by the Speaker of the House of Delegates, and two members from the Senate are appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules. In North Carolina, two members from the Senate are appointed to the Commission by the General Assembly, with recommendation from the President Pro Tempore of the Senate; two members from the House of Representatives are appointed by the General Assembly, with recommendation from the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and the fifth seat is directly appointed by the governor. Although both states appoint two members from their Senate and two from their House of Representatives, the fifth Commission member from North Carolina is not legally required to hold a public office while the fifth member from Virginia must come from the House of Delegates. Aside from the difference in origins, the key difference between the two states’ representation models is the level of confirmation required to finalize an appointment. All Virginia seats simply require a nomination to be appointed, whereas four out of the five North Carolina seats are appointed but require confirmation from the General Assembly to be finalized. The Compact allows for the Commission to make use of primary staff from both the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) and the North Carolina DOT. To facilitate an information exchange between the states, the Commission is required to meet at least twice per year. In order to strengthen participation from both states and avoid geographic bias, the Commission must hold, at a minimum, one meeting in each state in any given year. As a means to inform those outside the Commission of its progress, the group is mandated to issue at least one report each year summarizing the body’s activities. Despite being required to convene on a semi-annual basis, the Commission was inactive from its establishment in 2004 until 2010. During that time, members were appointed, but the Compact Commission itself did not convene. The Compact Commission has held regular meetings since 2010, but to date these have been informational in nature, with staff from DRPT, the North Carolina DOT Rail Division, Amtrak, and other organizations making presentations on different aspects of the planning and construction work underway in the SEHSR Corridor. The Compact Commission has yet to make policy decisions on actual implementation activities. The SEHSR Corridor has been under consideration or study for 22 years. The visioning pro- cess intensified in 1994 when the DOTs from Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida entered into an MOU to fund a study of the market potential of high-speed rail in the region. The intent of the study was to inform future planning and investment decisions that might lead to the provision of high-speed rail service in the Southeast. This initial study was administered by the North Carolina DOT on behalf of all of its partners. South Carolina and Virginia agreed to provide $50,000 in funding each, while Georgia and North Carolina provided $60,000. Florida contributed services in kind. When the scope of the project was extended to include a connection to Hampton Roads at the request of Virginia, the MOU was modified to have Virginia provide an additional $45,000 to support the work that continued to be administered by the North Carolina DOT. The planning process for the SEHSR Corridor began in 1998 when DRPT, the North Carolina DOT Rail Division, FHWA, and FRA signed an MOU to develop environmental documentation for the SEHSR Corridor in Virginia and North Carolina. This MOU established cost-sharing parameters and guided the two states’ collaboration from 1999 through 2002. Delays in gaining environmental clearance for the bi-state segment of the SEHSR Corridor were caused in part by the ARRA high-speed rail program, which required that states compete for funding and caused both North Carolina and Virginia each to submit proposals for their

Case Studies 59 own state. This was further exacerbated by Section 209 of the PRIIA, which removed federal subsidies for intercity Amtrak services of fewer than 750 miles. This change meant that both North Carolina and Virginia needed to identify funding to pay for the operating costs and capital charges associated with existing Amtrak services in the two states; each state negotiated separate agreements with Amtrak. As they have advanced the SEHSR Corridor over the past decade, DRPT and the North Carolina DOT Rail Division have developed a close working relationship. This has occurred as they have worked together on the Tier 1 and Tier 2 EIS documents and as they have advanced improvements within their own geographic boundaries along the SEHSR Corridor as cooperating partners. Recognizing the need to coordinate, particularly on challenging issues such as cost sharing, senior staff members from DRPT and the North Carolina DOT Rail Division have held regular “summits.” Challenges and Barriers • Balancing the priorities of Virginia and North Carolina. Train service between Richmond and Washington, D.C., is at capacity currently and new slots can only be created by new investment in this section of the alignment. Virginia and Washington, D.C., are competing for these slots as access would expand Amtrak services to Washington, D.C., and points north for both of their states. However, neither state is well-positioned to fund the improvements. North Carolina is investing in the North Carolina portion of its service, and, from a state-oriented perspective, Virginia has seemingly little to gain from investing in a section of the alignment that builds capacity for trains from south of its border. • Coordinating with host railroads. CSX owns and operates the rail corridor between Washington, D.C., and Selma, North Carolina, and decides whether Virginia and North Carolina are granted new train slots. The granting of new train slots can only be expected to happen if the states help to fund capacity improvements on CSX’s tracks. In addition, CSX currently owns the abandoned S-line that Virginia and North Carolina plan to purchase together. Southwest of Selma, the railroad is owned by the North Carolina Railroad (NCRR); all of the stock of NCRR is owned by the state of North Carolina. Norfolk Southern operates on the line with the per- mission of the owner. • Significant financial risk. As a megaproject supporting 13 new train services, with a current cost in excess of $4.0 billion, the SEHSR Corridor represents a significant financial risk. Initial financial forecasts indicate that the project should generate adequate revenues to cover operating costs, with little excess revenue beyond that. However, there is a risk that these forecasts could be overly optimistic and that the project may not be able to recover its operating costs. Lessons Learned • Establish agreement principles early on and stick to them. It is also essential to envision what the end product will be. Doing so forced Virginia and North Carolina to agree on the outcome of their joint effort. Once that occurred, they were able to identify the many steps needed to arrive at the end vision. • Obtaining cooperation from the underlying infrastructure owners/railroads is essential, as they largely control the nature and extent of improvements on their infrastructure and the ultimate ability of the states to achieve their vision for passenger rail. • State compacts can be useful instruments in institutionalizing a shared vision and working relationships, but they must have “teeth” if they are to play a role in defining and requiring implementation of the vision. Correspondence to the Conceptual Framework Table 13 shows how the SEHSR Corridor efforts fit into the conceptual framework.

60 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Focus Issue SEHSR Corridor (Visioning and Planning Phases)Stakeholders Commonwealth of Virginia; State of North Carolina.Institutional Relationships Established through bi-state compact between Commonwealth of Virginia and State of North Carolina.Identi�ication of Responsibilities Virginia and North Carolina agree to study, develop, and promote a plan to design construct, �inance, and operate a high-speed rail service through points in Virginia and North Carolina; the partners will advocate for federal funding and coordinate efforts to establish high-speed passenger rail service in the SEHSR Corridor.Role of Regulatory Agencies FRA review and approval of SDP and EIS analysis.Political Foundation Key legislators and executive branch leadership in both Virginia and North Carolina enacted the bi-state High-Speed Rail Compact to show the high level of support in each state.Why? (Compelling Need) Development of SEHSR would connect major cities in the Southeast United States as well as link with the highly utilized NEC at Washington, D.C.Decision-Making Process The Virginia-North Carolina Interstate High-Speed Rail Compact Commission is composed of 10 members, 5 from each state, and uses a simple majority of votes to make decisions; for the EIS, North Carolina DOT makes all decisions in close coordination with Virginia DRPT.Corridor Ownership CSX Transportation owns the right-of-way north of Selma and in the “shared” portion of the NC-VA segment of the SEHSR Corridor.Lead Agencies/Groups Commonwealth of Virginia; State of North Carolina (North Carolina DOT is of�icial project sponsor for Tier II EIS).Legal Authority Authorized by U.S. Congress, interstate compacts.Cost Sharing Funding for the Tier II EIS was agreed upon in face-to-face meetings between DRPT and the North Carolina DOT Rail Division, with Virginia covering approximately 70% of the local match and North Carolina the remaining 30%.Funding Sources The Compact Commission is authorized to use for its operation and expenses funds appropriated by the legislatures of Virginia and North Carolina, or from federal sources.Interaction with Others The Compact Commission is to work with adjacent states such as South Carolina and Georgia to plan and develop high-speed passenger rail service.Oversight FRA lead federal agency for NEPA and SDP review.Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providersof Service Virginia and North Carolina negotiate separate service agreements with Amtrak.Procurement The North Carolina DOT Rail Division and Virginia DRPT are directing study and environmental efforts and have authority to procure professional services. Contractual Arrangements Legal agreement serves as contract between the two states for study, effective as long as project is utilizing transportation development tool for bene�it of the states. Table 13. How SEHSR Corridor efforts address focus issues from the conceptual framework (visioning and planning phases).

Case Studies 61 3.5.5 Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor Background The Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor was one of five originally proposed high-speed pas- senger rail corridors designated by the U.S. DOT in 1992. It was part of a corridor defined as linking Chicago with Detroit, St. Louis, and Milwaukee. The Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor extends from Union Station in downtown Chicago, approximately 300 miles east to a station terminal in Pontiac, Michigan. The area of analysis includes portions of Cook County in Illinois; Lake, Porter, and La Porte counties in Indiana; and Berrien, Van Buren, Cass, Kalamazoo, Calhoun, Jackson, Washtenaw, Wayne, and Oakland counties in Michigan. Amtrak currently operates the Wolverine passenger rail service along the Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor (see Figure 12). The Wolverine provides three daily round trips along the corridor and serves 16 stations. The Wolverine is the most highly utilized passenger rail route in Michigan. Nature of the Partnership The Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor is currently undergoing a Tier 1 EIS program that is evaluating the Amtrak Wolverine route as well as other possible route alternatives along current and former railroad alignments for the proposed high-speed rail service. Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois are the sponsors of the Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor project. The Michigan DOT is the lead state for this project, with the Indiana DOT and the Illinois DOT as major partners. The Michigan DOT will maintain a direct relationship with FRA throughout the project. Norfolk Southern participates as a member of the Project Advisory Committee. Additionally, the Michigan DOT has an agreement with Amtrak for passenger rail service along the corridor. Currently, there is no arrangement between the Illinois DOT and the Indiana DOT to participate in the Michigan DOT’s service agreement with Amtrak for passenger rail services along the corridor. Challenges and Barriers • Executing a long-term, phased, implementation strategy. It is anticipated that the multibillion dollar project may not be realized until 2035. Due to this lengthy duration, much coordination will be needed with state DOT partners as well as host railroads operating in the corridor. • Addressing freight rail capacity constraints between Chicago, Illinois, and Porter, Indiana, including the area known as “South of the Lake,” one of the busiest freight rail corridors in the nation. The Michigan DOT is currently leading the passenger rail corridor investment planning Figure 12. Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac passenger rail corridor.

62 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs work, but the congested South of the Lake segment is not in Michigan. Project partners must identify ways to address this challenge through a multi-state solution. Lessons Learned • FRA’s requirements for high-speed and intercity passenger rail planning provided a critical framework and an opportunity to conduct the needed multi-state planning efforts. • The time and effort needed for establishing agreements was greater than anticipated. For the Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor various issues relating to agreements, procurement, man- agement, professional services, and so forth, required review from multiple agencies, slowing progress of the project. The development of multi-state agreements should take into consid- eration each individual state’s procurement and planning processes and timelines. • Early coordination and frequent communication were important. The project lead, the Michigan DOT, had built strong working relationships with Amtrak and other stakeholders. This helped to identify common goals and “deal breakers” for all partners in the project, avoiding major conflicts later in the project. Correspondence to the Conceptual Framework Table 14 shows how the Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor fits into the conceptual framework. 3.6 Case Studies from Outside of the Intercity Passenger Rail Sector 3.6.1 The Appalachian Regional Commission and the Appalachian Development Highway System Background During the 1950s, the Appalachian region of the eastern United States was lagging behind the rest of the nation in terms of education, income, health, and transportation infrastructure. This gap was primarily due to the presence of the Appalachian Mountains, which isolated the region from adjacent areas and commerce. Beginning in 1960, a coalition of governors from 10 states came together to lobby for federal assistance to reduce the region’s isolation, while promoting economic development. In 1963, President Kennedy formed a federal-state committee called the President’s Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC) and tasked the group with formulating a comprehensive plan to strengthen the region’s economy. The Appalachian Regional Development Act (ARDA), passed by Congress in 1965, created the ARC and charged its board with developing a system of rural highways throughout Appalachia that would provide internal circulation and connect to the surrounding Interstate highways. While the Appalachian region was initially defined as consisting of 10 states, 3 states (Mississippi, New York, and Ohio) were added in subsequent updates to the ARDA. Figure 13 shows the current geographical definition of Appalachia, which encompasses 205,000 square miles and includes portions of 12 states, the entire state of West Virginia, and 420 counties. Nature of the Partnership The decision-making body of the ARC, often referred to as simply “the Board,” is composed of governors from each of the 13 states within the Appalachian region (Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Virginia), a federal co-chair who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and a states’ co-chair who is appointed by a majority vote of the governors. There

Case Studies 63 Focus Issue Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor (Visioning and Planning Phases)Stakeholders Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, FRA, host railroads.Institutional Relationships State DOTs of Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois signed MOU for planning work and procurement of consultant services.Identi�ication of Responsibilities Development of service alternatives, Tier I EIS, and SDP.Role of Regulatory Agencies MOU requires partnering with FRA and that parties are to cooperate to the maximum extent to ensure projects are developed in full compliance with federal and state requirements.Political Foundation 2009 Midwest Governors’ MOU was signed by the governors of each of the participating states as well as by the Mayor of the City of Chicago.Why? (Compelling Need) Provide improved intercity mobility by passenger rail that is competitive with auto and air travel between Chicago and Detroit.Corridor Ownership Portions of the corridor are owned by Canadian National, Norfolk Southern, CSX,and Amtrak.Lead Agencies/Groups Michigan DOT is leading the project, maintains direct relationship with FRA for project coordination.Cost Sharing Michigan DOT committed $400,000, Indiana DOT committed $200,000, and Illinois DOT committed $200,000 in local matching funds to match the $3.2 million FRA grant for the Passenger Rail Corridor Investment Plan.Funding Sources The MOU supports participants in making applications for funding from the ARRA of 2009, which made $8 billion available for the purpose of funding the Passenger Rail Investment Act of 2008.Oversight U.S. DOT and FRA.Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providersof Service Norfolk Southern Railroad participates as a member of the Project Advisory Committee.Contractual Arrangements Michigan DOT has contractual arrangement with consultants to conduct planning and environmental analysis. Table 14. How Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor efforts address focus issues from the conceptual framework (visioning and planning phases). are only 2 votes in play: the federal co-chair has 1, and the 13 governors share the other vote, which is cast by the states’ co-chair. Thus, for all resolutions considered by the ARC Board, except for project approval, the federal government representative and a majority of the governors must approve. In order to provide a degree of objectivity to this working arrangement, the Executive Director and the 48 staff members are not federal or state employees. The Executive Director is appointed by the ARC and serves as the chief executive, financial, and administrative officer for the ARC program. The ARC staff report to the Executive Director and are tasked with providing impartial technical and analytical support in the areas of finance, program management, administration, planning, research, and legal issues. Ultimately, it is the ARC staff members who are responsible for working with state agencies and local development districts (LDDs) to help implement the

64 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs programs and policies adopted by the ARC Board. The federal and state government partners split equally the administrative costs of the program support provided by the Executive Director and staff of the ARC. Given that the interests and priorities of the federal government, the ARC, the constituents, businesses within the partner states, and the individual Board members rarely converge and are often disjointed, consensus is reached with compromise. As an organization, ARC has very broad priorities relative to any of the individual proposals that it considers. Much of the com- promise that occurs within the ARC is related to individual projects, not long-term visioning and policymaking. The compromise is usually between an individual governor and the federal co-chair who, as mentioned above, holds the authority to accept or reject a project’s application for funding. Challenges and Barriers • The lack of prioritization for corridors has led to the development of a fragmented network, with all of the less complex and expensive segments being completed prior to the build out of the most expensive segments (e.g., bridge crossings, tunnels, etc.), which, from both an engineering and financial perspective, carry a greater share of the network’s overall risk. Thus, while the network is 88 percent complete, there are still critical bottlenecks that tend to occur at either state lines or intercorridor crossings. • MAP-21 restructured the process for funding ARC projects, shifting the funding program from a direct earmark for Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) projects to a Figure 13. The Appalachian region as currently defined by ARC.

Case Studies 65 competitive opportunity pooled with other funding under the FHWA’s Surface Transportation Program (STP). Despite the fact that ADHS projects no longer require a local funding match, projects must now compete with all other state roadway and transit projects for limited STP funding. • Difficulty demonstrating a return on investment at the state level given the regional nature of ADHS corridors (e.g., benefits are distributed throughout Appalachia, not concentrated in a single area) and the fact that the remaining segments are the most expensive, any given ADHS project is likely to have a low return on investment relative to an internal project with the same cost. For ARC highway projects, each specific state in which a project is being constructed leads the project, and advocates anticipate challenges convincing state DOT officials that they should move money away from high-priority projects (i.e., bridge replacements, interstate crossings, etc.) that have been in planning for decades. • A wide variety of potential environmental impacts continue to be a risk to completion of the ADHS as there are many federal regulations (i.e., Endangered Species Act, Section 4(f), etc.) and regulatory bodies that are more likely to apply, or become involved with, the implementation of ADHS projects. Further, public opposition surrounding these projects has been frequent, intense, and effective at delaying project delivery. Lessons Learned • Because the network is highly interdependent, decisions made regarding one corridor can fundamentally affect the potential universe of actions that could be taken relative to unbuilt corridors, as well as current and future operations within existing corridors. When a remaining segment is delayed and the state DOTs resort to ad hoc decision-making, the result may not be in the best interest of the overall network. The ARC Board has the power only to approve or deny the realignment of a corridor or use of new termini; there is no overarching body that has responsibility for coordinating operations along corridors that are impacted by a decision. Such uncoordinated decisions often create a suboptimal operating environment and can potentially undermine the purpose, need, and viability of the existing and planned corridors. • Funding granted in perpetuity can be inefficient. Prior to MAP-21, funding for ADHS proj- ects was provided through congressional earmarks. Although this mechanism contributed to extensive development of the ADHS network by limiting the use of the funds to one purpose, funding for the unbuilt segments of the network is not being used as efficiently as it could be. The granting of ADHS funds in perpetuity can result in large sums of money earmarked for a particular corridor going unused for decades instead of being put to immediate use in corridors that are ready to advance. • The voting rules and board structure provide a system of checks and balances. The federal- state-local partnership model of ARC and its Board structure are effective at providing a network of oversight that serves to ensure the program and its funding pool are not abused. • Independent researchers provide unbiased data supporting decision-making. One of the more unique features of the ARC’s organizational structure is the presence of support staff and researchers who are neither federal nor state employees. These employees report directly to the Executive Director and are charged with producing quantitative measures and analyses that are used by the ARC Board and the co-chairs to assess the benefits and consequences of ARC’s programs and proposals. That the employees are not directly governed by a party that has a particular leaning (e.g., one that is sympathetic to federal versus state interests), supports unbiased estimates of a program’s value. Correspondence to the Conceptual Framework Table 15 shows how the ARC fits into the conceptual framework.

66 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Focus Issue ARC(Planning and Design and Construction Phases)Stakeholders 13 states of the Appalachian region (Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Virginia), federal government, local municipalities and counties, metropolitan planning organizations.Institutional Relationships Established through an act of the U.S. Congress.Identi�ication of Responsibilities ARC and Board of Commissioners responsible for authorizing federal funds to develop a system of rural highways through Appalachia and other infrastructure and economic development projects throughout the Appalachian region.Role of Regulatory Agencies U.S. Of�ice of Inspector General provides oversight to ARC; FHWA provides oversight of ADHS during and after implementation.Political Foundation Political support for ARC began under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson along with governors of the member states of the Appalachian region and the U.S. Congress.Why? (Compelling Need) Appalachian region had lagged behind the rest of the United States in terms of education, income, health, and transportation infrastructure. ARC’s primary purpose was to provide a collaborative forum in which federal, state, and local government entities could work together to address the problems affecting the Appalachian region, including construction of the ADHS.Decision-Making Process ARC’s Board of Commissioners is decision-making body, composed of governors from each of the 13 member states, a federal co-chair appointed by the President and con�irmed by the Senate, and a states’ co-chair appointed by a majority vote of the member governors. There are only two votes in Board decisions: federal co-chair has one vote and the 13 governors share the other vote, which is cast by the state co-chair.Lead Agencies/Groups ARC Board.Legal Authority United States Code Title 40 Subtitle IV – ARDA, 1965.Cost Sharing Depending on location and economic viability of speci�ic area, differing levels of local match funding can be required for the expenditure of federal funds for ADHS projects.Funding Sources U.S. Congress appropriates funding for all ARC administrative costs and projects; local matching funds vary across projects.Interaction with Others ARC Board interacts with 73 LDDs (some are also the metropolitan planning organization), 420 counties, federal government agencies, and other agencies as needed.Oversight Oversight provided by U.S. Of�ice of Inspector General.Procurement Authorized to enter contracts for services, leases, property, construction, etc. Contractual Arrangements Federal legislation is governing arrangement. Table 15. How ARC efforts address focus issues from the conceptual framework (planning and design and construction phases).

Case Studies 67 3.6.2 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Background WMATA, also known as Metro, provides rail (Metrorail), bus (Metrobus), and paratransit (MetroAccess) services to a 1,500-square mile area that includes the District of Columbia and surrounding jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia. Creation of WMATA dates back to the early 1950s and 1960s when Congress mandated preparation of plans for the movement of people and goods in the District of Columbia region. Nature of the Partnership The breadth and depth of coordination and consensus building at the federal, state, and local levels to come to common ground on the multi-institution arrangement has yielded a highly complex governance structure for WMATA. The WMATA Compact is the defining document that details the roles, responsibilities, and powers of WMATA in conducting its mission of providing effective mass transportation to the Washington metropolitan area. Challenges and Barriers Funding is by far the greatest challenge facing the WMATA system. An estimated additional support of $25 million from each signatory jurisdiction has been provided as of 2015 as “seed money” while negotiations continue over the funding that is needed to implement WMATA’s strategic plan (called “Momentum”) and to sustain the system over the long term—an amount is estimated to be in the billions. Lessons Learned • Having a clear mission and vision at the outset aided representatives from all WMATA justifications to find common ground in agreeing to the multi-state WMATA Compact. WMATA’s mission was clearly stated in the Compact. Finding common political ground among the various participating agencies of WMATA and recognizing the strength of regional coordination, as opposed to acting individually, played a key role in building consensus early on. • WMATA has developed indicators to regularly assess performance to see if it meets Board- established service criteria. Establishing clear goals that are linked to specific performance measures helps in achievement of those goals and allows the WMATA partnership to continue moving forward as a region in its provision of quality transit services. • Creating a congressionally supported multi-institutional compact is challenging but lasting. The federal-state-local partnership took over a decade to build consensus and create an agree- ment and legislation that all parties could sign. The WMATA Compact has proven durable over time. • Early establishment of shared funding allocations can instill accountability and help to ensure a continued commitment by all parties to build and operate a regional system over the long haul. Consideration for how the multi-agency partnership will manage situations where one partner may have financial trouble is important, along with ensuring that resources are allocated appropriately to areas of most need when services may not be laid out the same way as costs. Correspondence to the Conceptual Framework Table 16 shows how WMATA fits into the conceptual framework.

68 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Focus Issue WMATA Collaboration (Visioning, Planning, and Operations and Maintenance Phases)Stakeholders Federal government; Commonwealth of Virginia; Northern Virginia Transportation Commission; State of Maryland; District of Columbia; Washington Suburban Transit Commission; Cities of Alexandria, Falls Church, and Fairfax and Counties of Arlington, Fairfax, and Loudon in Virginia; and Counties of Montgomery and Prince George’s in Maryland.Institutional Relationships Established through WMATA Compact, agreed to by signatories 1965–1966.Identi�ication of Responsibilities WMATA and Board of Directors empowered to establish a regional transit authority to plan, develop, �inance, and operate a balanced regional system of transportation; other responsibilities cited in the Compact are to develop a regional mass transit plan, create sound �inancial policies to operate the system,and to develop and operate a transit police force, among many others.Role of Regulatory Agencies WMATA overseen by Board of Directors; representatives from the federal government report to the Government Services Administration; for �inancial oversight, WMATA Compact requires an annual audit by an independent third party; �inancial transactions of the Board are reviewed by U.S. Government Accountability Of�ice.Political Foundation National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 & 1965.WMATA Compact agreed to by U.S. Congress: Public Law 86-794, 74 Stat. 1031), by Maryland (Ch. 869, Acts of General Assembly 1965), by Virginia (Ch. 2, 1966 Acts of Assembly).Why? (Compelling Need) The National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 and 1965 declared that a coordinated system of rail rapid transit, bus transportation service, and highways is essential in the National Capital Region for the satisfactory movement of people and goods, the alleviation of traf�ic congestion, economic vitality, and the effective performance of the functions of the U.S. Government.Decision-Making Process Various decision-making procedures are speci�ied throughout the WMATA Compact; general actions of the Board are to be made only when a quorum is present and expressed by motion and resolution; other decision-making processes are detailed for issues such as adoption of a Mass Transit Plan, adjustments to service or fares, procurement of property or services, etc.Corridor Ownership Article XVI, Section 74 details WMATA’s authorization related to rights-of-way; According to the Compact, the Board is authorized to locate, construct, and maintain any of its transit and related facilities in, upon, over, or across anystreets, highways, freeways, bridges, and any other vehicular facilities.Lead Agencies/Groups WMATA Board of Directors.Legal Authority National Capital Transportation Act of 1960 & 1965.WMATA Compact agreed to by U.S. Congress: Public Law 86-794, 74 Stat. 1031), by Maryland (Ch. 869, Acts of General Assembly 1965), by Virginia (Ch. 2, 1966 Acts of Assembly).Cost Sharing Article VII enumerates �inancing policies for WMATA, and Section 18 details cost sharing of each of the signatory jurisdictions; the general policy states that “the payment of all costs shall be borne by the persons using or bene�itting from the Authority’s facilities and services and any remaining costs shall be equally shared among the federal, District of Columbia and participating local governments in the Zone.”Funding Sources Funding sources are fares as well as �inancial participation from governments in the Transit Zone in Virginia, Maryland, and District of Columbia, and the federal government. Table 16. How the WMATA collaboration addresses focus issues from the conceptual framework (visioning, planning, and operations and maintenance phases).

Case Studies 69 Focus Issue WMATA Collaboration (Visioning, Planning, and Operations and Maintenance Phases) Oversight Board of Directors provides oversight of WMATA; �inancial oversight provided by annual independent audit. Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providers of Service Compact allows WMATA to contract with third-party private provider to operate transit services within the Transit Zone.Marketing and Customer Service WMATA manages marketing and customer service. Advertising sales managed by third party.Revenue Sharing The Board shall set rates and fares where resulting revenue will pay the operating expenses and provide for repairs, maintenance, and depreciation of the transit system owned or controlled by the Authority.Branding WMATA responsible for management of “Metro” brand and use for various modes, i.e., Metrobus, Metrorail, etc.Liability Issues The Board may self-insure, or purchase insurance against loss or damage to any of its properties, against liability for injury to persons or property, and against loss of revenue from any cause whatsoever.Procurement Procurement procedures are laid out in Article XVI, Section 73; generally all procurement of property, services, or construction must come through opencompetition; this section details the procurement process and does provide for exceptions to the open procurement procedures.Contractual Arrangements Legal agreement serves as contract between all signatories of the WMATA Transit Zone. Operating Standards Operating and service standards are the sole purview of the Board of Directors according to Article XIII, Section 61. Table 16. (Continued). 3.7 Key Findings This section presents the key findings of the case studies by focus issue from the conceptual framework. 3.7.1 Stakeholders and Lead Agencies/Group The stakeholders involved in the U.S. passenger rail cases studied generally included state DOTs, passenger and commuter rail operators, and freight railroads. The roles of federal agencies and elected officials varied. The NEC was the only corridor that presented active involvement of groups that would be classified as coalitions. The two non-passenger rail cases involve more complex stakeholder arrangements. In the case of the ARC, the Board interacts with 73 LDDs, 420 counties, 13 states, and the federal government. WMATA has similar complexities as it must work with agencies in Virginia, Maryland, the District of Columbia, municipalities, counties, and the federal government. State DOTs generally held lead roles in the U.S. passenger rail cases. Typically, two or more states formed partnerships related to a common passenger rail project. In these partnerships, one of the DOTs would be assigned the responsibility of leading the overall project, applying for and managing federal grant funds, procuring consultant services, and coordinating the partnering agencies. Rarely were states equal partners in the partnership. Multi-state planning and proposed

70 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs implementation of rail corridor improvements have tended to follow a pattern wherein the state benefitting most from the project takes the lead. This has proven to be an effective partnering method across the Midwest: several corridor-level projects are proceeding under this type of arrangement including the Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor. In the SCHSRC, the Texas DOT took the lead in its partnership with the Oklahoma DOT to conduct the TOPRS because a majority of the future alignment would be in Texas. The PNWRC case study presents an exception as the Washington DOT and the Oregon DOT share equal responsibility for advancing passenger rail efforts. The example of high-speed rail service in Europe also shows how the participation of key agencies and stakeholders can evolve. Participants in the development and operation of the Brussels-Paris-London HSR Service have evolved dramatically since the three state-owned rail- roads (British Rail, SNCF, and SNCB) began planning in the 1980s. British Rail has been privatized and no longer exists. Pursuant to EU regulations (primarily EU Directive 91/440), both SNCF and SNCB have been reorganized into separate companies—one manages the infrastructure and provides track access, and the other operates trains. 3.7.2 Institutional Relationships and Contractual Arrangements As shown in Table 17, nearly all of the case studies had a formal mechanism in place to define the institutional relationship among the state partners, including MOUs, agreements in prin- ciple, interstate compacts, and operating agreements. The specific mechanism generally defined the roles and responsibilities of partnering agencies, cost sharing, and liability and outlined the purpose of the project at a high level. The joint work plan was a unique mechanism employed by the Washington State DOT and the Oregon DOT for the Cascades Rail Corridor. The document outlines a 5-year framework for the states to jointly manage activities in the corridor and includes a distinct vision, goals, objectives, roles, and responsibilities. The joint work plan was preceded by an MOU that defined how the two DOTs would work together to develop the landmark document. Voluntary partnerships were found only in the visioning and planning phases of the case studies, including NEC coalitions (CONEG and I-95 Coalition), Amtrak NEC Master Plan Working Group, NEC FUTURE, and the MWRRI Steering Committee. The NNEPRA/Downeaster case study was an exception, but it should be noted that NNEPRA was a newly created authority with a stated charge to manage operations and maintenance of a multi-state passenger rail service on behalf of other states. As passenger rail projects examined in the case studies progressed from the visioning, planning, and design and construction phases into the operating and maintenance phase, arrangements between partnering agencies and stakeholders included greater levels of detail and specificity. In the NEC, the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders (State of Connecticut, MTA, NJ TRANSIT, SEPTA, and Delaware Transit Corporation [DTC]) are highly detailed. The docu- ments define exactly what function each will perform individually (where overlapping areas of responsibility exist) and outline cost-sharing formulas or guidelines. In the case of WMATA, it took more than a decade for the congressionally supported federal-state-local partnership to build consensus and create an agreement and legislation that could be signed by the federal government, District of Columbia, State of Maryland, and Commonwealth of Virginia. However, this extensive and time-consuming effort has resulted in a compact that has proven durable and tough to break or even amend. Interestingly, while nearly all of the corridors had formal agreements to govern passenger rail activities across state lines, many corridors lacked a centralized, coordinating body. This circumstance is cited as one of the key reasons that progress in the SCHSRC has lagged behind other regions. In the NEC, the need for this type of coordinating body was the impetus for the

Case Studies 71 creation of the NEC Commission. Interviewees agreed that the NEC Commission has an appro- priate mandate and provides an important forum and structure for facilitating decision-making and should be enabled to continue into the future. Having an entity with a professional staff that can speak with objectivity on multi-state projects is critical, as is making service goals known and applicable to the entire length of the NEC. In the Midwest, the MIPRC and the MWRRI Steering Committee have worked closely over the years to advance passenger rail in the region and fill critical functions. Nonetheless, participants have identified a need for a single body with the ability to coordinate and fund regional, ongoing, long-term technical planning as well as to provide the political and educational functions neces- sary for future regional passenger rail implementation. Further, a number of issues loom on the horizon that may best be helped by a new or expanded governance entity; these issues include oversight and coordination of the Midwest’s Next Generation equipment, better uniformity of Section 209 pricing, and priorities and cost sharing for major infrastructure improvements. As previously noted, the legal mechanisms employed by the entities discussed in the case studies varied widely. Some entities relied on simple MOAs or MOUs, while others used detailed, multi- state contractual and operating agreements to establish various roles and responsibilities. Service operating agreements, required since 2008 by PRIIA, will bring a level of consistency to projects Case Study Mechanism(s) to Deine Institutional Relationship(s) Midwest Passenger Rail • Voluntary, No Agreement (MWRRI Steering Committee) • MOU (Governor’s Steering Group) • Interstate Compact (Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission) Northeast Corridor • Federal Legislation (NEC Commission) • Voluntary, No Agreement (CONEG, I-95 Coalition, Amtrak Master Plan Working Group, NEC FUTURE) • Various Operating Agreements Northern New England Passenger Rail Authority and Amtrak Downeaster Service • No Formal Interstate Agreement • Access and Operating Agreements (NNEPRA, Amtrak, host railroads) Paciic Northwest High-Speed Rail Corridor • MOU • Workplan South Central High-Speed Rail Corridor Legal Agreement Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor (VA-NC Segment) Bi-State Compact Chicago/Detroit-Pontiac Corridor MOU (Governor’s Steering Group) The ARC and the Appalachian Development Highway System Federal Legislation Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority Interstate Compact Brussels-Paris-London* Eurostar (for-pro
it corporation emerging from a tri- country partnership) *While no Brussels-Paris-London case study is included in this report, the research team includes this as an international example. Table 17. Institutional mechanisms used in intercity passenger rail case studies and an international example.

72 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs that receive high-speed rail funds. For a comprehensive summary of legal issues related to intercity rail service, see NCRRP Legal Research Digest 2: Railroad Legal Issues and Resources (Thomas, 2015). 3.7.3 Corridor Ownership In general, the corridors reviewed were owned primarily by freight railroads. The NEC was an exception in that NEC mainline tracks are owned by Amtrak, with portions also owned by the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut and the New York MTA. The unique ownership arrangement on the NEC eliminates much of the challenge related to balancing freight and pas- senger rail needs. However, the competition for scarce capacity on the NEC complicates efforts to reliably dispatch and operate intercity and commuter trains, particularly as Amtrak must navigate the 457-mile NEC through eight separate commuter operations. Because of the substantial capital costs and greater potential environmental impacts associated with establishing new rail rights-of- way, in all of the case studies use of the existing corridors was assumed rather than anticipating the establishment of new rights-of-way. 3.7.4 Role of Regulatory Agencies and Oversight In most of the cases studied, particularly in the planning and environmental stages, the role of federal regulatory agencies was limited to environmental reviews and grant administration. The federal role expands to safety regulation enforcement as projects move toward operations and maintenance. Recently, FRA’s requirement for SDPs and SOAs has expanded its purview to operations planning and service development. The federal roles that include the most direct over- sight occur in cases where federal legislation has established specific entities, such as WMATA, ARC, and the NEC Commission. A few of the corridors studied have formal governing boards, including the NEC Commission, ARC, and WMATA. If there was no governing board, state DOT leadership generally provided over- sight. Formal oversight roles at the state level are outlined for the MIPRC (each state has oversight authority for funds allocated to the Commission), and the Cascades Rail Corridor Management Workplan (the role is filled by a Washington DOT/Oregon DOT staff leadership team consist- ing of managers from the Oregon DOT’s Rail Division and Washington DOT’s Rail Office). For NNEPRA, oversight is provided by Maine’s Legislative Council and the Maine Commissioner of Transportation. One interviewee cited increased efficiency and effectiveness of the agency as an ancillary benefit of the involvement of the Maine Commissioner of Transportation because the state DOT has advocated for the corridor at the state level during critical periods of project development. Although this report includes no case study of high-speed rail service in Europe, the Brussels- Paris-London service provides an international example of the role of regulatory agencies and oversight. Several entities provide oversight of the Brussels-Paris-London service both for infrastructure and operations across the three countries, and the EU provides some level of regulatory influence through policy directives. 3.7.5 Liability Issues The challenge of determining how to allocate risk and liability among partners was raised in three case studies and is a significant issue in every effort to operate passenger rail operations over infrastructure owned by other entities. In the NEC, a complicated and intricate allocation of risk between owners and operators is often based on the provisions within historic agreements. Liability and indemnity obligations are two of the most contentious issues among parties operat- ing jointly on rail lines. In the Midwest, mitigating, limiting, or eliminating risk is a goal for all parties that regularly must be addressed as corridor projects advance. And, as noted previously,

Case Studies 73 distribution of liability between Amtrak/NNEPRA and Pan Am Railways in the Boston-Portland corridor was a major sticking point in negotiations for reinstating Downeaster service and had to be mitigated with STB involvement. At the planning and visioning phases of project development in the cases studied, agreements containing liability clauses generally made states liable for work and any incidents occurring within their respective boundaries. For example, in the bi-state MOU between Texas and Oklahoma in the SCHRSC, Article 20 deals with the limitation of liability as follows: “The States mutually agree that each is and may be held severally liable for any and all claims, demands and suits in law or equity of any nature whatsoever, paying damages or otherwise arising from any negligent performance of this Agreement” (“severally” means that the parties are only responsible for their share of the obligation). Similar general language was found in the 2009 Governor’s MOU in the Midwest under which participants agreed to be responsible for all work taking place within their respective state boundaries, including management of risk and liability for any pas- senger rail projects. An exception to this was the liability clause in the Midwest AIP, which allows for liability issues with the project to be mutually handled by Iowa DOT and Illinois DOT. No specific incidents under which liability clauses had to be invoked were raised by interviewees. As would be expected, the liability clauses in the operation and maintenance agreements were the most detailed and incorporated indemnity clauses for specific entities. For example, in the SEPTA and the DTC agreement, DTC agrees to indemnify, defend, and save harmless SEPTA from and against any liability, loss, or expense for any loss or damage to SEPTA’s property, arising out of or related to the provision of services by SEPTA as part of the agreement, and SEPTA was extended the sovereign immunity of the state of Delaware and DTC. 3.7.6 Cost Sharing and Funding Sources Most cost-sharing arrangements seen across the case studies were based on states contributing funding in proportion to the segment located within their state, as was seen in the Metro-North operating agreement with the Connecticut DOT and the working assumption for dividing future capital costs in the SCHSRC between Texas and Oklahoma. Similarly, in the Midwest, the MWRRI specified that at the corridor level states would generally be responsible for infrastructure within their respective states, with the exception of the Chicago Hub, where improvements would be a system responsibility. Addressing funding-related challenges was found to be a linchpin of the coordination efforts across the case studies: the 2009 Governor’s MOU in the Midwest was instituted to secure ARRA funding, a central charge of the NEC Commission is to address cost allocation across the NEC, and the impetus of the Washington State DOT’s and the Oregon DOT’s recent efforts to coor- dinate corridor management was PRIIA Section 209 changes in how state-supported services are funded. As noted previously, the rule of thumb for corridor projects in the Midwest is that states would generally be responsible for infrastructure within their respective states, with the exception of the Chicago Hub, where improvements would be a system responsibility. In situations where one state would benefit more than others on the corridor from an infrastructure improve- ment, determining the cost- and revenue-sharing formula was more complex. One interviewee cited the difficulty of coming to an agreement on how to approach these situations as an impediment to reaching consensus on a more formal governance structure to succeed the MWRRI effort. Multiple case studies cited the need for a dedicated funding source at the state and, potentially, regional level for capital and operating investments. Similarly, for cases such as the SEHSR Corridor, which are still in the planning stage, it is a significant challenge to demonstrate return on investment and that the system would be self-sustaining. Responding to new cost-allocation guidelines under PRIIA Section 209 was also cited as a challenge in the case studies.

74 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs For corridors reliant on state appropriations for funding, several related issues were raised. First, it can be challenging to reconcile the differing approaches to funding projects among state partners. In the SCHSRC, for example, Texas appropriates funding for passenger rail on a biannual basis whereas the Oklahoma legislature established payments for operation of Amtrak service for several years into the future. Planning for future expansion of service or coordinated investments in capital improvements becomes especially challenging. Closely related is timing of appropriations, as noted in the PNWRC case study, where timing of budget preparations is not currently aligned among the states, Amtrak, and the federal government. Relying on discretionary federal funding for capital improvements is also challenging. In NNEPRA’s case, for instance, periods of activity are often followed by substantial bouts of inactivity during which the agency is planning future improvements and simply waiting for the next grant cycle. Interestingly, perhaps the two most successful multi-state efforts reviewed, ARC and WMATA, both benefit from dedicated annual federal appropriations, although ARC’s funding was modified under MAP-21. State contributions were generally from a variety of sources, such as general revenues, established state transportation or rail funds, vehicle regional fees, and gas tax proceeds. For an in-depth analy- sis of issues related to funding passenger and freight rail projects, see NCRRP Report 1: Alternative Funding and Financing Mechanisms for Passenger and Freight Rail Projects (CPCS et al., 2015). 3.7.7 Decision-Making Process Many of the case studies did not outline a specific decision-making process. One common strategy, particularly for projects in the earlier stages of project development, was the designation of an agency to serve as project lead or administrator for a specific effort. The lead would then consult other states as needed in decision-making without being governed by specific procedures. This strategy was seen in the Midwest corridor-level agreements and the SCHSRC. An important function of the NEC Commission is to bring needed attention and analysis to the development and monitoring of capital programs and create a process for determining what is fair at the local/ regional level and corridor wide. The Cascades Rail Corridor Management Workplan calls for constant communications and includes dispute-resolution procedures and highly structured meetings and correspondence guidelines to address any negotiations, operations, or service-related issues. When issues have arisen, these communication platforms and procedures have played a key role in developing a joint resolution. Cases that featured formal commissions or governing boards had documented meeting schedules and voting guidelines. Voting rules generally asserted that voting members each had one vote, with a simple majority required for decisions. The ARC case study showed a variation on this setup; the ARC’s Board of Commissioners is composed of governors from each of the 13 states of the Appalachian region, a federal co-chair who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and a states’ co-chair who is appointed by a majority vote of the governors. The federal co-chair has one vote and the 13 Appalachian member states share one vote that is cast via the appointed state co-chair. ARC interviewees noted that this structure is effective at providing a network of oversight that ensures that the program and its funding pool are not abused. The federal government, through the federal co-chair, has the ultimate power of project approval. The federal co-chair can also deny the adoption of specific state documents that identify a state’s needs, goals, and objectives for its ARC program if the federal co-chair does not believe the proposed plan or project addresses the goals and objectives of the ARC strategic plan. This serves as a federal check on state and local activities at both the planning and implementation level.

Case Studies 75 For operations and maintenance, the operating agreements in the NEC case study did not outline formal procedures for decision-making, but they did note that decision-making is held jointly among the agreement parties depending on the topic. 3.7.8 Political Foundation What was clear from the case studies is that building and maintaining political support, regard- less of the political party in office, is central to successful project development. The absence of a political champion for the SCHSRC, for example, has contributed to the relatively weak progression of the corridor because there is no entity to offer direction for the project, promote it, and lobby for it at the state, federal, or local level. A recurring theme across the case studies was the risk inherent in changing political admin- istrations at the state level. For such large-scale and long-term infrastructure projects it can be a challenge to maintain momentum and remain a priority with state elected leadership. As long- term passenger rail projects advance, shorter term political changes can shift priorities away from passenger rail development and can lead to cancellation of projects or indefinite delays. In the Midwest for example, following completion of the MWRRS, new political administrations and shifting political priorities made moving projects forward in accordance with the stated vision more difficult, especially forming and maintaining long-term multi-state agreements. As seen in Wisconsin in the period 2010–2011, several agreements that had committed the state to planning projects were rescinded and ARRA grant funds returned as a new governor took office. Similar circumstances occurred in Ohio and, to some degree, in Iowa, where new governors’ legislative priorities did not include advancement of passenger rail services. One interviewee for the ARC case noted that advocating for ADHS projects at the state level has been challenging given that an ADHS project is likely to have a low return on investment relative to an internal project with the same cost due to the benefits being distributed throughout Appalachia. Several project leaders contacted for this study expressed the need to be flexible and expect change as projects evolve. Shifting political priorities can also place passenger rail services that rely on state appropriations for operating expenses in a rather precarious position. For example, NNEPRA’s executive director, as lead advocate for the Downeaster service, spends a substantial amount of time educating newly elected policymakers on the service and the value NNEPRA provides to the state and its citizens. NNEPRA’s executive director must also constantly remind these decision-makers of the com- mitments that the organization has already made to its passengers. 3.7.9 Compelling Need In nearly all the cases studied, an articulated need drove the use of a particular institutional model. For the AIP between the Iowa DOT and the Illinois DOT, for example, the need was to establish a rail service that conferred the following benefits: mobility options, fuel savings, cleaner air, and economic development. In some cases studied, challenges in securing funding were explicitly tied to difficulties garnering support for passenger rail efforts. The case studies also revealed that articulating a need is a critical element for progression of intercity passenger rail efforts across state lines. In the case of the SCHSRC, for example, project participants have not been successful at articulating a compelling enough need to balance the perceived high capital costs of passenger rail investments. This situation has led many elected officials and potential key supporters to deem and ultimately dismiss the high-speed rail corridor as unrealistic and, as discussed in the preceding section, has left the project without a critical champion.

76 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs 3.7.10 Relationship with Host Railroad or Other Providers of Service All U.S. passenger rail efforts other than those on the NEC are currently utilizing, or anticipate primarily operating on, rights-of-way owned by private railroads. Thus, private railroads have a very important role in ensuring passenger rail project success, and, further, private railroads have an important role to play in the institutional model created to develop and implement projects. Failing to successfully negotiate with host railroads can severely impede project progress. In the SEHSR Corridor and Pacific Northwest Corridor case studies, for example, interviewees reported success in obtaining railroad support by demonstrating the benefit to the railroad of supporting the passenger rail effort (e.g., public support in upgrading track). For the Downeaster service, provid- ing the Pan Am Railway with free access to the capital needed to improve its infrastructure helped NNEPRA finally establish the trust necessary to initiate a cooperative working arrangement. Pan Am Railway realized that the imposition of passenger service within its corridor could be good for business. However, subsequent disputes between NNEPRA/Amtrak and one of the three host railroads resulted in several years of delay in the implementation of passenger service from Boston to Portland. In the Midwest case study, multiple interviewees noted that engaging the railroads to determine their goals and to identify deal breakers early in the planning stages was very useful for estab- lishing trust and a foundation for strong communication. Well-established relationships in Texas and Oklahoma have enabled progress in project visioning and planning in the SCHSRC study. This is in direct contrast to Arkansas, where the lack of a strong working relationship with the host railroad has impeded progress in planning and analysis. Similarly, strong work- ing relationships with regional FRA staff and Amtrak were seen as critical to the success of projects. Rail network capacity constraints were cited as a barrier in the Northeast and Midwest. Capacity constraints in many segments of the NEC limit the ability to expand rail services or to provide for equitable balance among the various passenger services (each with a distinct operating profile, institutional model, and requirements), as well as between passenger and freight movements in general. Various overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities often exacerbate capacity constraints. For example, the rail corridor between Chicago, Illinois, and Porter, Indiana, including the area known as the South of the Lake, is one of the busiest freight rail corridors in the United States. The Michigan DOT is currently leading the passenger rail corridor investment planning work, yet this congested segment is outside of the state. Project partners must identify strategies to address this bottleneck in rail operations through a multi-state effort. In the Southeast, both North Carolina and Virginia want more train slots in the segment of the corridor between Richmond, Virginia, and Washington D.C., but CSX owns the right-of-way and is linking the granting of new slots to the states investing in capacity improvement. In addition, CSX currently owns the abandoned S-line that Virginia and North Carolina plan to purchase together. While this segment lies within Virginia, the Commonwealth itself has relatively little to gain from investing in this section of the alignment, if viewed from a state-oriented perspective. North Carolina is currently focusing its limited funding on investments in high-speed improve- ments between Charlotte and Raleigh. 3.7.11 Impact of PRIIA Section 209 PRIIA required states and Amtrak to “develop and implement a single, nationwide standardized methodology for establishing and allocating the operating and capital costs among the States and Amtrak” related to trains that operate on corridors of 750 miles or less by October 2013. The intent of Section 209 of PRIIA is to ensure that Amtrak treats all states equally and to allocate to each route

Case Studies 77 a proportionate set of costs that reflect the route’s relative use. The legislation effectively shifted costs previously paid by the federal government to states. Longer term impacts of Section 209 were noted in three case studies. For NNEPRA, this change in federal policy has had the effect of doubling NNEPRA’s costs related to using Amtrak’s rolling stock. Maine has committed to providing $8 million in operational funding and allowing the service to use the state’s debt service over the course of 25 years up to $31.5 million. This change has put NNEPRA in the difficult position of having to justify an increase in state-level subsidies in the absence of a corresponding increase in service, not an easy sell for politicians. In the Pacific Northwest, Washington and Oregon’s combined share for Amtrak’s Cascades service increased from 80 percent to 100 percent of operating costs not covered by train revenues. From the perspective of the Washington DOT and the Oregon DOT, this change means that the states incur additional costs, but it also allows the states to take a stronger, more active role in management of the service to control costs and increase revenues. This change was the impetus for the states’ recent effort to formalize joint management of the corridor. 3.7.12 Procurement At the early planning stages, procurements are generally limited to consultant services. Agree- ments reviewed generally designated specific parties for securing consultant support. As projects progress through development, agreements begin to deal with procurement of physical assets. For example, in the AIP between Illinois and Iowa, state costs for funding equipment procure- ment are set to be split based on the percentage of track mileage in each state—73 percent for Illinois and 27 percent for Iowa. For Metro-North service, Connecticut and New York are jointly procuring 405 new M8 cars for operation on the New Haven Line (as well as Connecticut’s Shore Line East service). The cost splits are based largely on terms specified in the service agreement. Connecticut paid approximately 65 percent of the purchase price and New York paid 35 percent. These percentages are based on each state’s ridership levels. SEPTA and DTC executed a sepa- rate agreement for purchase of four Silverliner V vehicles as part of a contract option with the manufacturer in order to provide additional service to Delaware in 2007. Illinois, in cooperation with the states of California, Michigan, Missouri, Iowa, Oregon, and Washington, is leading a multi-state procurement of new diesel-electric locomotives. 3.7.13 Marketing, Customer Service, and Branding In general, marketing, customer service, and branding were rarely discussed as significant challenges in multi-state rail planning. In the operations and maintenance phase, these areas were generally under the purview of the operator. Unlike most other state-supported Amtrak services, NNEPRA retains responsibilities for market- ing, customer service, and branding. NNEPRA has two staff positions reserved for managing the design and production of all media advertisements for the Downeaster service. It should be noted that because the service’s sole source of operations funding comes through Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire have no decision-making power over marketing campaigns for the tri-state service. NNEPRA staff has been successful in communicating a consistent and localized message that is distinct from nationwide Amtrak advertising. Given the Downeaster service’s lack of dedi- cated funding, the promotional efforts are important; they allow the service to reach new markets, thereby expanding its potential ridership base and increasing its revenue potential. The Downeaster service relies on four methods to solicit customer feedback: on-board personnel, station attendants, the Amtrak support hotline, and the Downeaster service online customer comment form. NNEPRA coordinates with Amtrak to receive customer comments,

78 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs and NNEPRA’s Manager of Passenger Services is charged with handling concerns internally (without Amtrak’s involvement) to the extent possible. 3.7.14 Coalitions The role of coalitions in passenger rail development also was not discussed by many of those interviewed. The NEC case study presented examples of coalitions, the I-95 Corridor Coalition and CONEG, which provide a forum to address multi-jurisdictional issues. The I-95 Corridor Coalition is a partnership of transportation agencies and related organizations located mainly in the 16 states traversed by I-95, along with affiliated members in adjacent Canadian provinces. The group has broadened its focus from just highways to examine other multi-jurisdictional transportation issues. Examples of I-95 Corridor Coalition projects involving the NEC include the Northeast Rail Operations Study (NEROps) and Mid-Atlantic Rail Operations Study (MAROps), which identified and analyzed the key bottlenecks and capacity issues in the rail corridors of the I-95 Corridor Coalition states. The study objective was to develop short-term rail investment programs to eliminate key rail bottlenecks for each region. CONEG is a non-partisan association of governors from seven northeastern states that was formed in 1976 to address a broad range of issues of regional importance. In addition to transportation, CONEG programs, policies, and initiatives address regional issues in energy, environment, and economic development. CONEG’s passenger rail vision includes enacting policies and making investments for safety and network development, improving the current regional network’s capacity and reliability, and supporting continued federal funding for infra- structure projects. CONEG played a key role in advocating for the electrification of the NEC in the 1990s and in development and funding of the Acela high-speed rail program. 3.7.15 Safety Standards Safety is not only a critical element of any passenger rail program, it is also a major concern for intercity passenger rail service. Most interviewees assumed that safety standards were a “given” in terms of both track and vehicles simply because any service would have to satisfy national safety regulations. A European example shows the importance of having a comprehensive safety training program. A severe breakdown in service on the Brussels-Paris-London high-speed rail line in December 2009 called into question the consistency of training for personnel involved in this cross-border operation. An investigation of the incident found that a primary cause of the breakdown was uneven training in safety, maintenance, and emergency procedures. The failings were attributed to the “complex tri-national joint venture behind the train operator’s structure in which personnel from country partners were contributed for Eurostar operations.” In September 2010, the partners completed a restructuring of Eurostar as a stand-alone corporation which brought all employees under Eurostar International Limited Inc., the new stand-alone company. This examination of operation of high-speed rail service on the Brussels-Paris-London network demonstrates the impor- tance of consistent safety, emergency procedures, and other training programs. Comprehensive and consistent safety and training programs should be a priority in the collaborative deliberations of partners in planning the operation of multi-state rail passenger services. 3.7.16 Other Characteristics Raised Several characteristics emerged from the case studies that were not explicitly captured in the conceptual framework.

Case Studies 79 Prioritizing Investments Prioritizing investments is a key underlying objective for NEC FUTURE. Establishing a long-term vision for the NEC alone will not ensure a coordinated implementation approach that nets the greatest benefit from federal and state investments. NEC FUTURE includes the devel- opment of integrated phasing plans that prioritize the growth of the NEC and ensure regional equity in the growth of commuter and intercity passenger rail services while ensuring that freight rail can continue to grow as well. The phasing plan will be handed off to the NEC Commission for further development and implementation. Prioritizing investments was also raised as an issue in the ARC case study with respect to the ADHS. The ARC fell short by failing to provide any sort of prioritization of the corridors and segments, leading to the development of an incomplete network, with all of the less complex and less expensive segments completed prior to the build out of the most expensive segments (e.g., bridge crossings, tunnels, etc.) that, from both engineering and financial perspectives, carry a greater share of the network’s overall risk. Thus, while the network is substantially complete, there are still critical bottlenecks that tend to occur at either state lines or intercorridor crossings. Navigating Environmental Impacts While impacts to natural resources are not uncommon when implementing large-scale trans- portation projects, the wide variety of resource conflicts impacting the ADHS network was notable. The region is quite mountainous; contains many rivers and tributaries; and is home to several national parks, which serve as habitats for a number of endangered species. Thus, many federal laws, regulations (i.e., the Endangered Species Act, Section 4(f), etc.), and regulatory bodies have been part of the decision-making process. Public opposition to these projects because of environmental concerns has been frequent, intense, and effective at delaying project delivery. “Last Mile” Connections The rural setting in which many of the Downeaster service stations are situated makes the establishment and provision of connecting transportation services difficult. Although the MBTA North Station interfaces with the MBTA subway system and its commuter rail lines, passengers arriving to other stations along the corridor are generally not afforded such a wide variety of options. Some of the municipalities provide circulator bus service to the Downeaster service stations, but others do not. Depending on the presence of local bus service and the points of interest served by the routes, passengers are often forced to either take a taxi or wait on a poorly timed transfer to a community circulator bus. International Coordination Although the Pacific Northwest rail service is wholly sponsored by the Washington State DOT and the Oregon DOT, there is a desire to include British Columbia as an active funding partner in the future. Cross-country border service provides additional complexities with respect to customs, security, and operations. The experience of the Brussels-Paris-London high-speed rail line, as well as experience of other international high-speed rail programs, can provide useful lessons and precedents in these unique cases.