Framework for Collaborative Decision Making on Additions to Highway Capacity (2014)

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11 Certain barriers from the case studies stood out among the others due to their prevalence or broad applicability. These barriers are summarized in Table 3.1 and are explored further following the table. These barriers became the issues or tar- gets that any collaborative decision-making framework for transportation must address. Cross-phase Issues Barriers that can be categorized as cross-phase issues stem from a lack of coordination and consistency across the phases of transportation decision making. Cross-phase issues result in redo loops of duplicated and wasted effort. Examples include the failure to eliminate fatally flawed solutions early in the decision-making process, failure to transfer decisions and the reason behind those decisions from one phase to another, failure to transfer data and information from one phase to another, and failure to ensure that decisions in late phases (i.e., NEPA) reflect the goals and objectives agreed on in plan- ning. The lapse of time between phases can exacerbate these issues as information becomes obsolete due to changes in the natural environment, changes in the human environment, and staff/management turnover. One common cross-phase issue arises between the programming/fiscal constraint phase and the planning, environmental review, and design phases. Often, projects work their way through these other phases then hit a road- block because of changes or limitations in the availability of programmed funds. In Arizona, the Maricopa Associa- tion of Governments (MAG) developed a plan in 1985 for a regional freeway system to be constructed by 2005, using a dedicated local revenue source. However, due to increasing construction and right-of-way costs and lower- than-expected revenues, it became clear by the early 1990s that the system could not be completed with the available funding. Voters in the region rejected two ballot measures in 1994 that would have generated additional revenue, largely because of a lack of confidence in MAG’s ability to deliver on its plans, forcing projects to be scaled back or delayed. Similarly, in 2003, NJDOT was in the process of developing an EIS for a proposed bypass of the borough of Flemington on New Jersey Route 31. As work on the EIS progressed, it became clear that the project was not in keeping with the state’s smart growth goals and was not likely to receive ade- quate funding for construction, due to its high cost. As a result, the EIS process was put on hold until a new integrated land-use and transportation plan was completed for the cor- ridor, to realign the project with state and community goals and develop a more cost-effective solution. There are also disconnects between long-range planning and environmental review. In the case studies examined, proj- ects going through the NEPA process did not always come out of the metropolitan transportation planning process. In some cases projects were even added to an MTP after beginning the NEPA process. For instance, in the US-285 project in Colo- rado the NEPA process began in July 2002. More than a year later, in November 2003, the project was added to the 2025 RTP and TIP. For the I-15 New Ogden Weber project in Utah, the EIS was initiated in April 2001, and the project was sub- sequently included in the 2030 Long-Range Plan (LRP) and TIP in December 2001. These examples suggest that there are sometimes disconnects between long-range transportation planning at the MPO level and transportation planning for projects at the state DOT level. The lack of an orderly flow from long-range planning through project development sug- gests that in some cases there may be limited information from the long-range planning process that can be used to expedite project development. Lack of Integration with external Factors Transportation planning is sometimes conducted in a vac- uum, without adequately considering other nontranspor- tation factors that either have impacts on transportation C h a p t e r 3 Barriers to Delivering a Project or Program

12 Insufficient Involvement of the public Beyond typical not-in-my-backyard issues, there are many reasons collaboration with the public can fail. The transpor- tation decision-making process can be difficult to under- stand, and subsections of the population (e.g., low-income, non-English-speaking) may feel (or actually be) excluded if it is more difficult for them to participate through tradi- tional methods. The feedback loop is often overlooked— that is, decision makers seek information from the public but fail to provide a response regarding how that input influenced the ultimate decision. Turnover in the commu- nity can result in changing goals and visions and a change in active participants. The public often does not become involved in transportation decision making until it is appar- ent they may be personally affected by the decision; and fre- quently, there is a lack of public trust in the transportation agency. facilities or could be affected by transportation plans. This can cause problems, not only within the transportation decision- making process, but also after plans are completed. The Texas Kelly Parkway case study points out the volatile nature of road projects driven by political and economic initia- tives. The Kelly Parkway was initially meant to serve the trans- portation needs of a commercial industrial park and shipping hub. Planning for the road was completed, but funding never became available for implementation. Since that time, Union Pacific has announced it will build a new intermodal terminal facility well outside the Kelly Parkway corridor. Shifting devel- opment goals at the Kelly USA industrial park site, as well as the shifting location of the truck-rail intermodal terminal, have a major impact on the projected traffic on the planned Kelly Parkway. These external factors could potentially derail this project, making the planning effort unnecessary, and poten- tially souring the goodwill developed within the local commu- nity during the development of the plan. In other cases, plans may be forced into a redo loop to con- sider external factors that were not originally considered. The New Jersey Route 31 case study highlights an example in which a project advanced to the NEPA phase without adequately addressing state and local land-use plans and goals, forcing the NEPA study to be put on hold while a broader corridor plan was developed. In the case of the Idaho Transportation Depart- ment’s (ITD) Vision 2033 study (see Figure 3.1), an initial state- wide LRP was developed in a traditional manner, but it was scrapped in favor of a new vision planning process following criticism that the original plan was the result of disjointed decision making rather than a clear departmental vision or policy and that it did not address land-use issues adequately. Table 3.1. Summary of Barriers from Case Studies Cross-Phase Issues Lack of Integration with External Factors Insufficient Involvement of the Public Absence of the public early in the decision-making process Lack of public trust in the transportation agency Insufficient Engagement of Agency Partners Turnover and Loss of Key Leaders Funding Constraints Challenges in Solution Screening Lack of adequate screening criteria Failure to fully consider a broad range of alternatives Data Availability Figure 3.1. Idaho’s Transportation Vision is regularly referenced during ITD’s planning process. Source: Idaho’s Transportation Future: Getting There Together—Idaho’s Transportation Vision, Idaho Transportation Department, 2004.

13 had a long and difficult relationship with the Air Force base, fearing health risks associated with it. Therefore, community members were generally suspicious of any new large govern- ment project. They viewed Kelly Parkway as just an extension of ongoing base activities and directed their misgivings toward the project team. To overcome this barrier, the team had to show that its work was different from the Air Force. This proved that the proposed parkway was in the best inter- est of the community and would not simply serve the base. Thus, community trust was slowly rebuilt. Following this breakthrough, the team was able to focus on the more sub- stantive elements of the project. Insufficient engagement of agency partners A common barrier to successful transportation decision making, and clearly a key aspect of any collaborative decision-making framework, is effective collaboration with decision-making partners. Engaging the right players, get- ting them involved early and at key points in the decision- making process, and sustaining their involvement can be challenging for many reasons. These often relate to failure to reach out to agencies, lack of trust, conflicting missions and cultures, resistance to change, and, quite often, limited staff time and funding. Resource agencies have a limited ability to participate in the decision-making process, par- ticularly in planning activities that go beyond the core statu- tory requirements of the resource agency. For example, the lack of available time to participate was a barrier to resource agency involvement in the Colorado STEP UP process. Failure to involve agencies (or the appropriate authority within agencies) in decisions contributes to redo loops, delays, and revisited decisions. Failure to engage agencies early in the process can make it more difficult to obtain regulatory approval later on and also results in a waste of time, effort, and money. In addition, the institutional obstacles that plague transportation agencies similarly affect regulatory agencies. These internal issues—such as staff turnover, changes in leader ship, lack of coordination, and resistance to change— can negatively affect agencies’ participation in the transpor- tation decision-making process. turnover and Loss of Key Leaders Staff turnover and a loss of key leaders were barriers on some projects. For instance, in the US-64 Asheboro Bypass project in North Carolina, staff turnover led to delays in overall proj- ect planning and the EIS document production schedule. Three different project planning engineers took helm of the Absence of the Public Early in the Decision-Making Process Either through lack of opportunity or lack of interest, the pub- lic often does not become involved in transportation decisions until late in the environmental review process and, therefore, is not part of broad goal setting and prioritizing. This lack of public representation is not always apparent until late in the process and can then result in the need to revisit decisions. For instance, in the California I-710 Corridor study, the initial outreach process, though thorough, was not enough to ensure full public support. Thus, midway through the project, people started to complain about air quality impacts and the taking of residential properties; and the project team was forced to revamp its public involvement program. Lack of Public Trust in the Transportation Agency A lack of public trust in the transportation agency can be a key barrier to projects. This often occurs when the public feels that the DOT has already decided on a course of action and does not really wish to engage communities in the decision-making process. Several of the case studies attested to this. They showed the importance of a state DOT taking the time to instill public trust and the benefits which could be realized. In the New Jersey Route 31 case, a major issue at the outset of the integrated land-use and transportation planning pro- cess was the frustration and distrust felt by many members of the local community. Some local residents considered NJDOT’s decision not to proceed with the Flemington Bypass after decades of study to be a betrayal or a broken promise. Delays in a separate intersection project along Route 31 also fueled local resentment of NJDOT and fed suspicions that the agency was not interested in hearing their opinions and working with the community to develop a locally supported solution. NJDOT and its consultants were only able to rebuild trust with the community by proving that they were truly interested in obtaining community input for the design of the substitute for the bypass. In addition to public meetings and sessions with the advisory body it created, NJDOT and its project team held many one-on-one interviews with residents. Members of the project team attended local meetings with Flemington Borough, Raritan Township, and Hunterdon County to elicit feedback. Also, near the beginning of the planning process, NJDOT completed two small improvement projects on Route 31, which helped convince residents that the agency was truly interested in helping the community with its congestion problem. In the Texas Kelly Parkway project, the most challenging aspect was gaining the community’s trust. The community

14 DOT and Indiana DOT initiated an EIS in January 1999, which concluded with a Record of Decision (ROD) in Decem- ber 2005 for a new alignment south of and parallel to the existing US-24 roadway. Once again, funding shortfalls delayed the project, but in the spring of 2007, construction began in Ohio. In Indiana, construction has begun and is expected to be complete by 2011. The I-405 corridor study in Washington, officially named the Interstate 405 Congestion Relief and Bus Rapid Transit Projects, is a $10.9 billion long-range master plan of coordi- nated multimodal transportation projects that can be imple- mented as funding becomes available. While the integrated planning effort to address corridorwide highway and transit improvements provides a strong example of a well-managed and structured collaborative process, the program is cur- rently funded at $1.5 billion and additional sources of fund- ing have yet to be identified. In November 2007, voters rejected a multibillion dollar measure to fund regional roads and transit projects, leaving WSDOT and political leaders struggling to come up with a new plan for funding major transportation projects. In the case of the New Jersey Route 31, the recognized lack of funding for the initially proposed Flemington Bypass was a major impetus for the decision to eliminate this project—even though it was already part way through the NEPA process. Despite the initial interest of the MPO in the development of the Texas Kelly Parkway project, funding has not been identified for the project. A portion of the project, the Kelly Crossroads reconstruction, is listed in the 2008–2011 TIP as a project with environmental clearance, but no funding is allo- cated for activities. The San Antonio–Bexar County MPO’s LRP, Metropolitan 2030, lists the Kelly Parkway as a tolled roadway with a planned fiscal year of 2035. No funding is allo- cated, and the project is designated as an unspecified public- private development agreement. Challenges in Solution Screening Lack of Adequate Screening Criteria Inadequacies surrounding the screening criteria used to com- pare and eliminate solutions in each stage of transportation decision making are a common barrier to effective transpor- tation decision making. One widespread problem, also related to cross-phase issues, is the failure to look back and ensure screening criteria are representative of broader visions and goals established through planning and in the development of a purpose and need in environmental review. Also typical is the failure to use screening criteria that appropriately rep- resent all aspects of a solution, including impacts to both the natural and human environments and long-term costs and EIS and its associated merger process at different points along the way. The original project manager retired. A subsequent internal reorganization resulted in department reassignments. The consulting firm assisting the state DOT in preparing the EIS also had turnover of key staff. Although these changes set the project back, the excellent documentation associated with the merger process helped keep the process going and avoided revisiting past decisions. In developing Idaho’s Transportation Vision 2033, there was concern that a change in leadership might be a stumbling block. Although the departure of the ITD’s director at the beginning of the visioning process did appear to slow the implementation process initially, the project manager carried it forward with the approval of the new director. Funding Constraints The US-24 EIS project in Indiana and Ohio is a good exam- ple of a project that was adversely affected by lack of funding despite recognized transportation needs. US-24 in Ohio and Indiana needed improvement back in the early 1960s when the Ohio Department of Highways (later Ohio DOT) Bureau of Location and Design first proposed a new 31-mi alignment between the towns of Maumee and Napoleon, Ohio. How- ever, funding limitations and resistance from property own- ers opposed to the taking of their farmland for right-of-way held this project back for more than 30 years (see Figure 3.2). In the 1980s, the project reemerged due to a grassroots move- ment of local government, business, and citizen groups; and in 1991, the project received federal funds to initiate the nec- essary planning studies. In 1994, Indiana DOT, Ohio DOT, and FHWA published the U.S. Route 24 Improvement Feasi- bility Study that recommended a four-lane divided highway to provide long-term capacity and safety improvements. Ohio Source: US-24 New Haven to Defiance Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Ohio Department of Transportation, July 2003. Figure 3.2. Road along US-24 project.

15 Because this draft EIS met with significant public dissatisfac- tion, additional alternatives were identified and FHWA supple- mented its 1991 draft EIS twice, releasing the first supplemental draft EIS in January 1996 and the second in July 1996. FHWA issued its final EIS in September 1997 and selected the pre- ferred alternative in the ROD in November 1997. Controversy set back the project at least another 2 years when, in January 1998, the city of Alexandria filed a lawsuit against the project alleging that alternatives with fewer lanes should have been considered. Although Alexandria eventually reached a settle- ment with FHWA in March 1999, the lawsuit was continued by three Alexandria-based organizations acting as plaintiffs. In April 1999, the U.S. District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. FHWA appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court, which reversed the lower court’s decision in December 1999. A new supplemental draft and final EIS were then completed and FHWA signed its ROD in June 2000, more than 10 years after the start of the NEPA process. The potential for transit and multimodal alternatives in a project is frequently a source of controversy, particularly in cases when the state DOT was not prepared to address these options as a component of the transportation solution. Some of the most conflicted projects were those in which the public or interest groups were lobbying for a greater transit dimen- sion. In the I-710 corridor to the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, neighborhood groups and local committee mem- bers insisted that a rail alternative be considered a part of the solution. Their insistence spurred a whole new public out- reach effort and alternatives analysis. Some of the challenges in embracing transit and multi- modal alternatives stemmed from institutional issues and lack of integration between transportation agencies and MPOs. Moreover, transit and other multimodal alternatives were often difficult for state DOTs to examine in relation to high- way investments, particularly at the point of a NEPA process. In many cases, transit and multimodal alternatives were better addressed at the regional planning level or in a corridor-level planning study. For example, the Maricopa Regional Trans- portation Plan (RTP) was a case study of a regional plan that expanded emphasis on transit—the level and type of transit was one of the most contentious elements of the plan. Data availability Relying on data and information to make decisions, espe- cially fine-scale decisions, can present a barrier to integrating environmental considerations early in the planning process. This barrier can arise even when efforts are taken to improve GIS data and coordination processes. For instance, the largest obstacle encountered in the devel- opment of Colorado STEP UP was the lack of availability of the necessary data. The issue of scale compounds the issue of benefits. In addition, the selection (and application) of inad- equate screening criteria can contribute to unequal consider- ation of all alternatives (e.g., ruling out transit and other nonhighway options with a cursory review). Failure to Fully Consider a Broad Range of Alternatives The Woodrow Wilson Bridge replacement project is an exam- ple of a highway project in which the need was clear given the deteriorating condition and insufficient capacity of the exist- ing bridge (see Figure 3.3). However, the decision-making process took many years longer than expected because of dis- agreement over project design and alternatives under consid- eration. In this case, FHWA, along with agencies in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia (D.C.), began exam- ining alternatives in 1989 to solve the bridge’s capacity and structural problems. FHWA issued a draft EIS in August of 1991, analyzing five alternatives for replacing the bridge. Figure 3.3. Woodrow Wilson Bridge: (a) circa 1962 and (b) design rendering of new bridge. (a) (b) Source: Courtesy of Woodrow Wilson Bridge Project.

16 the available data then tell only part of the story. Relying on those data to make fine-scale decisions would be challenging. In developing the Binghamton Long-Range Transportation Plan, the BMTS encountered some technical challenges in moving the output from the consultant’s land-use model into its travel demand model. The land-use model used units of 30+ acres, called community elements, which were defined by com- binations of land-use types; but these units did not automati- cally mesh with the traffic analysis zones used in the BMTS travel demand model. Nevertheless, thanks to the technical ability of its staff, BMTS was able to overcome these technical obstacles to conduct traffic analysis of the land-use scenarios. data gaps, given the differences in the scale of data needed between the long-range planning and project planning steps. On the one hand, the most consistent data sources are at the state or federal level, but these data are often not refined enough for project considerations. On the other hand, detailed data, such as parcel data or species inventories, are not uni- formly available beyond the regional scale. Although the STEP UP leadership team envisioned a fully populated database containing many different environmental layers that could be integrated seamlessly with Colorado DOT’s information and electronic infrastructure, fulfilling this vision is currently not possible. STEP UP does not include data from several sources;