Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committee:

Good morning. I thank you for the opportunity to discuss the status of research using the International Space Station. I have been a space life sciences researcher for more than 25 years, regularly funded by grants from NASA. From 1996-1998 I took leave from my academic position at The Pennsylvania State University to serve as a payload specialist astronaut, or guest researcher, on the STS-90 Neurolab Spacelab mission, which flew on the space shuttle Columbia in 1998. I have more than 15 years of experience advising Page 2 NASA on its life sciences strategy and portfolio, either as a direct consultant or through committees of the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. I help evaluate NASA’s Bioastronautics Research Program for the Institute of Medicine. I am also inaugural member of the National Research Council’s (NRC) newly constituted Committee on Biological and Physical Sciences in Space (CBPSS). Part of our charge is to monitor NASA’s progress in implementing the recommendations contained in, “Recapturing a Future for Space Exploration: Life and Physical Sciences Research for a New Era,” published by the NRC in 2011.¹

The ISS provides a unique platform for research. Past NRC studies have noted the critical importance of the ISS’s capabilities to support the goal of long-term human exploration in space. These capabilities include the ability to

perform experiments of extended duration, the ability to continually revise experiment parameters on the basis of previous results, the flexibility in experimental design provided by human operators, and the availability of sophisticated experimental facilities with significant power and data resources. The ISS is the only platform of its kind, and it is essential that its presence and dedication to research for the life and physical sciences be fully employed for as long as it is practicable to do so.

To prepare for this hearing, you asked four specific questions:

1. What are the opportunities and challenges in conducting space life and physical science research on the ISS and what should be done to address them?
2. What are some of the most critical areas of ISS research in space life and physical sciences to enabling the long-term goal of sending humans to the surface of Mars, and what is the status of progress on that research?
3. How are priorities for research on the ISS established and is there a clear and well understood process for aligning ISS resources with those priorities?
4. What are the implications of the proposed extension of ISS operations to 2024 on research and what criteria should Congress use to consider the proposed extension?

In the time allotted, I’d like to share my generally positive view of NASA’s progress, and provide some specific suggestions to maximize the use of this extraordinary national resource that has been orbiting our planet every 90 minutes for the past 17 years. My comments will not stray far from my areas of expertise in the life sciences, but many of them should be applicable to the physical sciences as well.

1. What are the opportunities and challenges in conducting space life and physical science research on the ISS and what should be done to address them?

The 2009 report from the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee (the “Augustine Commission”) emphasized that future astronauts will face three unique stressors²:

• prolonged exposure to solar and galactic radiation;
• prolonged periods of exposure to microgravity; and,
• confinement in close, relatively austere quarters along with a small number of other crew members who must live and work as a cohesive team for many months while having limited contact with their family, friends and culture.

All of these stressors are present in the ISS environment. Martian operations add more stressors: a dusty, dim, energetic environment and a gravitational field that is a little more than a third of our own. Research to address the biological response to fractional gravity is perhaps the area most impacted by changes to the ISS program over the decades. Unless we improve our research centrifuge capabilities on the ISS, we accept a risk of sending humans to Mars with little or no knowledge of how mammalian biology responds in a gravitational field other than Earth’s.

My colleagues in the science community report that two of the major challenges to the biology research portfolio are limited access to the ISS and limited crew time. Some types of research, particularly that employing small mammals, is very time consuming to execute. Animal husbandry for a single rodent experiment can easily outstrip available ISS crew time for research during an increment. We can reasonably anticipate that competition for crew time will become worse as the facility ages, and demands on crew time to perform necessary maintenance become more acute.

Access to the ISS for research is not just a matter of access to space, it is a matter of competing programs. ISS research time is allocated in roughly equal proportions between NASA sponsored, peer-reviewed science and projects sponsored by the Center for the Advancement of Science in Space (CASIS), regardless of what that research might be. The outcome is that National Laboratory research and peer-reviewed, NASA-sponsored research vie for scarce resources such as crew time and positions on the flight manifest; in some cases forcing NASA research to lower-fidelity Earth-based analogs such as bed rest research for muscle atrophy and bone demineralization.

The extension criteria report requested by Congress in the NASA Authorization Act of 2015 creates opportunities

to better coordinate NASA and CASIS sponsored research. For example, the ISS Program Office could require an experimental definition phase to maximize science return by combining compatible experiments and expanding biospecimen-sharing experiments to answer the most pressing research questions.

2. What are some of the most critical areas of ISS research in space life and physical sciences to enabling the long-term goal of sending humans to the surface of Mars, and what is the status of progress on that research?

The biological risks associated with exploration-class spaceflight are far from being mitigated. This conclusion is based on analysis of 40 years of NASA-sponsored research.

Since the days of Skylab, NASA-funded investigators conducted an aggressive and successful biological research program that was robust, comprehensive, and internationally recognized. Beginning with those early efforts, and continuing with our international partners on the Mir and the ISS, we have built a knowledge base that defines Page 4 the rate at which humans adapt during spaceflight up to six-months duration, with four data points exceeding one-year duration. Right now, we are expanding the one-year database! To prepare for Mars, we need to extend the duration further—up to three years—using a combination of astronaut volunteers and small mammals such as rats and mice.

In Life of Reason,³ George Santayana warned that, “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” We should not forget the precipitous drop in NASAsponsored research in the first decade of the millennium. The 2001 peak of 1014 separate research tasks was slashed to just 364 in 2010. Space biology and the physical sciences were particularly hard hit, losing about 80% of their research portfolio.

Congress heard the research community’s concerns, and we are most thankful for your response. The NRC’s Life and Physical Sciences (LPS) Decadal Survey—completed in 2011 as a response to a request from Congress introduced in 2008 authorization language—prompted a sea change in NASA’s approach to biological and physical sciences research.

The LPS Decadal summarized and sequenced 65 high priority research tasks. Furthermore, the Decadal study created two notional research plans aligned with specific priorities; one being a goal of rebuilding a research enterprise and the other a goal of a human mission to Mars. More about these goals later.

3. How are priorities for research on the ISS established and is there a clear and well understood process for aligning ISS resources with those priorities?

My response to this question considers general aspects of peer-reviewed research projects that are solicited through open competition. All NASA-sponsored space life and physical sciences research is conducted in this way.

Developing strategic priorities for ISS research is not a new concept. Notable examples from this millennium include:

• The NASA-sponsored Research Maximization and Prioritization Task Force, commonly known as ReMAP, which reported its findings in 2002, representing the breadth of translational research in the biological and physical sciences.
• The ISS utilization studies organized by the National Research Council in 2005.
• Most recently, the Life and Physical Sciences (LPS) Decadal Research Plan; the first decadal survey of NASA’s life and physical sciences programs. The guiding principle of the study was, “to set an agenda for research in the next decade that would use the unique characteristics of the space environment to address complex problems in the life and physical sciences, so as to deliver both new knowledge and practical benefits for humankind as it embarks on a new era of space exploration.” Furthermore, the LPS Decadal organizers were tasked with establishing priorities for an integrated portfolio of biological and physical sciences research in the decade of 2010-2020.

Why have we asked the prioritization question so many times, and why must we do so again? Because space research

informs two broad, often competing, goals: One centers on intrinsic scientific importance or impact; research that illuminates our place in the universe, but cannot be accomplished in a terrestrial environment. The other goal values research that enables long-term human exploration of space beyond low-earth orbit, and develops effective countermeasures to mitigate the potentially damaging effects of longterm exposure to the space environment. Over the past 25 years, other review panels, both internal and external to NASA, have defined similar goals. In the case of the LPS, research was categorized as either (1) required to enable exploration missions or (2) enabled or facilitated because of exploration missions. I prefer the more contemporary synonyms of “discovery” and “translational” research.

Throughout the history of the United States space program both goals have been important, but their relative importance has changed over time. In the early part of the Apollo era, the limited amount of biological and physical research that occurred was focused on the health and safety of astronaut crews in a microgravity environment. Until late in the Apollo program, significant research questions that did not contribute directly to a successful Moon landing received lower priority. In contrast, more regular access to space provided by the space shuttle afforded an opportunity for discovery research to take higher priority; an emphasis that fared poorly in the austere NASA budgetary environment of the mid-2000’s.

Thus, the relative priority of these two goals of research—enabling long-term human exploration of space (translation) and answering questions of intrinsic scientific merit (discovery enabled by space research)—shifts according to NASA’s programmatic goals.

I make note of the fact that section 201 NASA Authorization Act of 2015 articulates a translational goal of sending humans to Mars, while section 718 emphasizes discovery research. The key question is this: Shall discovery or translational research takes precedence in the mature years of the ISS research program? If it is translational research to prepare for a human trip to Mars, then the ISS research portfolio should be tailored accordingly.

The LPS Decadal Survey provides a very detailed scheme to evaluate the importance of proposed research on the International Space Station. It includes eight unique criteria to prioritize research,⁴ as follows:

• Positive Impact on Exploration Efforts, Improved Access to Data or to Samples, Risk Reduction. The extent to which the results of the research will reduce uncertainty about both the benefits and the risks of space exploration.
• Potential to Enhance Mission Options or to Reduce Mission Costs. The extent to which the results of the research will reduce the costs of space exploration.
• Positive Impact on Exploration Efforts, Improved Access to Data or to Samples. The extent to which the results of the research may lead to entirely new options for exploration missions.
• Relative Impact Within a Research Field. The extent to which the results of the research will provide full or partial answers to grand science challenges that the space environment provides a unique means to address.
• Needs that are Unique to NASA Exploration Programs. The extent to which the results of the research are uniquely needed by NASA, as opposed to any other agencies.
• Research Programs That Could Be Dual-Use. The extent to which the results of the research can be synergistic with other agencies’ needs.
• Research Value of Using Reduced-Gravity Environment. The extent to which the research must use the space environment to achieve useful knowledge.
• Ability to Translate Results to Terrestrial Needs. The extent to which the results of the research could lead to either faster or better solutions to terrestrial problems or to terrestrial economic benefit.

Some of these criteria emphasize discovery; others translation. The LPS Decadal Survey prioritizes specific research tasks for each criterion. Again, the Survey appropriately stopped short of weighting or prioritizing criteria against each other because of the programmatic implications. That responsibility—to prioritize either discovery research or Mars—falls largely to the executive and legislative branches. When this question is decided, then the LPS decadal should be a useful tool to program research for the remaining life of the ISS.

Operationally, the ISS Program Office prioritizes all the research to be conducted on each ISS increment. It is a well understood process: CASIS receives a 50% allocation, followed by human research, then technology demonstrations. What resources remain are allocated to the Biological and Physical Sciences Program and the Science Mission

Directorate payloads. Both the Human Research and Biological and Physical Science utilize the LPS Decadal criteria for prioritization within their respective programs, but it is not apparent the extent, if any, that LPS Decadal criteria are used to prioritize research across the four programs.

Lastly, it is worth noting that ISS research expenditures, which in FY 2012 constituted about 8%, or $225M, of ISS program costs, are not anticipated to keep pace with overall cost growth of the ISS program.

4. What are the implications of the proposed extension of ISS operations to 2024 on research and what criteria should Congress use to consider the proposed extension?

To evaluate the proposed extension, one of the first tests that Congress should apply can be answered with a yes or no. “Is NASA prepared to operate a robust research program through 2024?” In my opinion, the answer is an unqualified, “yes!” The scope of change in NASA life and physical sciences in the past four years has been remarkable. Allow me to highlight some notable examples:

• In 2011 NASA reorganized the remnants of a once robust life and physical sciences program to form the Space Life and Physical Sciences Research and Applications Division (SLPSRA). The program is formulated to execute high quality, high value research and application activities in the areas of space life sciences, physical sciences and human research. This reorganization acknowledges—in point of fact, celebrates—both the discovery and translational outcomes of research in the biological and physical sciences.
• Consistent with recommendations in the LPS Decadal, the Biological and Physical Sciences Program has restarted regular research announcements for ground-based and flight experiments. As a rule, these proposals are externally peer reviewed. In FY2014, 30 proposals were funded; 9 of them flight experiments.
• NASA is making greater use of advisors in the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. In October of 2014 the NRC instituted a new Committee on Biology and Physical Sciences in Space (CBPSS) chaired by Betsy Cantwell (University of Arizona) and Rob Ferl (University of Florida). Part of the Committee’s charge is to monitor the progress in implementation of the recommendations contained in, the LPS Decadal.
• The Human Research Program has been aligned with a global exploration strategy. Annual solicitations for research have resumed. The past four quarters for which summaries are available included 212 research publications and more than 277 research proposals.
• We now have an American astronaut on a one-year mission to the ISS, with a unique opportunity to examine his genomic response to this environment.
• The technical content of the Human Bioastronautics Roadmap is in the middle of a five-year review of its 33 risks and 299 research gaps relevant to health and operations in space. The project is being conducted by the Institute of Medicine.
• NASA’s Human System Risk Board tracks a subset of 23 risks that require additional research. While all but one have some level of risk mitigation for a one-year stay on the Moon, about half (N=11) do not have any substantive level of risk mitigation for three-year planetary operations.

I think it’s reasonable to conclude that NASA has planned its life and physical sciences enterprise to take advantage of ISS research capabilities. The greatest remaining knowledge gaps are for Design Reference Missions on Mars for more than one year.

A recent NASA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report⁵ identified several concerns for continued ISS operations through 2024. There are four aspects of the report that I’d like to address:

First, the OIG found that ISS extension to 2024 could permit NASA enough time to mitigate an additional seven risks of long duration spaceflight. Nevertheless, extended utilization was not expected to fully mitigate another 11 human health risks prior to 2024, and two additional risks could not be mitigated using the ISS. The OIG concluded that NASA, “needs to prioritize its research aboard Station to address the most important risks in the time available.” I think this conclusion misses an important point. The likelihood and consequences of at least 11 of the 13 unmitigated risks are dependent on the tasks required of a crew during a Mars Design Reference Mission. Today, there are simply too many degrees of freedom in the task set to establish useful risk criteria. Therefore, before the

capabilities of the ISS to mitigate these risks can be evaluated, the risk must be better understood by performing a thorough task analysis of Martian operations.

Second, the report did not address powered down mass to any great extent. This is a critical need when biological samples, including live organisms, are to be returned to the ground for additional study.

Third, the OIG emphasized average crew time as a metric to quantify research utility. Although there are other metrics, including number of investigations, use of allocated space, up-mass, down-mass, and power, thermal, and data usage; in general, NASA does not consider these measures primary indicators of research utilization.⁶ What is missing is a method to evaluate the efficiency of on-orbit research. Specifically, what percentage of crew time allocated to research is used to conduct it, compared to ancillary functions for such as setting up and stowing equipment? A similar focus has improved extravehicular operations on the ISS. I suspect that we will find that some of the highest priority research, such as studies using small mammals, is also the least efficient; requiring substantial amounts of crew time to set up experiments. If this is true, then increasing efficiency, for example, by improving coordination between NASA and CASIS, could be another way to capture more crew time for research in high priority areas.

Fourth, the OIG notes that research time is constrained with a six person crew. To maximize research utilization, we need to think about a seventh scientist crew member when commercial crew systems can support him or her. Summary We desperately need to increase research capabilities in space by translating findings from cell culture to reference organisms and mammalian models such as mice and rats to future flight crews. Translational research is the “gold standard” of the NIH, and it is what the research community, and the American people, should expect from the International Space Station. We need the capability to house and test model organisms on the ISS for extended periods of time, and whenever possible, to expose them to loading forces that approximate Mars. But equally important, we need adequate time for crew to prepare and conduct these experiments. The potential return is immense; the application of this research to our aging public could become one of the most important justifications for an extended human presence in space. My LPS Decadal Survey colleagues and I contend that NASA can and should continue to restore a high level of programmatic vision and dedication to life and physical sciences research, to ensure that the considerable obstacles to human exploration missions to Mars can be resolved. This will depend on NASA embracing life and physical sciences research as part of its core exploration mission and re-energizing a community of life and physical scientists and engineers focused on both discovery and translational research.

To maximize ISS research, it is of paramount importance . . .

• That the life and physical sciences research portfolio supported by NASA, both extramurally and intramurally, receive high attention.
• That NASA’s research management structure be optimized to meet its discovery research, translational research, and commercialization goals. The utility of a coherent research plan that is appropriately resourced and consistently applied to enable exploration cannot be overemphasized. This will require improved coordination with CASIS.
• That the research portfolio be based on both discovery and translational programmatic priorities, and with specific destination(s) and mission tasks in mind.
• That there is sufficient external oversight to help NASA reach its research goals.

My top recommendations are the following:

• Articulate a timeframe for delivering and completing an operational risk mitigation plan for a multi-year human mission to Mars, and vet both the plan and the timeframe with the external scientific community.
• Review the essential resources for extended mammalian research on the ISS, including a seventh crew member; a scientist-astronaut whose nominal responsibilities are science programming.
• Extend biological science experiments to cover a substantial portion of a mammalian life cycle, and incorporate fractional (Martian) gravity exposure where possible.

Mr. Chairman, given sufficient resources, I am optimistic that NASA can deliver another decade of rigorous translational research. It’s what the scientific community expects, and the American people deserve. I sincerely thank you for your vigilant support of the nation’s space program, and the opportunity to appear before you today.

Good Morning Chairman Babin, Chairman Bridenstine, Ranking Members Edwards and Bonamici, and members of the subcommittees. I am Dr. Tony Busalacchi and I am Director of the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center and Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Science at the University of Maryland. Prior to coming to the University of Maryland 15 years ago, I was a civil servant for 18 years at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the last 10 years of which I was a laboratory chief and member of the Senior Executive Service. While at Goddard I also served as the source selection official for the SeaWiFS Ocean Color Data Buy from Orbital Sciences Corporation that is directly relevant to this hearing.

Presently, I also serve as the Co-Chair of Decadal Survey for Earth Sciences and Applications from Space being carried out by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. The report from this study will provide the sponsors—NASA, NOAA and the USGS—with consensus recommendations from the environmental monitoring and Earth science and applications communities for an integrated and sustainable approach to the conduct of the U.S. government’s civilian space-based Earth-system science programs.

The decadal survey’s prioritization of research activities will be based on our committee’s consideration of identified science priorities; broad national operational observation priorities as identified in U.S. government policy, law, and international agreements (for example, the 2014 National Plan for Civil Earth Observation) and the relevant appropriation and authorization acts governing NASA, NOAA, and USGS; cost and technical readiness; the likely emergence of new technologies; the role of supporting activities such as in situ measurements; computational infrastructure for modeling, data assimilation, and data management; and opportunities to leverage related activities including consideration of interagency cooperation and international collaboration. With the expectation that the capabilities of non-traditional providers of Earth observations will continue to increase in scope and quality, the decadal survey has also been asked to suggest approaches for evaluating these new capabilities and integrating them, where appropriate, into NASA, NOAA and USGS strategic plans. The committee will also consider how such capabilities might alter NOAA’s and USGS’s flight mission and sensor priorities in the next decade and beyond.

Before continuing with my testimony I should note that I am speaking on my own behalf today, not on behalf of the other co-chair of the decadal survey—Dr. Waleed Abdalati of the University of Colorado—or the survey’s steering committee that is being assembled as we meet today. Nothing in my testimony today should be construed as indicating anything about what the decadal survey committee may recommend when our report is published in the summer of 2017.

Following the suggestion in the committee’s letter inviting me to testify, I will organize my testimony around the following questions:

1. What are the opportunities and challenges associated with potential public private partnerships for NASA’s Earth science program?
2. What were the key lessons learned from prior public private partnerships, such as Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS), and what were the most challenging aspects?
3. Provide a summary of prior National Academies work relevant to NASA Earth observations and partnerships with commercial entities.
4. What processes and policies are needed to identify if public private partnerships should be used and when, and how they should be evaluated? What, if any, are the next steps for Congress?

1. What are the opportunities and challenges associated with potential public private partnerships for NASA’s Earth science program?

Public-private partnerships have the potential for cost savings to the government and the possibility for accelerating innovation. While this potential may exist it is far from being realized and proven possible.

NASA’s Earth Science Division (ESD) conducts a wide range of satellite and sub-orbital missions in order to better understand Earth as an integrated system. Earth observations provide the foundation for critical scientific advances and data products derived from these observations that are used for an extraordinary range of societal applications including resource management, weather forecasts, climate projections, agricultural production, and natural disaster response. ESD develops its observing strategy in response to Congressional and Executive Branch direction and through consultation with the scientific community. In particular, the consensus views of the scientific community as expressed in Academies’ decadal survey reports are used to guide future investments.

In addition to the ambitious plans recommended to NASA in the inaugural decadal survey, Earth Science and Applications from Space (2007),¹ starting in Fiscal Year 2014 NASA was directed to assume additional responsibilities for sustaining a number of measurements previously assigned to other agencies.² With these constraints and against the backdrop of an austere budgetary environment that is likely to persist for the foreseeable future, and facing increased demands for Earth information products critical to the nation’s welfare, the Earth Science Division is actively examining evolving opportunities to use smaller and less costly spacecraft, spacecraft constellations, hosted payloads, and “missions of opportunity”—all with the objective of “doing more with less.” For example, following a recommendation in the 2007 decadal survey, ESD developed a new “Venture” class series of science-driven, competitively selected, comparatively low-cost missions that are providing more frequent opportunities for investment in innovative Earth science using smaller satellites, the International Space Station, hosted payloads, and sub-orbital platforms.

The private sector is rightfully known as an engine of innovation. This is seen, for example, in the myriad of companies that are now developing novel Earth imaging capabilities. Public-private partnerships may offer a way for NASA ESD to acquire—at lower cost—the data it and the nation require. While this approach may prove practical in the case of Earth imaging where there is over 60 years of heritage, in my view there is no a priori reason to believe it will prove practical for new remote-sensing methodologies and technologies. As I discuss later in my testimony, issues of data access and data quality pose particular challenges in a government partnership with a profit-generating private entity.

2. What were the key lessons learned from prior public private partnerships, such as Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS), and what were the most challenging aspects?

SeaWiFS³ was a science data buy in which NASA served as the anchor tenant to a private entity that was responsible for building and launching a spacecraft and instrument with particular capabilities. While my testimony today focuses on SeaWiFS, it should be recognized that other types of public-private partnerships have been successfully demonstrated; for example, the hosted payload model whereby NASA utilizes available capacity on commercial satellites to accommodate an additional instrument(s).

From a scientific perspective, SeaWIFS was a grand success in terms of the quality of the global ocean color data that

was acquired and the subsequent research on marine ecosystems. The structure of the data buy was such that NASA had insight-without-oversight. Overall, this strategy worked well primarily because our SeaWiFS Project maintained a healthy working relationship with Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) and the instrument vendor, Hughes/Santa Barbara Research Center, even though there were some serious problems with the launch vehicle, spacecraft and sensor resulting in a four-year launch delay. OSC also overran their budget, but not at government expense. While the whole process was very stressful for all parties, it did result ultimately in the provision of quality data. It is worth noting, however, that a less harmonious relationship between both parties could well have led to contract cancellation.

Even though SeaWIFS was technically a data buy from the private sector, the project would not have been a success without the engineering support from NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Considerable support was provided by GSFC engineers in areas such as the power system, attitude control system, navigation system, component quality control. Although there was some heritage in ocean color remote sensing from the proof of concept Coastal Zone Color Scanner, the fact that SeaWiFS was a totally new sensor employing a novel lunar calibration underscored the need for expert engineering support from an organization like NASA Goddard.

As part of the ocean color data buy arrangement, NASA was also responsible for science data processing, on-orbit sensor calibration, and product quality control. Key to the success of the research quality of the data was the sustained participation of the science community, a project office staffed by experienced scientists with a vested interest in the mission, and development of the necessary infrastructure that did not exist when the project started. In any such public-private partnership going forward this range of activities needs to be supported and sustained.

Most of the infrastructure (including staff, which is critical) that we put in place under SeaWiFS remains in place today and has been expanded to support development of successor instruments, including MODIS⁴ and its successor, VIIRS,⁵ which is currently manifested on Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership, or Suomi NPP. VIIRS is also a key instrument on NOAA’s JPSS⁶ system going forward. This is relevant to the topic of routine or sustained observations where the science or support to societal benefit areas requires the data stream to be stable, continuous and calibrated for years to decades. If such long-term data records and related research is the goal, then a long-term commitment is required.

Maintaining consistent and traceable time series between missions with, for example, different sensor designs and different orbits presents many challenges. It is not clear how this can be accomplished by a public-private partnership given that every mission is competed and executed independently. This problem is magnified by the need for reprocessing all data sets using standardized algorithms and calibration methodologies. Developing close working relationships and sharing data with other space agencies has always been NASA’s policy. NASA has also made data freely available. Under commercialization, these relationships and policies would need to be maintained. The private sector (U.S. and international) tends to consider code, sensor design information, and test data as proprietary—potentially a huge stumbling block to data consistency and continuity.

In order for OSC to market ocean color data, NASA did not have free and open access to the data. Overall, the data access agreement for research worked well—that is researchers had to register and verify they were only using the data for research and not for commercial purposes. Even though most of the research with SeaWiFs data was done in a delayed mode, we were able to provide real-time data in support of research cruises/field campaigns. Going forward any public-private partnership will need to develop a cost model based on data latency and resolution.

3. Provide a summary of prior National Academies work relevant to NASA Earth observations and partnerships with commercial entities.

The Academies has published several reports that touch on the issues of this hearing, including Resolving Conflicts

Arising from the Privatization of Environmental Data (2001); Toward New Partnerships In Remote Sensing: Government, the Private Sector, and Earth Science Research (2002); and Assessing the Requirements for Sustained Ocean Color Research and Operations (2011).⁷ Of particular note, Toward New Partnerships and Assessing the Requirements for Sustained Ocean Color Research and Operations include an examination and lessons learned from NASA’s Science Data Buy (SDB) for SeaWiFS, a data buy for which, as previously mentioned, I am quite familiar with as I was the SeaWiFS source selection official while serving as head of NASA Goddard’s Laboratory for Hydrospheric Processes.

Here, I would like to touch briefly on two specific challenges that need to be addressed for commercial entities to become viable partners in NASA’s Earth science research and applications programs.

Full and Open Access to Data:

For obvious reasons, a commercial entity entering into a partnership to provide NASA observations must have a business model that promises a tangible financial return. Typically, whether the entity is producer or distributor, they will require restrictions on access to data. However, as noted in Toward New Partnerships, full and open access to data and the opportunity both to replicate research findings and to conduct further research using the same data are critical to scientific research.

In the case of SeaWiFS, which generated ocean color data of commercial and scientific value, the contract between NASA and the data provider, Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC), had NASA retaining all rights to data for research purposes, and ORBIMAGE, a spinoff of OSC, retaining all rights for commercial and operational purposes. The contract included an embargo period of 2 weeks from collection for general distribution of data to research users to protect ORBIMAGE’s commercial interest. Notably—and the key to making this arrangement practicable in my view—the commercial value of ocean color data to the fishing industry dissipates rapidly while the scientific value is not impacted substantially by short delays in data distribution.

With respect to access and utilization of its science data, NASA has, as a matter of longstanding policy and practice, archived all science mission data products to ensure long-term usability and to promote wide-spread usage by scientists, educators, decision-makers, and the general public. NASA has called attention to this policy in particular with respect to Earth science data, stating, “Perhaps the most notable endeavor in this [open access] regard is the Earth Observing System Data and Information System (EOSDIS), which processes, archives, and distributes data from a large number of Earth observing satellites and represents a crucial capability for studying the Earth system from space and improving prediction of Earth system change. EOSDIS consists of a set of processing facilities and data centers distributed across the United States that serve hundreds of thousands of users around the world.”⁸

Ensuring the Quality of the Data and Maximizing the Nation’s Return on Investment

In Assessing the Requirements for Sustained Ocean Color Research and Operations, it is noted that, “Building and launching a sensor are only the first steps toward successfully producing ocean color radiance and ocean color products. Even if the sensor meets all high-quality requirements, without stability monitoring, vicarious calibration, and reprocessing capabilities, the data will not meet standards for scientific and climate-impact assessments.” The report goes on to note that: “To a large extent, success of the SeaWiFS/MODIS era missions can be attributed to the fact that they incorporated a series of important steps, including: pre-flight characterization, on-orbit assessment of sensor stability and gains, a program for vicarious calibration, improvements in the models for atmospheric correction and bio-optical algorithms, the validation of the final products across a wide range of ocean ecosystems, the decision going into the missions that datasets would be reprocessed multiple times as improvements became available, and a commitment and dedication to widely distribute data for science and education (e.g., Acker et al.,⁹ 2002a; McClain,

2009;¹⁰ Siegel and Franz, 2010¹¹).”

The report’s conclusion, which I strongly endorse, is that SeaWiFS’ success in producing high-quality data was due to the commitment by NASA to all critical steps of the mission, including pre-flight characterization, on-orbit assessment of sensor stability and gains, solar and lunar calibration, vicarious calibration, atmospheric correction and bio-optical algorithms, product validation, reprocessing, and widely distributed data for science and education.

It is my understanding that the organizers of this hearing, the Space and Environment Subcommittees of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives have a particular interest in the potential role of public-private partnerships in sustaining Earth science measurements beyond the nominal lifetime of the mission/instrument that provided a first demonstration of capability/proof of concept. Here I wish to note the particular challenges that would need to be met—whether by NASA or in partnership with a private entity—with respect to trend detection and the creation of data records that can be used to inform decision makers.

Monitoring over long time periods is essential to detecting trends, whether for solar radiance, land-cover change, or ozone destruction. Long-term monitoring is also necessary to understand critical processes that are characterized by low-frequency variability. Because changes on a wide range of time and space scales affect Earth, it is not possible to determine a priori and with certainty the types of observations that should be made and the appropriate sampling strategy. An observing system may very well reveal unexpected phenomena such as the large-scale, low-frequency El Niño/Southern Oscillation of sea surface temperature as is happening right now in the tropical Pacific Ocean, and scientific opportunities are lost if the observing strategy cannot adapt accordingly.¹²

A Finding in Towards New Partnerships gives further detail on the challenge in creating an observing system capable of trend detection. There it is stated, “Continuity of remote sensing observations over long periods of time is essential for Earth system science and global change research, and it requires that scientists have access to repeated observations obtained over periods of many years…As scientists expand their use of data from both public and private sources, problems may arise in combining remote sensing data from multiple sensors with different capabilities and characteristics.” These statements are consistent with an earlier report from the Academies, where it is noted, “It takes a special effort to preserve the quality of data acquired with different satellite systems and sensors, so that valid comparisons can be made over an entire set of observations. There are few examples of continuous data records based on satellite measurements where data quality is consistent across changes in sensors, even when copies of the sensor design are used. Sensor characterization and an effective, ongoing program of sensor calibration and validation are essential in order to separate the effects of changes in the Earth system from effects owing to changes in the observing system…Data systems should be designed to meet the needs for periodic reprocessing of the entire data set. An aggressive, science-driven program to ensure long-term data quality and continuity is very important.”¹³

4. What processes and policies are needed to identify if public private partnerships should be used and when, and how they should be evaluated? What, if any, are the next steps for Congress?

Drawing on the lessons learned from the past, the most important next step is to establish a series of best practices to guide future public private partnerships for Earth remote sensing. In my experience, the following are characteristics of successful partnerships between NASA and a private-entity:

• The establishment of an appropriate insight/oversight model with the commercial partner.
  • What worked well for the SeaWiFS science data buy was the arrangement where NASA maintained insight, but not oversight, of the project. “Insight” is a monitoring activity, whereas “oversight” is an exercise of authority by the Government. SeaWiFS was a cost-sharing collaboration between NASA and Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) wherein NASA Goddard specified the data attributes and bought the research rights to these data, maintaining insight, but not oversight, of OSC. The SeaWiFS Project at GSFC was responsible for the calibration, validation, and routine processing of these data. OSC provided the spacecraft, instrument,

• and launch, and was responsible for spacecraft operations for five years at a fixed price, while retaining the operational and commercial rights to these data. In order to protect OSC’s data rights, the release of research data was delayed, unless near-real time access is necessary for calibration and validation activities.¹⁴

• NASA access to algorithms and instrument characterization; NASA access to and reuse of data; and the establishment of an appropriate data archive.
  • Turning data intinformation of value tboth a commercial entity and tthe science community--now and in the future--requires detailed knowledge of how the raw data are generated, the algorithms that are used tprocess the data and generate higher-level data products, and control of how the data are archived. Taking these steps ensures the quality of the data and enables it tbe characterized in a way that permits it tbe combined with similarly well-characterized data from different instruments. It alsfacilitates future reprocessing in light of new knowledge and newer algorithms.
• Need for science teams as part of a plan tmaximize the utility of the data
  • The establishment of a science team early in the development of a NASA Earth observation mission is a familiar and well-grounded recommendation. Once established, early science efforts (e.g. on prototype systems and/or synthetic datasets) can contribute directly tengineering and systems analyses. They can alsoptimize algorithms through competition (e.g. retrieval algorithms, extrapolations, etc.); provide a conduit tthe user community; and provide timely notice tthe research community, which would rapidly expand the user base. In addition, they can exploit the science perspective for system refinements (i.e. for follow-on missions), validation, and error detection.¹⁵
• Technical readiness as a measure of what observation methodology may be ripe for a public private partnership.
  • In the case of Earth imaging there is over six decades worth of heritage on the design of such sensors. This has provided the opportunity for significant core competencies tbe developed in the private sector thus enabling public private partnerships. Those technologies that are mature are likely the ones that may be most amenable ta public private partnership. Conversely, the more novel the technology or newer the data stream may well require more government involvement tdraw on a wider base of expertise for sensor characterization, calibration, validation, and science data processing and reprocessing.
• Commercial demand and market for the data is key tcost savings tthe government.
  • If the government is the sole user of the data, there is little incentive for a public private partnership. In the example of SeaWiFS, the cost tthe government was reduced by OSC’s intent tsell the real-time data tthe commercial fishing industry. Transition across basic research tapplied research tthe development of products and applications is not easy and not fast. However, the extent twhich this can be accelerated in support of a range of societal benefit areas, including, for example, agriculture, transportation, fishing, recreation, and land use, will determine the non-governmental demand for the data and potential cost savings tthe government.

I hope that even these brief comments demonstrate that obtaining the kinds of data required by scientists for critical Earth science applications and for credible forecasts of the future state of the Earth system requires careful attention from the design of an instrument tthe plan for continuity tstewardship of the data. Yet, the science community operates in a way that typically differs dramatically from that of the commercial remote sensing industry. Public-private partnerships offer an alternative—and potentially less costly—method tacquire Earth observations. However, with SeaWiFS as a guide, a successful public-partnership may be realized only in limited circumstances and only with careful attention tthe particular needs of both profit-making entities and the scientific community.