Summary
We are fighting tomorrow’s wars in today’s program development offices.
—Lt. Gen. (USAF, Ret.) Henry A. “Trey” Obering III
INTRODUCTION
Entering the 1990s the U.S. Air Force (USAF) was widely recognized as being a premier technical acquisition enterprise.1 In the decades leading up to the 1990s, the USAF possessed a cadre of technical experts who were well respected by industry owing to their extensive experience with weapon system development; their knowledge of their disciplines; their understanding of the greater system, or system of systems, in which the product was to operate; and their possession of the charter and authority to make trades among the technical requirements necessary to optimize the product within the cost and schedule constraints.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, during the post-Cold War drawdown of the services, the USAF reacted to shifts in the strategic and budgetary environment. These reactions had the cumulative effect of distancing the Air Force from its close technical oversight of the contractors who were building the Air Force’s highly complex systems. The indiscriminate application of the total system performance responsibility (TSPR) acquisition methodology and varied interpretations of its intent; reductions in the civil service technical workforce; over-emphasis on contract price
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1 G.E. Christle, D. Davis, G. Porter, CNA Independent Assessment: Air Force Acquisition, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria Va., 2009, p. 1.
as an award criterion; and reactions to ethics violations with respect to government employee–contractor relationships were among the factors that caused the USAF to lose its position as a highly capable and professional enterprise in defense acquisition. TSPR was an overt move by senior Department of Defense (DoD) and Air Force personnel to have Air Force acquisition professionals remove themselves from the daily involvement with their industry counterparts. There was a belief by some that USAF engineers should only be engaged in developing the specifications and should then step back from program execution. This view both supported and was necessitated by reductions in Air Force uniformed and civilian staff with extensive technical backgrounds. These trends were exacerbated in some cases by the use of contract price as the dominant discriminator in determining contract awards, which has led to the all-too-frequent use of lowest price, technically acceptable (LPTA) awards.2 Taken together, the cumulative effect of these trends has been the USAF’s broad and deep loss of its technical baseline, which later contributed to many of the cost and schedule overruns in Air Force acquisition programs.
OWNING THE TECHNICAL BASELINE
New weapons systems require enormous investments in systems and people, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The system itself needs to be well understood throughout its life cycle, from concept formulation through operational use. Modern warfighting systems operate within a system of systems, and the complex web of interfaces and integration nodes among the systems also requires planning, investment, and support. The trade-offs and decisions required for optimal planning and execution of these advanced systems can only be made by the entity—in this case the USAF—responsible for the integration of all elements across the entire system and their eventual use to defend U.S. interests.
The term “owning the technical baseline” (OTB) has gained traction among USAF acquisition professionals and leaders; however, the term has not achieved universal recognition, understanding, or implementation. Within the broader DoD acquisition community, the term “ownership” is sometimes mistakenly construed as referring to the legal ownership of technical data rights. This fails to acknowledge that meaningful ownership, in terms of owning the technical baseline, is a much broader concept. Linking the term “ownership” with technical data rights has led to concerns on the part of industry over the protection of intellectual property rights.
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2 The U.S. Air Force’s KC-X Program is one example where the Air Force relied on LPTA evaluation criteria. Discussion on the KC-X Program can be found in The DoD’s Use of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) Price Selection. The full reference is J.S. Gansler, L.H. Harrington, and W. Lucyshyn, The DoD’s Use of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) Price Selection, UMD-CM-13-098, revised September 2013, p. 10.
While such protection is indeed an important issue, the technical baseline can be owned without encroaching on technical data rights within the current guidelines surrounding intellectual property. Most important, the word “ownership” refers to an acceptance by the service, and by the relevant individuals in the service, of certain fundamental responsibilities for outcomes. These responsibilities cannot be farmed out. As Admiral Hyman G. Rickover put it,3
Responsibility is a unique concept. . . . You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you. . . . If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else. Unless you can point your finger at the man who is responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible.
In order to discuss owning the technical baseline, it is important to begin with definitions. The report of the workshop, Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force: A Workshop Report established the following definitions for owning the technical baseline:4
Technical baseline: Data and information that provide the program office knowledge to establish, trade off, verify, change, accept, and sustain functional capabilities, design characteristics, affordability, schedule, and quantified performance parameters at the chosen level of the system hierarchy.
Owning the technical baseline: Air Force program managers and personnel have sufficient technical knowledge of their engineering development programs to enable program success by making informed, timely, and independent decisions5 to manage cost, schedule, and performance risk while ensuring disciplined program execution. Owning the technical baseline allows the Air Force to respond knowledgeably and have minimal disruption to mission success. [emphasis added]
Owning the technical baseline allows the government acquisition team to manage and respond knowledgeably and effectively to systems development, operations, and execution, thereby avoiding technical and other programmatic barriers to mission success. Additionally, owning the technical baseline ensures that government personnel understand the user requirements, why a particular design and its various features have been selected over competing designs, and what the options are to pursue alternative paths to the final product given unanticipated cost,
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3 D. Oliver, Against the Tide: Rickover’s Leadership Principles and the Rise of the Nuclear Navy, Naval Institute Press, 2014, p. 31.
4 National Research Council, Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force: A Workshop Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2015.
5 Decisions made by the government team should be consistent with the terms and conditions contained in associated contracts.
schedule, and performance challenges. Per the definition of the technical baseline, ownership occurs at the chosen level of system hierarchy. There is a range of technical complexity in programs within the Air Force that drives the need for employing varying levels of technical expertise and knowledge. Acquisition of an off-the-shelf commercial item does not require the same technical expertise to make informed, timely, and independent decisions as do programs that require the design, development, and production of complex weapons systems.
In May 2009, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force chief of staff issued a memorandum stating that “the United States Air Force is committed to recapturing acquisition excellence by rebuilding an Air Force acquisition culture that delivers products and services as promised—on time, within budget, and in compliance with all laws, policies, and regulations.6” It is in this context, regaining acquisition excellence, that owning the technical baseline needs to be treated as more than a process or checklist; it needs to be viewed as the result of a holistic, consistent, connected set of technical, business, human capital, and mission strategies and practices.7
This report comprises three chapters. Chapter 1 provides context for the study. It includes an overview of the OTB workshop, key observations from that workshop, and the current environment within the Air Force acquisition community related to owning the technical baseline of USAF acquisition programs. Chapter 2 addresses the first item in the statement of task and discusses the strategic value to the Air Force of owning the technical baseline and the risk of not owning it. Additionally, Chapter 2 addresses the second item in the statement of task by highlighting key aspects of how agencies other than the Air Force own the technical baseline for their acquisition programs. Lastly, Chapter 3 addresses the third and fourth items in the statement of task by identifying specific barriers to owning the technical baseline for the Air Force and making recommendations to help guide the Air Force in overcoming those barriers. Each recommendation represents an identified method for the Air Force to adopt to assist in owning the technical baseline of its acquisition programs. The discussion prior to each recommendation in Chapter 3 is provided to assist the Air Force in assessing the identified methods.
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6 U.S. Air Force, Acquisition Improvement Plan, May 4, 2009, http://www.dodbuzz.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/acquisition-improvement-plan-4-may-09.pdf.
7 Hon. Stan Soloway, president and CEO, Professional Services Council, interview with the committee on January 14, 2016.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The loss of the technical baseline in the USAF began with decisions made by leadership, and it will take the commitment of leadership to enable the Air Force to reestablish its once hard-earned reputation of technical proficiency and acquisition excellence. The Committee on Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force: A Study has formulated a series of recommendations that should assist the Air Force in taking appropriate ownership of the technical baseline and thereby continuing to regain its reputation for excellence in acquisition.
RECOMMENDATION 1: The Secretary of the Air Force should investigate why the position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition is in an acting or vacant status more frequently than other Air Force Assistant Secretary positions. This investigation should consider how the Air Force, along with other Services and government agencies, fills similar critical positions and should focus on identifying best practices for implementation. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition position should not be vacant for any extended period of time, and the use of an acting individual should be minimized. Furthermore, in order to attract competitive talent, the Air Force should ensure that it does not impose any additional restrictions beyond those required by law, especially relative to the post-employment period, for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Air Force senior leaders should define, develop, and execute a strategy that balances risk and reward from a program implementation viewpoint, fosters a learning environment characterized by healthy tension and debate, and actively rewards acquisition personnel that regularly find a “pathway to yes.” A risk-tolerant acquisition culture, in concert with a sense of urgency, is critical to agile and timely acquisition for the Air Force to maintain its advantage against rapidly evolving threats. Significant attention should be given to the proliferation and acceptance of this crucial change. The strategy should include the following at a minimum:
- Establishing an education and training program to promote and develop a risk-tolerant culture that includes the use of current and former experienced acquisition professionals to provide guidance and mentorship.
- Encouraging the pursuit of more reasonable interpretations of policy and process flexibility to more efficiently accomplish program goals while maintaining compliance.
- Assuring that logical and reasonable deviations from policy or requirements can be expeditiously pursued by empowered acquisition personnel.
In addition to changes that provide consistent tenancy in the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and a strategy to proliferate a more risk-tolerant acquisition culture, changes in how the Air Force manages its workforce are necessary.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The Air Force should continue and complete its efforts to determine which current programs should own the technical baseline and develop staffing standards to determine the proper mix and number of military and civilian engineers required to own the technical baseline for those programs. Criteria should be established for when the Air Force should own the technical baseline as opposed to having knowledge of the baseline as technical integrator or interface systems reviewer. The decision to own the technical baseline for future programs should be included in the acquisition milestone protocol as gated decision points. Additionally, the Air Force should develop methods to measure whether or not selected programs have successfully achieved, and are maintaining, ownership of the technical baseline. Cost overruns, schedule delays, and unidentified, or incorrectly identified, key performance parameters (KPPs) are potential measurement points.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The Air Force should review, and make appropriate changes to, current assignment policies and practices for the acquisition workforce to reduce turnover and attrition and increase succession and transition planning; should invest in a more structured mentoring program across the acquisition workforce to increase the sharing of best practices; and should ensure that the career management system for the acquisition workforce be charged with providing appropriate educational opportunities, training, and industrial experiences to acquisition personnel. The intent of the review should be to create strong career paths for acquisition personnel reflecting the critical value of acquisition to future Air Force operations.
RECOMMENDATION 5: Air Force leadership should, in concert with its current activities, ensure that there is necessary guidance and governance for the currency of appropriate skills of the acquisition workforce at all levels. This must include, but is not limited to, emphasis on the criticality to program success of technically educated and technically experienced program managers. Additionally, the Air Force should prioritize education and experience in industry, recognize its importance to the development of competent acquisition personnel, and increase the opportunities for members of the acquisition workforce to gain this education and experience.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The Air Force should establish, select, and equip a dedicated line of program acquisition officers, selected from a defined science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)-intensive career path in the uniformed services. This dedicated line of program acquisition officers would be similar in intent, education, and experience to the Navy’s engineering and aeronautical engineering duty officers. Additionally, a robust career path for USAF civilian engineers and program managers should be established that supports their critical importance to the successful execution of acquisition programs through ownership of the technical baseline. Program managers should generally be selected from the engineering and technical workforce.
RECOMMENDATION 7: Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) leaders should work with the Engineering, Professional, and Administrative Support Services (EPASS) program management office to put in place a rigorous requirements definition process such that specific technical requirements and criteria are approved by the program manager and that contractor personnel align with those requirements to meet the needs of the program. Application of AFLCMC’s technically acceptable, lowest evaluated price (TA/LEP) approach should be a secondary consideration to meeting the requirement and delivering customer value.
As the committee found during the Owning the Technical Baseline Workshop and learned from the interviews conducted during the study, the authorities and accountabilities of the program manager (PM) as they relate to the authorities and accountabilities of the contracting officer (CO) are currently causing tension and often negatively impacting the effectiveness of the USAF acquisition team. Contracting support is key to owning the technical baseline, and changes are needed for future success in Air Force acquisition programs.
RECOMMENDATION 8: The Air Force should issue a guidance memorandum that clearly specifies the lines of authority and accountability for all members of the government acquisition team. This memorandum should clarify and reinforce PM authorities and responsibilities as well as specify CO responsibilities, as part of the government acquisition team, in relation to the PM. Specifically, all functional entities should provide the PM with the support necessary to attain program success. All members of the government acquisition team should be measured based on program success while complying with the law. Additionally, the Air Force should revise the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) to make it clear that Air Force program executive officers (PEOs) and PMs, or their designated representatives, are mandatory participants in business clearance and contract clearance
sessions. Program management and contracting personnel should be trained in implementation of the guidance.
RECOMMENDATION 9: Contracting professionals’ appraisals should have appropriate objectives and metrics tied directly to the program office or organization’s mission success. The PEO or the PM or their designee should be required to provide written performance input to the contracting professionals’ annual appraisals. Contracting professionals should engage with the program office and be well trained and experienced with their accountability and responsibility for delivering support to the assigned Air Force organization and mission.
RECOMMENDATION 10: The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition should clarify the criteria for use of the lowest price, technically acceptable (LPTA) methodology and ensure there are avenues for the government acquisition team to discuss its appropriateness for meeting mission requirements. LPTA should not be applied to complex, multiyear, multidiscipline programs or knowledge-based service contracts that require high-end acquisition and technical talent. A decision to use LPTA should depend on clear and unambiguous requirements, underlying market research, and relevant information acquired during government and contractor interactions, such as “industry days.” If there is a requirement that demands special treatment, the case should be made in the requirements definition, acquisition strategy, and pre-request for proposal (RFP) activity.
In a constrained budget atmosphere, the efficient use of available funds to support weapons systems is paramount to meeting mission requirements. USAF leaders have recognized this need and have already begun to employ more flexible means of funding USAF’s acquisition staff.
RECOMMENDATION 11: The Air Force should complete the shift from operations and maintenance (O&M) funds to research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) funds for funding acquisition staff. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition should require PMs to include in their program financial plan such a budget, as necessary, to fully fund the in-house technical effort.
It is crucial that the Air Force fully implement these recommendations. Enacting only a subset of the recommendations contained in this report will hinder the Air Force’s ability to own the technical baseline and regain its acquisition excellence.
BOTTOM LINE
Tomorrow’s wars are being fought in today’s program development offices. To win those wars, urgent and dramatic steps are needed to ensure that the Air Force removes several major barriers to success. Owning the technical baseline is a critical component of the Air Force’s ability to regain and maintain acquisition excellence. There are definitely very professional program executive officers (PEOs) and program managers (PMs) who are performing well in spite of the barriers, but it is clear that the USAF needs to take immediate steps to emphasize the value of its acquisition professionals, ensure sustained leadership within the acquisition community, reinforce the PM’s authority and accountability, clarify the role of the contracting officer vis-à-vis the PM, strengthen and expand the technical knowledge base and expertise of the acquisition workforce, and continue to eliminate barriers and avoid creating new ones. These necessary steps for owning the technical baseline are especially important in light of the shorter and shorter time frames within which the Air Force needs to develop and deploy warfighting capabilities to meet rapidly emerging and changing threats.
