THESIS OF A SPEECH ON DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES AND EXPORT CONTROL
General I.P. Lebedev (reserves)
Scientific Secretary, RAS Council on Export Control
Very good and strong arguments, as contained in the opening remarks of the chair of the Russian Academy of Sciences delegation, Academician Gennadiy Mesyats, and in the reports of Doctor of Technical Sciences, O.K. Rogozin, Candidate of Military Sciences Danilevich, and Professor V.I. Tsymbal, show the importance of the discussions of the problems of dual-use technologies between the Russian Academy of Sciences and the American National Academy of Sciences.
Major changes in Russian legislation permit us to conclude that both the Russian and American Academies use the same principles when dealing with problems of exporting results of fundamental research and applied research. The Russian President's Decree # 308 on the Creation of an Export Control System in the Russian Federation (abbreviated as "Russian Export Control"), issued on April 11, 1992 and published in our press, can serve as an example of this. The Russian Academy of Sciences is a part of the same system.
The Council for Export Control of the Russian Academy of Sciences was established on June 28, 1992, by Resolution #209 of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Academician G.A. Mesyats (vice-president of Russian Academy of Sciences) was nominated as president of this Council. Five academicians, nine corresponding members, lawyers, economists, and financial specialists are members of the Council for Export Control. We are certain that such a competent and, more importantly, highly scientific staff of the Council for Export Control can execute the export control of dual-use technologies in a highly qualified manner.
The Russian Academy of Sciences, within the limits of its authority and the limits of Russian legislation, has as its goal during our present negotiations the development of specific recommendations for examination and decision making of government authorities regarding the main directions of specific fundamental and applied research in the area of dual-use technology.
We have prepared three lists of restricted items, which we would like you to examine and then submit your suggestions. Of course, it is impossible to do this immediately, but we do ask your favor to do so by the next conference. These three lists have been introduced into practice in the Russian Academy of Sciences, and our scientists follow them when dealing with export matters. The lists of restricted items are, naturally, open, i.e., they are not classified and they have been published in our press. The lists of
restricted items of the American delegation (the Department of Commerce list) will be examined by the Russian Academy of Sciences and will be submitted with our comments for further consideration to appropriate Russian governmental authorities.
The American delegation asked many questions on subjects that are within the competence of the government of the Russian Federation. We must inform you that in order to receive answers to these questions, you should address them to established channels in the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and we are certain that answers will be given at the corresponding level. The Russian Academy of Sciences will provide to our governmental organizations scientific consultations related to specific subjects of fundamental and applied research.
Mutual trust between the scientists and scientific organizations of our Academies is the basis of collaboration on the problem of fundamental and applied research in the area of dual-use technologies. We know very well that Americans are pragmatists and require not only words, but also practical confirmation or, as you say, guaranties and a system of sanctions for violators.
Let us recall the trust that used to exist between our countries during the Second World War (the speech on extending lend-lease to our country that President Roosevelt gave to the American Congress and Russia's collaboration with the Bell Company—its scientific laboratories, engineers, and specialists—in eliminating defects of the aircraft ''Aircobra"); they did not believe our words, they required proof. In the case of our work with Bell Company, our test pilots and military representatives proved in practice the presence of defects (e.g., the aircraft developed a "flat spin" under certain conditions) when an airplane piloted by a Russian crashed before the eyes of company representatives. Company specialists and scientists then redesigned the aircraft and eliminated the defect, thus preventing the deaths of other pilots. That was a period of mutual trust and friendship.
Today, we should renew this trust and mutually protect dual-use applications from the possible unsanctioned use for creation of weapons, especially of weapons of mass destruction. In that respect, both of our export control systems should work effectively without restraining scientific progress, without impeding economic development of our countries, providing mutual support for scientists to eliminate "brain drain", which both delegations have discussed.
Concerning a system of sanctions for violations of the established export control regime, you do not have to worry about us. We know that the American legislation stipulates ten years of imprisonment for violations, and Russian legislation stipulates 15 years of imprisonment.
All other guaranties will be stipulated in agreements on grants and scientific collaboration, and any changes will be coordinated between both sides. Meanwhile, as