Emergency Communications Planning for Airports (2016)

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61 APPENDIX C Case Examples INTRODUCTION TO CASE EXAMPLES The four case examples in this appendix illustrate effective comprehensive communications planning for emergencies and crises from three very different airports. Case examples 1 and 2, Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) and Denver International Airport (DEN), respectively, represent an optimal approach: a full, aggressive engagement with all types of communications for all types of emergencies, mission-critical systems failures and crises, and a rigorous process of applying lessons learned. A handful of other airports, mostly large hubs but also a few medium hubs, can probably match or approach this level of communications planning; however, the methods used by DEN and DFW are scalable, so an airport of any size of type can adapt them. Case Example 3 is drawn from a small hub, Boise Airport (BOI). Like DFW and DEN, BOI demonstrates the power of collaborating with other city departments and community partners as well as of taking a com- prehensive crisis approach. As with DFW and DEN the tools and procedures used by BOI are scalable and adaptable, even to large and medium hubs. As noted by Smith, Kenville, and Sawyer (2015), small air- ports are often freer to innovate. Indeed, they are sometimes driven to innovation by staffing and funding constraints. In addition, smaller airports may be more likely to involve external partners in all aspects of emergency management to leverage the needed aspects and resources (Smith 2014). Case Example 4 came from a general aviation (GA) airport, Watsonville (California) Municipal Airport (WVI). It demonstrates that even small airports with small staffs can accomplish highly effective emergency communications given clear goals, leadership, and cooperation with community partners. CASE EXAMPLE 1: DALLAS/FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (DFW) Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) is the ninth busiest airport in the world for passenger travel and the third busiest for operations, hosting 1,850 flights a day and serving more than 63 million customers a year. The airport is a major economic driver for the Dallas/Fort Worth region, generating about $37 billion in economic impact each year. The primary source for this case example was an interview with Mary Jo Polidore, Vice President for Corporate Communications at DFW, conducted on October 26, 2015. DFW utilizes a stand-alone crisis communication plan that is an appendix to their Airport’s Emergency Plan (AEP). The plan was developed by the airport corporate communications staff and addresses all aspects of notification to both internal and external airport stakeholders. DFW has always had a crisis communication plan (CCP), but in the last five years the plan has expanded to be more comprehensive and goes through annual updating to incorporate lessons learned from emergency management exercise and real-time events. With 16 years of experience leading corporate communications for several divisions of a leading U.S. aerospace and defense company, including its $11 billion aeronautics businesses, Polidore has been able to apply lessons learned into the DFW’s CCP, with the focus on preparing, responding, and recovering from crisis situations. The current DFW CCP is a 24-page document that details responsibilities, policies, teams, checklists, communications infrastructure, and redundancy. The plan, which is very much in line with National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) protocols, also includes sample statements, press releases, incorporation of social media, etc. The corporate communications staff is trained in working within DFW’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Although their plan is called a crisis communications plan, the operational responsibilities and functions within the plan are also used for major events, not just emergencies or crisis situations, which is evidence of the DFW commitment to NIMS and ICS. Anytime the airport activates its EOC, the corporate communications team acts to support the incident command and control by staffing the communications section of the EOC and managing all of the internal and external public communications. Generally, two people are sent to the EOC, and one com- munications professional is sent to the Mobile Command Center at the scene. The EOC Communications manages public communications and serves in a policy role at the EOC. For larger emergencies, the policy role is accomplished by the communications vice president working in collaboration with executive vice presidents and the CEO looking ahead at public perception, expectations, and communication needs from a strategic level. The second communications staffer at the EOC monitors and manages social media and responses, and the third serves as the on-site media relations spokesperson. For larger emergencies and those

62 impacting employees as well as customers and/or stakeholders, an internal communications professional is added to the EOC team and additional supporting communications personnel, including outside public relations and social media contractors, are brought in. DFW responds to special events in the same way it does to a crisis. Polidore stated, “just as in the military, you fight how you train and you train as you fight.” Using the CCP for major events helps DFW ensure proficiency when and if a major crisis occurs. DFW also reviews and exercises its plan on a regular basis. “Every event or exercise is followed by post-event debriefs and evaluations of what went right, what went wrong, and how we can improve and incorporate these lessons learned immediately into our plan, processes and procedures.” One noteworthy event for DFW occurred in September 2014, when Thomas Duncan became the first person in the United States to die of the Ebola virus. Duncan had traveled through DFW days prior to being admitted to a hospital. This event quickly triggered global media attention and put DFW in the spotlight. Concern on traditional media, social media and public skyrocketed. The corporate communi- cations team quietly began monitoring media and managing the social media channels, and determined that in cases of public health, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and local health departments have the primary responsibility for public communications while the airport had supportive responsibilities. Consequently, the team’s strategy was to help others understand who had the primary responsibility for communication and then to support those efforts in the interest of public health and safety. The DFW com- munications team set up direct links with the CDC and Tarrant County Public Health Department in an effort understand and align with their actions. It quickly learned that their airport stakeholder groups, such as the airlines, TSA, Customs and Border Patrol, concessioners, etc., as well as internal employee groups, needed information. DFW gathered as much information from experts as possible pertaining to medical facts about the real risks involved. Monitoring and assessing traditional and social media helped DFW to determine what operational actions would assist health authorities in speaking with confidence about pre- cautionary measures performed at DFW and other places in order to quell public concerns. Some of these actions were not due to actual need, but were triggered by the public perception of the risk. An example was the cleaning and disinfecting of the restrooms and paths that Duncan may have travelled on his way through the terminal: This may not have been necessary, but it demonstrated DFW’s commitment to doing whatever was necessary to ensure a safe environment for customers. DFW activated its EOC for this event and focused primarily on its crisis communication functions. This was the first time the EOC had been activated to support what was primarily a communications emergency rather than an operational emergency, and all departments of the airport mobilized at the EOC to support this effort. DFW’s corporate communications team has learned the importance of bench strength capabilities. Its commitment to staff the EOC’s communication functions has brought with it the need to establish inter- nal backup. It has also identified additional public/media relations personnel in the community that can provide EOC support in the event that trained communications employees need relief or are unavailable. This support includes 24-7 social media monitoring and extended crisis communications and traditional media monitoring and support. CASE EXAMPLE 2: DENVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (DEN) DEN is the 17th busiest airport in the world and the fifth busiest airport in the United States. With more than 53 million passengers traveling through the airport each year, DEN is one of the busiest large hub airports in the United States, which is the world’s largest aviation market and is the primary economic engine for the state of Colorado, generating more than $26 billion for the region annually. The primary source for this case example was an interview Heath Montgomery, DEN’s communications strategist and media relations director, on Oct. 26, 2015, supplemented by correspondence with Stephen Lee, the airport’s director of operations–support, and training and exercise manager Jason Taussig. DEN has a single comprehensive crisis communications plan—the Denver International Airport Crisis Communication Manual—that guides all aspects of internal and external communications (Figure C1). The crisis communications manual was developed by the airport’s global communications department (GC), then the public relations group, based on the needs it perceived. It received positive support because all airport departments saw the value that an incident management team receives from well-handled com- munication. The positive support entailed “suggesting items and encouraging.” When the EOC is acti- vated and the incident involves intelligence-gathering and analysis, GC feeds what essential information it has to the EOC (S. Lee, personal communication, Oct. 21, 2015). The GC department trains the crisis communications procedures in-house, but the airport’s exercise, evaluation, and training group uses exercises to evaluate how well it works and how well it applies the results. For example, in DEN’s last full-scale exercise, a simulation EO cell made calls to GC to see

63 if it was giving appropriate information; the GC was also required to put together a press conference (Figure C2). PIOs from other agencies and the state played the role of news media and peppered staffers with demands for answers and speculation (Figure C3) (Lee). DEN’s summer 2015 Active Shooter Functional Exercise focused on the communication team’s role to a large degree. The airport purchased a service that allowed simulation of social media, website searches, and e-mails. “The exercise team hit them and our call center with hundreds of calls, e-mails, tweets, etc. Combining that information with phone calls from the Simcell allowed the airport to see if the GC and the call center were giving out accurate and consistent information that matched what was coming from the EOC. The exercise also tested to see if the GC picked up on some small intelligence FIGURE C1 Denver International Crisis Communication Manual table of contents (rev. Sept. 2015).

64 FIGURE C2 Simulated press conference at DEN full-scale exercise (Denver International Airport photo). FIGURE C3 PIOs from other agencies playing media roles at simulated press conference at DEN full-scale exercise (Denver International Airport photo). items in all of the noise. DEN wanted to see if the communications group passed the relevant information to the EOC” (S. Lee, personal communication, Nov. 21, 2015). DEN’s CCP follows NIMS, making the airport align with the EOC command structure of the airport, city-county, state, and nation. It enables a predesignated flow of information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) and EOC. Having the CCP managed by the GC office makes the best use of all information assets and personnel. The Denver CCP model enables instant play-in so that incoming and outgoing com- munications are optimized for the EOC, the JIC, the PIO, the airport, and the community. The CCP is flex- ible, providing for a small-scale JIC for small events and a large-scale JIC for large incidents, making the airport’s communications posture highly nimble. The airport’s communications structure, with its clearly defined roles and responsibilities, allows PIOs from other agencies to step in when needed (Montgomery). When the CCP was first launched under the aegis of GC, the main hurdle could have been turf concerns with other airport departments. That was avoided by open communications, transparency, collaboration, and cooperation with other airport departments. Inadequate bench depth would have been a barrier to implementation, but GC has an active program to train key personnel in all airport departments on the communications plan. DEN was willing to invest in communications redundancies, which avoided many typical barriers to good crisis communications (Montgomery). DEN’s advice to an airport just creating its emergency communications plan or considering a CCP is to start by building on NIMS and ICS, an approach that is especially important for a small airport. After the NIMS/ICS-based start, the airport can leverage assets of community partners by building good rela- tionships. “The important thing is to have people with an understanding of the professional role of com- municators and how it fits into an EOC and NIMS environment” (Montgomery). DEN’s GC office provides intelligence data and analysis to the airport EOC when called upon to do so. DEN aggressively uses social media. The airport’s exercise, evaluation and training group regularly

65 includes communications in exercises. Finally, the GC office applies the lessons learned from actual events, exercises, and interactions with stakeholders through a formal program for continuous improvement. CASE EXAMPLE 3: BOISE AIRPORT (BOI) Boise Airport (BOI), though a small hub facility, is the main airport for the state of Idaho, served by six legacy and low-cost air carriers. The city-owned airport has two parallel runways with an ILS Category III landing system. BOI’s CCP was developed and is maintained by the airport marketing manager, who also acts as the PIO when the plan is activated. The most remarkable aspect of the plan is that it is scalable in terms of the level of crisis. In a full-scale crisis, the airport follows NIMS/ICS protocol and will operate a JIC with the City of Boise. The CCP is a single plan that is referenced in the airport’s AEP (Figure C4). It is typically updated whenever it is utilized, so the airport feels the plan is better housed outside the AEP and merely referenced (S. Demory, personal communication, Sept. 30, 2015). The CCP is reviewed and trained annually as per the airport’s FAR Part 139 requirements, and the airport stakeholders are involved in the process. BOI evaluates possible changes to its CCP after an activation, through its internal emergency operations team (Operations, LEO, ARFF) where review and decisions are based on concurrence and consensus. Depending on the significance of the change, it will either be made immediately or after the next scheduled review date of the CCP. During a recent (2015) AAR, an important lesson was learned as a result of CCP activation dealing with an aircraft crash. The review revealed that the use of telephones for “critical information” such as runway FIGURE C4 Boise Airport Crisis Communication Plan table of contents.

66 opening/closure rather than other media was essential to avoid confusion and ensure that vital information was clear to all parties involved. The second critical change was to have a single point of contact in airport operations and air traffic control, so that the messages were not a point of confusion between employees. One important factor to note is that since Boise is a small hub, it has the ability to talk individually with all stakeholders about any changes in its CCP. Boise’s advice to other airports developing a CCP is to learn from their peers and gather as much information as possible and then customize a plan that addresses its unique situation (size, governance, mutual aid, etc.). The BOI CCP is considered sensitive security information and can be available upon request to Boise Airport by another airport. CASE EXAMPLE 4: WATSONVILLE AIRPORT (WVI) WVI is a GA airport owned by the City of Watsonville, California. The airport is currently (as of October 2015) developing its emergency communications plan as part of a CCP in conjunction with the city. The communications plan is Chapter 5 in the AEP (Figure C5), which is voluntary for a GA airport. Develop- ment of the plan is being led by the airport manager; the emergency communications planning group FIGURE C5 Emergency communications plan in WVI AEP.

67 includes airport staff, city fire department, city EOC, and the Watsonville Emergency Airlift Command Team (W.E.A.C.T.). The WVI case example is based on an interview with airport manager Rayvon Williams and on documents that he provided. The emerging plan is bifurcated depending on the type and severity of the emergency or crisis; and whether the event is solely the airport’s to manage or whether the airport is part of a larger effort. If the event is the airport’s to manage: Based on the historical pattern incidents and accidents. Watsonville has developed an “Initial Action Plan” which serves as a first response guidance for staff and instructions to work with Watsonville City resources, local FAA (NorCal TRACON and San Jose FSDO), FAA Region and the NTSB. This plan is primarily aircraft accident/incident specific. We do take care to be mindful of local media also. The communications element of the Initial Actions Plan is simple and straight forward (R. Williams, personal communication, Oct. 10, 2015). The section of the Watsonville city plan for the airport, reproduced as Figure C6, is a one-page tactical/ operational tool for airport employees. Laminated copies are in every airport vehicle, fuel truck, fire FIGURE C6 Communications plan for airport in “part-of-the-larger” city plan.

68 department rig, as well as in the Unified Command room and at various on-field locations. Additionally, each employee has a copy in his/her personal vehicle. If it is “Part of the larger” effort: Based on the lessons learned from the 1989 Loma Prieta earth quake and the 2008 Wildfires, the Municipal Airport has taken a seat at the city Emergency Operations Center instituted by the Watsonville Fire Department. WVI’s emergency communications does go beyond the airport and City when a larger effort requires the Airport to be used for airlift capabilities. As such I have worked to develop a separate, all volunteer, group to formalize the lessons learned during Loma Prieta. This group is W.E.A.C.T. and was formed over a two year period. The Municipal Airport sponsored the group (established an area on the field, provided storage facilities, supplies, tools, etc.) and synced them with Watsonville EOC, County OES and the local American Red Cross (R. Williams). To evaluate the emergency communications plan, the airport holds two airport-specific exercises a year, and one of them is a surprise drill arranged in partnership with the city fire department. After each exercise, there is an AAR with broad participation by stakeholders, and the plan is tweaked as needed. According to Williams, WVI’s initial communications challenge is “ensuring our communication, our desired message, matches the ‘emergency.’ As noted we have at least two types of emergencies. . . . what we call ‘Minor’ and ‘Major’ [see Figure C7]. Within each is a sub-category; i.e., airport-specific or Airport as part of the Larger Community where we provide support. As we have had relatively few actual emer- gencies over the last four years, it seems the first challenge is just getting the type of emergency defined and then acting accordingly. We are working to define simple metrics to communicate and follow up.” The main value added by the comprehensive CCP and the exercise program associated with it is that the airport can access facts and act more quickly. As Williams notes, “I’ve learned sometimes the ‘best’ first action is not to immediately act. . . . we need a minute to ‘wind the proverbial watch’— think, then act. We have run a few exercises that have helped us improve here.” WVI’s advice to an airport starting to develop its emergency communications plan is to start with simple, more likely events and determine the “why/what/how . . . you need to communicate and to whom.” Furthermore, the airport needs to look to leverage existing relationships and processes (R. Williams, per- sonal communication, Oct. 19. 2015). A good airport emergency communications plan provides “simple, clear, implementable procedures that get the right information to the right people at the airport and in the community, thereby improving the resiliency of both” (R. Williams, personal communication, Oct. 20, 2015). The Watsonville plans—the airport’s and the city’s—are notable for their concise nature. Their formats are essentially those of an SOP.

69 FIGURE C7 Watsonville Community Emergency Classification Grid.