Committee on Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs
in the U.S. Air Force: A Study

Air Force Studies Board

Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences

A Report of

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This activity was supported by Grant FA9550-14-1-0127 from the U.S. Air Force. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the view of any organization or agency that provided support for the project.

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Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/23631.

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COMMITTEE ON OWNING THE TECHNICAL BASELINE FOR ACQUISITION PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. AIR FORCE: A STUDY

HENRY A. OBERING III, Booz Allen Hamilton, Chair

LAWRENCE J. DELANEY, Independent Consultant, Vice Chair

DONALD R. ERBSCHLOE, Technical Consultant

MILLARD S. FIREBAUGH, University of Maryland

MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, Schafer Corporation

GARY A. KYLE, Persistent Agility, Inc.

THOMAS L. MAXWELL, Independent Aerospace Consultant

SUE C. PAYTON, SCI Aerospace, Inc.

RICHARD T. ROCA, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University

WILLIAM J. STRICKLAND, HumRRO

DEBORAH L. WESTPHAL, Toffler Associates

REBECCA WINSTON, Winston Strategic Management Consulting

Staff

JOAN FULLER, Director, Air Force Studies Board

ANDREW J. KREEGER, Study Director

DIONNA C. ALI, Research Assistant

STEVEN DARBES, Research Assistant

ADRIANNA HARGROVE, Senior Program Assistant/Financial Assistant

CHRIS JONES, Financial Manager

MARGUERITE E. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Coordinator

JOAN ZIMMERMANN, Consultant

AIR FORCE STUDIES BOARD

DOUGLAS M. FRASER, Doug Fraser, LLC, Chair

DONALD C. FRASER, Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (retired), Vice Chair

BRIAN A. ARNOLD, Peachtree City, Georgia

ALLISON ASTORINO-COURTOIS, National Security Innovations, Inc.

TED F. BOWLDS, The Spectrum Group

STEVEN R.J. BRUECK, University of New Mexico

FRANK J. CAPPUCCIO, Cappuccio and Associates, LLC

BLAISE J. DURANTE, U.S. Air Force (retired)

BRENDAN B. GODFREY, University of Maryland, College Park

MICHAEL A. HAMEL, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company

DANIEL E. HASTINGS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

RAYMOND E. JOHNS, JR., Flight Safety International

ROBERT H. LATIFF, R. Latiff Associates

NANCY G. LEVESON, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MARK J. LEWIS, Institute for Defense Analyses Science and Technology Policy Institute

ALEX MILLER, University of Tennessee

OZDEN OCHOA, Texas A&M University

RICHARD V. REYNOLDS, The VanFleet Group, LLC

STARNES E. WALKER, University of Delaware

DEBORAH WESTPHAL, Toffler Associates

DAVID A. WHELAN, Boeing Defense, Space, and Security

REBECCA WINSTON, Winston Strategic Management Consulting

MICHAEL I. YARYMOVYCH, Sarasota Space Associates

Staff

JOAN FULLER, Director

ALAN H. SHAW, Deputy Director

DIONNA C. ALI, Research Assistant

GEORGE C. COYLE, Senior Program Officer

STEVEN DARBES, Research Assistant

CARTER W. FORD, Program Officer

ADRIANNA HARGROVE, Senior Program Assistant/Financial Assistant

CHRIS JONES, Financial Manager

ANDREW J. KREEGER, Program Officer

MARGUERITE E. SCHNEIDER, Administrative Coordinator

Foreword

After my early operational flying assignments, I began my U.S. Air Force (USAF) acquisition career in 1980 coming out of graduate school. At that time, USAF acquisition was considered the gold standard in the Department of Defense (DoD). The culture was one of innovation and risk taking, producing systems that performed in Operation Desert Storm, including the stealth fighter/bomber, precision-guided weapons, and so on. I personally experienced the quality of the USAF acquisition community when I served as the executive officer to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) in the early 1990s. The vast majority of the USAF program managers and the System Program Office teams that briefed their programs through the DoD oversight chain clearly “owned” the technical baseline of their systems, were knowledgeable about the industry, and were authoritative and accountable for their performance.

When I compare what I observed then to what the committee heard in its interviews for this study, it is clear that the USAF acquisition culture of innovation and risk taking has eroded. There are definitely very professional program executive officers (PEOs) and program managers (PMs) who are performing well in spite of the barriers to their success, which the committee discusses in this report. But it is also clear that the USAF needs to take critical steps to emphasize the value of the USAF acquisition professional; reinforce the PM’s authority and accountability; clarify the role of the contracting officer with the PM; strengthen the technical expertise of the acquisition workforce; and continue to knock down barriers as they arise. This is especially important in light of the ever shorter timeframes within

which the Air Force needs to develop and deploy warfighting capabilities to meet rapidly emerging threats.

This study was not meant to be another attempt at acquisition reform. The committee wanted to stay focused on concrete and achievable steps that the USAF could take to strengthen its ability to produce and maintain weapons systems in a more timely and cost-effective manner. We are truly fighting tomorrow’s wars today in our system program offices, and we should make sure that our acquisition warfighters have every available weapon in their arsenal.

Lt. Gen. (USAF, Ret.) Henry A. “Trey” Obering III, Chair
Committee on Owning the Technical Baseline for
Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force: A Study

Preface

This study was conducted as a follow-on activity to the National Research Council¹ workshop “Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force.” The workshop created the framework and foundational information this study utilized to explore the important topic of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) owning the technical baseline in its acquisition programs. During the workshop the topics of programs, leadership and culture, workforce, contracting, and funding were identified as fundamental components of owning the technical baseline. The workshop and its subsequent report,² published in 2015, were leveraged as a reference document and as a foundation for this study’s approach to address issues identified during the workshop.

STATEMENT OF TASK AND STUDY APPROACH

The Air Force Studies Board (AFSB) of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine was asked by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology and Engineering to build on the work of the aforementioned workshop and provide recommendations to improve the USAF’s capabilities to

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¹ Effective July 1, 2015, the institution is called the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. References in this report to the National Research Council are used in a historical context for identifying programs prior to that date.

² National Research Council, Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force: A Workshop Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2015.

own the technical baseline for its acquisition programs. The National Academies approved the statement of task for this study in August 2015³ and in October 2015 appointed the Committee on Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force: A Study.⁴ The committee was asked to address the following questions:

1. What is the strategic value to the U.S. Air Force in properly controlling, as well as the risk of not controlling, the technical baselines of its programs?
2. How do others (e.g., services, government agencies, and commercial industry) control technical baselines and what are the most promising mechanisms for potential application within the U.S. Air Force?
3. Are there ways to remove or remediate barriers across the U.S. Air Force, such as barriers identified in Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force: A Workshop Report to properly control the technical baselines of future programs?
4. How can the U.S. Air Force assess and adopt any identified methods for controlling the technical baselines across its acquisition programs?

To address these questions, the committee held three data-gathering meetings, which included face-to-face and telephone interviews, from January through March 2016 to review the information presented and discussed during the workshop, independently research the topic, conduct interviews with experts, identify key findings, and develop recommendations. A fourth meeting was held in May 2016 for the committee to write the report. Throughout the meetings, the committee met with current and former senior personnel from the USAF, the Navy, Department of Defense (DoD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Defense Acquisition University (DAU), and industry.⁵ In this context, the committee aimed to identify the strategic and operational value to the USAF of properly controlling, or “owning,” the technical baselines of its programs by investigating how other services, government agencies, and industry control technical baselines and qualitatively measure the success of their control. The committee sought to identify and recommend methods to remove or remediate barriers to owning the technical baseline that exist across the USAF. These recommendations were developed by examining how the programs, leadership and culture, workforce, contracting, and funding all play roles in the decisions regarding programs and controlling the technical baseline.

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³Appendix A provides the statement of task for this study.

⁴Appendix B provides short biographies of the committee members.

⁵Appendix C provides a list of meetings and speakers.

Acknowledgment of Reviewers

This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their review of this report:

R. Stephen Berry, University of Chicago,

Holly Dunlap, Raytheon Company,

Gordon R. England, PFP Cybersecurity,

John M. Griffin, Griffin Consulting,

Ronald T. Kadish, Booz Allen Hamilton,

William A. LaPlante, The MITRE Corporation,

Paul D. Nielsen, Carnegie Mellon University,

Jon S. Ogg, AeroVise, LLC, and

Starnes E. Walker, University of Delaware.

Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Chris G. Whipple, ENVIRON (retired), who was respon-

sible for making certain that independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.

Contents

SUMMARY

1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

Overview of the Workshop on Owning the Technical Baseline

Key Observations from the Workshop

Current Environment for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force

2 STRATEGIC VALUE OF OWNING THE TECHNICAL BASELINE

The Importance of Owning the Technical Baseline

The Risk of Not Owning the Technical Baseline

How Other Agencies Own the Technical Baseline

3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION

Leadership and Culture

Workforce Management

Contracting Support

Lines of Authority

Lowest Price, Technically Acceptable

Funding

Concluding Remarks

APPENDIXES

A Statement of Task

B Biographical Sketches of Committee Members

C Meetings and Speakers

D Memorandum from the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center

Acronyms

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