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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals Committee on Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Chemical Explosive Precursors Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology Division of Earth and Life Sciences This prepublication version of Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals has been provided to the public to facilitate timely access to the Consensus Study Report. Although the substance of the report is final, editorial changes may be made throughout the text and citations will be checked prior to publication. The final report will be available through the National Academies Press in winter 2018. A Consensus Report of PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 This activity was supported by Contract No. HHSP233201400020B/HHSP23337050 with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization or agency that provided support for the project. International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-XXXXX-X International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-XXXXX-X Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.17226/24862 Library of Congress Control Number OR Cataloging-in-Publication: Additional copies of this publication are available for sale from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Keck 360, Washington, DC 20001; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313; http://www.nap.edu. Copyright 2017 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.17226/24862. PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

The National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863 by an Act of Congress, signed by President Lincoln, as a private, nongovernmental institution to advise the nation on issues related to science and technology. Members are elected by their peers for outstanding contributions to research. Dr. Marcia McNutt is president. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964 under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences to bring the practices of engineering to advising the nation. Members are elected by their peers for extraordinary contributions to engineering. Dr. C. D. Mote, Jr., is president. The National Academy of Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine) was established in 1970 under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences to advise the nation on medical and health issues. Members are elected by their peers for distinguished contributions to medicine and health. Dr. Victor J. Dzau is president. The three Academies work together as the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to provide independent, objective analysis and advice to the nation and conduct other activities to solve complex problems and inform public policy decisions. The National Academies also encourage education and research, recognize outstanding contributions to knowledge, and increase public understanding in matters of science, engineering, and medicine. Learn more about the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine at www.national-academies.org. PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

Consensus Study Reports published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine document the evidence-based consensus on the study’s statement of task by an authoring committee of experts. Reports typically include findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on information gathered by the committee and the committee’s deliberations. Each report has been subjected to a rigorous and independent peer-review process and it represents the position of the National Academies on the statement of task. Proceedings published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine chronicle the presentations and discussions at a workshop, symposium, or other event convened by the National Academies. The statements and opinions contained in proceedings are those of the participants and are not endorsed by other participants, the planning committee, or the National Academies. For information about other products and activities of the National Academies, please visit www.nationalacademies.org/about/whatwedo. PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

COMMITTEE ON REDUCING THE THREAT OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ATTACKS BY RESTRICTING ACCESS TO CHEMICAL EXPLOSIVE PRECURSORS Members VICTORIA A. GREENFIELD (Chair), George Mason University ROBERT G. BEST, Defense Threat Reduction Agency – JIDO LEO E. BRADLEY, LE Bradley Consulting LLC JOHN C. BRULIA, Austin Powder Company (Retired) CARRIE L. CASTILLE, Independent Consultant DAVID G. DELANEY, University of Maryland ARTHUR G. FRAAS, Resources for the Future WILLIAM J. HURLEY, Institute for Defense Analysis KARMEN N. LAPPO, Sandia National Laboratories BECKY D. OLINGER, Los Alamos National Laboratory JIMMIE C. OXLEY, University of Rhode Island KEVIN F. SMITH, Sustainable Supply Chain Consulting KIRK YEAGER, Federal Bureau of Investigation Staff CAMLY TRAN, Study Director SAMUEL M. GOODMAN, Postdoctoral Fellow JARRETT I. NGUYEN, Senior Program Assistant PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS v

BOARD ON CHEMICAL SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY Co-Chairs DAVID BEM, PPG Industries DAVID R. WALT, Tufts University Members HÉCTOR D. ABRUÑA, Cornell University JOEL C. BARRISH, Achillion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. MARK A. BARTEAU, NAE, University of Michigan JOAN BRENNECKE, NAE, University of Notre Dame MICHELLE V. BUCHANAN, Oak Ridge National Laboratory DAVID W. CHRISTIANSON, University of Pennsylvania JENNIFER SINCLAIR CURTIS, University of California, Davis RICHARD EISENBERG, NAS, University of Rochester SAMUEL H. GELLMAN, NAS, University of Wisconsin–Madison SHARON C. GLOTZER, NAS, University of Michigan MIRIAM E. JOHN, Sandia National Laboratories (retired) FRANCES S. LIGLER, NAE, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and North Carolina State University SANDER G. MILLS, Merck Research Laboratories (retired) JOSEPH B. POWELL, Shell PETER J. ROSSKY, NAS, Rice University TIMOTHY SWAGER, NAS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine Staff TERESA FRYBERGER, Board Director MARILEE SHELTON-DAVENPORT, Senior Program Officer CAMLY TRAN, Program Officer ANNA SBEREGAEVA, Associate Program Officer SAMUEL M. GOODMAN, Postdoctoral Fellow JARRETT I. NGUYEN, Senior Program Assistant SHUBHA BANSKOTA, Financial Associate PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS vi

Preface “Jumping to conclusions is efficient if the conclusions are likely to be correct and the costs of an occasional mistake acceptable. Jumping to conclusions is risky when the situation is unfamiliar, the stakes are high and there is no time to collect more information.” Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow Daniel Kahneman, in Thinking, Fast and Slow, distinguishes between deliberative thinking and intuitive thinking, leaving us to consider the benefits of the former and the pitfalls of the latter in policy making. Deliberative thinking can occur proactively, enabling policy makers to weigh tradeoffs, recognize complexity, and focus on long-term strategies for coping with crises; whereas intuitive thinking, which might occur reactively in the aftermath of a crisis, leans towards rapid and simple decisions, based on emotion and familiarity. Although it has been over two decades since the United States experienced the truck bombings of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center in New York City, terrorist attacks with smaller-scale improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Boston (2013); Paris, France (2015); Brussels, Belgium (2016); New York and New Jersey (2016); and Manchester, United Kingdom (2017) serve as concrete reminders that IEDs remain a persistent threat to the United States and its allies. One could hardly describe this chain of events as a lull in terrorist activity, but the absence of a recent domestic episode like that in Oklahoma City, suggests an opening for U.S. policy makers to work through some of the most challenging issues around the threat of IEDs deliberatively, in a period of relative calm. To that end, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) asked the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to consider opportunities to reduce the threat of IED attacks by restricting access to precursor chemicals that can be used to make homemade explosives. In so doing, DHS chose to examine one element of the overall threat, restricting access to precursor chemicals used in homemade explosives. In response, the Academies assembled a thirteen-member committee of experts on chemistry, energetic materials, supply chain management, economics, defense, law, and other fields to prioritize the precursor chemicals that can be used to make homemade explosives, to analyze the movement of those chemicals through the domestic supply chain and identify potential vulnerabilities, to examine current domestic and international regulation of the chemicals, and to compare economic, security, and other tradeoffs among potential control strategies. The Academies selected committee members with backgrounds in research, industry, and policy- PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS vii

making and with experience on the ground to ensure that we considered the scientific, practical, and policy aspects of our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We spent much of our time establishing priorities, examining the supply chains of those chemicals that we deemed most concerning, and looking for vulnerabilities as the chemicals make their way to end users. In mapping various regulations and voluntary programs to the chemicals’ supply chains to look for gaps, we found more evidence of visibility and oversight, albeit piecemeal, in import, manufacturing, storage, and distribution than in retailing. For that reason, we chose to focus our deliberations on control strategies that could address retail-level vulnerabilities, including those pertaining to e-commerce. From the outset, we recognized that as long as explosive materials such as black and smokeless powders are readily available, the threat of IED attacks cannot be eliminated; nevertheless, we identified a set of possible control strategies, featuring different types of restrictions on access to precursor chemicals that could play a part in risk reduction. This report considers the benefits, costs, and uncertainties of each approach, but does not provide the comprehensive analysis of specific proposals that would be necessary for policy making. Drawing inspiration from Kahneman, we argue for treating this report as the starting point of an ongoing deliberative process, which would include a fuller, quantitative analysis of benefits, costs, and uncertainties, not as an end point for decision making. Even if event-driven policy making is unavoidable, we have tried to lay the groundwork for better policy responses, so that in-the-moment decision-making can look more like thoughtful decision-making. Lastly, I would like to take this opportunity to thank each committee member and the Academies staff for their contributions and support. It has been an honor to work with such an outstanding group of dedicated individuals. Victoria A. Greenfield, Chair PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS viii

Acknowledgments The completion of this study would not have been successful without the assistance of many individuals and organizations. The committee would especially like to thank the following individuals and organizations for their contribution during this study: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which sponsored the study and provided valuable information on the agency’s responsibilities with the Chemical Facilities Anti- Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program and risk assessment structure. The committee would especially like to thank the director of the Infrastructure and Security Compliance Division, David Wulf, as well as Craig Conklin (Office of Infrastructure Protection) who served as the DHS liaison to the committee and was effective in responding to the committee’s requests for information. Eva-Maria Engdahl, Ivette Tarrida-Soler, and Michael Berglund of the European Commission and Anne-Marie Fry and Nathan Munson at the United Kingdom’s Home Office for hosting two members of the committee and a staff officer to discuss their current regulations on chemical explosive precursors. Speakers and invited participants at the committee’s data-gathering meetings. These individuals are listed here: Andy O’Hare, The Fertilizer Institute; Cynthia Hilton, The Institute of Makers of Explosives; Tony Cheesebrough, Tom Colley, Todd Klessman, Kelly Murray, Mike Pickford, and Patrick Starke, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Matt Hendley and Kevin Sheehan, U.S. Department of Justice – FBI; Col. Bradley B. Preston, U.S. Department of Defense – Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization; Special Agent Will McCray, U.S. Department of Justice – Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; William Hoffman, U.S. Department of Agriculture; James Bevan, Conflict Armament Research; Noel Hsu, Orica; Donald Thomas, CF Industries; Gary Vogen, Yara; Hank Sattlethight, The Aluminum Association; Ross Anderson, Arkema; Chris Gibson, Hawkins Inc.; Julie Heckman, American Pyrotechnic Association; Jennifer Gibson, National Association of Chemical Distributors; David Closs, Michigan State University; Henry Willis, RAND Corporation; Lisa Robinson, Harvard University; Michael Lewis, ANGUS Chemical Company; Kris Griffith, American Pacific Corporation; Daniel Roczniak, American Chemistry Council; Steven Krupinsky, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Antonio Guzman, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration; LCDR Adam Cooley and Betty McMenemy, U.S. Coast Guard; Lisa Long and Jeffrey Wanko, U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration; Paul Bomgardner and Steven Webb, U.S. Department of Transportation; Philip Davison, Association of American Plant Food Control Officials; Thomas Farmer, Association of American Railroads; Boyd Stephenson, National Tank Truck Carriers; Kyle Liske, Agriculture Retailers Association; Nicholas Cindrich, CVS/Caremark; Howard Kunreuther, University of Pennsylvania; Clare Narrod, University of Maryland; Drew Sindlinger, Nathan Tsoi, and Ramana Kasibhotla, Transportation Security Administration; and Christopher Logue, New York Department of Agriculture. PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS ix

Acknowledgment of Reviewers This Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We thank the following individuals for their review of this report: RICK BLASGEN, Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals RUTH DOHERTY, University of Maryland, College Park JULIE HECKMAN, American Pyrotechnics Association NOEL HSU, Orica Limited MICHAEL KENNEDY, Kennedy Law and Policy RUSSELL MCINTYRE, Defense Intelligence Agency (retired) ABDUL-AKEEM A. SADIQ, Indiana University-Purdue University DWIGHT C. STREIT, University of California, Los Angeles TIM SWAGER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations of this report nor did they see the final draft before its release. The review of this report was overseen by JOHN ANDERSON, Illinois Institute of Technology and FRAN LIGLER, North Carolina State University and University of North Carolina Chapel Hill. They were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with the standards of the National Academies and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies. PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS x

Contents Summary........................................................................................................................................ 1 1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................... 9 Charge to the Committee and Interpretation of Scope.............................................................. 10 Study Origins ............................................................................................................................ 13 Analytical Approach ................................................................................................................. 16 Framework and Tools ........................................................................................................... 17 Data Gathering ..................................................................................................................... 18 Definitions ............................................................................................................................. 18 Organization of the Report........................................................................................................ 19 2 PRECURSOR CHEMICALS USED TO MAKE HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES ............. 21 Past and Recent Attacks Involving Explosives ......................................................................... 21 Case Study: The Evolving Tactics of a Terrorist Group....................................................... 24 Identifying and Prioritizing Precursor Chemicals Used in IED Attacks ................................. 26 Charge Size Analysis............................................................................................................. 27 Generating a Short List of Precursor Chemicals ................................................................. 28 Criteria for Generating Groups A, B, and C ........................................................................ 29 Application of the Criteria to Precursor Chemicals ............................................................. 29 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 32 3 DOMESTIC CHEMICAL SUPPLY CHAIN ....................................................................... 33 Supply Chain Overview ............................................................................................................ 34 Production and Input Nodes ................................................................................................. 37 Transportation Modes........................................................................................................... 38 Distribution and Retail Nodes .............................................................................................. 39 End User Nodes .................................................................................................................... 40 Internet Commerce................................................................................................................ 40 Domestic Policy Mechanisms ................................................................................................... 42 Department of Justice ........................................................................................................... 43 Department of Homeland Security........................................................................................ 45 Environmental Protection Agency ........................................................................................ 47 Department of Labor............................................................................................................. 48 PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS xi

xii Contents Department of Transportation .............................................................................................. 48 Department of Commerce ..................................................................................................... 49 State and Local Regulations ................................................................................................. 49 Private-Public Partnerships ................................................................................................. 51 Trade Associations Programs ............................................................................................... 52 Outreach ............................................................................................................................... 54 Best Practices........................................................................................................................ 54 Supply Chain Vulnerabilities .................................................................................................... 54 Types of Vulnerabilities ........................................................................................................ 55 Coverage of Controls and Other Policy Mechanisms .......................................................... 56 Exploding Targets ..................................................................................................................... 57 Chemical Characteristics...................................................................................................... 57 Legal Considerations ............................................................................................................ 58 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 60 4 INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS ................................................................................... 65 Australia .................................................................................................................................... 67 Canada....................................................................................................................................... 68 Singapore .................................................................................................................................. 69 European Union ........................................................................................................................ 69 The Standing Committee on Precursors ............................................................................... 69 Compliance Effectiveness ..................................................................................................... 70 Effectiveness.......................................................................................................................... 72 Challenges and Initial Responses ......................................................................................... 73 Global Shield ............................................................................................................................ 74 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 75 Market Level ......................................................................................................................... 76 Responsible Entities .............................................................................................................. 76 Harmonization ...................................................................................................................... 76 5 ASSESSING POSSIBLE CONTROL STRATEGIES ......................................................... 79 Possible Control Strategies ....................................................................................................... 80 Retail-Level Controls ............................................................................................................ 81 Other Retail-Level Measures and Activities ......................................................................... 82 Building a Control Strategy from Controls, Measures, and Activities ................................. 82 Assessing Tradeoffs Among Control Strategies ....................................................................... 85 PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

Contents xiii Assessment of Benefits .......................................................................................................... 86 Assessment of Costs .............................................................................................................. 90 Consideration of Uncertainties ............................................................................................. 91 Assessments of Other Measures and Activities ..................................................................... 93 Summary of Assessments and Trade-offs .............................................................................. 94 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 96 6 POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO RESTRICTING MALICIOUS ACTORS’ ACCESS TO PRECURSOR CHEMICALS: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........ 99 Beyond Precursor Chemicals .................................................................................................. 100 Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 100 Priority Precursor Chemicals ............................................................................................. 100 Strategies at the Retail Level .............................................................................................. 102 Analysis of Control Strategies ............................................................................................ 105 Voluntary Measures, Activities, and Programs .................................................................. 106 Priority Research Areas .......................................................................................................... 107 Data Collection from Incidents Involving Explosives ........................................................ 107 Substitute Chemicals ........................................................................................................... 108 Standardized Thresholds ..................................................................................................... 108 Behavioral Responses ......................................................................................................... 109 Final Thoughts ........................................................................................................................ 109 References .................................................................................................................................. 111 Appendix A Acronyms .............................................................................................................. 123 Appendix B Risk and Risk Management ................................................................................... 127 Appendix C History of High-Profile Bombing Attacks ............................................................ 133 Appendix D Group A Chemical Supply Chains ........................................................................ 135 Appendix E International Questions .......................................................................................... 153 Appendix F Training Materials.................................................................................................. 155 Appendix G Methods and Limitations of Regulatory Assessment............................................ 159 Appendix H Examples of Retail-Level Control Strategies and Other Measures or Activities.. 163 Appendix I Committee Members and Staff Biographies........................................................... 171 PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

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Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a type of unconventional explosive weapon that can be deployed in a variety of ways, and can cause loss of life, injury, and property damage in both military and civilian environments. Terrorists, violent extremists, and criminals often choose IEDs because the ingredients, components, and instructions required to make IEDs are highly accessible. In many cases, precursor chemicals enable this criminal use of IEDs because they are used in the manufacture of homemade explosives (HMEs), which are often used as a component of IEDs.

Many precursor chemicals are frequently used in industrial manufacturing and may be available as commercial products for personal use. Guides for making HMEs and instructions for constructing IEDs are widely available and can be easily found on the internet. Other countries restrict access to precursor chemicals in an effort to reduce the opportunity for HMEs to be used in IEDs. Although IED attacks have been less frequent in the United States than in other countries, IEDs remain a persistent domestic threat. Restricting access to precursor chemicals might contribute to reducing the threat of IED attacks and in turn prevent potentially devastating bombings, save lives, and reduce financial impacts.

Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals prioritizes precursor chemicals that can be used to make HMEs and analyzes the movement of those chemicals through United States commercial supply chains and identifies potential vulnerabilities. This report examines current United States and international regulation of the chemicals, and compares the economic, security, and other tradeoffs among potential control strategies.

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