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105 6.1 Conclusions This research has examined different institutional models for supporting intercity passenger rail service. Each model has its advantages and disadvantages depending on the circumstances being faced by those leading an intercity passenger rail initiative. For example, if the states involved in such an initiative have similar levels of interest in furthering project goals, some form of a multi-state commission or a more formally coordinated state action model would probably be most appropriate. If lines of authority and accountability are desired from a multi-state compact, a model that includes a federal role might be more appropriate. While consideration of organizational structure is important, it is equally important to consider leadership skills. The success of multi-state collaborations for intercity passenger rail partnerships relies on pragmatic planning early in the process. The earlier that planning occurs, the more successful the operation of the final structure will be. PRIIA has significantly changed the institutional model of intercity passenger rail provi- sion by providing more transparency and flexibility in the arrangements that can be made to offer such service. States are in a better position to identify different service options that might be most effective given the type of service desired and the level of commitment from partner states. This flexibility necessarily raises questions regarding the types of institutional relationships that will be most effective given desired goals. A number of issues facing inter- city passenger rail initiatives, such as Next Generation equipment purchase, more uniformity of Section 209 pricing, and priorities and cost sharing for major infrastructure improvements, also raise questions regarding how to establish institutional relationships that will lead to successful joint action. Table 19 shows the different types of institutional models examined in this research. Not sur- prisingly, the majority of the intercity passenger rail institutional models aimed at developing new services rely on state participation. As seen in Table 19, this reliance on state participation results in either a single state taking a leadership role or the creation of some form of voluntary partnership. In situations where the aim of an institutional model is to support existing passenger rail service (as opposed to developing new service), Amtrak usually plays a significant role. The case studies provide an interesting snapshot of how states are organizing themselves for intercity passenger rail services and the types of issues they face. For example, state DOTs generally held lead roles in all of the U.S. passenger rail cases. Typically, two or more states formed partner- ships related to a common passenger rail project. In these partnerships, one of the DOTs would be assigned responsibility for leading the overall project, applying for and managing federal grant funds, procuring consultant services, and coordinating the partnering agencies. Rarely were states equal partners in the partnership. C H A P T E R 6 Conclusions and Future Research
106 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs Model Working De�inition Case Study (Mechanism for Implementation)Single State Agency Contracting with and on Behalf of Other States Where an existing or newly created public agency of a single state addresses multi-state interests throughcontracts. ⢠Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac Corridor (MOU) ⢠NNEPRA (single state legislation) ⢠MTA Metro-North Services in CT and NJ (bi-state operating agreements) ⢠SEPTA services to Wilmington/Newark, DE (bi-state operating agreement) ⢠MBTA Service to Providence, Warwick, and Wickford Junction, RI (operating agreement)Voluntary Coalition/ Partnership Where stakeholders convene in a forum to collaborate for a common interest on a voluntary basis. ⢠Midwest High Speed Rail Steering Group (MOU) ⢠I-95 Coalition (voluntary, no formal agreement) ⢠CONEG (voluntary, CONEG Policy Research Center, Inc. is non-pro�it arm for program activities) ⢠Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MOU) ⢠Amtrak Northeast Corridor Infrastructure Master Plan Working Group (voluntary, no formal agreement) ⢠NEC Future (voluntary, no formal agreement among stakeholders)Special Authority Where an independent entity, often a distinct governmental body, delivers a limited number of public services within de�ined boundaries; services are generally provided within a single state or 2 to 3 states. ⢠WMATA (interstate compact) For-Pro�it Corporations Where a privately held company develops infrastructure or operates services on a for-pro�it, limited-liability basis. ⢠Brussels-Paris-London High-Speed Rail Network (Eurostar)* Federally Chartered Corporations Where a corporation is established by Congress to provide a public service;generally set up with federal subsidies at the outset but often intended to become �inancially self-sustaining over time. ⢠Amtrak (federal legislation) Federal-State Commission Where a body of federal, state, and, sometimes, local leaders organize to address a critical need, which often includes the distribution of federal funds among multiple states. ⢠ARC (federal legislation) ⢠NEC Commission (federal legislation) Multi-State Commission Where 2 or more states establish a common agency to execute a speci�ic function; does not include a direct role for the federal government. ⢠SEHSR Project â VA-NC (interstate compact) ⢠Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission (interstate compact) Coordinated State Efforts Where 2 or more states enter into an agreement to coordinate efforts within their respective states. ⢠Paci�ic Northwest Rail Corridor (MOU/Cascades Rail Corridor Management Workplan) ⢠South Central: TOPRS (bi-state agreement) *This example was not included as a case study for this report. Table 19. Institutional models found in the case studies.
Conclusions and Future Research 107 Nearly all of the case studies had some means of defining the institutional relationships among the state partners, including MOUs, AIPs, interstate compacts, and operating agreements. Service operating agreements, required since 2008 by PRIIA, are expected to bring a level of consistency to projects that receive high-speed rail funds. These agreements generally define the roles and responsibilities of partnering agencies, cost sharing, and liability and outline the purpose of the project. As passenger rail projects progress from visioning, planning, and design and construction phases into the operation and maintenance phase, the arrangements among partnering agencies and stakeholders includes greater levels of detail and specificity. Nearly all of the case studies note that the articulation of a transportation need for intercity passenger rail drove the development of a particular institutional model. The case studies also reveal that the articulation of a transportation need is a critical factor, especially for intercity passenger rail efforts that cross state lines. Interestingly, while nearly all of the corridors examined had formal agreements governing passenger rail activities across state lines, those interviewed pointed to the lack of a centralized, coordinating body as a key constraint. This lack was cited as one of the key reasons that progress in some of the corridors has lagged behind progress in other regions. In addition, and particularly for projects in the planning phase, the role of federal regulatory agencies was primarily related to environmental reviews and grant administration. The federal role expands to safety regulation enforcement as projects move toward operations and maintenance. Recently, through FRAâs requirement for SDPs and SOAs, its purview has expanded to operations planning and service development. Most of the cases studies did not outline a specific decision-making process. As noted previously, usually a lead agency is designated to serve as project lead or administrator for a specific effort. The lead would then consult other states as needed in decision-making without being gov- erned by specific procedures. The Midwest corridor-level agreements and the SCHSRC provide examples of the use of this kind of decision-making process. An important function of the NEC Commission is to bring needed attention and analysis to the development and monitoring of capital programs and to establish a formal structure for making investments at both the local/ regional and corridor levels, with each investment decision following consistent guidelines. Part of the decision-making process is garnering and maintaining political support for the project. The absence of a political champion in the SCHSR Corridor, for example, was pointed to as contributing to the relatively weak progression of the corridor as there is no entity to offer direction for the project or to promote and lobby for the project at the federal, state, or local levels. A recurring theme in the case studies was the risk inherent in state administration turnover. The long-term nature of large-scale infrastructure projects poses challenges to project leaders in maintaining momentum for the projects and keeping them a high priority for state elected leadership. Identifying funding sources was found to be a linchpin of the coordination efforts described in the case studies. For example, the 2009 Governorâs MOU in the Midwest was instituted to secure ARRA funding, a central charge of the NEC Commission is to address cost allocation across the NEC, and the impetus of recent efforts by the Washington State DOT and Oregon DOT to coordinate corridor management was PRIIA Section 209 changes in how state-supported services were to be funded. Multiple case studies cited the need for a dedicated funding source at the state level and, potentially, the regional level for capital and operating investments. Similarly, for initiatives that are still in the planning stage, such as the SEHSR Corridor, demonstrating a return on investment and showing that a system could be self-sustaining is a significant challenge. In the cases studied, most cost-sharing arrangements were organized so that states contributed funding in propor- tion to the corridor segment located within their state, as was seen in the Metro-North operating
108 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs agreement with the Connecticut DOT and the working assumption for dividing future capital costs between Texas and Oklahoma in the SCHSRC. Each of the passenger rail efforts showcased in the case studies (other than the one on the NEC) is currently utilizing or anticipates using rights-of-way owned by private railroads. Therefore, relationships with private railroads have a very important role to play in initiatives to provide passenger rail service and thus are a factor to be considered in the creation of institutional models to develop and implement projects. Failing to successfully negotiate with host railroads can severely impede project progress. One of the key issues in negotiations with host railroads is how to allocate risk and liability among partners. Liability and indemnity obligations are two of the most contentious issues among parties operating jointly on rail lines. In the NEC, a complicated and intricate allocation of risk between owners and operators is based on the provisions within historic agreements. In the Midwest, mitigating, limiting, or eliminating risk has been a goal for all of the participants, and mitigating or eliminating risk is a topic that is revisited each time the project advances. At the visioning and planning phases of project development, agreements containing liability clauses generally make states liable for work and any incidents occurring within their respective boundaries. As would be expected, the liability clauses in the operations and maintenance agreements are more detailed and incorporate indemnity clauses for specific entities. Section 5.4 of this report suggests some actions to take as part of launching an intercity pas- senger rail effort to enhance the chances of its success. These suggestions include the following: ⢠Provide early and continuous coordination ⢠Explore the benefits of centralized coordination ⢠Share funding assumptions early on ⢠Define clear and transparent roles ⢠Allow for sufficient time and resources ⢠Consider varying institutional models for different project phases ⢠Capitalize on existing federal requirements as a starting point for coordination ⢠Obtain cooperation from railroads by protecting their basic needs ⢠Consider use of a mediator if negotiations are going to fail ⢠Promote opportunities for agencies and organizations that provide âlast mileâ services and amenities to participate in service planning ⢠Consider an incremental approach to implementation ⢠Consider the interdependency of segments when prioritizing projects ⢠Be aware that direct monetary compensation is not always required ⢠Consider independent researchers when establishing staff arrangements ⢠Link goals to clear performance measures and establish a process for assessing progress regularly ⢠Provide guidance for governing boards With respect to selecting or creating an institutional model for supporting an intercity pas- senger rail project, Chapter 5 presented an approach for identifying the types of institutional models that might be most appropriate for a particular case based on its key factors. Thus, for example, if one is interested in creating an effective institutional model for a case where a federal role is desired or needed, the structure created will have to be different than one that would be created for a case where states want to have controlling authority. So many factors are involved in the creation of an effective institutional model that it is often difficult to identify the ones that are most critical to the development of a particular multi-state effort. However, the premise of the decision tree approach is that several key concerns can be identified that will lead to different ways of structuring the leadership, decision-making, and overall authority structure of a passen- ger rail development project. At the very least, the decision tree analysis allows a practitioner to determine which institutional models do not meet the key criteria.
Conclusions and Future Research 109 Most of the cases studied included some level of Amtrak involvement. As noted in Chapter 2 of this report, Amtrak is the current model of a national intercity passenger rail network in the United States, although PRIIA has redefined how the relationship between the states and Amtrak is to occur. An important observation on the institutional models discussed herein is that Amtrak can be a part of all of them (except the freight railroad model). Whether as owner, service pro- vider, or partner, Amtrak can have a role in each passenger rail effort presented herein. Amtrakâs role will, of course, vary according to the agreements that dictate the roles of each participant. Given the national perspective that Amtrak brings to intercity passenger rail operations, it will need to be involved in every project anyway if for no other reason than to provide a reference on how new services relate to or integrate with existing national intercity service. 6.2 Future Research This project examined current institutional models for delivery of intercity passenger rail services, many of which are in the early stages of visioning and planning. There were only a few examples of multiple states actually engaged in operating a service, thus the benefits of any particular institutional model have yet to be proven. However, this research has identified some key issues that deserve future research. 6.2.1 Long-Term Effects of PRIIA PRIIA requirements (and those that might come from new legislation) are having a significant impact on the institutional relationships of those involved in intercity passenger rail services. With costs made more transparent and states given more flexibility in determining how they want to support rail services, the institutional framework for intercity passenger rail is in transi- tion. It seems likely that within 2 to 3 years, common institutional models for service provision will become evident. Research should be conducted on these evolving institutional models to determine what factors were important in defining the arrangements and to assess the relative effectiveness and transferability of the results to other contexts. This evolution is particularly important for the NEC not only because of its role in the U.S. intercity rail network, but because of the multiple parties participating in all aspects of service provision. The NEC Commission provides a unique institutional model for bringing structure to the decision-making process in the corridor. It will be worth following the evolution of the NEC Commissionâs work and assessing whether a similar concept could be used elsewhere. 6.2.2 High-Speed Rail Institutional Models Although high-speed rail projects were part of the research case studies, they were not high- lighted as a separate type of intercity passenger rail context. In reality, institutional models for high-speed rail service will most likely be much more complexânot only will multiple states be involved (assuming the service crosses state lines), but also arrangements will need to be made with the cities and towns through which the service passes and those where stations are located. Further, given the likelihood that highways will be crossed as the rail line traverses a state, there will need to be state DOT involvement. It will be important to observe how institutional models are made in such high-speed rail projects as the one currently under development in California. 6.2.3 Procurement and Liability Issues Although multi-state partnerships for intercity passenger rail face many challenges, two that seem to create the most difficulty are procurement processes (procuring products or services
110 Developing Multi-State Institutions to Implement Intercity Passenger Rail Programs that cross state lines) and liability. Many of the states involved in the cases studied struggled with these issues. In the absence of a federal presence that allows multi-state procurement, states have relied on special provisions and other legal permissions to provide the needed services. Use of these strategies becomes more complicated as the number of states involved in the agreement increases. There is a need for research that would provide a detailed examination of procure- ment and liability issues as they relate to intercity passenger rail investments. Such research would look at what has been done in those cases where intercity service currently exists, the legal foundation for such action, and the transferability of such actions to other jurisdictions. For other legal aspects of intercity passenger rail service, see NCRRP Legal Research Digest 1 (Wyatt and Schenck, February 2015). 6.2.4 Role of Performance Measures in Guiding Institutional Changes According to MAP-21 legislation, transportation planning and decision-making are to be performance based. The intent of performance measures is to provide decision-makers with the ability to monitor the progress being made on system performance and to adjust priorities where necessary. Performance measures can be used to guide intercity passenger rail efforts as well. Presumably, the metrics would vary by the stage of project development; however, it would be useful to have some research on how to change institutional models in response to declining performance. The research would look at examples from both the public sector and private industry to discover what changes have been made to improve system or network performance. Change strategies would be identified and highlighted for application in different intercity rail contexts.
