Transportation Research Implementation: Application of Research Outcomes (2015)

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91 APPENDIX B: COMMISSIONED WHITE PAPER 2 Lessons Learned from Case Studies of Successful Research Implementation in Europe and the United States Joris Al, Forum of European National Highway Research Laboratories (FEHRL), Brussels, Belgium Mark Vandehey, Kittelson & Associates, Inc., Portland, Oregon, USA executive Summary In preparation for the second in the series of EU–U.S. symposia on transportation research, several case studies illustrating the main factors that play a role in the successful implementation of research were evalu- ated. This paper presents 13 case studies that illustrate successes—and challenges—in implementing transpor- tation research products, technologies, and practices. Seven of these examples are from countries in the Euro- pean Union and six are from the United States. Each case was selected to highlight a particular aspect of the implementation process, but these cases also collectively present eight reoccurring themes or lessons learned that apply to both the U.S. and EU programs: • Stakeholder involvement. Perhaps the most common factor noted in the case studies as a criterion for successful implementation efforts was early and continuous stakeholder involvement. Stakeholders clearly differ for each project, but they generally represent those that have experienced the problem that needs to be addressed and will therefore be the end users of the research. They also include those who will be responsible for moving the research products into and through implementation. When such stakeholders are involved in the definition of the research, and when they remain involved in ensuring that the research produces a solution that meets their needs, implementation tends to move far faster and more smoothly. • Resources for implementation. Even in cases in which there had been a substantial investment in research, the funds programmed or available for implementation activities were often very limited. Part of this limitation appeared to be a result of the manner in which funds were allocated to different programs and sponsors and a lack of clarity regarding who was responsible for the implementation costs (e.g., the end user or the research sponsor?). However, some cases showed that even a small amount of funding can be a very strong incentive for implementation. Such funding helps to underwrite the risk, whether real or perceived, in using the new technology and often demonstrates an official endorsement of the products and practices. Staffing resources were equally important, particularly in ensuring that there was continuity throughout the process. • Development. Several of the cases point to the chal- lenges of trying to deploy research products that have not been fully developed or field tested. Aside from ensuring that the technology is ready for user applications, the development phase can also be the time in which addi- tional data and evidence can be collected to substantiate the value of and need for the product. There are also cases that illustrate the success of building public–private part- nerships during this time to ensure the research products will be commercially available for implementation. • Early adopters. Successful cases highlighted the importance of having a champion that acted as an advocate for the innovation from research through implementation—a period that in some cases spanned more than a decade. Champions can be individuals, but more often are organizations with a specific interest. Champions that represent the end user community are particularly effective and often serve as one of the early

92 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n adopters of the technology or recruit other early adopters. Their involvement is critical because it provides a credible peer-to-peer basis for sharing knowledge with other end users. • Institutional barriers. Many of the cases illustrate the multiple approvals and institutional actions often required to move a product from research into practice. These actions include everything from changes in standards or specifications to approvals of governing bodies or councils to the resolution of intellectual property issues. In particular, procurement rules and regulations can form a major obstacle to quick advancement of implementation efforts. Some of the cases illustrate the value of planning for those barriers and of ensuring that the key stakeholders that control those processes are included in the research from the beginning. Further, it is apparent that some organizations have made a concerted effort to streamline these institutional processes to accelerate the implementation process. • Governmental leadership. Clearly the governmental structure of the United States and that of the European Union and its member nations differ greatly, but a num- ber of the cases illustrate how leadership at that level can be a powerful catalyst and engine for change. As noted before, the government is often the source of funding for both research and implementation activities, and govern- mental leadership at the federal level or through the EU Commission can also help overcome institutional barriers. Ultimately, government leadership can also seek to use regulatory and standard-setting authorities to accelerate implementation of a product from state of the art to state of the practice. This kind of governmental support appears to be more prevalent when the subject of the research reflects a clearly felt societal issue, such as safety or con- gestion. Larger research programs that address broad tech- nical issues may not attract the same support or sense of urgency for implementation by the public or politicians. • Communication. Effective technology transfer is largely based on the sharing of knowledge, and consistent internal and external communication is a key to making technology transfer happen. Starting in the research phase, communication can build a pull for research results but can also establish realistic expectations about what may be coming from the research. There are several excellent examples in the case studies that show how continuous communication helped educate potential end users, inform decision makers, and, where appropriate, gain public support. The specifics of how the message is communicated are equally important. As an example, in the European context, language can be an issue. Although those conducting the research are usually fairly proficient in English as a working language, the decision makers responsible for implementation may not be. • Market readiness. In the analogy of planting seeds, the seeds are more likely to sprout when the soil they are scattered on has already been tilled. Likewise, when the market is well informed and prepared, new ideas are likely to find an easier place in which to grow and mature. Many of the cases indicate that such efforts can greatly accelerate the implementation process and provide highway users with benefits faster. One question that surfaced was how today’s college curricula could be changed to ensure that the next generation of transportation professionals would also be prepared to use these new technologies and practices. Table 1 lists the 13 case studies and identifies the themes that apply to each. Table 2 summarizes the case studies according to the objective of the research and implemen- tation, the role of research and development, the primary implementation strategies, and the lessons learned. introduction The cases included in this report represent a broad range of topics and approaches to the implementation of research. They cover multiple surface transportation modes and vary considerably in the final outcome that was expected. The degree to which they were successful is, of course, open to debate, but each in its own way illustrates valuable lessons. As a group, they also provide some insights into the different challenges and oppor- tunities that are found in the European Union and the United States. In general, these cases illustrate that there are likely more commonalities than differences in the way research is implemented on both sides of the Atlan- tic; however, in each region, specific practices and ideas can be found that could be applied to improve practices in many areas. In the evaluation of these cases, several issues surfaced that may help shed light on why implementation is so challenging to address: 1. Definition of research. It is clear that there are many different definitions of research as well as multiple types of research ranging from “applied research” that responds to a specific problem, to very large, long-term research programs with a basis in fundamental scien- tific questions. Whereas the former are geared toward implementation-ready solutions, more-basic research may require several iterations to even begin to look into practical application, so that even the question “What is the purpose of research?” can have many answers. 2. Definition of implementation. There are also many different interpretations of the term “implementation.” Some consider implementation to include everything that occurs after research, whereas other definitions make a distinction between development, implementation, and deployment. This difference points out the challenge

93A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 even of defining when implementation should begin and when it is considered complete. For example, is it com- plete when the results have been translated into regula- tion or when the results have become daily practice? 3. Relationship between research and implementa- tion. Although there is no shortage of literature on the research process and the results of research, information about implementation is generally more difficult to find, and when it is available, there is often no direct or sys- tematic link back to the underlying research. This obser- vation seems to point to the fact that often the sponsor of the research is different from the owner of the practical problem that the research is intended to solve. Little doc- umentation that linked the two or described the process from the initial question to the applied solution could be found. 4. Innovation versus research. There is a distinction between research leading innovation and innovation lead- ing research. In some of the case studies, it was clear that the research itself resulted in innovation (e.g., new ana- lytical methods, products, applications or policy). In other case studies, innovation created interest in a particular topic that spurred research (e.g., finding new applications for ground-penetrating radar). That research then became the catalyst for broader implementation. Special attention may have to be given to the position of innovation and how it affects the subject of implementation. It is also apparent that there are several constants that must be a part of any value-driven implementation effort, specifically, communication, governance, and finance and capacity. Having a clear understanding of who is in charge and how the initiative will be funded and staffed are simply core elements in the planning of any implementation process. Likewise, participation of stakeholders in all phases of this process and early and continuous communication are fundamental building blocks to any successful implementation effort. As noted in the executive summary, the cases pointed to the value that comes from focusing on each of these elements. As illustrated in Figure 1, it is also apparent that the pathway to implementation is not necessarily linear. As a research effort moves from its origin as a problem to research execution, there needs to be continual checking in to ensure that what is being done in research does, in fact, address the initial problem. It is not uncommon TABLE 1 Themes Exemplified in Each Case Study Case Study St ak eh ol de r In vo lv em en t R es ou rc es f or I m pl em en ta ti on D ev el op m en t E ar ly A do pt er s an d C ha m pi on s O ve rc om in g In st it ut io na l B ar ri er s G ov er nm en ta l L ea de rs hi p C om m un ic at io n M ar ke t R ea di ne ss European Union Asset Management (the Netherlands) X X X ALJOIN X X INNOTRACK X X X X River Information Services X X X X SAMARIS, ARCHES, and CERTAIN X X X Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints (IPW, the Netherlands) X X X X Climate Change X X X United States Highway Safety Manual X X X X X Flashing Yellow Arrow Left-Turn Display X X Modern Roundabouts X X X Warm-Mix Asphalt Pavements X X Heavy Rail Acoustic Bearing Detector X X Bus Rapid Transit X X X Note: ALJOIN = Crashworthiness of Joints in Aluminum Rail Vehicles; SAMARIS = Sustainable and Advanced Materials for Road Infrastructures; ARCHES = Assessment and Rehabilitation of Central European Highway Structures; CERTAIN = Central European Research in Road Infrastructure; IPW = Netherlands’ Innovative Road Maintenance program.

94 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n TABLE 2 Summary of Case Studies Case Study Objective of the Research and Implementation Role of Research and Development Primary Implementation Strategies Lessons Learned European Union Asset Management (the Netherlands) Provide the basis for a quantitative and qualitative risk- based performance management of the National Road Administration. Develop risk assessment and management tools such as life-cycle costing, systems engineering, and key performance indicators. Comprehensive implementation plan, pilot projects and training, and gradual adaptation of service level agreement. Translating research language into operator language is important, as is training. Stakeholder involvement, including (top) management, is essential. Translating output in guidelines and procedures fixates results. ALJOIN Following accidents resulting in deaths, improve the material and construction of rail vehicles to minimize fatalities during crashes. Provide a quantitative basis for the standards on joints and welds of vehicles, including modeling of vehicle impact. Translation of research results into international standards and publication of the research results. Bringing together all stakeholders helped in creating a solid solution. Societal impact of crashes and impact on sector provided urgency. Standards make for quicker and more general implementation. INNOTRACK Increase the competitiveness of the sector in a period of growing demand and environmental constraints by reducing track-related life-cycle costs. Identify the cost drivers of railway track construction and maintenance and provide a quantitative and methodological basis for cost reduction. Establishing an implementation group, achieving dissemination through communication and training, and making technical report and databases available. Incentives for implementation of innovations (e.g. through procurement) are necessary. Local differences prevent general implementation; a common language is required. Stakeholder involvement gives stakeholders a competitive advantage. River Information Services Raise the status of inland navigation to a full-scale alternative to road transport through upgrading and harmonizing information services. Identify organizational requirements for improved information systems and develop new standardized technologies and applications. Structured dissemination and support activities, ministerial support, and forced implementation via EU directive. Championship on the political level overcomes barriers. Broad stakeholder participation and continuity in expert staffing are important. PIANC organization provided a strong neutral expert platform. SAMARIS, ARCHES, and CERTAIN Bring the former Eastern European countries to a more advanced infrastructure quality through own and assisted experiences with new technology. Develop methodologies, testing, technical guides, and field trials of improved technology for pavements and structures. Dissemination through conferences (project), broad publication of field-test results, and translation of reports into national languages. Involving experts from target countries eliminated the not-invented-here syndrome. Specific outreach program did reach research experts. Lack of funds, procurement barriers, and absence of standards prevent implementation. Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints (IPW, the Netherlands) Solve the problem of noisy and short-lived expansion joints in an otherwise relatively silent and durable road infrastructure. Prove feasibility of new generation of silent and durable joints through an innovation program in the shape of a contest and supported by research. Starting on the problem from the operations end, inviting the market to provide competing solutions, and introducing solutions via procurement strategy. Market readiness of research was a condition for participation in the program–contest. Multidisciplinary teams reached a high level of technology readiness. The limited scope of the contest was an advantage because it led to quick results. Climate Change Provide road authorities with concrete models and instruments to tackle effects of climate change on infrastructure (adaptation strategies). Provide (modeling) tools for predicting and assessing effects and a sound risk-based approach for (local) adaptation or evacuation measures. Research that was partly based on actual experience, NRAs’ adoption of follow-up programs and research, and results that provided a menu for NRAs to choose from. Close involvement of stakeholders (e.g., in providing data) reduced the gap between research and operators. Champions from different countries for parts of the research created involvement. As an intermediate organization, CEDR provided a basis for discussion with road owners. United States Highway Safety Manual Implement a new, quantitatively based approach to analyzing the benefits of safety countermeasures and improvements. Create these new methodologies and continue to address additional issues. Broad stakeholder involvement, development and delivery of extensive training, and federal leadership. Translating research into practical applications is a challenge. Implementation should begin while R&D is still under way. Funding for implementation activities is important. Flashing Yellow Arrow Left-Turn Display Put into practice a new approach to signal display to improve safety and operations for left-turn movements. Develop the technology and demonstrate the practicality and benefits of the approach. User involvement in all phases, federal leadership and cooperation, and inclusion in national standards. Changes to standards require extensive institutional coordination. Lead efforts and demonstrations were critical. Hard data are needed to make the case. Modern Roundabouts Encourage use of modern roundabouts by state and local government as a means of improving safety and operations. Develop a guide for engineers on how to design roundabouts in a way compatible with U.S. standards and expectations. Federal leadership, provision of tools and training, and leveraging of early adopters. Lead states provided a showcase for others. Guidelines or standards can expedite deployment. Public outreach and acceptance can be important. Warm-Mix Asphalt Pavements Encourage greater use of WMA to improve air quality, worker health, hauling distances, and a variety of other factors. Show the durability and cost-effectiveness of WMA. Participation of lead states that served as champions, addressing of issues directly and quickly, and hands-on demonstrations and training. Change the technology in implementation if problems surface. Develop the support of industry. Federal leadership can help reduce the perception of risks. Heavy Rail Acoustic Bearing Detector Implement a tool to help identify faulty rail wheel bearings before they fail. Design, test, and commercially manufacture a practical device so that the concept could be implemented. Commercialization of the research and identification of early adopters. Lack of funding for implementation can be a major barrier. Finding a commercial partner to manufacture the technology can be critical and challenging. Bus Rapid Transit Provide regions with a practical alternative that will enhance transit service and passenger throughput. Develop practical guides to assist cities in (a) deciding what they actually needed and (b) how to implement that approach. Early adopters, development of guidelines, and flexibility in implementation for users. Users need to have flexibility to fit the innovation to meet their own needs (i.e., one size does not fit all). Having actual working applications is a huge incentive for others to join in implementation. Note: PIANC = World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure; NRA = national roads authority; CEDR = Conference of European Directors of Roads; WMA = warm-mix asphalt.

95A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 TABLE 2 Summary of Case Studies Case Study Objective of the Research and Implementation Role of Research and Development Primary Implementation Strategies Lessons Learned European Union Asset Management (the Netherlands) Provide the basis for a quantitative and qualitative risk- based performance management of the National Road Administration. Develop risk assessment and management tools such as life-cycle costing, systems engineering, and key performance indicators. Comprehensive implementation plan, pilot projects and training, and gradual adaptation of service level agreement. Translating research language into operator language is important, as is training. Stakeholder involvement, including (top) management, is essential. Translating output in guidelines and procedures fixates results. ALJOIN Following accidents resulting in deaths, improve the material and construction of rail vehicles to minimize fatalities during crashes. Provide a quantitative basis for the standards on joints and welds of vehicles, including modeling of vehicle impact. Translation of research results into international standards and publication of the research results. Bringing together all stakeholders helped in creating a solid solution. Societal impact of crashes and impact on sector provided urgency. Standards make for quicker and more general implementation. INNOTRACK Increase the competitiveness of the sector in a period of growing demand and environmental constraints by reducing track-related life-cycle costs. Identify the cost drivers of railway track construction and maintenance and provide a quantitative and methodological basis for cost reduction. Establishing an implementation group, achieving dissemination through communication and training, and making technical report and databases available. Incentives for implementation of innovations (e.g. through procurement) are necessary. Local differences prevent general implementation; a common language is required. Stakeholder involvement gives stakeholders a competitive advantage. River Information Services Raise the status of inland navigation to a full-scale alternative to road transport through upgrading and harmonizing information services. Identify organizational requirements for improved information systems and develop new standardized technologies and applications. Structured dissemination and support activities, ministerial support, and forced implementation via EU directive. Championship on the political level overcomes barriers. Broad stakeholder participation and continuity in expert staffing are important. PIANC organization provided a strong neutral expert platform. SAMARIS, ARCHES, and CERTAIN Bring the former Eastern European countries to a more advanced infrastructure quality through own and assisted experiences with new technology. Develop methodologies, testing, technical guides, and field trials of improved technology for pavements and structures. Dissemination through conferences (project), broad publication of field-test results, and translation of reports into national languages. Involving experts from target countries eliminated the not-invented-here syndrome. Specific outreach program did reach research experts. Lack of funds, procurement barriers, and absence of standards prevent implementation. Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints (IPW, the Netherlands) Solve the problem of noisy and short-lived expansion joints in an otherwise relatively silent and durable road infrastructure. Prove feasibility of new generation of silent and durable joints through an innovation program in the shape of a contest and supported by research. Starting on the problem from the operations end, inviting the market to provide competing solutions, and introducing solutions via procurement strategy. Market readiness of research was a condition for participation in the program–contest. Multidisciplinary teams reached a high level of technology readiness. The limited scope of the contest was an advantage because it led to quick results. Climate Change Provide road authorities with concrete models and instruments to tackle effects of climate change on infrastructure (adaptation strategies). Provide (modeling) tools for predicting and assessing effects and a sound risk-based approach for (local) adaptation or evacuation measures. Research that was partly based on actual experience, NRAs’ adoption of follow-up programs and research, and results that provided a menu for NRAs to choose from. Close involvement of stakeholders (e.g., in providing data) reduced the gap between research and operators. Champions from different countries for parts of the research created involvement. As an intermediate organization, CEDR provided a basis for discussion with road owners. United States Highway Safety Manual Implement a new, quantitatively based approach to analyzing the benefits of safety countermeasures and improvements. Create these new methodologies and continue to address additional issues. Broad stakeholder involvement, development and delivery of extensive training, and federal leadership. Translating research into practical applications is a challenge. Implementation should begin while R&D is still under way. Funding for implementation activities is important. Flashing Yellow Arrow Left-Turn Display Put into practice a new approach to signal display to improve safety and operations for left-turn movements. Develop the technology and demonstrate the practicality and benefits of the approach. User involvement in all phases, federal leadership and cooperation, and inclusion in national standards. Changes to standards require extensive institutional coordination. Lead efforts and demonstrations were critical. Hard data are needed to make the case. Modern Roundabouts Encourage use of modern roundabouts by state and local government as a means of improving safety and operations. Develop a guide for engineers on how to design roundabouts in a way compatible with U.S. standards and expectations. Federal leadership, provision of tools and training, and leveraging of early adopters. Lead states provided a showcase for others. Guidelines or standards can expedite deployment. Public outreach and acceptance can be important. Warm-Mix Asphalt Pavements Encourage greater use of WMA to improve air quality, worker health, hauling distances, and a variety of other factors. Show the durability and cost-effectiveness of WMA. Participation of lead states that served as champions, addressing of issues directly and quickly, and hands-on demonstrations and training. Change the technology in implementation if problems surface. Develop the support of industry. Federal leadership can help reduce the perception of risks. Heavy Rail Acoustic Bearing Detector Implement a tool to help identify faulty rail wheel bearings before they fail. Design, test, and commercially manufacture a practical device so that the concept could be implemented. Commercialization of the research and identification of early adopters. Lack of funding for implementation can be a major barrier. Finding a commercial partner to manufacture the technology can be critical and challenging. Bus Rapid Transit Provide regions with a practical alternative that will enhance transit service and passenger throughput. Develop practical guides to assist cities in (a) deciding what they actually needed and (b) how to implement that approach. Early adopters, development of guidelines, and flexibility in implementation for users. Users need to have flexibility to fit the innovation to meet their own needs (i.e., one size does not fit all). Having actual working applications is a huge incentive for others to join in implementation. Note: PIANC = World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure; NRA = national roads authority; CEDR = Conference of European Directors of Roads; WMA = warm-mix asphalt.

96 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n that as understanding of possible solutions evolves, so too may the scope of the research itself be refined. This refinement can be particularly true as a research product is developed and field tested and as the realities of what is needed for full implementation become more apparent. Accepting the need for this continuous process of evolu- tion can help both in planning for implementation and in ensuring that the right stakeholders are always involved in the process. These case studies present an extremely broad range of different implementation strategies. Therefore, one challenge is how to determine which strategy best fits the particular audience the research hopes to reach, the technology that is being implemented, and the avail- able resources. One method for looking at these differ- ent strategies is to consider the following two aspects of implementation: • Mandatory versus volunteer. In many cases, the fastest way to implement a new technology is to mandate its use through regulation, specifications, or standards, assuming that the regulation process can also be expe- dited. Clearly, this option can be viewed as extreme, but when something like a matter of public safety is involved, it may well be justified [e.g., after the collapse of the Inter- state bridge in Minnesota, the Federal Highway Admin- istration (FHWA) very quickly issued new standards regarding gusset plates]. Simply making implementation of a new technology or practice voluntary may be more acceptable to the stakeholders but can lead to a prolonged implementation process. However, such an approach may be appropriate when users have other available options to choose from or when the benefits are incremental. In many ways, this is the approach many companies face in trying to bring their new products to the market. • Proactive versus passive. Some of the cases illustrate a very aggressive push by the sponsoring organization to get a technology implemented. In other cases, there was greater dependency on the end user’s taking the initiative to become informed about the product, perhaps out of sensitivity to the stakeholder group or simply because of a lack of resources for a full-scale deployment effort. Although both strategies may lead to the implementation of the research, the speed with which that happens, as well as the ultimate market penetration, can vary significantly. Figure 2 is a representation of how different implemen- tation strategies may fit within the context of these two sets of variables. This information is provided only for illustration purposes to help readers frame their own thinking about what might work in their own efforts to improve the implementation of research. Finally, in putting together this paper it became clear, particularly for the European Union, that there is a general lack of structured information on the actual application of research results and, thus, the outcome of research. The information that is available tends to be fragmented at best. It would be most useful for research- ers and for those responsible for implementation to have at their disposal a database with examples of implemen- tation in several countries or states. A very interesting effort at systematically looking at implementation is the European Rail Research Advisory Council (ERRAC) WP06 project, which aimed to evalu- ate the market uptake of past research project results in the rail sector. On the basis of that evaluation, projects are categorized as having strong market uptake (clear evi- dence of the use of products and services, dissemination of knowledge, and implementation of project objectives in several countries), medium uptake, and weak uptake FIGURE 1 Pathway to implementation.

97A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 (no known use of products and services, dissemination of knowledge, or implementation). In 2012, 59 projects had been evaluated, of which 15 were found to have strong market uptake, 16 medium, and 29 a weak uptake. A standard checklist for successful projects was developed in 2011 and is still being used. The lessons learned from this project are compared with the outcome of the case studies in another section of this paper. This database might be a good example for future applications. Such a database should include references to institutes, discus- sion platforms, implementing agencies, and organizations. eu caSe StudieS Asset Management in the Netherlands Although this example of the implementation of asset man- agement may not be representative of what is normally associated with research implementation, it does show that implementing research is feasible—even research that has not been directly commissioned by the problem owner himself. The implementation took time and effort, and without a strong sense of urgency would not have been successful. Original Research Purpose and Need Asset management is the profession of balancing cost, performance, and risk over the life cycle of an asset and takes into account the actual financial means, available human resources, information, and cultural aspects in an organization. In 2006, the Netherlands executive agency for high- ways, waterways, and water management, Rijkswater- staat (RWS), was in a fairly advanced state of disorder with regard to performance and management of infra- structure. The budget was more a sum of the wishes and plans of each regional directorate, often influenced by the local technical and political situation, than a consolidated priority of necessary works to uphold and improve the system. As availability of funds had not been a problem for many years, there was no clear incentive to change that situation. Management contracts diverged signifi- cantly between the regions. The whole funding system for maintenance and operations was not transparent to the outside world, including the Ministry of Transport and the general public. The condition of the assets could, in reality, be quite different from the existing documentation (if it existed), a situation that caused problems with con- tractors hired to perform maintenance and construction. At the same time, the annual budget of the ministry had started to come under pressure. The funds for new construction were as yet undisputed, but maintenance did not receive as much political support, so that bud- get reductions in the Ministry of Transport were mostly translated into the reduction of operation and mainte- nance budgets. As part of the condition for RWS to become a more independent agency in the field of operations and maintenance, it was decided in 2008 to set up a FIGURE 2 Implementation strategies: passive–active matrix. PASSIVE standards available information available benchmark solutions promote knowledge funding available innovative procurement prescribe solutions specifications targeted subsidy provide database ACTIVE VOLUNTARY MANDATORY funding conditions standards required education/ training

98 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n comprehensive Program for Asset Management (PAM) aimed at improving the situation not only in a few years, but as the program developed. There was too little time to establish a solid fundamental research program, although it was clear that the knowledge on the subject of asset management was still largely under development. Research Process and Results PAM started in December 2008 with a decision of the RWS board of directors. The four initial scope elements of the program were to • Develop and implement a system for reliable and accurate asset data, • Develop a stable long-term maintenance program, • Define clear objectives and transparent require- ments, and • Improve procurement procedures for more trans- parency. In 2009, a fifth element was added: introduce a system of life-cycle costing. RWS realized that it would take many years to set up and implement asset management, but the first results in terms of process and procedure improvement were expected to be realized in about 2 or 3 years. All of the scope elements required serious consideration from a practical point of view, and research was needed to fill the many knowledge gaps and design a system- atic approach to the issue. Little information was read- ily available nationally in a suitable format. As the time requirements were quite strict, the decision was made to rely mainly on existing research programs; to benchmark in several European countries (notably the United King- dom and Sweden) and in different sectors (such as the energy sector and drinking water sector); and to commis- sion additional research for specific information. The following European research programs and insti- tutes played an important role in PAM: • Next Generation Infrastructures Foundation. This research program began in 2004 and will be completed in 2014. About half of the program’s funding is provided by the government. The research focuses on issues in asset management that crosscut all infrastructure sectors. The program started off as a traditional research program with the aim of bringing together researchers and research. Since 2008, it has put much more emphasis on stake- holder involvement, in part through an Asset Management Platform in which stakeholders and researchers partici- pate. The program encompassed more than 40 doctoral research projects. Specific themes that were essential for the development of the RWS PAM were risk management [including the development of appropriate translation of methods as RAMS (reliability, availability, maintainabil- ity, and safety) or SHEEP (security, health, environment, economics and politics)], life-cycle costing (LCC), systems engineering, and probabilistic maintenance. • Institute of Asset Management. The Institute of Asset Management is a professional institute in the United Kingdom that develops best practices for asset management. Publicly Available Specification (PAS) 55 provides clear definitions and specifications for estab- lishing optimized asset management systems that align to a certifiable quality management system according to ISO 9001. • Coordination and Implementation of Road Research in Europe (ERA-NET ROAD). Out of 20 proposals submitted for the 2010 call “Effective Asset Management Meeting Future Challenges,” seven were selected. These seven proposals covered topics such as methods for assessment of service condition, key perfor- mance indicators, stakeholder involvement issues, and intervention strategies. The call finished in 2013 with a meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark. Many of the notions developed during the research were introduced in the PAM program as it went along. RWS staff also gathered knowledge from several other institutes and participated in a scanning tour to the United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand on this subject that was organized by FHWA and the American Association of State Highway and Transporta- tion Officials (AASHTO). Implementation Activities The implementation of asset management research was done through the PAM program. The different research results had to be translated into action perspectives for the entire RWS staff, from higher and middle manage- ment down to the average staff member in the field. On the management level, it was important to bring all the different aspects of the asset management process together in a design scheme, distinguishing between the roles of the asset owner (the Ministry of Transport), the asset manager (RWS), and the market. For the field staff, it was essential to understand the process of data collection and performance measure- ment, as this process would mostly dictate their daily priorities. For instance, the system of decomposition of data in order to fill the database on the maintenance situ- ation had to be uniform throughout the whole organiza- tion of more than 1,000 staff. Most of the staff used to gather this data were familiar with their own database systems (if they existed), but making this change would require extensive education. Several internal guidelines

99A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 were published (e.g., contracting requirements), some of which received mandatory status through the asset owner (e.g., the life-cycle costing system). The asset man- agement process is shown in Figure 3. The comprehensive implementation plan that was set up consisted of several key actions that could differ according to the scope elements mentioned earlier: • A general action was an extensive communication program for all concerned. An essential aspect of this action was the heavy involvement of top management in the communication. • Training sessions were organized for management and staff on the new system requirements and on how to handle the concrete material to implement the system (e.g., new format for regional asset management plans, data decomposition). • Pilot projects were identified to speed up imple- mentation, and sessions were organized to convey the results to colleagues. • In the meantime, the existing service level agree- ment (SLA) between RWS and the Ministry was adapted, first on an experimental basis. All these actions were organized and supported by a dedicated task force with strong support from the top managerial level. At the same time, outreach to external stakeholders (provinces, country officials, contractors) was organized to familiarize them with the new method of working. As the project formally ended in 2012, the task force has now been disbanded and the standing orga- nization has now explicitly taken over the responsi- bility for further implementation of the results. This responsibility is included in the management contract for the unit concerned. Concrete results of the program started to come in as soon as April 2010, and new instruments for performance management were used in the contract negotiation on the SLA 2011. By then, the first regional asset management Objectives and Standards Plans SLA Asset owner–asset manager Management contracts Internal contracts between headquarters and regional divisions Contracts with market parties Performance contracts D&C contracts DBFM contracts SLA quotation Scenarios (performance, risk profile, and budget) Network plans Optimization on network corridors Cross-asset prioritization Maintenance plans Per asset type: Long-term planning Maintenance measures and costs Strategic objectives Policy papers Legal regulations Asset policies/KPIs Tactical framework Maintenance strategies Processes Asset decomposition Life-cycle cost Operational tools Models Risk matrices Residual lifetime Cost information Intervention levels Manuals Contracts Asset data Network information system Monitoring and evaluation FIGURE 3 The asset management process (KPIs = key performance indicators; SLA = service level agreement; D&C = design and construct; DBFM = design, build, finance, and manage). (Source: Evaluation Programme Report.)

100 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n teams were being set up. Regional directorates that took the lead in using new work methods received awards, and a Corporate Asset Management Learning Center was established in 2011. The main results of the program are as follows: • LCC (including maintenance) has been fully intro- duced, is mandatory (regulation) for the calculation of new construction, and is used on a regular basis for large rehabilitation projects. • SLA for maintenance and operations has been fully revised and is mainly risk-driven. • There is centralized (risk-based) programming. • Procurement contracts are performance based. • The underlying information system (NIS) has been revised and the quality of information has greatly improved. • Asset management is a leading process for the organizational design of RWS. • A number of research results (systems engineering, probabilistic planning) have been introduced over the whole range of construction works. Barriers to Implementation • Institutional decisions. Although there was a great sense of urgency to get to grips with diminishing funds for maintenance and the administrative situation was urgently in need of improvement, it took a relatively long time to come to a decision on starting PAM. The ongoing research of the Next Generation Infrastructures program was not formally related to the maintenance issue at the start. The two programs ran parallel for some time. • Governance. The factor of power played an impor- tant role as well. It was clear from literature and examples elsewhere that proper asset management would highly influence the decision-making process and the daily plan- ning and execution of maintenance priorities. All con- cerned did not necessarily welcome this development, especially as regional directorates were used to having large executive responsibility and being quite set in their ways. As early as 2005, proposals for introducing asset management were made and rejected. The size of the organization (more than 10,000 full-time employees at the time) was another complicating factor, as asset manage- ment, in essence, only functions when it is at the core of the work processes. The pressure on RWS originated mainly outside the organization. Increased congestion resulting from lengthy maintenance projects had become a political risk. The combination of this risk with the financial situ- ation had become an explosive mix. Setting up PAM helped to relieve some of the pressure, especially as the Ministry was informed about the plans and involved at a fairly early stage. As asset management is mainly an internal process, there was little formal regulation to contend with. • Readiness. It must be recognized that, at the time, asset management was such a new instrument that the executive level of the organization could not easily see it as the solution of the existing problems. However, there was not enough time to start with what would have been a lengthy process for raising the awareness of the instrument. • Resources. To a large extent, the research needed to develop asset management had already been commis- sioned via other financial mechanisms, and the program itself was mostly managed internally with the assistance of a limited number of consultants. The limited additional funds necessary to implement asset management were included in the SLA between RWS and the Ministry. Lessons Learned • Management involvement. Defining the research need and creating management support were key factors. At the outset, the involvement of the different manage- ment layers throughout the organization was too small. This led to slow decision making and a relatively slow start-up. A lot of effort had to be spent on broad manage- ment support for the program later on. Once the support had been realized by showing the potential for improve- ment, this support proved to be essential for success. • Communication. The main condition for the success of asset management was the dedicated program itself. It was a concerted effort to translate the large amount of existing and new research and other experience into daily practice. As the program brought together the responsible people in RWS from the top to the lower level, it created

101A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 a direct forum for translating research into practice on the basis of the requirements of the Ministry. • Organizational coordination. The research was only partly commissioned on the initiative of PAM. However, PAM played a crucial role in achieving the results. Since PAM had not been able to influence the research scope of the Next Generation Infrastructures program at the outset, it was necessary to create a sup- port construction between the Next Generation Infra- structures research program and PAM, namely, the Asset Management Platform, which exists to this day. In this platform, research progress and support were discussed and additional queries were addressed during the process. The translation of research into practical application during the research phase also helped focus the research efforts. • Stakeholders. Transparency of the process and broad communication with stakeholders—both internal (ministry, financial departments, own organization) and, later on, external (provinces, countries, construction sec- tor, consultants)—proved to help in creating acceptance for a new way of risk-based planning and performance- based procurement. This included regularly celebrating successes that were achieved during the project. • Training. Extensive training and support by peer groups, which is still going on after the termination of the program, was essential to anchor new ways of work- ing in the organization and its immediate surroundings. • Policies and guidelines. Translating new procedures and routines into the internal and external guidelines and regulations helped establish the results. Examples are the new format for the SLA, regulation on LCC (type: com- ply or explain), internal procurement guidelines, data requirements for constructors, and inspection. • International aspects. PAM is a national program of RWS. It would probably have been introduced in some shape or another independently of international devel- opments. The existence of similar international research and implementation programs was, however, essential in speeding up the process in the Netherlands. There was a lot of international exchange (some mentioned above) with other European countries, notably the Scandinavian countries, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. PAM representatives participated in international conferences, where they both gave and gathered essential knowledge. Peer reviews were organized on certain issues. ALJOIN The Crashworthiness of Joints in Aluminum Rail Vehi- cles (ALJOIN) project illustrates how standards can be used as an effective tool for implementation of research, even throughout the European Union, particularly where public interest and focus are high. Original Research Purpose and Need Aluminum alloys are now in widespread use in Europe (and elsewhere) for rail vehicle construction, from com- muter to express trains. The main contributor to the suc- cess of aluminum alloys as structural materials in rail transport was the development of closed-cell aluminum extrusions that can easily be welded together to form lightweight rail vehicles with high inherent rigidity, which could not be achieved with older designs. As rail transport is becoming more popular throughout Europe, there is an increased need to improve passenger safety by improving the crashworthiness of rail vehicles to mini- mize fatalities and injuries if an accident does occur. The strength, integrity, and performance of aluminum welds in rail vehicles contribute greatly to the overall body shell strength and crashworthiness. In collisions involving seam-welded aluminum rail coaches—among others, the 1999 Ladbroke Grove accident in the United Kingdom, in which 31 people lost their lives (Figure 4)—some of the longitudinal seam welds fractured for some meters beyond the zone of severe damage, the panels themselves generally being intact without significant distortion. Research Process and Results The aim of the project was to gain the knowledge needed to design cost-effective aluminum rail vehicle bodies that would not fail in the event of catastrophic joint failure under extreme loading. To achieve this overall goal, several objectives were addressed, includ- ing determining performance specifications for joints, testing the absorption capacity of welds and develop- ing criteria for different kinds of joints, developing and validating models of material and joint failure, analyz- ing components and structures, and investigating alter- native welding techniques. The work was carried out in three phases. The first phase, a thorough investigation of existing joint designs and joining techniques, revealed shortcomings in exist- ing designs. The second phase concentrated on the fun- damental properties of aluminum weldments and on the performance of alternative welding techniques. Analyti- cal models of failure were developed and validated with tests. The third phase concentrated on modeling rail vehicle impact with and without improved joints. The results have improved the crashworthiness of alu- minum rail vehicles and can contribute to a reduction of fatalities in potential future accidents. The cost of the research is less than the statistical value of one fatality. The scientific impact of the project was large, with 13 papers and a dedicated international conference in 2005. The output has contributed directly to two European Standards (EN): EN 15085, Railway Applications—

102 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n Welding of Railway Vehicles and Components, and EN 15227, Crashworthiness Requirements for Railway Vehicle Bodies. Under the Fifth Research and Technological Development (RTD) Framework Programme, the ALJOIN project ran from 2002 to 2005. A European consortium (Denmark, Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) contracted the project. The cost of the project was approximately e2.2 million, of which e1.2 million was EU funded. The ALJOIN project was continued with the ALJOIN PLUS project, which was commissioned to provide the necessary information to create a benchmark for joints in aluminum rail vehicles against which improvements in joint design are measured. The United Kingdom Railway Safety and Standards Board funded it with a contribu- tion from Bombardier Transportation. Implementation Activities There was no specific implementation plan. However, the widely publicized accident in Ladbroke Grove and the ensuing investigation ensured the commitment of the stake- holders to addressing the identified safety-critical issues. The results were disseminated beyond the lifetime of the funding because of the interest generated and have led to EN standardization—thus, the results have become part of the regular body of standards of the European Union. Lessons Learned • ALJOIN addressed a specific technical problem that has concerned the rail manufacturing industry for many years by bringing together industry, academia, and research institutions in a joint effort to provide a solution. • ALJOIN provided a significant contribution to the report to the Cullen inquiry with regard to the 1999 Lad- broke Grove rail crash. • Industry recognition of a problem affecting the core of its business and its commitment to finding a solution can drive the success of the project. In this case, the safety concerns were particularly critical, as most modern rail vehicles are aluminum. • A coordinated response to a research need iden- tified as a consequence of a tragic event led to the understanding of fundamental issues related to alumi- num joining technologies and their crashworthiness. This understanding emphasized that a strong need for research is beneficial to success. • The quality of the work also contributed to the suc- cess of the project, as has the dissemination of its results beyond the lifetime of the funding. This is an important lesson that shows that results from research cannot be self-promoting and that appropriate postproject dissemi- nation is critical to maximizing the benefits. INNOTRACK INNOTRACK (Innovative Track Systems) was an ambitious research effort directed at increasing the competitiveness of the railway sector. Its success was largely due to the extensive network of stakeholders FIGURE 4 Vehicle involved in the Ladbroke Grove acci- dent. (Source: ALJOIN final technical report.) Examples of ALJOIN Implementation over Time, Including Early Adopters • The main ALJOIN project outcomes have been the implementation of a joint design for extruded aluminum sections and an input to ENs for aluminum welded joints. These are being put into commercial operation. • A 2009 ERRAC evaluation study showed confidence that the results were going to be used throughout Europe and supported by the EN stan- dardization system. One of the reasons for this confidence was that safety is one of the competi- tive factors in the transport industry. • The technical solutions developed through ALJOIN have been exploited by the European rail manufacturing industry and have already been implemented in the manufacture of rail vehicles. • The results have been made available for the review of the future revisions of the relevant stan- dards in the field of aluminum joint crashworthi- ness and for the construction of future aluminum railway car bodies.

103A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 that were engaged and to the advance planning done for implementation. Original Research Purpose and Need The European Commission founded the INNOTRACK research project under the Sixth Framework Programme. It was a joint response of the major stakeholders in the rail sector—infrastructure managers, the railway supply industry, and research bodies—to further develop a cost- effective, high-performance track infrastructure by pro- viding innovative solutions toward significant reduction of both investments and maintenance-related infrastruc- ture costs on a life-cycle basis. The final technical report states the objective in one sentence: “Increase the com- petitiveness of the railway sector by decreasing track- related life-cycle costs.” The project contributed to the objectives of the European Commission White Paper on Transport 2002. The second major objective of INNO- TRACK was to streamline the introduction of innovative solutions on a European scale. The need for the research stemmed from the wish and necessity for railways to keep playing an increasingly important role in the transport of goods and persons. The railways were facing new demands regarding speed and axle loads, higher availability and reliability, and increased environmental and safety demands. As the cost of track and substructure represents 50% to 60% of the maintenance and renewal cost of railways, a new approach to reducing life-cycle costs was neces- sary. Railways form a complex system. Originally built up from national perspective, rail is now an international system, the components of which are far from harmo- nized or standardized but still have to work together. Much of the knowledge was empirical and frag- mented, whereas many of the cost drivers were interna- tional; that is, the same cost drivers affected all systems. This led to an international research project in which eight European countries, more than 12 industrial part- ners, and nine research institutes participated. Research Process and Results The project ran from 2006 to 2010 and had a budget of about €20 million. It was organized in subprojects. To achieve a wider approach, a matrix organization was formed. Three vertical technical subprojects were devel- oped to meet the technical demands: • Track Support Structure (SP 2). This subproject studied track subgrade monitoring and assessment. Furthermore, evaluation and testing of superstructure innovations were carried out. • Switches and Crossings (SP 3). This subproject studied optimized switch designs in which predictive modeling played a key role. Further standardization of driving and locking devices was a key elements, as was the development of switch monitoring equipment. • Rails and Welding (SP 4). This subproject dealt with methods for establishing rail deterioration under varying operational conditions. It established mainte- nance criteria and methods. It further studied improved methods for the testing of rail materials, for rail inspec- tion, and for welding. These subprojects were supported by three cross- disciplinary (horizontal) subprojects created to verify and to give other aspects on technical solutions on the basis of the new demands mentioned above: • Duty and Requirements (SP 1). The aim of this subproject was first to identify current problems and cost drivers for the existing infrastructure. After the root causes had been identified, the project proposed innova- tive solutions to mitigate the problems. At the end of the project, a technical verification of technical solutions that had not been validated in the technical subproj- ects was carried out. The aim was to deliver innovative solutions that were both technically and economically verified. Finally, this subproject also assessed the overall potential cost reduction derived from the INNOTRACK solutions. • Life-Cycle Cost Assessment (SP 6). This subproject had two purposes. The first was to economically verify the innovative solutions to the technical problems. This task was carried out with LCC and RAMS analyses. The second purpose was to evaluate and develop a Europe- wide accepted process. • Logistics (SP 5). In this subproject, the potential for logistic improvements was identified and proposals for promising areas of improvement were brought forward. Furthermore, the subproject was responsible for a logis- tics assessment of derived technical solutions. Logistics should be understood in a broad sense that incorporates aspects such as sourcing and contracting. The result of the project overall was a toolbox compris- ing more than 140 reports with different deliverables: analyses, processes, methods, technical standards, and many innovative solutions. The approach from the perspective of the cost driv- ers brought the research immediately very close to the actual practice of the infrastructure manager and the contractors, which was high on both the technical and the market-readiness levels. Cost drivers include improving subgrade, subsoil assessment, track stiff- ness, rail grades, corrugation (Figure 5), insulated joints, rail cracks, switches and crossings, and LCC

104 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n methods. In the reports, each cost driver is analyzed and solutions are proposed. Some of these solutions are given in the shape of possible standards and have been submitted as such to the European standardiza- tion authorities. The INNOTRACK project has been a unique oppor- tunity to bring together rail infrastructure managers and industry suppliers and to concentrate on research issues that have a strong influence on the reduction of rail infrastructure life-cycle cost. Implementation Activities The INNOTRACK project and final report, as well as other deliverables, devote a lot of attention to imple- mentation. The INNOTRACK Concluding Technical Report notes that Many EU projects end when the project is for- mally finalised. . . . [I]t has been an ambition from the beginning to have a focus on implementation. This is the reason for the engagement and contri- bution with extra resources from the UIC [Interna- tional Union of Railways]. During and after the formal end of the project, extensive work has been carried out to prepare and support implementation of the results. This work has engaged many railways both inside and outside the consortium as well as several organizations and regulatory bodies. In addition, an implementation group has been established based on INNOTRACK Steering Com- mittee and Coordination Group. The aim of this group is to promote and coordinate the Europe- wide implementation of INNOTRACK results. Implementation activities were widespread but well designed, with the deliverables lying at the base of the implementation plan. One implementation stream included formulation of guidelines that have partly been submitted to standardization authorities (e.g., one on hollow sleepers). Also, seven databases were created for future R&D work. The other implementation stream consisted of the final technical report, which is the key to the 140 underlying deliverables. From that report, top management infor- mation material has been deduced. Activities included conferences, publications, specific information for infra- structure managers, and training and industry events. Although the INNOTRACK website is still available, it is not actualized any more. However, there are still active working groups, such as the Maintenance Working Group, and specific international projects that are follow-ups of INNOTRACK are still running. Barriers to Implementation Although the project aimed for an overall cost reduc- tion of 30%, and some examples show that good results have been obtained, it is hard to prove that this general reduction was actually realized. The main reason is that the problems, and also the technical solutions, are com- parable internationally; the specific local situation differs too much to be able to guarantee full-scale implementa- tion of all the possible improvements. Differences exist in the local technical situation (infrastructure, moving material, regulation, labor cost, circumstances), but also in the political situation. For instance, there was agreement on the method for calculating life-cycle costs, but the local parameters in the actual calculation are predominant when the LCC instrument is used, so that it is difficult to com- pare results, let alone coordinate decision making on a European scale. The reason for slow implementation is often that, for many participating members, there are no economic benefits to carrying on with the implementation work. However, the INNOTRACK project did set in motion an improvement process on a large scale, and this process FIGURE 5 Short wave formation (corrugation control). (Source: INNOTRACK final report.)

105A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 offered the whole sector (not only the participants) much information and material with which to improve. The general direction of that improvement is convergence of the different systems, but it is slow going. Finally the existing European procurement regulation does not make it easy to implement research and innova- tion results, as the parties involved in the earlier stages often find barriers to tendering in the implementation phase. Industrial partners and technical companies that take the initiative are sometimes punished for doing so, and therefore may be reticent when it comes to taking the lead in research and innovation. Lessons Learned INNOTRACK knew the following success factors for implementation: • Implementation was part of the aim of the proj- ect from the outset. Implementation received structural attention in the setup of the project, and deliverables on implementation were foreseen from the start. • Participants from all stakeholders were involved from the outset in defining the problem, doing the research, and discussing the answers. However, the total group was small enough to be able to work and coordinate efficiently. • The definition of the problem and the research method (cost drivers as an essential starting point of the research for improvement) placed the project high on both the technology and the market-readiness levels. Therefore, deliverables were close to the work experi- ence of the stakeholders. • The existence of market parties that are able to offer grinding as a service to the rail infrastructure provider is a key success factor for the introduction of rail grinding, because the provider is saved from having to buy a very expensive device for a relatively small network. Examples of INNOTRACK Implementation over Time, Including Early Adopters • One good example of the implementation of INNOTRACK is the treatment of rail cracks by grinding. Although this process had been known in Europe before 2006, the project proved to be the main catalyst for introducing this technology to Europe (and worldwide), even in countries that were skeptical at the beginning. • The technology is relatively expensive in terms of investment (one grinding unit would cost more than e20 million), but in the Netherlands alone, the cost savings amount to e50 million per year. Extrapolated to the European scale, this savings would probably amount to more than e1 billion. • Other implemented results from the projects are related to treating soil erosion in the substructure. Sweden is using lateral drilling and concrete insertion in locations where the substructure has weakened. • In Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland, much effort has been put into reducing the length of rail joints to prevent train wheels from excavating the rail ends on the joint. Also other, more durable welding techniques are being applied. Short-pitch corrugation on high-speed lines, an indication that grinding is required. (Source: INNOTRACK final report.) INNOTRACK Policy and Regulatory Issues, Including Financial Issues It is undeniable that implementation of many of the results from INNOTRACK would improve the business case of rail in comparison with other modes. In particular, the LCC instrument proves that many cost drivers can be handled more rationally. The actual situation in many countries, however, may prevent full-scale implementation. Basically, the essential decisions about care for the rail infrastructure lie in political hands throughout Europe. Decisions on investment in improving the infrastructure lie with politically responsible people and are not always made on the basis of sound business cases. Public opinion also plays a big role in this process. There is simply no real market incentive for improvement.

106 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n The following lessons can be drawn from this case: • Implementation of innovation will not come about without proper incentives, both for those responsible for maintenance and those responsible for the market. One of the incentives should be a reward (or, in any case, no punishment) for those involved in innovative research. • Procurement rules should be considered (or recon- sidered) to provide a bigger incentive for innovation. • Local differences often stand in the way of Europe- wide implementation of evident improvements: the rail sector retains the basic characteristics of a quilt. There is as yet no common language for comparing business cases between countries and agencies. • Close and intensive involvement of players in research projects such as INNOTRACK does give them a competitive advantage. River Information Services The case of River Information Services (RIS) is an exam- ple illustrating the possibility of full-scale implementa- tion of European research in member states through best practice supported by regulation and the use of the time and energy that is needed to do that successfully. Original Research Purpose and Need The origin of RIS lies in the effort of the European Com- mission in the 1990s to raise the status of inland naviga- tion to a full-scale alternative for transport by road and rail in Europe under the pressure of increasing congestion and safety concerns. At that time, several countries were working on information systems for inland shipping (more coordination had already been achieved in the maritime sector). As their work was not very coordinated, continua- tion could have led to the implementation of different tech- nologies in each country. European research, particularly that funded through EU research programs, has played a very important role in harmonizing the development of RIS. The policy development went hand in hand with European research. The interest of a number of countries in participating in this effort, particularly countries in the Rhine and Danube basins, stemmed from the necessity to tackle economical, transport operational, environmental, and safety issues upstream and downstream. Research Process and Results From 1990 onward, RIS was developed through a num- ber of research projects. The most influential of these were Efficient Inland Navigation Information System (INCARNATION), Inland Navigation Demonstrator for River Information Services (INDRIS), and Consor- tium Operational Management Platform River Informa- tion Services (COMPRIS), the last being mainly directed at implementation of RIS. The projects resulted from research calls by the Euro- pean Commission that were formulated in coordination with representatives from member states, the research industry, and the navigation sector. These were assem- bled in a platform Waterborne Support Group. Some of the consortia bidding for research already existed and had been involved in the European Cooperation in Sci- ence and Technology (COST) program. The INCARNATION project aimed at identification of administrative and organizational barriers and the assessment of informational and organizational require- ments and functionalities of an efficient inland naviga- tion information system with special regard to transport capacity and goods flow, safety of traffic, and transport of dangerous goods. INCARNATION • Covered 10 work packages that resulted in policy requirements, capacity and safety requirements, user requirements, and functional and technical specifications; • Encompassed the demonstration project of an onboard radar tracking system; and • Yielded recommendations on implementation in terms of further Europe-wide demonstration projects, introduction in national policies, legal aspects to consider, and the harmonization of reporting and communication procedures as well as standardization Europe-wide. The INDRIS project ran from 1997 to 2000. The main aim of the project was to set specifications for and to demonstrate and assess communication technolo- gies, management procedures, and information services for the RIS concept. The INDRIS project successfully demonstrated the technical realization of the RIS con- cept and many of its elements. Achievements included the following: • Incorporation of new technologies in inland navi- gation [Automatic Identification System (AIS) tran- sponders and the inland Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS)]; • Development of a framework for West European cooperation on RIS, standards, and harmonization (RIS guidelines, inland ECDIS standards, AIS standards); and • Development of more user-oriented applications, not only for vessel traffic management and safety of nav- igation but oriented also to value-added services for the transport industry (vessel traffic management in large areas, onboard applications, and logistic and transport information exchange).

107A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 A special feature regarding RIS implementation was the key role of the World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure (PIANC), which translated research into practical guidelines. The advantage was that PIANC, being a technical association, was further removed from the political stage than any committees the European Union might have set up. Moreover, because the Danube countries and Eastern European countries were members of PIANC, RIS had much broader support than the member countries of the European Union at that time could have had. The guidelines were published in 2002 and served as the basis for further implementation. Implementation Activities The COMPRIS project, which ran from 2002 to 2005, was intended to be the last stepping-stone before the full implementation of RIS across Europe. During the Pan- European Conference on Inland Waterway Transport in Rotterdam in September 2001, the European Ministers of Transport declared that RIS should be up and run- ning on the main European rivers within 5 years. The main objective of COMPRIS, a research and develop- ment project, was to contribute to this implementation strategy and, thus, to make the RIS concept feasible throughout Europe. Therefore, COMPRIS was to be linked to existing and future initiatives in the participat- ing European countries. Once the COMPRIS project had ended, the market forces were to be in a position to offer solutions and services on the basis of tested concepts and the specified standards. The project included creating an operational test platform, demonstrations to policy mak- ers and operational responsible management (Figure 6), and developing guidelines and e-learning training mod- ules. The steering committee consisted of government officials, but there was very open communication with market parties, especially in the pilots that were part of the project. The industry also participated financially in the pilots. In 2004, the Central Commission on the Rhine updated and adopted the PIANC guidelines. With the adoption of the RIS Framework Directive in 2005, the scene was fully set for the implementation of RIS. After the adoption of the European RIS directive, the pace of implementation seems to have diverged between countries. In its publication River Information Services: Modernising Inland Shipping Through Advanced Infor- mation Technologies, the European Commission gives a brief overview of the actual implementation of the RIS directive. Elements of the RIS solutions were imple- mented throughout the first decade, beginning in 2001. Although no single country seems to have implemented the entire range of RIS measures, Austria (which had already started implementation on the Danube early in 2001), the Netherlands, Germany, and Flanders had already implemented part of the available measures according to European standards in 2006. The first pan- European implementation had to wait until a few years after the publication and adoption of the RIS Frame- work Directive. At present, implementation in accor- dance with EU regulation is widespread in the European Union, in other European countries, and in many parts of the world, including the United States and China. The implementation of RIS has been limited to issues concerning navigation traffic management. There are more aspects to RIS, such as logistics, that have remained unimplemented. The same goes for the development of the interfaces between navigation and road and rail transport. The relationship of RIS key technologies to RIS services is shown in Figure 7. Barriers to Implementation On the whole, the implementation of RIS must be con- sidered as a success story. One must realize, though, that inland navigation is a niche market. It is small and, therefore, any innovation will need a long time to take hold because the return on investment on new products is slow. On one hand, being a small market helped in coming to agreements; on the other hand, the competi- tion in that market is severe, and political influence could be (and was) used to speed up or decelerate certain devel- opments. One example was the introduction of informa- tion systems that require privacy-sensitive information to be entered. This measure was held up for quite some time in the Netherlands by the lobby of the skippers’ organization. Along with being a niche market, inland navigation is not a wealthy sector. Any investment has a long payback time, and much of the capital in the sector is fixed in the assets (barges) themselves, which are mostly heavily FIGURE 6 Demonstrator vessel Ostarrichi.

108 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n mortgaged. Another limiting factor was the small number of research institutes, including specialized research institutes, and the lack of transparency in the sector. On a practical level, there was a certain lack of coordi- nation of the many pilots. There was no central direction of these efforts at implementation. On the policy side, the RIS directive that came into force after 15 years of research and development was the breakthrough needed for widespread implementation. Even then it took a few years for the directive to be implemented. The positive aspect was that the preceding process had assembled most of the stakeholders, so that the directive as such was no surprise. From a political point of view, the inland navigation sector is not a strong key player, but it definitely has influence on the political decision makers. Lessons Learned The following factors played a key role for implementation: • The European Commission took up a strong role at the outset of the process, coordinating and bringing parties together with a clear purpose. • The sector was involved in the early stages of the problem definition and all along during the research itself. • There was continuity in the institutes and persons involved. Although the projects ran for quite some time, changes in staffing were not very big. This continuity allowed for a certain trust to emerge between stakeholders. For the future, this same continuity poses another problem, as many key players are nearing the end of their active work. • Involvement of PIANC as an expert but relatively outside agency proved to be a considerable success fac- tor, in that it allowed separation of the political and tech- nical streams. • RIS generated a fairly strong expert platform that made it possible to discuss experiences from multiple pilots in different countries. • Translation of the expert work into European reg- ulation or directive was planned from the outset and the stakes were rather high for the stakeholders involved. This circumstance led to active participation. SAMARIS, ARCHES, and CERTAIN This case study considers three EU projects because they are interrelated. All three were strategically directed at diminishing the gap in the standard of highway infrastruc- ture between the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the rest of the European Union. In terms of full-scale implementation, these projects, whether individu- ally or together, did not quite meet the requirements of the supervisory panel for this study. However, these projects seem to be representative of quite a few research projects, and there are some useful lessons to be learned from them. RIS Key Technologies RIS Services RIS Services Waterway charges and port dues Statistics Information for law enforcement Information for Transport Logistics Hull Data RIS Index Reference Data Vessel Tracking and Tracing Systems Notice to Skippers Electronic Ship Reporting Inland ECDIS Calamity Abatement Support Traffic Management Traffic Information Services Fairway Information Service FIGURE 7 Relation between RIS key technologies and RIS services. (Source: PIANC Report 125-2011.)

109A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 The three projects are • Sustainable and Advanced Materials for Road Infrastructures (SAMARIS), • Assessment and Rehabilitation of Central Euro- pean Highway Structures (ARCHES), and • Central European Research in Road Infrastructure (CERTAIN). SAMARIS and ARCHES were mainly concerned with the content of the research, whereas CERTAIN aimed at dissemination and implementation of the results. Original Research Purpose and Need The purpose of the research that was commissioned through SAMARIS, ARCHES, and some other projects was at least twofold. In the 1990s, it was felt that an effort should be made to develop a common European body of knowledge about infrastructure construction, both for bridges and for pavements. The background for this initiative was the common European problem of the deteriorating state of maintenance of the infrastructure assets and the shortage of funds for and political interest in that problem. At the same time it was clear that the CEECs were building up a backlog in knowledge that had to be reduced if the European Commission were to remain justified in speaking about one trans-European network for roads. As some of the CEECs had recently joined the European Union, there needed to be a joint effort to reduce the distance. Under the Competitive and Sustainable Growth pro- gram (GROWTH), one of the subprograms of the Fifth RTD Framework Programme, the issue of materials was addressed specifically. Materials was also one of the cen- tral issues addressed in the FEHRL Strategic European Road Research Program (SERRP II). Research Process and Results What became the SAMARIS project was originally pro- posed under two different proposals, one on road pave- ments (MAP) and one on structures (STRIM) in 2000. At the request of the European Commission, these pro- posals were merged and resubmitted under the name of SAMARIS 1 year later and contracted in 2003; the two research streams were retained. The objective of the pavement stream was to encourage the sustainable use of recycled and secondary materials. The objective included preparation for the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) harmonization standards, which included developing guidelines for the use of recycled materials. The objective of the structures stream was to radi- cally improve efficiency and durability of repair meth- ods by reducing the number of hours of disruptive road closures. At the same time, the aim was to reduce costs, improve safety, and pay special attention to the CEECs. The project plan called for research, demonstration, and interaction with national road administrations and with other road professionals through a professional network. The project ran through 2006. The ARCHES project focused on structural assessment and monitoring, strategies for preventing deterioration, and the optimization of rehabilitation. It had four work packages, among which were the strengthening of bridges by bonded reinforcements and the hardening of structures with ultrahigh-performance fiber-reinforced concrete (UHPFRC). The project results were delivered in 2007. Both projects yielded an impressive number of practical research findings. Examples from SAMARIS are • A method for assessing alternative materials, • Test procedures, • Environmental annexes to road product standards in preparation for CEN standardization, • Technical guides for recycling techniques, • Methods for structure assessment, • Field trials of corrosion inhibitors, and • Full-scale application of UHPFRC for bridge reha- bilitation and guidelines for use. ARCHES yielded guidelines for nondestructive proof- load testing and corrosion testing, particularly with cathodic protection, and application of UHPFRC in a full-scale test in Slovenia. Implementation Activities To improve the chances of implementation, the SAMARIS project established an end user group to offer advice on prioritization of research issues, to review documents, and to discuss results. Meetings and newsletters were organized, and end users played the role of reviewers of the 17 main reports, mainly for practical relevance. In anticipation of difficulties with further implementation, the end user group was continued for some time after the formal end of the project. Parallel to this, the CERTAIN project was started in 2006. This project aimed at facilitating the integration of CEECs and new member states into the EU road research community. CERTAIN was composed of four work packages: organizing workshops, project management training, facilitating secondments, and developing web tools for experts and for dissemination purposes. The project ran

110 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n through 2010. Much attention was paid to the language barrier, which can be an obstacle for implementation in Europe. Courses, workshops, and the Internet platform were multilingual, and some documents were translated. Barriers to Implementation The SAMARIS report signaled the risk of lagging imple- mentation in the final report: Some of the obstacles are systemic and very dif- ficult to overcome from “below” or from “out- side.” Curiously, the very considerable economic “risk” of research and development is generally understood and accepted, but the much smaller risk involved in the implementation of the results of successful research is often seen as prohibitive. (Final Report, p. 8) Continuation of the end users group for some time was not able to overcome this situation. There were several reasons for the lack of implementation: • Lack of funds in general for maintenance and rehabilitation, a situation that led to increasing backlog and temporary solutions, some with large consequences for road users (e.g., closing off lanes on roads and bridges, detours, and speed limits); • Lack of national technical standardization for rehabilitation work; • Basing contract performance criteria on traditional experience more often than on the latest knowledge; • Long-term performance not being a critical con- dition in design–build contracts (the lowest price wins contracts any time); and • Uncertainty regarding whether universities took up project research results in their curriculums. Basically, there was no structural or systematic follow- up of research on a national scale in terms of training, standardization, or procurement regulation. Lessons Learned There were some success factors in the three projects, though mainly with regard to the execution of the research and the theoretical possibilities for implementation: • Aiming projects at gathering very practical knowl- edge and conducting research in target countries by Examples of Implementation of SAMARIS, ARCHES, and CERTAIN over Time, Including Early Adopters As the aim of the research was primarily to bring the CEECs up to date, implementation in Poland and Slovenia was chosen as an example. In spite of the efforts to create optimal conditions, the actual implementation of the results of the research remained minimal in the CEECs. In other European countries, many of the technologies were already being used, in part independently of the two projects described in this paper. Such was the case in Switzerland, where more than 15 applications of UHPFRC are known. In Norway, the knowledge generated in the SAMARIS project was taken up and further developed [by the Norwegian Concrete Innovation Center (COIN), among others]. The construction sector is one of the main promoters of the fiber technology involved, which is considered a known technology that is sometimes prescribed in construction rehabilitation. In other European countries, as well as in North America, China, and Japan, the technology is also available and being used frequently. In the CEECs, the implementation mostly stopped after the realization of the pilots. As these were real-life pilots, the results, such as the €Cˇezsoški Bridge in Slovenia, are still there. In fact, the pilot project for this bridge showed that applying new materials such as UHPFRC, though more expensive, even delivers a short-term benefit because of a shorter construction time, fewer labor costs, and less disruption over the whole project. ˇCezsoški Bridge, Slovenia, after application of UHPFRC. (Source: ARCHES report.)

111A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 bringing in experts from other EU countries can dimin- ish the not-invented-here factor. • When projects achieve clear short-term results on important issues (e.g., cost, less disruption, safety), the chances that they will result in implementation are higher. • Involving end users in the discussion of the practi- cability of the research and reviewing results from that angle is beneficial. • There should be specific outreach programs for tar- get groups (e.g., national regulatory authorities, decision makers, the construction industry), and it is preferable to finance these programs along with the research. • Translating information into the language of the end user overcomes the language barrier. • Involving universities may lead to adaptation of the teaching curricula at high schools and universities; how- ever, sometimes universities and research institutes are competitors (also in the eyes of the European Commission). • The construction sector may be an important motor behind the implementation of solutions, given (or earning) enough funds to develop innovative solutions. • Continuity of research staff leads to very good knowledge networks (although there is a risk of a short- age of experts over time). Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints The Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints project, which was part of the Netherlands’ Innovative Road Maintenance (IPW) program, is a good example of how innovation-driven research can yield improvements (in this case, reducing the noise factor in pavement and bridge joints). However, the procurement conditions prevented the general introduction of the winning concepts. Original Research Purpose and Need The use of silent asphalt is widespread in the Netherlands, particularly in noise-sensitive areas. The relative contri- bution of expansion joints (Figure 8) increases with the application of silent asphalt. Silent expansion joints, usu- ally bituminous, are used to reduce the noise of passing traffic. The average life span of the current silent expan- sion joints is too short: 3.5 years on average. This life span is much shorter than that of the adjacent silent asphalt, and this disparity causes both considerable additional costs for maintenance and traffic management and major disruption. The road authority, RWS, challenged the research and construction communities to develop silent expansion joints that would have the same life span as silent asphalt. These innovative joints were to be subjected to extensive laboratory testing and live trials (Figure 9). Research Process and Results The project did not take the shape of a traditional research project. It was part of the innovation program IPW and financed by that program. In 2007, RWS organized a contest for the market to come up with solutions that would be silent and have a life span of at least 10 years. In the first phase (2008), 15 proposals were submitted from different European countries. An independent jury of experts judged them according to published weighted criteria, which included noise reduction, cost, environ- mental aspects, and durability. Ten proposals survived the first phase of the contest and were subjected to exten- sive testing by three-dimensional finite element analysis with temperature and traffic load. The four proposals that remained after this phase were tested extensively in laboratory circumstances at the Netherlands Organisa- tion for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), Delft, and in real-time pilots in both the Netherlands and Switzerland in 2010. Three proposals fully met the contest require- FIGURE 8 Expansion joints. FIGURE 9 LinTrack laboratory simulation. (Source: Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands.)

112 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ments. Of these, two were selected as preferred standard solutions in the road construction manual (multiple choice matrix). The contest officially ended with a sym- posium in 2012. The conclusion is that the contest yielded at least two scientifically proved solutions that are silent, last more than 10 years, are cost effective over the maintenance life span, and can be applied in practice. Implementation Activities Owing to the specific character of this innovation pro- gram, the research was very close to the implementing organization from the outset. The scope of the research was already defined in practical terms. The implementa- tion plan consisted of including the research results in the existing construction manual to give both the client and the contractor all the information needed to specify the best solutions when contracting. The national Platform Expansion Joints (PVO) center played a role in disseminating the information generated in the project. PVO is the knowledge center for this sub- ject and assists construction companies and government organizations at all levels to come up with solutions. This knowledge center is cofunded by the public and private sectors. The platform organizes working groups, training, and meetings to share information. Barriers to Implementation The main barrier to standardized implementation of specific noise-reduction solutions lies in the procurement guidelines being used. In the Netherlands, the system of performance contracts is generally used for maintenance. LCC is not a standard requirement for performance- based maintenance contracts. For noise requirements in these contracts, any solution that meets the minimal requirement is accepted: those requirements dictate noise level and life span. Therefore, the contractor usually chooses the cheapest solution that meets the requirement. There are no concrete plans to change that situation, although it is expected that LCC will become a requirement in the near future, as it already is with new construction. Lessons Learned Although the specific expansion joints that won the contest are not (yet) being used as a standard, the pro- cess from research to implementation can be considered successful. In the past few years, developing and using silent joints has certainly gained momentum in both the Netherlands and some other European countries that use silent asphalt on a regular basis. Specific success factors for this project were as follows: • The issue of silent joints is widely recognized, par- ticularly in urban and semiurban areas. The penalty for exceeding the noise standards is high, as building proj- ects are being stopped because of it. • The research on expansion joints started on a rela- tively high market-readiness level. The issue was defined from a practical point of view by the people who had to implement the solutions. Examples of Implementation of Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints Project over Time, Including Early Adopters Although the research and innovation proj-ect on silent joints yielded concrete results in terms of design for a new generation of joints, none of the winning proposals has as yet been gen- erally applied in practice. Two of the joint produc- ers have a (small) market share, but application is not standard. The construction companies have developed their own, often cheaper solutions, partly on the basis of the research that took place (and was made public). Some construction companies buy the joints or material from specialized companies. It is, however, not certain that, on a life-cycle basis, these are the best and most durable solutions. The quality of the joints has greatly increased since the IPW project was initiated. There is increas- ing international interest in the technology, notably in Sweden and China, among other countries. Policy and Regulatory Issues, Including Financial Issues, for the Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints Project The Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints project was financed through the IPW Innova- tion Program and cost about €1 million. No direct return on investment was required. The market parties covered the development cost of the solu- tions; these were not refunded. Although silent joints are a Europe-wide issue, especially for bridges spanning valleys with habi- tation in mountainous areas, there are currently no EU standards. Noise expertise in the European Union is rather fragmented.

113A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 • The contest brought together researchers, contractors, producers, and the clients concerned. There was much interaction between the different phases of the contest. • The contest criteria and, therefore, the scope of the research were rather limited and quite clear to the participants. • Through setting the criteria, multidisciplinary teams were necessary for a successful result. This reduced surprises at the end of the project and delivered accept- able and viable solutions. • The whole project was monitored closely from the start, and deadlines and conditions were strict. Expertise on both content and process was available throughout the project. • The existence of PVO made it possible to disseminate results widely. Communication with all stakeholders was good throughout the project. Climate Change There is likely no issue more controversial or extensive than climate change. This case study chronicles the step-by-step process of research that moved this project forward. Original Research Purpose and Need Climate change is one of today’s big societal challenges. The effects of climate change have a huge impact on mobility and transport and, thus, on the economy and on the well-being of citizens everywhere. All transport infrastructure networks will suffer the results of increasing rainfall, more and more intense storms, and changes in temperature patterns. It is no wonder that, in many countries, research on climate change has reached a peak. The first priority was to understand the phenomenon of climate change. In the transport sector, however, the brunt of the research was directed at mitigation and adaptation strategies. Research was, and is, being undertaken by individual countries. More and more collective international research has been initiated because the knowledge is widespread, increasing knowledge is expensive, and there is a risk of duplication. In Europe, a research program was set up under the auspices of ERA-NET ROAD. This program was a coordination action funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Commission. Within the framework of this action, the call “Road Owners Get- ting to Grips with Climate Change” was launched as the first cross-border-funded joint research program. Eleven national road administrations (Austria, Den- mark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Nor- way, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) participated in the program and provided a total project budget of €1,350 million (Figure 10). Nineteen proposals from 18 different countries were submitted for the call. The research program aimed at providing road authorities all across Europe with the knowledge and tools necessary to get to grips with climate change and its effects on all elements of road management by adapting design rules, updating and improving data collection, and developing risk management methods. Research Process and Results Four of the 19 submitted projects were selected for funding: • Improved Local Winter Index to Assess Maintenance Needs and Adaptation Costs in Climate Change Scenarios (IRWIN), • Pavement Performance and Remediation Require- ments Following Climate Change (P2R2C2), • Risk Management for Roads in a Changing Climate (RIMAROCC), and • Storm Water Prevention—Methods to Predict Damage from Water Stream in and near Road Pavements in Lowland Areas: The Blue Spot Concept (SWAMP). These projects, which constituted the research program, are discussed next.

114 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n IRWIN: Improved Local Winter Index to Assess Maintenance Needs and Adaptation Costs in Climate Change Scenarios A winter index is a tool for planning and calculating winter maintenance work as compared with the present situation. It can also be used for evaluating road con- struction risks and construction dimensioning. However, winter indexes were not very detailed and did not take into account local climatic variations. Through the use of a dense network of stations, road weather informa- tion systems would improve winter index calculations because measurements would be taken close to the road and reveal short and local weather events. Swedish and Finnish data were used to improve the index. The following benefits were realized: better linkage between weather and maintenance needs, better under- standing of local weather variations, a user-friendly tool, and better coverage of extreme events such as heavy snowfall or strong winds. At the same time, the tool pro- vides a better basis for assessing the financial implica- tions of climate change for road owners. FIGURE 10 Results from individual country surveys on the assessment of the probability of effects and severity of consequences resulting from changes in climate parameters (P = probability, S = severity).

115A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 P2R2C2: Pavement Performance and Remediation Requirements Following Climate Change This project investigated the likely impacts of climate change in Europe, from the Alps northward, on the moisture and ice conditions in the pavement and the subgrade and the consequent behavior of the pavement material and pavement response to traffic over a 100- year timescale. The aims of the project were to • Study the likely differences in moisture (water) condition in the pavements of roads in Europe as a con- sequence of climate change, • Estimate the likely consequences for pavement and subgrade material behavior for a range of representative pavement types and climatic zones, • Assess uncertainties so as to permit risk and vulner- ability to be evaluated, • Define options for responding to the changes, and • Perform a cost-benefit analysis to allow road own- ers to determine the best options for their own situations. The project was performed through a combination of literature review, laboratory evaluation of materi- als, computational studies of pavement structural and hydrological performance, and development of recom- mendations suitable for implementation by road owners. Although the life cycle of pavement is much less than the time span over which climate change will have an influence on pavement performance, the effects of these changes on pavement construction, management, and use will be better understood. This knowledge will yield recommendations for design and construction param- eters in areas affected by changes. RIMAROCC: Risk Management for Roads in a Changing Climate The purpose of this study was to provide a systematic method for risk management on the basis of three ques- tions: What can happen? How likely is it to happen? If it does happen, what are the consequences? The RIMAROCC method was designed to meet the common needs of road owners and road administrators in Europe. The method seeks to present a framework for climate change adaptation for roads to help ensure that road networks will be more resilient to future climate change. The method is based on existing risk analysis and risk management tools for roads within the ERA- NET ROAD member states and others. It is designed to be compatible with and function in parallel with existing methods and to allow the maintenance of specific and functional methods for data collection, calculations, and cooperation. The method, which is also in line with ISO 31000 (risk management), consists of seven steps and is a cyclic process designed to continuously improve per- formance and capitalize on experiences. The method has been tested in practical case studies in four countries and at different scales, including the network scale (a 100- to 1,000-km network of primary roads), the section scale (a 20- to 100-km road section), and the structure scale (a bridge). In addition to demon- strating the method and showing its scope and limitations, these case studies show in concrete terms how the method can be implemented and what the possible adaptations of the overall methodological framework could be. SWAMP: Storm Water Prevention—Methods to Predict Damage from Water Stream in and near Road Pavements in Lowland Areas: The Blue Spot Concept A greater frequency and intensity of flooding is expected to result from climate change in many parts of Europe, particularly central and northern Europe. Flooding poses a great threat to roads and traffic and damages the road structures themselves. In many countries, design guide- lines for new road-related construction have changed in response to the anticipated future climate. Changing the entire existing road network would be very costly and most likely is not necessary. Identifying the weakest parts of the road network is the first and most important part of a climate adaptation strategy. The SWAMP project addressed the critical issue of finding the parts of the road network that were most vul- nerable to flooding by using a geographic information system. These parts are referred to as “blue spots.” It was believed that most resources should, at least initially, be spent on relatively few blue spots. Additionally, one should perhaps think twice before rebuilding or upgrad- ing structures. In many situations, the worst socioeco- nomic costs, which appear to be related to obstruction of traffic, may be avoided simply by using early warning systems combined with effective communication to the road users. The project dealt with the issue of how to limit the effects of flooding or, if possible, avoid flooding at blue spots. The project aimed to present the crucial issues to consider in the creation of national or even regional guidelines for inspection and maintenance. The suggestions were geared toward lowland areas that are relatively flat and toward mildly undulating landscapes; steep, sloping areas were not explicitly covered. The project also provided the following: • Guidance and instructions to engineers and people in charge of inspection, maintenance, and repair;

116 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n • Useful information to decision makers responsi- ble for renewal of the drainage system, with the aim of reducing future flooding and damage of the road net- work; and • Practical suggestions on how to perform field work in a systematic way over the season and also how to pre- pare the road system before, during, and after a heavy rain event. Implementation Activities At the conclusion of the program, a final event was organized by FEHRL and the German Federal Highway Research Institute (BASt) in 2010. The conference was organized around different workshops, reports, and pre- sentations of the projects’ results. The output of this research program was a series of reports that facilitate the understanding of this research across the countries of Europe. These reports were pre- sented as proposed guidelines. The work of this research program has been taken up by the Conference of European Directors of Roads (CEDR) in its working groups on climate change mit- igation and adaptation. This was possible because CEDR member states were already involved in the projects themselves. The implementation followed two lines: • The program was used as a starting point for fur- ther applied research funded through the CEDR call funding mechanism under the responsibility of the Task Group Research. Examples of further research following from the CEDR call “Road Owners Adapting to Climate Change” are the projects Roads for Today, Adapted for Tomorrow (ROADAPT) and Climate Projection Data- base for Roads (CLiPDaR). • Comparative studies on climate change mitigation and adaptation measures were initiated in CEDR mem- ber states under the responsibility of the respective task groups on climate change adaptation and mitigation. The road directors discussed these reports extensively in their meetings from 2011 to 2013. The working groups are being continued in the CEDR Strategic Plan and work program for 2013 to 2017. Barriers to Implementation During the 2010 conference held at the conclusion of the program, workshop participants identified several bar- riers to the development of the approaches and to their implementation in future. These barriers can be divided into two categories: • Scientific uncertainty or imperfection, such as the quality of climate modeling (need for more robust risk assessment) and uncertainty in prediction of emissions (need for more consistent future scenarios) and • Policy considerations, such as lack of funding for investment in necessary inspection and improvement of the networks and the difficulty of developing generic guidelines because local influences are so important. Sometimes policies are counterproductive. An example is the EU Water Framework Directive, which limits the amount of water that can be removed preventatively from a flood risk site. Lessons Learned This research program yielded the following lessons on conducting a program: • The projects were initiated rather individually and, therefore, developed a focus on specific climate risks and countries. This focus rendered the projects clearly applicable in specific circumstances but less interesting and less applicable for a larger number of stakeholders. Basically, SWAMP and RIMAROCC have been widely implemented, but the other two proj- ects have not. • Developing a robust database (in this case, on the impacts of climate change) could help road author- ities apply the knowledge flexibly, depending on local circumstances. • The workshop participants felt that more emphasis should have been placed on the implementation aspects of the results, either imbedded as part of the outcome of the projects or in a special call aimed specifically at implementation of results in selected places or countries in Europe. There was no defined strategy of how to pro- ceed with the available results. • The CEDR working group structure greatly assisted in translating research into practical recommen- dations and served as a catalyst for the involvement of road owners. Because much of the testing took place on the network itself, the results were directly recognizable. • If research activity is directed at a specific goal (as opposed to knowledge development without implementation in mind) the scope should be accordingly specific, as should the indication of the geographical area for which the research is meant to offer solutions. This specificity saves a lot of energy in the evaluation of tender proposals. These lessons have been input to the description of research needs for the CEDR call “Road Owners Adapt- ing to Climate Change.”

117A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 Examples of Implementation of the Climate Change Program over Time, Including Early Adopters The CEDR working method includes an investi-gation among the members of possibilities for and concrete examples of implementation of the recommendations included in final working group reports. Thus, there is a sample of actual experiences with the implementation of research, although the research itself first has to be translated into a for- mat that is manageable for road directors in actual practice. Thematic working groups therefore serve, on the one hand, as the initiator of research but on the other hand as the interpreter to the operational and responsible management. In the case of climate change mitigation and adaptation, several examples of intended imple- mentation were identified through a questionnaire. In the field of mitigation, these ranged from dis- semination of the reports and underlying research to the taking up of results in government policy papers by experts in the respective agencies. The following recent information on adaptation is available: • Germany. In Germany, the RIMAROCC method is elaborated at present in the currently running project Development of a Robust Gener- ally Applicable Indicator System for Ecological Changes in Floodplain Systems (RIVA), which has resulted in a product that generates maps with cli- mate risk locations. The SWAMP results could be used as a basis for an intermodal blue spot analysis in the future. • Denmark. In Denmark, the SWAMP project was implemented in a pilot project. The results from this project were used as a founding model in 2013 to further develop a risk analysis model to identify roads of particular interest with regard to flood risks. This project was called the Blue Spot Project. The developed model, including subse- quent cost–benefit analyses with the integration of socioeconomic calculations, is now (in 2014) being implemented on a national scale in Denmark. • Norway. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration used RIMAROCC as a reference for developing a procedure for risk assessment of roads and road structures for climate-related events. The R&D program was called Climate and Transport. Standards and handbooks for stormwa- ter trenches have been changed to address a pre- cipitation probability of 200 years instead of 100 years. SWAMP was not implemented in Norway, but the methodology is well known and is under evaluation in a new R&D program on natural haz- ards. IRWIN has also been used as a reference in the Climate and Transport program in the study of winter operations. However, winter indices are not in use. • The Netherlands. The Netherlands initiated a blue spot investigation following from the SWAMP project, and this investigation resulted in a report in 2012. The SWAMP method was custom fitted and further elaborated to the Dutch (flat) situation of polders and maintained water levels, which is different from hilly countries. Following the inves- tigation, a risk investigation of blue spots with the RIMAROCC method was begun and is currently in progress. The resulting maps of locations that are at risk are a basis for the planning of measures, if necessary. • Ireland. Ireland’s National Roads Authority participated closely in the Climate Change program and implemented the SWAMP and RIMAROCC projects, which resulted in practicable solutions. SWAMP was integrated into the national strategic knowledge map and used in flood mapping through detailed surface modeling that employed a geo- graphic information system. The findings resulted in a protocol for flood risk management. With the help of the RIMAROCC results, this protocol was then translated into a four-phase implementation plan that covered the establishment of a baseline database, detailed site-specific modeling (both in full use), and selection of mitigating measures and warning and evacuation systems. • Other countries. Within the ROADAPT proj- ect, the RIMAROCC method is currently being elaborated and fit to use by European road author- ities, generally for assessing all climate risks and not just flooding. Case studies are being done both in southern countries (Portugal) and in northern countries [the Denmark–Sweden Öresund region and the Netherlands–Germany Rotterdam–Ruhr corridor]. Other countries that were intending to implement (parts of) this research were Finland, France, Hungary, and Sweden.

118 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n u.S. caSe StudieS Highway Safety Manual The development of the Highway Safety Manual (HSM) represents the culmination of a decade-long research effort and demonstrates the importance of engaging a very broad range of stakeholders in the entire innova- tion process. This case study illustrates the institutional and resource challenges that a project of this magnitude must overcome. Original Research Purpose and Need With more than 30,000 fatalities per year occurring on U.S. roadways, it is clear that safety is and must continue to be the nation’s number one priority. Significant resources have been dedicated to improving roadway safety, partic- ularly through the leadership of FHWA. However, deci- sions regarding where to direct those resources and how they could be best used have often come down to a matter of professional judgment and past experience. The development of the HSM was an outgrowth of recognition that safety practitioners lacked a quantitative basis for objectively estimating the number of expected crashes on a roadway segment or at an intersection, particularly after safety countermeasures were applied. Nor did a tool exist that was sensitive to different traffic volumes, geometric characteristics of the site, crash his- tory, and the surrounding land uses. The ability of safety specialists not only to make informed decisions in the design of safety improvements but also to evaluate alter- natives and priorities in the planning phase was, therefore, severely limited. What was needed was a tool that would provide science-based methods for evaluating past safety performance and estimating future safety performance as a means of reducing fatalities and severe injury crashes on the nation’s 4 million miles of roadways. Research Process and Results It took approximately 11 years to produce the first edi- tion of the HSM. The manual’s complexity and impor- tance were in many ways unprecedented in the field of highway safety, and the HSM would not have been developed without the very close cooperation and sus- tained support of three major players: the Transporta- tion Research Board (TRB), AASHTO, and FHWA. The idea of developing a comprehensive resource document on roadway safety originated at the 1999 TRB Annual Meeting, at which a special session on predict- ing highway safety was held. At that session, there was a collective realization that the profession lacked a single authoritative document on how to quantitatively estimate safety and that such a resource was badly needed. That same year, a workshop was held to develop an initial out- line and plan for creating the HSM. The workshop was a joint effort of eight TRB standing committees and FHWA and led to the formation of the TRB Task Force for the Development of a Highway Safety Manual in the year 2000. The task force, which was composed of technical experts, academics, and representatives of the end user community, including the state departments of transpor- tation (DOTs), played a key role in identifying specific research needs for the HSM and providing technical over- sight to the ongoing research projects. Ultimately, the task force was one of the primary reviewing bodies of the HSM as the document moved to publication in 2010. Once a plan was developed, research for the HSM was funded primarily through TRB’s National Coop- erative Highway Research Program (NCHRP). FHWA provided significant leadership and research support for the entire program and helped the project maintain momentum from start to finish. The first edition of the HSM was developed and produced from eight separate NCHRP projects. Some of these projects focused on compiling and developing material on past safety-related research, and others conducted original safety research to fill gaps in the current knowledge base. These eight NCHRP projects took place from 2001 to 2010. Individual representatives of the state DOTs played a critical role in the entire project, as did AASHTO, the asso- ciation that represents the collective interests of all the state DOTs. AASHTO took on the responsibility of publishing the first edition of the HSM, and in so doing formed a joint task force with representatives from AASHTO subcommit- tees on design, traffic engineering, and safety management. The joint task force was tasked with ensuring the HSM would meet the needs of state DOTs and also with promot- ing the use of the HSM upon publication. Ultimately, all of these efforts resulted in the develop- ment of a comprehensive document that provides tools and methods for a qualitative and objective safety analysis of • Existing and expected safety performance of differ- ent roadway segments and intersections; • Alternative roadway projects and their potential effect on the severity and frequency of crashes; • Design decisions and exceptions that often arise within a project’s development and their corresponding effect on crash frequency and severity; and • Relative improvement in safety performance result- ing from projects or treatments that have been imple- mented (e.g., how effective a treatment was in reducing crashes). Plans for the second edition of the HSM have started. Research has continued since 2010 to work to fill in the

119A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 gaps in the roadway safety knowledge base. Currently, approximately 18 NCHRP projects are identified for inclusion in the second edition of the HSM. Some of these projects have been completed, some are ongoing, and some will be started in the near future. Each of the 18 projects is planned for integration into the second edi- tion, which has a targeted publication year of 2020. Implementation Activities Because of the extensive involvement of so many stake- holders and end users in the entire research process, a lot of pull was created well before the HSM was published. FHWA in particular did a lot to inform the highway safety community about the HSM, even while the docu- ment was being developed, and this activity further built anticipation for the end product. Also, many plans for implementation activities, including the development of training and outreach materials, were well under way. Training One of the greatest challenges in implementing the HSM has simply been giving people the knowledge to use it. Therefore, training has been a cornerstone of the imple- mentation efforts. Several different training initiatives targeted state DOTs and local agencies (e.g., counties and cities), many of which were organized and funded through government organizations. Following are some highlights: • Highway Safety Manual Implementation and Training Materials (NCHRP 17-38). This NCHRP proj- ect was undertaken and completed in time for the initial publication of the first edition of the HSM. It produced spreadsheet tools for implementing the crash prediction methods of the HSM as well as training materials on how to use the HSM. • Safety Management in a Data-Limited Environment Training. This course was developed by a subcommittee of the TRB Standing Committee on Highway Safety Performance, which was engaged throughout the entire development of the HSM. Materials produced included training materials and speakers’ notes for use through the Local Technical Assistance Program and Tribal Technical Assistance Program to present a day-long course. These two programs work with local agencies and tribes on surface transportation issues and improvements. • FHWA National Highway Institute HSM train- ing courses. The National Highway Institute, which is housed within FHWA, was formed more than 30 years ago to provide training to state DOTs and other trans- portation professionals. Nine courses were developed as part of the HSM implementation, including online and webinar-based courses.1 • FHWA Resource Center training. FHWA’s Resource Center is composed of national and interna- tional experts that provide technical assistance and train- ing to the highway community to advance innovation in all fields. To supplement the direct assistance they pro- vided in implementing the HSM, the Resource Center also developed three workshops, including “HSM for Local Officials.” Software and Tool Development One of the primary hurdles to implementation of the HSM was the initial lack of software with which to implement the new network screening and crash predic- tion methods within the HSM. The level of effort neces- sary to implement the methods by hand is too great to make their routine use feasible. As a result, the follow- ing efforts were undertaken to make it easier for practi- tioners to use the methods, including spreadsheet tools (mentioned above) and new software: • SafetyAnalyst software. FHWA initially funded the development of SafetyAnalyst software, which implements Part B of the HSM (“Roadway Safety Management Process”), at a large scale. The intent was to provide state DOTs with a tool they could use to help automate the network screening, diagnoses, countermeasure selection, and effectiveness evaluations. AASHTO has taken ownership of the software and now leads updates to it and deployment to states. • Interactive Highway Safety Design Model (IHSDM) software. FHWA updated a preexisting soft- ware tool, IHSDM, to include the predictive methods in the HSM. Practitioners can now use this free software to predict crashes on rural roads and highways, suburban and urban arterials, freeways, and interchanges. In-person opportunities and online resources have been established to facilitate information sharing between state DOTs and to help them share success stories in HSM implementation. Examples include the following: • Lead-States Program. The intent of this effort has been to jump-start HSM implementation by providing targeted technical assistance to a select group of “lead states” in implementing the HSM. The 13 lead states and eight support states taking part in this effort have shared information on their use of the HSM through multiple peer exchange workshops. This early effort, along with 1 Information on FHWA HSM training courses is available at http:// safety.fhwa.dot.gov/hsm/courses.cfm.

120 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n the development of an HSM user guide, will provide insights to help other states apply the HSM more accu- rately and routinely. • HSM website and online user forum. AASHTO established a website for HSM-specific materials that includes an online user forum where practitioners can post questions regarding the HSM and informed experts from AASHTO can post answers to their inquiries.2 • FHWA Crash Modification Factors Clearinghouse. In a unique forum for collaboration, FHWA established an online clearinghouse where researchers can post crash modification factors, which are then ranked on the basis of the quality of the studies that produced them. The intent of the website is to give practitioners and research- ers an up-to-date library of crash modification factors that reflects the collective current knowledge base.3 • Supplemental HSM implementation materials. FHWA and AASHTO have collaborated to produce several supplemental publications and outreach materials regarding the HSM, all of which are available on the HSM website. Barriers to Implementation • Lack of financial and staff resources. There has been considerable investment in training and other implementation efforts; however, with 52 states and more than 20,000 local agencies, much more needs to be done, including determining where priority should be directed. Also, resources are needed to collect and man- age additional data as the HSM methods are applied in practice. • Communication of the benefits of using the HSM. Although nearly 5,000 copies of the first edition of the HSM have been purchased and distributed, implementa- tion is still mixed. Although the lead states have been at the forefront of implementing the HSM, other states are just beginning to look seriously at its application. Communicating the value of the HSM analyses can be challenging, particularly in motivating decision makers and staff across multiple levels of an agency to allocate the necessary resources to learn and apply the HSM. • Lack of data. Many of the HSM methods are data intensive, and many state and local agencies still lack the ability to implement these methods. • Difficulty in using the HSM. In many ways, the concept of the HSM is very basic, but in practice it can be a challenge to apply. Effort needs to be made to continue 2 The HSM User Discussion Forum is at http://www.highway safetymanual.org/Pages/forum.aspx. The HSM website is http:// www.highwaysafetymanual.org/. 3 The Crash Modification Factors Clearinghouse is at http://www .cmfclearinghouse.org/. to simplify the HSM methods to facilitate their use in routine projects and activities. Lessons Learned • Balancing technical information and easy-to-apply information. AASHTO, FHWA, and TRB collectively aimed to include the most technically robust and accu- rate information in the HSM, and their efforts resulted in crash prediction modeling techniques that use statistical models and analysis unfamiliar or new to many practi- tioners. The challenge of presenting those models and methods in a manner in which practitioners can apply them and be able to interpret the results was, and con- tinues to be, one of the more formidable in producing future editions. As a result, there is increased focus on developing spreadsheet and software tools that automate the implementation of the methods to make the HSM easier for practitioners to use. • Integrating the HSM into established processes and programs. The states that have had the most success in integrating the HSM are those that have used it to supplement a process or program they had already estab- lished. For example, the Utah DOT has been working on integrating the HSM into its process for design exception and design variance evaluation and approval. The Ohio DOT has implemented SafetyAnalyst as its mechanism for managing safety on the Ohio road network. • Communication. Some of the hesitancy from states that were not early adopters of the HSM was related to whether the perceived additional effort to apply the HSM was worth the outcomes. Peer exchanges and shar- ing information, especially successful applications, are particularly valuable in overcoming some of the initial resistance to things that are new or different. The more that can be done at a peer-to-peer level rather than from the top down, the more successful the outcome appears to be. • Funding and resources. Many of the barriers to implementing the HSM relate to funding and resources to collect data or to understand how to the use the HSM. Many of the combined efforts of FHWA, AASHTO, and TRB have been directed to producing training and supplemental materials that address those issues and to making them available to states and local agencies free of charge. Flashing Yellow Arrow Left-Turn Display This case study highlights how important research can be in providing the technical justification for change and how that can be used to successfully support the institu- tional decisions that follow.

121A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 Original Research Purpose and Need Protected–permitted left-turn (PPLT) signal phasing at traffic signals has existed for many years in the United States, but prior to the completion of this research, various different displays were in use, a situation that led to driver confusion. There were also certain applications that created safety hazards as a result of the phenomenon known as yellow trap. The purpose of the research was twofold: to develop a uniform display for the PPLT that could be easily understood by motorists and also to develop a display that could overcome safety hazards presented by issues such as the yellow trap. The research was originally sought by AASHTO and was funded through NCHRP. Research Process and Results Figure 11 provides a summary of the major elements of the research along with a chronological overview of the research effort from project initiation through publica- tion of the final report and beyond. The research began with a cadre of different types of PPLT displays created by innovative engineers and practitioners around the country. The research involved extensive collection of field data throughout the United States, evaluation of existing displays, and completion of extensive human factor research to assess driver understanding of various displays. To meet the study objectives, and as shown in Figure 11, the research moved beyond traditional controlled- environment driver surveys and assessments. The project team used full-scale driving simulators to implement a pioneering effort in assessing human factors and driver understanding. The simulations were very beneficial in demonstrating to practitioners the driver understanding of the innovation. Later, the research team collaborated with FHWA and practitioners around the United States to implement the new flashing yellow arrow (FYA) display in the field. Ultimately, the research effort rec- ommended and tested a new FYA display. The project culminated with a research report that was published in 2003. Research Implementation Upon publication of the final research report, NCHRP Report 493: Evaluation of Traffic Signal Displays for Protected/Permissive Left-Turn Control, NCHRP and the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices continued work through the summer of 2004 to advance the implementation of the project recommenda- tions. These efforts included participation in the commit- tee’s task force meetings and review of draft language for the codes that would allow for national implementation of the FYA. Figure 12 presents the timeline and key steps associated with the implementation. The field implementation effort required careful coordination with FHWA to secure interim approval for field testing the new FYA. It also involved considerable effort to convince practitioners to try something new and serve as early implementers of the FYA. The involvement of practitioners in the pilot evaluations was helpful in convincing the larger group of practitioners. Ultimately, the new FYA was found to uncharacteristically appeal to the public at large and generally proved to be a great success in early implementation. Inclusion in FHWA’s Manual on Uniform Traf- fic Control Devices (MUTCD) is essential for traffic control devices in the United States. The MUTCD is the U.S. national standard for traffic control devices, although each U.S. state has the ability to adopt its own standard if it has unique circumstances that jus- tify a different standard. The first step in the process Final report is published Additional FYA sites in Oregon, Arizona, and Florida 464 drivers participate in full-scale driver simulator experiment conducted at UMass and TTI Intersection operations studies in eight states; 26 total studies 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 During the first phase of field studies, the project team developed and conducted a laptop computer–based photographic driver survey to determine driver understanding of the six basic PPLT displays in use nationwide. Static and dynamic survey techniques were used. National Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices considers placing the new FYA in the MUTCD Field implementation of first FYA display in Montgomery County, Maryland Laptop-based photographic driver survey of 2,465 people in eight states Project begins with 50-state survey on PPLT use A variety of left-turn signal displays, combined with signs, is used in the United States FIGURE 11 PPLT research timeline (UMass = University of Massachusetts; TTI = Texas Transportation Institute; FYA = flash- ing yellow arrow; MUTCD = Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices).

122 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n for inclusion in the MUTCD often is being approved as an experimental device (the FYA achieved this sta- tus in 2004). Gaining interim approval is the next step (the FYA achieved this status in 2006) before achiev- ing final approval as a standard in the MUTCD (the FYA achieved this status in 2009). After the FYA gained interim approval in 2006 and received con- tinued positive feedback within the U.S. traffic engi- neering community, many more jurisdictions began implementing the device. Formal inclusion of the FYA in the MUTCD in 2009 further accelerated its appli- cation. By 2012, at least 31 of the 50 U.S. states had begun implementing FYA for PPLT treatments. Barriers to Implementation • Resistance to change and lack of market readiness. One of the greatest challenges to implementation has simply been overcoming the inertia of continuing to do things the way they have always been done. Traffic engineers have a tendency to be conservative and need a fair bit of motivation or convincing to try a new method. In the case of the FYA, they also needed to understand and appreciate how the risk associated with the innovation had been reduced through R&D activities and results. • Technological barriers. For the experimental implementations, local agencies were provided a significant amount of assistance in developing signal controller logic to implement the FYA. This assistance bridged the gap between the initial research recommendation and the now-standard capabilities many controller manufacturers currently provide, but for which there initially was no market. • Communication. A big part of the implementation was simply getting the word out to public agencies across the United States through FHWA programs, NCHRP briefs, conferences, and webinars, among other activi- ties. Assistance was provided to agencies implementing the FYA across the country through public outreach pro- grams and answering staff questions related to opera- tional and safety aspects of the FYA. • Institutional barriers. The new traffic control device could not be deployed in the field without prior FHWA–MUTCD approval. The entire FHWA approval process took approximately 6 years. Lessons Learned • Local connections. Local connections were a key to securing participation in the research. The initial FYA research implementation sites were often in locations with which the research team and research panel personnel were familiar. As an example, Oregon, which now has more than 500 FYA displays in use, is the home state of one of the lead researchers for the original NCHRP research project. The combination of long-standing, trust-based connections with industry practitioners and close-in location were key elements in convincing often skeptical agencies to implement the FYA. • Federal leadership. The support and leadership of FHWA were essential to this implementation effort. While FHWA often plays an important leadership role in deploying innovation, in this case FHWA leadership was essential, given the need to gain approval for the FYA to be included in the MUTCD. • Early adopters. The first implementers of the FYA quickly became some of its best advocates. Initial field success bred champions for the display, and they helped to spread the word through conferences and other indus- try venues. • Seeing is believing. Traffic engineers and members of the law enforcement community were often the most skeptical of the FYA. In many cases, the general public and business community started requesting that the FYA be used in their locale after seeing it successfully used elsewhere. Instead of engineers installing new displays on their own initiative, public input sometimes com- pelled agency implementation. • Clear explanation and management of risk. Engi- neers tend to be risk averse. Working with legal practi- tioners such as the TRB Standing Committee on Tort Liability and Risk Management can help ensure risk is managed and minimized. • Communications. Disseminating practical lessons learned is a key. Agencies are more likely to implement the FYA if they have a good understanding of the pros and cons, of lessons learned from others, and of the tech- nical issues and costs involved. It is the classic proverb: Tell me and I forget, show me and I remember, involve me and I understand. • Continuing research. Continuing research helped demonstrate the success of the FYA. Following the pub- lication of the original NCHRP research report, other 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 MUTCD implementation coordination NCHRP 493 is published Pedestrian- friendly FYA FYA included in MUTCD FHWA interim approval for use of FYA Figure 12 FYA implementation timeline.

123A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 researchers at the national and state levels began to assess the operational and safety benefits of the FYA with before-and-after studies. The positive findings from these results helped keep the momentum moving for- ward for the FYA. Modern Roundabouts Although modern roundabouts are not a new concept in many European countries, their implementation in the United States has been a more recent success. This case study demonstrates how development of technical guides and tools can be a powerful accelerator for overcoming resistance to change. Original Research Purpose and Need Roundabouts are a form of intersection control in common use throughout the world today (Figure 13). Modern roundabouts are generally circular in shape, and their geometric features force traffic to slow down when passing through the intersection. Signs instruct motorists entering the roundabout to yield. The safety benefits of modern roundabouts are as follows: • Fewer vehicular conflict points, • Low absolute speeds, • Low relative speeds, and • Two-stage crossings for pedestrians. The first operation of a modern roundabout occurred in the United Kingdom in 1966, when the rule that entering motorists yield was first adopted. Research in the United Kingdom showed improvements in capacity, reductions in delays, and safety benefits with the operation of these roundabouts as compared with other types of intersections. In the decades that followed, modern roundabouts were adopted and constructed in Europe and Australia (1970s and 1980s), but the first modern roundabout in the United States was not constructed until 1990. In the following years, roundabout construction in the United States began to rise slowly and was concentrated in states with roundabout advocates such as Maryland and Florida. However, many transportation profession- als and agencies in the United States were still hesitant to recommend and install roundabouts because of a lack of objective nationwide guidelines on the planning, per- formance, and design of roundabouts. In 1997, FHWA commissioned the research that formed the basis of Roundabouts: An Informational Guide in 2000. Research Process and Results Although a few states published roundabout guides before 2000, the development of the FHWA roundabout guide was the first major research effort in the United States. The scope of the guide was to provide general information, planning techniques, evaluation procedures for assessing operational and safety performance, and design guidelines for roundabouts. After the first edition of Roundabouts: An Informational Guide was published in 2000, additional research efforts continued. NCHRP Report 572: Roundabouts in the United States, published in 2007, included an inventory of existing roundabouts and data related to their safety, operations, and design; the development of safety prediction models; an operational analysis method for estimating delay and queue lengths; speed prediction tools; and a study of pedestrian and bicyclist behavior at roundabouts. NCHRP Report 572 also provided the basis for an update, NCHRP 672: Roundabouts: An Informational Guide, 2nd ed. Finally, in 2009–2010, guidance on roundabouts was incorporated into the MUTCD and the Highway Capacity Manual (HCM). Roundabout research is ongoing, and the information and guidance available for practitioners continues to expand, including in the areas of freight movement, pedestrian and bicycle mobility, roundabout capacity models, and roundabout crash prediction models. Figure 14 provides a summary timeline of roundabout research in the United States. Implementation Activities After the publication of NCHRP 572: Roundabouts: An Informational Guide in 2000, states and local jurisdictions began to implement the research findings, publish state-specific guides, and adopt official policies FIGURE 13 Modern roundabout.

124 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n related to roundabouts. Figure 15 shows the rise in roundabouts in the United States. Use of roundabouts did not grow uniformly across the United States; in 1992, only three states had roundabouts. By 1997, that number had grown by 14 states, with some states, such as Florida, Colorado, and Maryland, lead- ing in the number of roundabouts implemented. After 2000, the number of roundabouts began to rise more quickly, as more states followed the guidance in Round- abouts: An Informational Guide. By the mid-2000s, only a small handful of states had not installed roundabouts, and today, all 50 states have them, although the number still varies substantially. These geographic differences in implementation are somewhat correlated with the differ- ent types of policies adopted by states and local jurisdic- tions. Eleven states have implemented statewide policies mandating analysis of the roundabout as an option when traffic control at an intersection is being considered, and these states have seen higher numbers of roundabouts per capita, per roadway mile, and per vehicle mile trav- eled than other states. The adoption of roundabouts as a policy decision in the states has also affected the rate at which roundabouts are implemented; states with no official mention of round- abouts in their transportation policy have been the slow- est to construct roundabouts. Figure 16 shows varying types of roundabout policies by state and compares the levels of roundabout implementation by state policy type. Some states, such as Georgia, have offered educa- tional courses in which researchers engaged state and local engineers in hands-on workshops to enable them to gain knowledge and confidence in the planning, design, and implementation of roundabouts. In 2008, FHWA included roundabouts in its list of nine proven safety countermeasures, an action that further encouraged roundabout implementation across the United States. In 2013, roundabout design was included in FHWA’s Every Day Counts initiative, which provides communications to high-level decision makers on the benefits of certain market-ready technologies and innovations and to practitioners regarding technical information. Barriers to Implementation • Lack of public support. In regions where roundabouts were unfamiliar to the public prior to their initial installation, public opinion has largely been negative. Research has shown that after the construction of a roundabout, public opinion generally shifts to a more positive view. However, lack of initial public 1990s: Maryland, Florida O&D guides 2009–2010: NCHRP Report 672, MUTCD, HSM, HCM 2007: NCHRP Report 572 2001–2007: Explosion of state guides and manuals 2000: FHWA roundabouts guide First modern use in the United States 2005 2010200019951990 FIGURE 14 Timeline for roundabout research in the United States (O&D = origin and destination). FIGURE 15 Total number of roundabouts in the United States. 3,000 N um b er o f R ou n d ab ou ts 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 Known Year Estimated Year Assumed Unknown Site Known Site but Unknown Year 500 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 0

125A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 understanding and experience in driving through the design has undoubtedly slowed the implementation of roundabout programs in parts of the United States. Communication and education have been key elements in improving public support. • Governance. Implementation has also been affected by the difficulty some states have had in establishing a roundabout program within the existing organizational structure of the state’s DOT. While some states have successfully implemented roundabout programs, others have lacked the internal resources and advocates to establish a roundabout program that can span internal divisions and allow for coordination and communication between agencies within their existing organizational structure, particularly with regard to design and safety. • Risk aversion and desire to minimize liability. In some cases, state agencies and engineers were initially reluctant to implement roundabouts because of concerns about risk and liability, given that roundabouts were an unknown in the United States. Also, roundabouts were slow to be adopted into manuals—although the first edi- tion of Roundabouts: An Informational Guide was pub- lished in 2000, roundabouts were not incorporated into the MUTCD and HCM until 2009 and 2010, respectively. FIGURE 15 Total number of roundabouts in the United States. Number Number of Roundabouts Roundabouts per Roundabouts per Policy Type of States Roundabouts per Trillion VMT Million Roadway Milesa Million Persons None 9 42 159.46 66.83 2.0 Consider—allow 12 280 313.62 241.25 3.2 Consider—encourage 19 1,207 979.34 812.64 9.0 Require analysis 11 747 1,277.22 1,035.01 11.6 Total 51 2,276 765.43 569.57 7.4 Note: VMT = vehicle miles traveled. aDoes not include Interstate miles. FIGURE 16 Types of roundabout policies in the United States and comparison of the level of roundabout implementation by policy type. Legend None Consider – Allow Consider – Encourage Evaluate Justify Strong

126 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n • Technical and safety concerns. In some states, freight industry organizations have raised concerns about affecting the movement of trucks through freight corridors. These concerns stem from perceptions that roundabout geometry will not accommodate trucks and that roundabouts would result in an overall capacity reduction and greater delays on truck routes. Additional research stemming from states, such as Minnesota and Wisconsin (Joint Roundabout Truck Study) and Kansas (Accommodating Oversize/Overweight Vehicles at Roundabouts), has provided guidance to states addressing these concerns. • Concern regarding how to provide accessible pedestrian crossings for all pedestrians, including those who are blind or visually impaired. The Americans with Disabilities Act, comprehensive legislation unique to the United States, requires pedestrian facilities to be accessi- ble to and usable by all pedestrians, including those who are blind or visually impaired. At double-lane round- abouts, these pedestrians are unable to safely assess gaps in vehicle flow, and a standard crosswalk is not accessible to them. NCHRP Project 3-78A investigated the effectiveness of different treatments at roundabout crossings, and the results of this research were published in NCHRP Report 674: Crossing Solutions at Round- abouts and Channelized Turn Lanes for Pedestrians with Vision Disabilities. NCHRP Project 3-78B is developing related guidelines. Lessons Learned • Federal leadership. Leadership, technical support, and funding from the federal level were critical to allow- ing states to build roundabout programs in the United States. Initial interest in roundabouts came from early adopter states, but it was not until FHWA commissioned the research and publication of Roundabouts: An Infor- mational Guide that all states had access to the guid- ance and technical knowledge needed to move programs forward. FHWA has continued to drive the roundabout program forward at the national level with the inclusion of roundabouts in its list of proven safety countermea- sures and with its peer-to-peer program, outreach mate- rials, support of ongoing research, and funding support of state programs. • Advocates and champions. In the case of round- abouts, the majority of early adopter states, such as Washington State and Maryland, and local agencies had a strong roundabout champion that was willing to drive the process of installing a roundabout initially. This advocate can also guide the development of a round- about program or policy that allows, encourages, or requires consideration of roundabouts. • Governance and policy. Strong policy at the state level has definitely had an impact on the level of imple- mentation. In states with stronger policies (those requir- ing consideration of a roundabout where feasible), roundabouts have been selected and installed more than in states with more flexible policies (those encouraging or allowing consideration of roundabouts) or no policy at all. • Starting where there is a demonstrated need. Early adopter states and agencies have been successful in installing roundabouts and gaining public support at intersections with high historical crash rates relative to other locations. • Sharing positive outcomes. Initially, Roundabouts: An Informational Guide provided evidence of the safety benefits of roundabouts. Ongoing research has contin- ued to support the finding that roundabouts have lower levels of serious injury and fatal crashes. As more juris- dictions have experienced positive safety and traffic flow outcomes with roundabouts, the adoption of this form of intersection control has accelerated. Sharing these sto- ries can have a snowball effect that simply feeds itself. • Diverse stakeholders. The interest and active engagement of professionals in a variety of specializa- tions enhanced the usefulness of the research. Because roundabouts appeal to practitioners in a variety of spe- cializations, representatives from diverse perspectives and groups within transportation came together and learned from each other through the research process. Roundabouts provided a topic of convergence and have led to interdisciplinary work and innovative thinking. Warm-Mix Asphalt Pavements This case study is an excellent example of how interna- tional cooperation was the impetus for a major change in asphalt paving in the United States and how federal leadership has had a tremendous impact on both the development of the product and the acceleration of its implementation. Original Research Purpose and Need This case study focuses on the successful implementa- tion of warm-mix asphalt (WMA) in asphalt pavements. WMA is a generic term for any asphalt technology that reduces the mixing and placement temperatures of asphalt mixtures for the construction of pavements. In general, WMA is produced at temperatures lower than those of typical hot-mix asphalt. WMA traces its origins to Europe in the late 1990s, and its original purpose was to respond to the need for reduced construction tempera- ture and worker comfort in asphalt-related industries.

127A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 However, subsequent research and application of the technology soon demonstrated several other benefits. A survey conducted by the National Asphalt Pavement Association (NAPA) in 2012 revealed that every state in the United States has built at least one WMA project. The primary benefits identified in the NAPA survey are summarized in Figure 17. Interest in the use of WMA grew at a very high rate in the United States, and the European experience indicated that with further research and development, WMA could provide many potential benefits for U.S. applications. Research Process and Results In 2004, the first WMA pavement was constructed in the United States. In 2005, FHWA and the industry formed a WMA Technical Working Group to further guide the implementation of WMA, collect data, conduct analysis, recommend research, and develop guidelines and specifi- cations. The FHWA Mobil Asphalt Testing Trailer con- ducted the first of 14 testing and evaluation field projects in 2006. FHWA’s Western Federal Lands Highway Divi- sion constructed its first WMA project in Yellowstone National Park in 2007. FHWA and AASHTO conducted a European scan of WMA technologies and their perfor- mance in 2007. The first of three editions of Warm Mix Asphalt: Best Practices was published in 2008.4 4 This publication is available at http://www.asphaltpavement.org/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=313&Itemid=1308. Despite the promise and potential benefits of WMA, concerns remained; as a result, several national stud- ies needed to be conducted to address those concerns and to help better define the benefits of the technolo- gies. One of the most common concerns was the lack of standard guidance for the mix design when WMA technologies were used. To address this concern, sev- eral national research projects were undertaken with the strong support of FHWA and equally strong participa- tion of the member state DOTs of AASHTO. The states and FHWA were able to pool their funds to make this possible through NCHRP. These studies examined the following issues: • Development of revisions to the Superpave® mix design process for WMA, including performance tests to assess the efficacy of WMA mix designs; • Establishment of relationships between laboratory- measured engineering properties and the field performance of pavements constructed with WMA and HMA mixes; • Comparison of the relative performance, costs, energy use, and emissions of WMA and conventional HMA pavements; • Assessment of whether WMA technologies FIGURE 17 Industry responses on benefits of using WMA (RAP = recycled asphalt pavement; RAS = recycled asphalt shingles). (Source: Hansen, K. R., and A. Copeland. Annual Asphalt Pavement Survey on Recycled Materials and Warm-Mix Asphalt Usage: 2009–2012. IS-138. National Asphalt Pavement Association, Lanham, Md., 2013.) Better work environment for crews Reduced plant emissions Better workability Energy savings Extended paving season Longer haul distances Improved in-place distances Minimizing bumps over crack sealed Allows higher RAP and RAS 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percentage of Responses 4 This publication is available at http://www.asphaltpavement.org/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=313&Itemid=1308.

128 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n adversely affect the moisture susceptibility of flexible pavements and development of guidelines for identifying and limiting moisture susceptibility in WMA pavements; • Monitoring of the long-term field performance of selected WMA projects across the United States and evaluation of laboratory-measured mix properties to determine which characteristics can be related to field performance; • Investigation of the key properties of foamed asphalt binders; • Development of a procedure to simulate long-term aging of WMA and HMA asphalt; and • Development of a design and evaluation procedure for the use of recycled asphalt shingles in WMA. To address the need for more comprehensive guidance for the design of mixes that use WMA technologies, the Turner–Fairbank Highway Research Center recently constructed full-scale test sections that use varying levels of recycled materials (recycled asphalt pavement and recycled asphalt shingles) with alternative production technologies. These sections are being tested to failure to identify optimal pairing of WMA technology with the level of recycled materials while ensuring little or no impact on performance as compared with conventional pavement materials. Plans are to complete this testing by early 2016. Implementation Activities Beginning in 2010, FHWA’s Every Day Counts initiative played an instrumental role in helping to spread the word about the benefits of WMA technology and research results. The fundamental purpose of Every Day Counts is to identify and deploy innovation and promising technology aimed at shortening project delivery, enhancing the safety of roadways, and protecting the environment. The program provides communications to high-level decision makers regarding the benefits of certain market-ready technologies and innovations and to practitioners regarding technical information. Every Day Counts offers extensive webinars to assist with outreach and information sharing, technical assistance (often on-site) to states and other agencies interested in the innovations, ongoing newsletters, and a limited amount of financial assistance for demonstration projects.5 The WMA Technology Working Group also played an important role in disseminating information to stakeholders and manufacturers. WMA was a focal point at national and international conferences related to asphalt technology. 5 More information regarding Every Day Counts can be found at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/everydaycounts/. In 2005, there were three documented technologies for WMA in the United States. By 2012, that number had increased to more than 30. NAPA surveys6 showed that • In 2009, WMA accounted for only 5% of all asphalt plant mix production; • By 2010, WMA accounted for 11% of all asphalt plant mix production; • By 2011, WMA had grown to 19% of all asphalt plant mix production; • By 2012, with the inclusion of WMA in the Every Day Counts initiative, WMA accounted for approxi- mately 24% of all asphalt plant mix production in the United States; and • FHWA and its partners envisioned that WMA will constitute 75% of the market in the next 3 to 5 years. The surveys also showed that WMA usage had grown among all segments of owners. Most new pavement tech- nologies typically are implemented first by state agen- cies, but the state agency experience has led to growth in both local agencies and the private sector (i.e., real estate developers). In summary, it is clear that use of WMA is growing rapidly across all segments. Many of the states have fully implemented WMA and allow contractors to use approved WMA technologies. However, the survey data also show that implementation of WMA is not uniform across U.S. market segments and that some state highway agencies still consider WMA an experimental technology. There is also a fairly wide dis- parity among the geographic regions. The implementation of WMA can clearly be consid- ered successful and is perhaps one of the most successful implementations of new technology in the United States in terms of how rapidly the technology has grown in such a short period of time. WMA should indeed be con- sidered a model in many respects for rapid deployment of innovation. While research will continue to address issues of both cost and performance, it is clear that WMA technology offers many benefits from an engineering and environmental perspective. Barriers to Implementation • Resources. Cost is a factor. While the cost differential between WMA and high-temperature technology has decreased significantly overtime (particularly with the development of asphalt foaming systems), the initial cost of WMA is still higher than that of traditional methods. 6 Hansen, K. R., and A. Copeland. Annual Asphalt Pavement Survey on Recycled Materials and Warm-Mix Asphalt Usage: 2009–2012. IS-138. National Asphalt Pavement Association, Lanham, Md., 2013.

129A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 Government contracts are typically awarded to the lowest bid, which creates an inherent disadvantage for WMA. • Governance. There is a general lack of guidance on specifications for WMA. In addition to the cost dif- ferential just noted, WMA is typically not specified as a requirement in bidding. This circumstance may very well change over time as benefits of WMA become increas- ingly known. • Continuing development. There is currently a lack of long-term performance statistics for WMA. Many pavement engineers have had concerns about the long-term performance of the mixtures, especially with regard to susceptibility to rutting and moisture damage. However, significant progress is being made with continued research and development of WMA technologies. The Long-Term Pavement Performance (LTPP) program has initiated a new experiment that will collect and monitor data on the long-term perfor- mance of WMA pavements. Lessons Learned • Stakeholder involvement. Engaging the industry from the beginning has been, and remains, a key to suc- cess. In most states where WMA has been adopted into standard practice, the highway agencies were open to innovations through the use of permissive specifications and quickly accepted WMA technologies that have had successful demonstration projects. • Federal leadership. FHWA’s national leadership role was critical. WMA technology was a featured focus of the FHWA Every Day Counts initiative as well as the focus of the agency’s WMA Technical Working Group and Mobile Asphalt Testing Trailer Program. FHWA’s leadership is often an important factor in serving as a catalyst for state agencies to adopt new highway technology. In addition, the outreach program played an important role in simply educating and disseminating information. • Development. The “D” in R&D is critical. WMA technology is another example that highlights the impor- tance of further development and testing beyond the initial technology to address refinement of engineering properties and market concerns, including cost and per- formance factors. Heavy Rail Acoustic Bearing Detector Implementation of a new technology to a smaller community of users (e.g., the rail industry) does not necessarily make the implementation any easier. Finding support and funding for the development of the technology is critical, as is the importance of having a credible early adopter. Original Research Purpose and Need Preventing serious crashes on the nation’s rail system is critical to protecting the lives of the public and those that work on the railroad but also has a tremendous impact on the economic viability of the industry. As in all safety issues, the greatest challenge is identifying the factors that could contribute to crashes and then taking actions to counteract those factors in a way that does not disrupt the flow of freight and passengers. One of the factors that has been found to contribute to the potential for rail crashes is defects in the roller bearings of the wheels. From 1990 through 2005, the North American railroad system experienced an average of 40 to 60 reportable incidents per year related to bearing failure. The costs of reported derailments in 1998 exceeded $24 million. These unacceptable bearing- related derailments continued to occur despite thousands of thermal scanners placed every 10 to 20 miles along the mainline. A detection system based on earlier warnings of defects would have the advantage of allowing bearings to be removed from service proactively during routine maintenance. Development and implementation of an improved system for wayside acoustic detection of roller bear- ing defects has been a railroad industry objective for at least 25 years. The work on this objective began in 1995 as an Association of American Railroads (AAR) Strategic Research Initiative with the initial step of obtaining acoustic signatures of roller bearing defects. The purpose of the research was to identify a nonin- trusive approach for detecting internal bearing defects without stops in train service. The early warning would allow for removal of wheel sets before the bearings could overheat. Research Process and Results The research was very much a public–private partnership. The Transportation Technology Center, Inc., (TTCI) had been deeply involved in the research and development effort since 1994. The original collection of the acoustic signatures was obtained first in the laboratory and then on TTCI test tracks. The next step involved creating a developmental system for field testing and demonstration; that goal was achieved with the installation of the first functioning system on the Conrail railroad in Middlesex, New Jersey, in 1998. After testing for some time, and with enough success to prove the feasibility of the concept, the research proj-

130 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ect was completed in 1999. Although the research work was made available to potential manufacturers, no com- pany stepped forward to develop the system for revenue service. With no viable alternative, TTCI agreed to bring the acoustic detection concept to market. By 2001, four production prototype acoustic bearing detection systems were operating: one in North America, two in South Africa, and one in Australia. The data these systems generated led to a production detection system for tapered roller bearings that was available for imple- mentation on any heavy haul freight railway. Implementation Activities Early implementation proved somewhat challenging, but AAR has a robust system for communicating new technology through research briefs, publications, and conferences. Further, the international rail community is relatively small as compared with the highway com- munity, which makes it easier to share and disseminate new technology and research results. However, as with others of these case studies, finding early adopters of the technology was critical to achieving widespread implementation. The first North American acoustic detection systems were installed in 2002. The Trackside Acoustic Detec- tion System (TADS) was originally designed to detect internal defects that met AAR standards for condemn- able roller bearing defects. After some use of the system, however, it became apparent that larger defects repre- senting higher risk needed to be correctly detected and characterized in order to prioritize bearing removals. This issue became one focus of further development of the detection algorithm, which was first installed in the field in 2005. In North America 18 TADS are now in use, includ- ing three portable systems. It is estimated that approxi- mately 75% of the Class I rail network is covered by acoustic bearing detectors. With the wider implemen- tation of acoustic bearing detection systems and with improvements in the use of the existing thermal systems, reportable incidents related to bearings, which ranged from 40 to 60 per year between 1990 and 2005, have fallen to an average of 10 to 15 per year since 2010. In December 2003, the first TADS was installed in China. After its initial evaluation of TADS, the Chinese Ministry of Railways made plans to install acoustic detection systems across its national rail network. Today approximately 80 TADS are in operation in China. Examples of TADS are shown in Figure 18. Barriers to Implementation • Resources. Funding for further development and refinement of the technology beyond the initial research project was needed. For this particular technology, there was a need to develop a product that could overcome several issues, including working in extreme weather conditions and limiting false positive detections. • Lack of early adopters. There was a lack of rail- road operators willing to deploy the early versions of the technology for testing and further development. Rail- road operators needed to see success before implementa- tion on a wider scale. Lessons Learned • Early adopters. Finding a willing test partner was again an important part of the success. In North America, (a) (b) FIGURE 18 Typical TADS installations: (a) North America and (b) China.

131A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 Conrail and BNSF Railway were early partners, and they saw potential for the technology. As discussed previously, the railroad community is fairly small, and word of the early results and sharing of results led to wider implementation. • Development. Once again, the “D” in R&D was critical. With most new technology (particularly for new products), the initial research is often just the beginning (and often the least expensive). Further development and testing is required to make a product market ready. For- tunately, in this case, TTCI was willing to invest its finan- cial resources to further develop the product and bring it to market. Without that investment, the results of this research easily could never have been implemented. • Resources. This case study can clearly be consid- ered a successful implementation, but it was one that required patience, perseverance, and financial resources to bring the product to market. One of the more impor- tant lessons learned is perhaps the need to devote money in research programs to further development of promis- ing technology to get it closer to being market ready and to help overcome some of the inherent risk and uncer- tainty of product development. Bus Rapid Transit This case study is centered on a fairly mature practice, bus rapid transit (BRT), that had already been imple- mented in several other countries. Although BRT was in practice elsewhere, research was still needed to refine the concept to meet needs of the U.S. market and to address that market’s unique concerns. Once this goal was achieved, BRT became widely accepted. Original Research Purpose and Need Like modern roundabouts, BRT had been used suc- cessfully in many places outside the United States, but research was required to determine how to best support its implementation inside the United States. The timeline for BRT development in the United States (Figure 19) can generally be divided into three phases: 1. Phase 1. Pioneering implementations. Between 1977 and 2002, BRT service was initiated in 14 North American cities; in eight of these cities, the service was initiated even before the earliest U.S. BRT guidelines had been developed. However, it became clear that information needed to be shared between those who had implemented BRT and those who were consid- ering such systems. In 2003, the Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) published TCRP Report 90: Bus Rapid Transit in two volumes. Volume 1: Case Studies in Bus Rapid Transit studied inter- national BRT systems and several of the pioneering U.S. systems. Volume 2: Implementation Guidelines provided broad implementation guidelines based on international and domestic experience. A year later, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) published Characteristics of Bus Rapid Transit for Decision- Making, which provided information about charac- teristics of the first wave of BRT in the United States, discussed the benefits of BRT, and offered implemen- tation guidelines. 2. Phase 2. Early lessons learned and guidelines. By around 2003, BRT was moving from a pioneering phase to one that was built on the experience and les- Pioneering implementations Early Lessons Learned & Guidelines Refining the Knowledge 54 BRT Services24 BRT Services14 BRT Services 1977 2003 2007 2015 19 99 — FT A co m m en ce s B RT de m on str at ion pr og ra m (1 0 l oc at ion s) 20 03 — TC RP Re po rt 90 , V olu m es 1 & 2 20 03 — ITA -e nh an ce d b us ra pi d t ra ns it 20 10 — AP TA Re co m m en de d P ra cti ce se rie s 20 11 — BR T c las sifi ed as di sti nc t m od e i n N TD 20 13 — TC QS M in clu de s B RT 20 14 — TC RP A -3 9 20 07 — Bu s R ap id Tra ns it P rac tit ion er’ s G uid e 20 09 — Ch ara cte ris tic s o f B us Ra pid Tr an sit fo r D ec isio n-M ak ing , 2 nd ed . 20 10 — Bu s a nd Ra il P ref ere nti al Tre atm en ts in Mi xe d T ra c 20 03 — Bu s R ap id Tra ns it V eh icl e D em an d a nd Su pp ly An aly sis 20 04 — Ch ara cte ris tic s o f B us Ra pid Tr an sit fo r D ec isio n-M ak ing , 1 st ed . 20 06 — Ap pli ca bil ity pf Bo go ta’ s T ran sM ile nio BR T S yst em fo r th e U nit ed St ate s 20 02 — Bu s R ap id Tra ns it a nd th e A me ric an Co mm un ity FIGURE 19 Timeline of North American BRT development (ITS = intelligent transportation systems; NTD = National Transit Database; TCQSM = Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual; TCRP A-39 = Improving Transportation Network Efficiency Through Implementation of Transit-Supportive Roadway Strategies).

132 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n sons learned by the early adopters. As guidelines were developed that incorporated those lessons and experi- ences, BRT made the transition from an experimental application to an accepted (and highly regarded) solu- tion to multiple urban transportation issues. By 2005, 24 new BRT systems were being implemented in 11 North American cities. Several of these services were expan- sions of existing BRT systems. As an example, in Los Angeles, the success of Metro Rapid (BRT in mixed traf- fic operation) led to the development of the Orange Line (BRT in busway operation). 3. Phase 3. Refining the knowledge. In more recent years, implementation efforts have focused on develop- ing and sharing information on particular issues that affect BRT installations. In many ways, this activity could be considered development, as it recognizes that BRT is an evolving concept that needs to continue to mature, even this far into deployment. By 2007, North American experience with BRT and growing interest from communities led to research that explored specific emerging issues and concerns and offered U.S. transit agencies stronger guidance for BRT implementation. Research conducted during this period including studies focused on – At-grade crossings of busways, – The costs and impacts of specific BRT components, – Development of a method for forecasting BRT ridership, – Recommended practice for BRT running ways and stations and other BRT service components, and – Approaches to implementing transit preferential treatments in conjunction with BRT and other types of bus services. Between 2007 and 2013, 54 new BRT services were implemented in North America. As in the previous wave of implementations, several were expansions of existing BRT networks. Some of the new services included more high-end features than the original services in the same community (e.g., in the York Region of Ontario, Canada, and in Las Vegas, Nevada). Two more BRT services were implemented in the United States in January 2014. This means that, as of January 2014, at least 94 BRT services had begun operations in North America. Implementations by year through 2013 are depicted in Figure 20. At least 70, and possibly up to 90, new BRT services are currently proposed or under development in North America. One indicator of the extent to which BRT has become a state of the practice modality is treatment of BRT as a distinct mode in the National Transit Data- base (NTD) as of 2011 and in the Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual (TCQSM) as of 2013. These changes to the NTD and the TCQSM are promising developments for the future availability of BRT data and analysis tools. Barriers to Implementation • Product definition. The development of BRT in the United States has faced several challenges. A fundamental challenge has been defining what is and what is not BRT. This definition is an ongoing impediment for practitioners who are trying to describe BRT to stakeholders, decide between alternative transit modes and services, and make effective decisions for transportation investment. FTA says FIGURE 20 North American BRT services implemented, by year. 11 19 77 19 78 19 79 19 80 19 81 19 82 19 83 19 84 19 85 19 86 19 87 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 N u m b er o f B R T Se rv ic es Im p le m en te d 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

133A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 that BRT is “a rapid mode of transportation that can pro- vide the quality of rail transit and the flexibility of buses.” TCRP Report 90 says that BRT is “a flexible, rubber-tired form of rapid transit that combines stations, vehicles, ser- vices, running ways, and ITS [intelligent transportation systems] elements into an integrated system with a strong identity.” BRT has been implemented as the bus equivalent of streetcar or light rail transit service, but BRT has also been implemented as a branded express bus service. • Product flexibility. Although the flexibility with which BRT can be designed, implemented, and operated is one of its strongest advantages, this flexibility is also one of its greatest challenges. Given that BRT systems can include an extensively varying combination of features (e.g., different types of vehicles, running ways, stations, and service plans), it is all the more imperative that planners carefully consider options for each feature of the service, how those features will be packaged, and how they will be phased into implementation. There is no simple, one-size-fits-all approach to implementing BRT; what works in Cleveland may not work in Los Angeles. Fortunately, as more cities implement BRT and variations thereof, there is an increasingly larger body of knowledge and experience for researchers to study and for agencies to benefit from. Looking at other agencies’ experiences with BRT should be part of any analysis of alternatives that considers BRT. Finally, while BRT can provide similar service at a lower cost than light rail transit and streetcar service, recent studies do show that BRT can still be an expensive capital project. • Communication of purpose. A related challenge is that rail modes are typically seen as better and more desirable than bus modes and that BRT might be perceived as just another bus service. Accordingly, it is important to consider how well informed stakeholders are with respect to BRT and BRT features. These stakeholders include the public, landowners, and developers as well as public agencies and local governments with an interest in the project. Some stakeholders, such as developers, may initially see BRT as just another bus service and not realize that BRT has been shown to have positive impacts on land development when it is appropriately designed (e.g., Boston, Massachusetts; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Ottawa, Canada). The specific features of the BRT service will have an influence on whether or not developers will continue to see it as just another bus service. Lessons Learned • Evolution. The development of BRT in North America has been cyclical. Initial implementations provide a body of experience that can be analyzed and can serve as the basis of planning, operations, and design guidelines. Continued implementation supports more robust analysis and the development of more robust guidelines. This cycle is anticipated to continue, given the number of BRT services proposed for future implementation. • Supporting data. Successful BRT implementations lead to (a) expanded BRT systems, (b) higher-level BRT services, and (c) increased interest in BRT within com- munities that have not implemented it. In addition, BRT has been implemented in communities of varying size, from Aspen, Colorado, to New York, New York. These facts demonstrate one of BRT’s strengths: its flexibility with respect to features and configurations. Continued implementation of BRT services tailored to the needs of individual communities and individual corridors means that data will become available for more features and more configurations. Such new data will support future BRT research efforts. • Educating officials. The public and elected officials must be educated as to what BRT is, what it can be, and what benefits it can provide. For example, BRT can be implemented incrementally or in a single phase. Incre- mental implementation can be used as a means of seeing investments pay off sooner, but because BRT as a com- plete service will not make as big a splash in the minds of riders and nonriders, the strength of its identity and branding may be diluted. In this regard, case studies can demonstrate that BRT can be successful. • Early adopters. A successful first implementation of BRT in a community leads to support for additional implementations in the community. The first project should be chosen carefully. leSSonS learned from the caSe StudieS This section illustrates the lessons learned from the case studies about the implementation of transportation research. In the fairly broad cross section of cases that have been examined, it is apparent that there are many common lessons that provide instruction about what works and what challenges to plan for. These are neither success factors nor barriers, but rather are topic areas in which there is a fairly rich range of experiences that can be used to improve the practice of research implementation. When the different phases in the research value chain are considered, the main lesson is probably that there is a considerable gap between research and implementa- tion. Many of the case studies show excellent research results, successful pilots or tests, and extensive report- ing of results, including recommendations for follow-up. However, the implementation often stops at conducting a demonstration project, delivering a final report, or holding a conference, even with research projects that pay extensive attention to the follow-up of their findings. Market uptake is very slow and often cannot directly be

134 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n related to the preceding research. The good news, how- ever, is that market uptake does seem to take place even- tually, although in a different shape than the outcome of the research would have it. In European programs, especially, the specific technical, legal, financial, politi- cal, national, or even local conditions tend to determine the rate and form of the uptake. Although each case was selected to highlight a par- ticular aspect of the implementation process, as a group the case studies present several reoccurring themes that apply to both the U.S. and EU programs: 1. Stakeholder involvement, 2. Resources for implementation, 3. Development, 4. Early adopters and champions, 5. Overcoming institutional barriers, 6. Government leadership, 7. Communication, and 8. Market readiness. It is always difficult to make generalizations about such broad issues; however, the hope is that focusing on a finite set of themes may enable the group to more easily and effectively discuss these points and provide a frame- work for future actions. Although there are clearly issues where there is some overlap, each of these areas does attempt to bring forward one major theme emerging from the case studies. Stakeholder Involvement Perhaps the most common factor noted in the case studies as a criterion for successful implementation efforts is early and continuous stakeholder involvement. The stakeholders for each project clearly were different, but they generally included representation of those who had experienced the problem to be addressed and therefore would be the end users of the research. They also included those who would be responsible for moving the research products into and through implementation. When such stakeholders are involved in the definition of the research and remain involved in ensuring that the research does produce a solution that meets their needs, implementation tends to move far faster and more smoothly. Some examples of such stakeholders in the case studies include the following: • Highway Safety Manual. A broad range of academics and practitioners not only were involved in setting the research agenda but are continuing to stay engaged in its implementation. • Modern Roundabouts. Engaging a diverse group of stakeholders early in the process led to broader support and acceptance for the outcomes. • INNOTRACK. Participants representing all stakeholders were already involved in defining the problem, but the group was small enough to be able to work efficiently. • Climate Change. The national road authorities were part of the project. Resources for Implementation Even in cases in which there had been a substantial investment in research, the funds programmed or avail- able for implementation activities were often very lim- ited. Part of this appears to be a result of the manner in which funds were allocated to different programs and sponsors and a lack of clarity regarding who was responsible for the implementation costs (e.g., the end user, the research sponsor). However, some of the cases also showed that even a small amount of funding can be a very strong incentive for imple- mentation. Such funding helps to underwrite the risk, whether real or perceived, in using the new technology and often demonstrates an official endorsement of the products and practices. Staffing resources are equally important, particularly in ensuring that there is con- tinuity throughout the process. Examples include the following: • Warm-Mix Asphalt Pavements. Through the fed- eral contributions from the FHWA Every Day Counts program, implementation of this practice has reached every state faster than nearly any other technology. • SAMARIS. The absence of resources for imple- mentation in former East European countries was one of the main factors in why research outcomes were not implemented. • Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints. The resources for implementation were ensured through reg- ular road construction and maintenance budgets. Development Several of the cases point to the challenges in trying to deploy research products that had not been fully developed or field tested. In addition to ensuring that the technology is, in fact, ready for user applications, the development phase can also be the time in which additional data and evidence can be collected to substantiate the value and need for the product. There were also cases that illustrated the success of building public–private partnerships during this time; these partnerships ensured that the research products would be commercially available for implementation. Examples include the following:

135A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 • Heavy Rail Acoustic Bearing Detector. Although the concept for this kind of detection approach existed, it was not until TTCI stepped forward to develop and field test a prototype that interest really accelerated. • River Information Services. The role of PIANC in bringing together experts in a neutral platform helped to develop the sense of urgency and applicable solutions. Early Adopters and Champions Successful cases often highlighted the importance of hav- ing a champion that was an advocate for the innovation from research through implementation, a period that in some cases spanned more than a decade. Champions that represent the end user community were particularly effective and often recruited early adopters of the tech- nology or served as one of them. Their involvement was critical because it provided a credible peer-to-peer basis for sharing knowledge with other end users. Examples include the following: • Bus Rapid Transit. The early adopters of this approach in the United States provided a hands-on oppor- tunity for other cities to see what BRT really offered as well as a basis for refining the concept as more was learned from actual applications. • Climate Change. With their specific climate conditions, some northern European countries were clearly front runners in developing and implementing solutions. Interest was low in countries where these conditions did not prevail. Overcoming Institutional Barriers Many of the cases illustrate the multiple approvals and institutional actions that are often required to move a product from research into practice. These actions include everything from changes in standards or specifications, approvals of governing bodies or councils, and the resolu- tion of intellectual property issues. In particular, procure- ment rules and regulations can prove to be a major obstacle to quickly advancing implementation efforts. Some of the cases illustrate the value of planning for such barriers and ensuring that the key stakeholders that control those pro- cesses are included in the research from the beginning. Fur- ther, it is apparent that some organizations have made a concerted effort to streamline these institutional processes to accelerate the implementation process. • Asset Management in the Netherlands. Involve- ment of the management of the implementing organiza- tion was essential to overcome institutional barriers and to adapt administrative procedures. • INNOTRACK. The relatively slow implementation of many research results in spite of widespread support was due to lack of incentives (e.g., procurement incentives) for market parties. Governmental Leadership Although the governmental structures of the United States and the European Union and its member nations differ greatly, several of the cases illustrate how leadership at that level can be a powerful catalyst and engine for change. As noted before, the government is often the source of fund- ing for both research and implementation activities, and governmental leadership at the federal level or through the European Commission can also help overcome institu- tional barriers. Ultimately, government leadership can also seek to use regulatory and standard-setting authorities to accelerate implementation of a product from state of the art to state of the practice. This kind of governmental sup- port appears to be more prevalent when the subject of the research reflects a clearly felt societal issue, such as safety or congestion. Larger research programs that address broad technical issues may not attract the same support or sense of urgency for implementation by the public or politicians. An example of governmental leadership is ALJOIN, in which the translation of research results into new standards for the construction of rail vehicles was key to Europe-wide implementation. Communication Effective technology transfer is based largely on the shar- ing of knowledge, and consistent internal and external communication is a key to making that happen. Begin- ning in the research phase, communication can build a pull for research results as well as establish realis- tic expectations about what may be coming from the research. There are a number of excellent examples in the case studies showing how continuous communica- tion helped educate potential end users, inform decision makers, and, where appropriate, gain public support. The specifics of how the message is communicated are equally important. For example, in the European con- text, language can be an issue. Although those conduct- ing the research are usually fairly proficient with English as a working language, the decision makers responsible for implementation may not be. Examples of the impor- tance of communication are as follows: • SAMARIS and ARCHES. The SAMARIS and ARCHES case studies show that translation of the results into the local language of the responsible implementing agency is essential, though not enough.

136 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n • INNOTRACK. Communication was an essential condition for the financing of this program, as for many EU-funded programs. Many deliverables were directed at transfer of knowledge. Market Readiness In the analogy of planting seeds, seeds are more likely to sprout when the soil they are scattered on has already been tilled. Likewise, when the market is well informed and prepared, new ideas are likely to find an easier place to grow and mature. Many of the cases indicated that such efforts could greatly accelerate the implementation process and provide highway users with benefits faster. One question that surfaced was how to change today’s college curricula to ensure that the next generation of transportation professionals will also be prepared to use these new technologies and practices? The approach in the Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints program showed how innovation-driven research was directed at solving a very practical problem on short notice. The market took up that challenge. Comparison with Lessons Learned from Other Projects The lessons learned from the case studies in this paper were compared with lessons learned from the ERRAC WP06 evaluation project. This comparison showed that the findings from ERRAC projects that proved to have a strong market uptake were consistent with the findings in this paper, as shown in extracts from a presentation for ERRAC members. Below are key extracts from the ERRAC WP06 PowerPoint presentation regarding the market readiness evaluation from 2012: • The projects were aimed at solving issues of general acknowledged interest (e.g., technical, safety, harmoni- zation, and business cases). • The projects had strong interaction between part- ners and relevant stakeholders. • The projects had a clearly defined scope and objectives from the beginning. • Project results were applied and implemented for products or for regulatory application and were made available for future revision. • The project had the capability of building on results of previous projects (systematic view). • The project pilot cases or business cases were devel- oped to provide viable solutions and not just as an exercise. The lessons learned in the Strategic Highway Research Program (SHRP) regarding research implementation also share many common themes with the U.S. experience highlighted in the case studies presented in this paper. Following is a summary of key lessons learned in SHRP presented by Neil Pedersen, a SHRP 2 deputy director, at the 2013 TRB annual meeting: • A research program should be established by leaders of the organizations who will implement the results. • Oversight should be provided by end users throughout the research and development phase. • Additional development work will often be needed to convert research results into usable products. • Planning for implementation needs to begin even before the research phase starts and should continue throughout the research phase. • Research results that necessitate a business process or organizational change require a different approach than deployment of new technology. • Pilot testing of research products is critical for identifying refinements and for demonstrating benefits and value. • The evaluation phase is a critical part of implemen- tation planning and should be done early in the research phase. • Personal communication with and education of potential users is critical to successful implementation. • Communications materials about research prod- ucts need to be meaningful for the target audience, namely, the user community. • Users react very differently if they think a product is being pushed on them than they do if they themselves reach the conclusion that the product will be useful in meeting a need they have. • Potential users want to know technical assistance is available. • It is important to listen to feedback from potential users. • Not all research results will be of equal value or importance to users. • Leadership is key to successful implementation of research results. • A research program should be prepared to answer the question, How will this research make a difference in addressing priority needs and goals of the agency and the transportation system? acknowledgmentS EU Case Studies Author Joris Al thanks his many Dutch and international colleagues for helping find cases and the necessary docu- mentation and for giving their time for interviews and in

137A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 reviewing drafts of this paper. The illustrations in this paper are all taken from public reports. The following people were interviewed for the EU case studies: • Asset Management: Bert de Wit, Senior Project Manager, Project Asset Management, and Jenne van der Velde, Senior Research Advisor on Asset Management, Rijkswaterstaat, the Netherlands. • ALJOIN: Dan Otteborn, who suggested this case and provided very relevant material. • INNOTRACK: Rolf Dollevoet, Professor of Rail Construction, Delft University of Technology, and System Expert, Prorail. • River Information Services: Cas Willems, Senior Advisor on Navigation, and Yvo Ten Broeke, Senior Advisor on Navigation and Rhine Commissioner, Rijks- waterstaat. • SAMARIS, ARCHES, CERTAIN: Tomas Wierz- bicki, Road and Bridge Research Institute, Poland; and Ales Znidaric and Aljosa Sanja, National Building and Civil Engineering Institute ZAG, Slovenia. • Silent and Durable Expansion Joints: Willem Jan van Vliet, Senior Advisor Noise Policy, and Bert Elber- sen, Senior Advisor Innovation, Rijkswaterstaat. • Climate Change: Kees van Muiswinkel, Senior Researcher, Rijkswaterstaat; Gordana Petkovic, Norwegian Public Roads Administration; and colleagues at CEDR who provided the latest information on implementation, notably in Germany, Ireland, and Norway. U.S. Case Studies Author Mark Vandehey thanks the following individu- als from Kittelson & Associates, Inc., for their invalu- able contributions to the overall content of this paper: Joe Toole, for his time, energy, and thoughtful edito- rial efforts and his help in organizing a great series of interviews in Washington, D.C.; Karla Kingsley, for her work in developing the Roundabout case study, help coordinating the graphics and reference list, and general support in other areas; and Ralph Bentley for excellent graphics work and document formatting. He also thanks the following individuals who provided extremely valu- able input on the topic of research implementation in the United States and, in particular, the roles of FHWA, AASHTO, and TRB: • From AASHTO: King Gee, Director of Engineer- ing and Technical Services; • From FHWA: Gregory G. Nadeau, Acting Admin- istrator; Michael Trentacoste, Associate Administrator for Research, Development, and Technology and Direc- tor, Turner–Fairbank Highway Research Center; Debra Elston, Director, Program Management; Hari Kalla, Director, Center for Accelerating Innovation; and Jack Jernigan, Director, Research and Technology Program Development and Partnership Team; and • From TRB: Christopher Hedges, Manager, National Cooperative Highway Research Program; and Neil Pedersen, Deputy Director, Implementation and Communications. Finally, the author sincerely thanks the following individuals for their valuable contributions to the development of the case studies: • Highway Safety Manual: Erin Ferguson of Kittel- son & Associates, Inc. • Flashing Yellow Arrow Left-Turn Display: Michael Trentacoste and others at FHWA. • Modern Roundabouts: Randy C. West, Director, National Center for Asphalt Technology, Auburn University, Alabama, who provided much of the background material and research developed in this case study; Karla Kingsley and Lee Rodegerdts of Kittelson & Associates, Inc.; and Michael Trentacoste and others at FHWA. • Warm-Mix Asphalt Pavements: Randy C. West, Director, National Center for Asphalt Technology, Auburn University, Alabama, who provided much of the background material and research developed in this case study; and Michael Trentacoste, Hari Kalla, and Jack Jernigan of FHWA. • Heavy Rail Acoustic Bearing Detector: Gerald Anderson, Senior Principal Investigator, Transportation Technology Center, Pueblo, Colorado, for providing the background material, technical content, and research developed in this case study and for excellent comments on the draft of the case study; and Bill Millar for help in identifying the case study and making the initial contact with Gerald. • Bus Rapid Transit: Kelly Blume of Kittelson & Associates, Inc. reSourceS Abbreviations AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials CEDR Conference of European Directors of Roads ERA-NET Coordination and Implementation of Road ROAD Research in Europe ERRAC European Rail Research Advisory Council FHWA Federal Highway Administration FTA Federal Transit Administration TRB Transportation Research Board

138 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n EU Case Studies General The EU Transport Research and Innovation Portal (TRIP), http://www.transport-research.info/web/, is a good source of documentation on projects realized under the EU Framework Programmes. Two other use- ful sources of general information are 1. Dent, D. Technology and Market Readiness. Dent Associ- ates Ltd, Farnborough, Hampshire, United Kingdom, 2011. 2. Presentation WP06 ERRAC: Evaluation of Market Uptake and Lessons Learned from Past Projects. ERRAC Plenary, March 2012. Asset Management 1. A Holistic Approach to Asset Management in the Nether- lands, van der Velde e.a. , 2013. 2. De Jong, S. P. L., L. K. Hessels, and B. J. R. van der Meu- len. Societal Impact Analysis Next Generation Infrastruc- tures. SciSA Report 1121. Rathenau Instituut, The Hague, Netherlands, 2012. 3. ERA-NET ROAD 2010 Call: Effective Asset Management Meeting Future Challenges. 4. Evaluation Program Asset Management Rijkswaterstaat, Twijinstra Gudde, December 2012. 5. Implementation Plan Asset Management, Rijkswaterstaat, April 2011. ALJOIN 1. ERRAC Project Evaluation Group on ALJOIN. Meeting Report, ERRAC, 2009. 2. European Commission. ALJOIN: Crashworthiness of Joints in Aluminum Rail Vehicles—Final Technical Report, 2005. 3. TRL. Client Project Report on ALJOIN, undated. INNOTRACK 1. Ekberg, A., and B. Paulsson, eds. INNOTRACK Conclud- ing Technical Report. International Union of Railways (UIC), Paris, 2010. River Information Services 1. European Commission. INDRIS: Inland Navigation Demonstrator for RIS, 2002. 2. European Commission. COMPRIS: Consortium Operational Management Platform River Information Services—Summary, Consolidated Test Report, 2006. 3. European Commission. River Information Services: Mod- ernising Inland Shipping Through Advanced Information Technologies, 2010. 4. INCARNATION. Identification of Administrative and Organizational Barriers and the Assessment of Infor- mational and Organizational Requirements and Func- tionalities of an Efficient Inland Navigation Information System with Special Regard to Transport Capacity and Goods Flow, Safety of Traffic and Transport of Danger- ous Goods—Final Report,1998. SAMARIS, ARCHES, CERTAIN 1. European Commission. SAMARIS: Sustainable and Advanced Materials for Road Infrastructure—Final Sum- mary Report, 2006. 2. European Commission. ARCHES: Assessment and Reha- bilitation of Central European Highway Structures—Final Activities Report, 2009. 3. European Commission. CERTAIN: Central European Research in Transport Infrastructure—Publishable Final Activity Report, 2010. 4. Šajna, A., E. Denarié, and V. Bras. Assessment of a UHP- FRC-Based Bridge Rehabilitation in Slovenia, Two Years After Application, 2012. 5. Šajna A., J. S. Šuput, E. Denarié, E. Brühwiler, G. Habert, P. Rossi, L. Rešcˇicˇ, and T. Wierzbicki. Composite UHP- FRC Concrete Construction for Rehabilitation—Most Recent Advances and Applications, 2011. Silent and Durable Expansion Joints 1. Rijkswaterstaat. Silent Durable Expansion Joints: Results of the Contest, 2012. Climate Change 1. Adesiyun, A., S. Phillips, L. Phillips, B. Verhaeghe, and B. Wlaschin. Road Owners Getting to Grips with Climate Change. Final Report of ERA-NET ROAD Programme, 2011. 2. CEDR. Adaptation to Climate Change. Report from CEDR Task Group 16 on Climate Change, 2011. [Group leader: Gyda Grendstad (Norway).] 3. CEDR. Adaptation to Climate Change, 2012. 4. CEDR. Description of Research Needs of CEDR Call: Road Owners Adapting to Climate Change, 2012. 5. Deltares. Investigation of the Blue Spots in the Nether- lands National Highway Network, 2012. 6. ERA-NET ROAD. Road Owners Getting to Grips with Climate Change. Final Report, 2011.

139A p p e n d i x B : C o m m i s s i o n e d w h i t e p A p e r 2 7. Malléjacq, P. CEDR Activity Report for Year 2011. CEDR Technical Group Research (TGR), 2012. U.S. Case Studies Highway Safety Manual 1. AASHTO. Highway Safety Manual. AASHTO, Washington, D.C., 2010. http://www.highwaysafety manual.org/. 2. FHWA. Crash Modification Factors Clearinghouse. http:// www.cmfclearinghouse.org/. 3. FHWA. Highway Safety Manual. U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. http://safety.fhwa.dot .gov/hsm/. 4. Kolody, K. Presentation on NCHRP Project 17-50 Lead States Initiative for Implementing the Highway Safety Manual. Peer Exchange 2. http://scohts-sm.transportation .org/2012%20SCOHTSSM%20meeting%20presenta tions/AASHTOSafetyManagement_1750%20Kolody .pptx. 5. TRB. NCHRP Project 17-50: Lead States Initiative for Implementing the Highway Safety Manual. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C. http://apps.trb.org/cmsfeed/TRBNetProjectDisplay .asp?ProjectID=2974. Flashing Yellow Arrow Left-Turn Display 1. Brehmer, C. L., K. C. Kacir, D. A. Noyce, and M. P. Manser. NCHRP Report 493: Evaluation of Traffic Sig- nal Displays for Protected/Permissive Left-Turn Control. Transportation Research Board of the National Acad- emies, Washington, D.C., 2003. 2. Kacir, K., C. L. Brehmer, and D. Noyce. A Recommended Permissive Display for Protective/Permissive Left-Turn Control. Institute of Transportation Engineers Journal, Vol. 73, No. 12, 2003, pp. 32, 37–40. Modern Roundabouts 1. FHWA. Roundabouts: An Informational Guide. FHWA- RD-00-068. U.S. Department of Transportation, Washing- ton, D.C., 2000. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/ research/safety/00068/. 2. Rodegerdts, L., M. Blogg, E. Wemple, E. Myers, M. Kyte, M. P. Dixon, G. F. List, A. Flannery, R. Troutbeck, W. Brilon, N. Wu, B. N. Persaud, C. Lyon, D. L. Harkey, and D. Carter. NCHRP Report 572: Roundabouts in the United States. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2007. 3. TRB. Highway Capacity Manual 2010. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2010. 4. Persaud, B., C. Lyon, S. Hallmark, H. Isebrands, R. B. Crown, B. Guichet, and A. O’Brien. NCHRP 672: Round- abouts: An Informational Guide. 2nd ed. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2010. 5. Joint Roundabout Truck Study. Minnesota Department of Transportation, Saint Paul, and Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Madison, 2012. 6. Russell, E. R., E. D. Landman, and R. Godavarthy. Accom- modating Oversize/Overweight Vehicles at Roundabouts. Report No. K-TRAN: KSU-10-1. Kansas State University Transportation Center, Manhattan, Kans., 2013. 7. Schroeder, B., R. Hughes, N. Rouphail, C. Cunningham, K. Salamati, R. Long, D. Guth, R. W. Emerson, D. Kim, J. Barlow, B. L. Bentzen, L. Rodegerdts, and E. Myers. NCHRP Report 674: Crossing Solutions at Roundabouts and Channelized Turn Lanes for Pedestrians with Vision Disabilities. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2011. Warm-Mix Asphalt Pavements 1. Hansen, K. R., and A. Copeland. Annual Asphalt Pave- ment Survey on Recycled Materials and Warm-Mix Asphalt Usage: 2009–2012. IS-138. National Asphalt Pavement Association, Lanham, Md., 2013. 2. West, R. C., and C. Rodezno. Warm Mix Asphalt Market Analysis. Draft Report. National Center for Asphalt Tech- nology, Auburn, Ala., 2013. Heavy Rail Acoustic Bearing Detector 1. Anderson, G., J. Cline, and R. Graff. Acoustic Detec- tion of Railcar Bearing Defects: Phase 1 Laboratory Test. Transportation Technology Center, Inc., Pueblo, Colo.; National Center for Asphalt Technology, Auburn, Ala., and Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 2003. Bus Rapid Transit Note: The lists of bus rapid transit (BRT) services and research documents used in this case study are not com- prehensive. With regard to the former, it is possible that there are proposed services that have not yet been iden- tified; with regard to the latter, the documents are key documents and illustrative documents. An initial list of BRT projects (updated May 2012) was obtained from the National Bus Rapid Transit Institute, http://www. nbrti.org. The following sources provide information about specific BRT services: 1. Eccles, K. A., and H. S. Levinson. TCRP Report 117: Design, Operation, and Safety of At-Grade Crossings of

140 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n Exclusive Busways. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2007. 2. FTA. Applicability of Bogotá’s TransMilenio BRT System to the United States. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2006. 3. FTA. Bus Rapid Transit and the American Community. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2002. 4. FTA. Bus Rapid Transit Vehicle Demand and Supply Analysis. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2003. 5. FTA. Characteristics of Bus Rapid Transit for Decision- Making. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2004. 6. FTA. Characteristics of Bus Rapid Transit for Decision- Making, 2nd ed. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2009. 7. h t t p : / / a r c h i v e . c o n s t a n t c o n t a c t . c o m / f s 1 9 6 / 1100778660802/archive/1116241709300.html. 8. http://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/03/22/news/story8 .html. 9. http://charmeck.org/city/charlotte/cats/planning/silver/ projectoverview/Pages/default.aspx. 10. ht tp: / /connect ivecorr idor .syr .edu/project -over view/key-project-highlights/. 11. http://legacy.rideuta.com/projects/BRT/. 12. http://metronews.ca/news/vancouver/778713/surrey-gets- a-b-line-on-labour-day/. 13. http://montgomeryplanning.org/transportation/highways/ brt.shtm. 14. http://sanjoaquinrtd.com/express/default.php. 15. http://tti.tamu.edu/group/transit-mobility/files/2012/10/ Seattle_Swift-10-26-12.pdf. 16. http://usa.streetsblog.org/2011/07/11/american-brt-a- rapid-bus-network-expands-in-las-vegas/. 17. http://web.mta.info/mta/planning/sbs/index.html. 18. http://www.actransit.org/2013/07/18/happy-birthday- san-pablo-rapid/. 19. http: / /www.browardmpo.org/userf i les / f i les /bro ward2035lrtp_amended4_18_12_Final%20resized.pdf. 20. http://www.brt.c-tran.com/get_involved/calendar.php. 21. http://www.brtchicago.com/brtjeffery.php. 22. http://www.cabq.gov/transit/bus-routes-and-schedules/ rapid-ride. 23. h t tp : / /www.capme t ro .o rg /me t ro rap id .p romo .aspx?id=2649. 24. http://www.cdta.org/schedules_service_areas_busplus_ faq.php. 25. ht tp : / /www.ct fas trak.com/about /what- i s -c t fas trak. 26. http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/MassTrans/Docs-Pdfs/BRT/ brt-inv7.7.09.pdf. 27. http://www.estreet-sbx.com/. 28. http://www.fresno.gov/Government/CityManager/brtfaq .htm. 29. http://www.fta.dot.gov/4328.html. 30. http://www.golynx.com/riding-lynx/lymmo.stml. 31. http://www.jtafla.com/JTAFuturePlans/Bus/Default .aspx?page=Downtown%20Phase%20I&pid=14. 32. http://www.jtafla.com/JTAFuturePlans/Bus/Default .aspx?page=North%20Corridor%20Study&pid=18. 33. http://www.jtafla.com/JTAFuturePlans/Bus/Default .aspx?page=Southeast%20Corridor%20Study&pid=60. 34. http://www.kcata.org/documents/uploads/MAX_Fact_ Sheet.pdf. 35. http://www.kingcounty.gov/transportation/kcdot/ MetroTransit/RapidRide.aspx. 36. http://www.kingcounty.gov/transportation/kcdot/ MetroTransit/TransitNow.aspx. 37. http://www.kolotv.com/home/headlines/63982972.html. 38. http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/dec/11/new- express-bus-route-service-airport/. 39. http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/sep/01/new-bus- lines-link-downtown-henderson-las-vegas/. 40. http://www.ltd.org/search/showresult.html?versionthread =45a4b83927fba5cb751c741bf4ac81e3. 41. http://www.madisonareampo.org/brt.cfm. 42. http://www.masstransitmag.com/article/10220344/a-dif ferent-path. 43. http://www.mataps.com/offline/Figure%205-2_Transit .pdfEl Camino, SamTrans. 44. http://www.metro.net/projects/rapid/. 45. http://www.metrocouncil.org/Transportation/Projects/ Future-Projects/Metro-Red-Line-facts.aspx. 46. http://www.metrotransit.org/Data/Sites/1/media/ metro-orange-line/2013-06-27-orange-line-basic-hand out.pdf. 47. http://www.miamidade.gov/transit/advisories/05-04-20- busway-event.asp. 48. http://www.nashvillemta.org/Nashville-MTA-Accom plishments.asp. 49. http://www.nbrti.org/docs/ppt/TRB2103_BRT_Work shop/Vancouver_B_Line.pdf. 50. http://www.octa.net/Plans-and-Programs/South-County- MIS/The-Study/?terms=BRT. 51. http://www.octranspo1.com/about-octranspo/history_ looking_back. 52. http://www.pittsburghtransit.info/busway.html. 53. http://www.provoorembrt.com/. 54. http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/las-vegas/buses-will- run-seven-days-week-new-va-medical-center. 55. http://www.rftabrt.com/history. 56. http://www.riderta.com/news/healthline-opens-euclid- avenue-pumping-new-life-cleveland. 57. http:/ /www.rideuta.com/mc/?page=Projects-Bus RapidTransit-5600WestBRT. 58. http://www.rtcsnv.com/mpo/plansstudies/Docs/Tropi cana%20Corridor%20Study%20Final%2003-03-08_ small.pdf. 59. http://www.rtcsnv.com/planning-engineering/rtc-projects/ flamingo-brt/.

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