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Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability (2021)

Chapter: 5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems

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Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
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5

Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The current strategic context that has thus far precluded any ballistic missile cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States is outlined in Chapter 1 of this report. If the context were to change, the benefits of information sharing—potentially the easiest and most attractive form of ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation—might be seen as worth consideration. The necessary change in the strategic context could arise from greater Russian confidence in its strategic capability as a result of its ongoing modernization program, or perhaps due to a reassessment by the Russian government concluding that U.S. regional missile defense in Europe does not threaten the existing or modernized Russian deterrent (see Appendix C). The context might change because cooperation or lack of cooperation in other areas, such as the Middle East, may reinforce for leaders in both countries the value of working together.

This chapter discusses cooperation on information sharing from existing ground-based radar systems and existing and proposed new satellite systems. The joint committees believe such cooperation meets two essential requirements for consideration by their governments: (1) providing militarily beneficial capabilities to both the Russian Federation and the United States, but (2) without giving military advantage to either country.

ASSESSMENTS OF IMPROVEMENTS FROM INFORMATION SHARING

The joint committees’ assessments of improvements that information sharing would provide to performance of Russian and U.S. regional missile defense systems were conducted in different ways to provide analyses that will be credible to their respective governments. Assessments by the Russian committee were conducted using computer simulations based on a generic but fixed area defended by a given number of interceptors whose launch time and trajectory accuracy may be improved by earlier and more accurate missile tracking. The results of Russian assessments are shown in terms of the reductions in the number of interceptors required to achieve a specific confidence level that an attack missile would be killed (a specific kill probability). Those simulations are not available to the public or to the U.S. committee. As a result, the U.S. committee has not been able to assess the technical assumptions on which the calculations are based or the

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
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simulations themselves. However, Russian committee members concluded that detailed analyses using nonpublic simulations would be more credible to key Russian audiences. Russian experts may use these calculations among themselves to evaluate the assessments and the projected resulting benefits.

Assessments conducted by the U.S. committee begin with kinetic calculations to establish that an interceptor could physically intercept the attack missile during its flight. The calculations similarly include the interceptor launch time (time after the attack missile is launched), but they do not take the calculations to the same end results (kill probabilities) as do the Russian calculations because the U.S. committee could not do so credibly without similarly using nonpublic computer simulations. The U.S. committee considered using the radar and satellite tracking data and the time and angle of interceptor flight as inputs to postulated simplistic models of kill probability. Those inputs would provide a likely envelope in time and space for the attack missile location during its trajectory, and the time and angle of the interceptor would allow determination of the length of time the infrared guidance on the interceptors would have to direct the interceptors to a collision. A smaller envelope and longer time to identify and maneuver an interceptor into that envelope would imply a greater kill probability. But a realistic kill probability is most likely a complicated function of those factors depending on measured performance of sensors and interceptors, which is not public. One could postulate a “circular error probable” for the interceptors (the radius inside which 50 percent of the interceptors would strike if they are normally distributed), but data on the size of the radius is not public, nor are the effects of time and target error on the radius, or even whether the interceptor accuracy is a normal distribution. In providing its own analysis here, the U.S. committee concluded that transparent calculations would be needed for the U.S. audiences of this report. The U.S. committee also concluded that calculating the additional time and reduced tracking error provided would be more useful to the U.S. government than calculations of kill probability that could be done transparently in this report. The governments would, of course, conduct their own analyses before pursuing options recommended by the joint committees.

Mutual Operational Interests

The Russian Federation and the United States have a shared interest in each other having reliably operational, timely, and accurate means of detecting ballistic missile launches that may pose a threat to either country or their allies (see Box 5-1 for a detailed explanation of ballistic missile tracking). This was true during the Cold War because neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wanted the other to mistake benign launches or nonlaunch signals (errors or anomalous signals in the early warning systems) as indications of a first strike. This is still true today because Russia and the United States are both vulnerable to—and therefore must be wary of—missiles launched by third states, while still minimizing false alarms. The Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles79 was signed in 1988 to avoid such mistakes. In 2009, Russia and China entered into a similar agreement.80 These agreements address U.S. and Russian launches (and for the Russians, Chinese launches), but not third-party launches, such as Iranian satellite launches. Countries already expect that ballistic missile and rocket launches are observed and tracked by U.S. and Russian early warning and tracking systems. It is in the interest of all countries that rockets and missiles fired in peacetime not be mistaken for hostile launches.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×
Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

CURRENTLY DEPLOYED SATELLITE AND GROUND-BASED RADAR SYSTEMS FOR MISSILE TRACKING

As noted in Chapter 3, the current U.S. missile early warning system consists of residual Defense Support Program satellites and the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which has satellites in both geosynchronous orbit ([GEO] four in orbit in 2019 of six planned at completion), and highly elliptical orbits ([HEO] two in orbit in 2019 of four planned at completion).81 Data processing and control are handled on the ground. The system’s advanced sensors provide initial detection and tracking data on a wide range of missile types, and also provide additional technical data and battlefield characterization.

Over time, the United States has had various plans to add to its capabilities with low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites: SBIRS Low (formerly “Brilliant Eyes”), the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), and the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). SBIRS Low/Brilliant Eyes, and PTSS were never launched, but two satellites, the STSS Demonstrators, were put in orbit in 2009. The satellites were launched together and orbit with about 40 degrees separation in plane at an altitude of 1,350 km, with a 120-minute orbital period.82 The STSS mission was to detect missile launches and to provide accurate tracking of midcourse reentry vehicles for ballistic missile defense. These satellites reportedly accomplished all of their stated mission objectives and remain partially operational, long past their designed lifetime.

In the coming years, the Russian Federation plans to launch satellites that restore its early warning capabilities that became nonoperational in 2014. This new constellation, like the U.S. system, will have satellites in both GEO and HEO orbits.

Both the Russian Federation and the United States have highly capable ground-based radar arrays for missile warning, characterization, and tracking. These are described in Chapter 3.

VALUE OF INFORMATION SHARING

The joint committees use the term “information sharing” as a category of cooperation that comprises a spectrum of options in type and time. The information proposed for sharing may be processed sensor data or it may be evaluations and analyses. For example, information generated from U.S. and/or Russian sensors may be shared in near-real-time, as soon as it is processed; in near-real-time, after rapid analysis; or on a timeline separate from any particular missile flight to conduct parallel or joint analyses of other countries’ missile developments and activities. As a further example, information unrelated to sensor measurements may be shared based on analyses of missile threats from third countries. The details of such a broad spectrum of information-sharing options may be determined by experts from the United States and the Russian Federation through a mechanism or series of mechanisms established by both countries (such as that proposed in Recommendation 4). These details would need, among other things, to balance integrity of secure information on the one hand and to facilitate optimal operational performance on the other. If done properly, information sharing would help both countries improve their BMD efforts by (1) establishing a common basis for evaluating the evolution of missile threats from third countries, and (2) possibly providing valuable operational data for existing missile defense systems. In addition, such information sharing would enhance mutual understanding in a domain currently dominated by mistrust.

Both the Russian Federation and the United States have some detection and tracking capabilities, so why should they share information? The joint committees concluded that

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
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information sharing can improve their capabilities. As they do currently, each country will continue to establish requirements for its own national assets. Beyond those requirements, more information is useful for several reasons. (1) Redundant information sources are useful as a crosscheck and validation, even if one source has a privileged, trusted status. (2) Diverse information sources are important to more rapid and higher-confidence characterization of threats. This point is elaborated below. (3) Geometric considerations make tracking from different locations especially valuable. (4) Shared information is a tool for communication; it is a measurement that can be analyzed by experts in both countries. These benefits can aid both countries’ missile defense systems and promote greater confidence between the countries with respect to missile defense systems and operations.

Dual Phenomenology

For decades, the United States and the Soviet Union depended on a concept of “dual phenomenology” in which missile launches worldwide were assessed with both space-based infrared systems and long-range, ground-based radars. Both sides found, early in the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) era, that infrared notifications from space systems were subject to false alarms. Given the serious consequences of retaliation based on erroneous data, each side found it important to have a separate and completely different technology to verify what the other technology had seen; thus, dual phenomenology was developed and deployed. Technology has improved dramatically since the early days, but the concept still applies.

Establishing an Earlier, More Accurate Firing Solution

A key benefit of sharing tracking data is that analyzing it from multiple directions and distances can reduce the uncertainty in measurements, and therefore improve predictions of the missile’s flight. Information from more satellites and ground-based radars increases the accuracy of the anticipated trajectory and ultimate landing point, and allows the interceptor to launch into a more constrained target area. This increases the probability of, and potentially reduces the time required for, successful interception (see Figure 5-1).

While greater launch location accuracy and initial trajectory information are important, the greatest potential value in sharing of satellite-system information would be in systems aimed at providing currently nonexistent midcourse detection and tracking capabilities. Such satellite-enabled midcourse tracking would also increase the sizes of areas defended by enabling interceptor missiles to engage attack missiles outside of the range of the interceptor launch site’s ground-based radar system (an operating mode called “engage on remote,” or EOR, in the United States).

In addition to satellite systems, ground-based radar systems are important, not only as an independent early warning technology but also as a means of more accurately calculating the location of an attack missile, and in targeting an interceptor to destroy it.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
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FIGURE 5-1 Graphical depiction of the benefit of angle diversity in reducing uncertainty in target location.
SOURCE: Created by staff.

Current space-based systems alone provide limited data for BMD calculations. They provide an initial launch location, a prediction of the type of target, and an initial trajectory. Predictions of the ultimate impact point based on these data are coarse. Later in missile flight (in terminal phase), long-range radars detect the inbound missile and provide a targeting solution to an interceptor system. Midcourse detection satellites, if available, can provide an earlier targeting solution for the interceptor, which can then launch sooner and intercept farther out with updates provided by the ground-based radars and the interceptor’s own onboard sensors.* In all cases, better ground-based radar data significantly increase the accuracy of target location, and can reduce damage caused by falling debris the farther away from Earth a missile is struck.

The benefit of sharing radar data is that if, at any time during the attack missile’s flight, a radar system from one country or the other can track it, uncertainty in the missile’s measured position decreases, and therefore the certainty in its trajectory and ultimate landing point increases. Decreases in the uncertainty of the missile location in its flight allow the interceptor to launch into a more constrained target area and increase its probability of interception. The situation is even

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* This presumes that the interceptor can use an initial firing solution and updates provided by data from remote sensor data, that is, from sensors on other platforms (forward-deployed radar or satellite systems) than the interceptor system’s co-located ground-based radar.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

better if multiple radar systems see the target throughout its flight and share position data in near-real-time. In other words, data from radar systems provide the position of an object at a given time, from which one can calculate the object’s trajectory. Secondarily, one might observe a radar cross section, which to some extent correlates to shape, but this is also a function of material and geometry relative to the radar system(s).

Russia’s location affords its ground-based radars advantages in detecting and tracking missiles launched from sites ranging from the Far East to the Middle East and South Asia, whether directed toward the Russian Federation, or toward the United States or its allies. This means that Russia’s ground-based radar data could be useful to U.S. regional BMD. The United States currently has more space-based assets than does the Russian Federation, so U.S. satellite data could be useful to Russian BMD.

To analyze the benefits of sharing radar data, the joint committees examined three hypothetical Iranian launch locations: Tabriz, Mashad, and Zahedan. The first two of these are known missile launch/test sites, but Zahedan is not. The launch locations were chosen to represent the spread of trajectory flight-path azimuths for Iranian missiles, and these cities exemplify the farthest east and west locations in Iran. The existing ground-based radar station at Armavir, in southern Russia, and the now-dismantled station in Gabala, Azerbaijan,* were used to illustrate which ground-based radar stations could track a missile from Iran.

The NATO radar station in southern Turkey is well placed to track missiles from all three Iranian hypothetical launch sites if they are targeting U.S. allies in Europe, but the Armavir radar station is also well placed and has a larger range, so it could provide tracking data over more of the trajectory of a missile targeting London, for example (see Figure 5-2). When NATO radar stations are able to track an attack missile, data from the Armavir station would be secondary for NATO purposes. That said, having a second measurement of the same object using different equipment and a different geometric perspective could help (1) validate or even cue a detection from existing U.S. capabilities, and (2) refine launch location and trajectory estimates so as to achieve more rapid, as well as more reliable, data to cue interceptor missiles. Furthermore, continuous tracking for twice as long of the missile’s flight, as is shown in Figure 5-3, would be of great value for further refinement of interceptor options.

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* The Russian Federation and Azerbaijan were unable to reach agreement on terms for continuing Russian operation of the early warning radar station at Gabala, so Russia dismantled the equipment and shipped it back to Russia in 2012. (Evgrashina, L., December 10, 2012, “Russia, Azerbaijan fail to agree on use of radar station,” Reuters, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-azerbaijan-radar/russia-azerbaijan-fail-to-agree-on-use-of-radar-station-idUSL5E8NAC3N20121210, accessed on October 24, 2018).

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
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FIGURE 5-2 Russian Armavir radar coverage of a hypothetical missile trajectory from Tabriz, Iran, to London, UK.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
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FIGURE 5-3 Tracking time and duration by various U.S., NATO, and Russian radar stations of a hypothetical missile trajectory from Tabriz, Iran, to London, UK.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant.
Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

While not the direct subject of this report, there is potential additional value to the United States from data about longer-range missiles targeting U.S. territory provided by a radar station in Armavir.* Iran does not at present have long-range ballistic missiles or ICBMs, but Iran continues to develop its ballistic missile capabilities and has demonstrated a space launch capability. A hypothetical Iranian ICBM trajectory targeting the continental United States would overfly Russian airspace (more if targeting Los Angeles, less if targeting Washington, DC). Current U.S. and NATO radars do not provide early-flight coverage of such missile trajectories, unless they are launched from Tabriz. The Russian radar station at Armavir provides varying degrees of coverage depending on the launch location, but as currently configured (180-degree coverage oriented approximately south by southeast) provides slightly more coverage than does the NATO radar station in south Turkey.

Increasing the azimuthal coverage of the Russian radar at Armavir helps to improve early-flight tracking of a hypothetical Iranian ICBM targeting the United States. In other words, if Armavir were to track in all horizontal directions (360 degrees), then it could view more of the trajectory of a missile from Iran traveling north toward Moscow or Los Angeles. The duration and timing of tracking for each radar installation, including NATO stations, Armavir, and the dismantled Gabala station, are shown graphically in Figure 5-4. The figure shows that Armavir with 360-degree scanning would see a missile traveling from Mashad to Washington, DC, for a period starting at 3 minutes into flight time until 9 minutes 45 seconds. An upgraded radar station at Gabala would be even better situated to track such a missile.

Image
Figure 5-4 Tracking time and duration of a hypothetical missile launch from Mashad, Iran to Washington, DC, by various U.S., NATO, and Russian radar stations, including the dismantled Russian radar station at Gabala, if Armavir and Gabala were upgraded to scan in all horizontal directions.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.

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* Missiles from Iran targeting U.S. territory would not be intermediate- or medium-range ballistic missiles, but they illustrate the advantages of geography and geometry in information sharing for BMD.

For data on the Armavir radar, see Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Congress, February 27, 2009, Options for Deploying Missile Defense in Europe, 18, available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/41165, accessed on December 1, 2016.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

Quantifying the Benefits of Earlier, More Accurate Tracking Information

The Russian committee assessed the benefits to Russian BMD of sharing information from existing ground-based radar systems and a LEO satellite system. They used the same methodology to evaluate the adequacy of missile defense deployments, so only the results can be shared publicly. Their conclusion is that information sharing would enable the Russian Federation to decrease the estimated number of Russian missile interceptors from the original 4–6 to 2 to achieve the same 95 percent probability of successfully defending one military-industrial center from one attacking warhead. Further, they calculated that, with the benefit of shared information, intercepting five warheads with 95 percent probability of success would require 12 missile interceptors, rather than the 22 to 24 required in the case of no cooperation. Such a significant improvement in effectiveness would be enough to justify pursuit of information sharing. The Russian Federation would still seek to defend 15 military-industrial centers, with up to 480 interceptors planned for deployment by 2020, but the defensive capabilities of the deployment would be doubled for a given number of interceptors should information-sharing cooperation be pursued.

Information sharing would also significantly increase the territorial size of each military-industrial center defended by Russian BMD systems, according to analyses done for this study. Figures 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7 compare territories defended by Russian BMD systems deployed in Moscow, Omsk, and Samara, respectively, when using tracking data from remote sensors against a hypothetical attack missile from Pakistan. As demonstrated in each case, operating modes that enable engagement using data from remote sensors (EOR operating mode), the defended area is significantly larger than regions that are defended under an operating mode that only uses data from remote sensors for the initial firing solution to enable launch (“launch on remote,” or LOR, operating mode).

Satellite-enabled midcourse tracking provided through information sharing would increase the size of areas defended for the U.S. regional BMD system in Europe by facilitating an EOR operating mode. Figure 5-8 demonstrates this. With EOR operating mode, the U.S. regional BMD system in Europe could provide defense against Iranian or Pakistani missiles targeting the Russian Federation.

Midcourse Tracking

As noted elsewhere in this report, several independent and one cooperative program have been initiated to enable midcourse tracking and discrimination using satellites, but have been cancelled due to technical, budgetary, or political considerations. These programs include the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) program, a joint low-altitude satellite program to conduct experiments on dim, post-boost targets. RAMOS was to have consisted of two satellites operating in tandem at approximately 525 km altitude and making stereoscopic measurements in the mid- and long-wave infrared regime. RAMOS was cancelled in 2004, reportedly for an inability to negotiate a satisfactory agreement between the countries.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×
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FIGURE 5-5 EOR and LOR defended area plot: Extent of European territory defended by Russian BMD systems located in Moscow for hypothetical Pakistani missile attacks with missile ranges varied from 50 km to 2,750 km. The areas shown are for single-shot defense. A shoot-look-shoot mode would further reduce the defended area.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Image
FIGURE 5-6 EOR and LOR defended area plot: Extent of European territory defended by Russian BMD systems located in Samara for a hypothetical Pakistani attack with missile ranges varied from 50 km to 2,750 km. The areas shown are for single-shot defense. A shoot-look-shoot mode would further reduce the defended area.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×
Image
FIGURE 5-7 EOR and LOR defended area plot: Extent of European territory defended by Russian BMD systems located in Omsk for a hypothetical Pakistani attack with missile ranges varied from 50 km to 2,750 km. The areas shown are for single-shot defense. A shoot-look-shoot mode would further reduce the defended area.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Image
FIGURE 5-8 EOR and LOR defended area plot: Extent of European territory defended by U.S. BMD systems located in Deveselu (shown in black) and Redzikowo (shown in red) for hypothetical Iranian attack missiles with ranges varied from 50 km to 6,000 km. The areas shown are for single-shot defense. A shoot-look-shoot mode would further reduce the defended area.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

Initially, RAMOS was to consist of two satellites, one American and one Russian, both in low-Earth orbit, with their respective ground support stations in their home countries. The Russian Federation was to provide launch capabilities for both satellites. The sensors developed by each country for their satellites would observe the same phenomena stereoscopically. That is, they would measure the same things using their infrared, visible light and ultraviolet sensors from different locations simultaneously, and the analyses could be compared by a joint scientific-technical team, formally created under the agreement. The main defense-relevant goal was to establish a dataset on background radiation from the Earth and objects on or near Earth (e.g., airplanes, sounding rockets) to use for calibrating sensors and analyzing sensor signals. To check the feasibility of this effort, existing Russian and U.S. satellite systems were to be used to measure benign targets of opportunity (e.g., a mountain that the two satellites would have in view at the same time) and the joint scientific-technical team was to compare the processed data.

Subsequent efforts by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to address the midcourse problem included the Space Tracking and Surveillance System and the Precision Tracking Space System, both of which were also subsequently cancelled.

The STSS system was proposed as a follow-on or replacement for the SBIRS Low satellite that was taken out of plans for the SBIRS system. STSS was envisioned as a low-Earth orbiting system that could both detect missile launches from Earth’s surface and track the missile in the midcourse phase, discriminating warheads from decoys. Two STSS demonstration satellites were launched by MDA and proved that low-Earth orbiting satellites could in fact detect missiles in the midcourse and provide much earlier firing solutions to either ground-based interceptors or sea-based interceptors. The value of being able to compute a ballistic trajectory earlier, soon after boost phase ended, could be significant, measuring possibly in minutes out of an attack-missile flight time of at most tens of minutes (e.g., Table 5-1). While the STSS demonstration was successful, the program was terminated due to growing complexity and system cost. The satellites had to have different types of infrared sensors for the launch and midcourse tracking functions, and their sensors were costly because they were gimbaled; that is, they were to be mounted so that they could be pointed in different directions by pivoting in multiple dimensions.

A simpler PTSS system was proposed that would drop the launch-detection mission (leaving that for the SBIRS GEO and HEO satellites) and focus only on midcourse tracking of missiles against a space background rather than an Earth background. This system had simpler infrared sensors and used satellite orientation rather than complex gimbaled sensors for pointing. MDA had planned to launch two PTSS satellites in 2017, but the program was terminated, again partially due to concerns about cost and quality.

As noted in the previous chapter, in 2012, the National Research Council (NRC) published Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives, which focuses primarily on boost-phase defenses for global missile defense.* The report also discusses the various options for midcourse discrimination and tracking, to include enhanced long-range radar systems, and was critical of the PTSS system.

The 2012 committee also had technical concerns with the system, noting that it could not adequately discriminate between actual missiles and decoys and debris. While STSS showed significant potential operational value and either of the two approaches (STSS or PTSS) would have been better than having no midcourse capability at all, it should be noted that the two satellite

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* See page of this report.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

constellations were designed to operate in low-Earth orbit, and that constellations designed with anything less than continuous global coverage would have been inadequate for the mission of global missile defense, which was the focus of the 2012 NRC committee report.

The operational PTSS constellation proposed in the MDA budget was planned to consist of nine satellites. Such limited numbers of LEO satellites would clearly be inadequate for full-Earth coverage. An equatorial orbit would not cover the northern or southern latitudes. Depending on altitude, nine satellites in nonequatorial orbits could only provide coverage over an area of interest approximately 60 percent of the time. (Using the now-cancelled Space-Based Radar satellite as an example, full coverage would require at least 21 satellites operating at 600 miles altitude, with complex track handover capability.83 The 2012 NRC committee calculated that an adequate PTSS constellation would require 24 satellites.84

The 2012 NRC committee’s criticisms were largely based on the utility versus cost calculation given the limited technical capabilities of the proposed PTSS system:85

  • In an equatorial orbit, the satellites would have been blind to missiles flying at extreme northern latitudes during midcourse, such as from North Korea and Iran, targeting North America.
  • With so few satellites, the system could not have provided continuous tracking of missiles across the Northern Hemisphere, as promised in initial descriptions of the program by MDA.
  • PTSS sensors were not sensitive enough to distinguish missiles from decoys and debris.

As the 2012 NRC committee was assessing MDA’s plan against the criteria of U.S. homeland missile defense, the proposed system would have needed to be significantly more robust, and the associated cost was difficult to justify.

Additional reviews were conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Amid serious concerns about both the cost and the ability of PTSS to deliver its promised capabilities, PTSS was cancelled in 2013.86

Some of the promised features of PTSS, if they could be achieved, would be valuable in the context of U.S.-Russian information sharing for missile defense. The present study examines potential Russian-U.S. collaboration on detecting, tracking, and defending against regional threats, so global coverage is not a criterion for success in the present study. Indeed, the weaknesses of PTSS, or a similar system, with respect to coverage at northern latitudes reduces the possibility that the satellites could be used against either country’s strategic deterrent, which is essential for U.S.-Russian cooperation on information sharing.

The need to discriminate decoys and debris from an actual attacking missile applies to threats from countries with advanced missile and warhead technologies. However, against simple threats, existing technologies may be sufficient. The main value of a joint U.S.-Russian satellite-based tracking system would be in providing an earlier targeting solution to ground-based and sea-based radar and interceptors. It is this ability to fire the interceptor before the long-range radar detects an inbound attack missile, and the ability of the interceptor to be fired toward a more accurate envelope in space, that provides benefits to the BMD systems in the form of critical time (i.e., an earlier and more accurate interceptor launch). Additionally, while ground-based radar systems can play a very useful role, when a BMD system relies on one or a few ground-based radar systems in a given location, the obvious countermeasure is to disable the radar system first. A LEO satellite system, such as that considered below, would provide additional resilience to the BMD systems.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
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A HYPOTHETICAL NINE-SATELLITE REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE TRACKING CONSTELLATION

To illustrate the value of satellite information sharing, the joint committees analyze a hypothetical constellation of nine satellites (perhaps fewer, depending on sensor capabilities) and conclude that such a constellation could provide valuable early tracking data for interceptor missiles, and battle damage assessment. The joint committees have not suggested here which country would provide the sensors, nor have they analyzed costs; and they did not evaluate a range of options or alternatives. The joint committees do, however, note that a shared satellite constellation could provide real benefit to both the Russian Federation and the United States: Sharing the costs can significantly reduce the contribution from each country, and placing sensors in orbit may be an attractive alternative to the more difficult question of shared radar systems on sovereign soil.

To evaluate whether a small constellation of relatively simple satellites would be able to provide continuous stereoscopic tracking of regional attack missile trajectories during their midcourse, committee consultant Jaganath Sankaran simulated a nine-satellite constellation using Satellite Tool Kit software. Table 5-1 summarizes the parameters that were assumed for the analysis, which only included geometric line-of-sight capabilities of gimbaled sensors on the hypothetical constellation. No attempt was made to model the actual signal-to-noise ratio and the consequent tracking accuracy obtained. Such an analysis would require a broader-scope study, including access to data on sensor performance that has not been made public.*

A total of seven distinct attack missile launches were simulated using a 24-hour time window. Times of launch and impact are measured from time zero (00:00:00). Times of launch were chosen arbitrarily except, as shown in Table 5-2, in two instances of simultaneous launches occurring at different locations. The simultaneous launches test the ability of the nine-satellite constellation to track multiple threats effectively without compromising either Russian- or U.S.perceived interests by favoring one threat over the other.

TABLE 5-1 Hypothetical Ballistic Missile Tracking Constellation Satellite and Sensor Parameters

Satellite/Sensor Parameter Parameter Value
Satellite Orbit Type Equatorial
Satellite Orbit Altitude (km) 1,750
Total Number of Satellites 9
Spacing between satellites 40°
Sensor Type Simple Conic (Tracking)
Sensor Field of View
Maximum Possible Tracking Line-of-Sight Slant Range (km) 8,000

SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.

___________________

* An additional concern is that the orbit altitude considered here lies in the inner Van Allen belt, a band of energetic charged particles encircling the Earth. These particles degrade satellite components and create additional noise in the sensors. This challenge is generally addressed by utilizing radiation-hardened electronics and image analysis that filters the particle tracks, which are generally distinctive. The challenge is real, and additional analysis and engineering would be required, but the joint committees do not see the challenge as insurmountable, as shown by the successful operation of STSS in a similar orbit.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

TABLE 5-2 Hypothetical Missile Events for Regional Missile Tracking and Simulated Nine-Satellite Constellation

Event Launch Location Target Location Launch Time (HH:MM:SS) Target Impact (HH:MM:SS)
Missile Threat Event 1 Tabriz, Iran London, U.K. 00:00:00 00:17:00
Missile Threat Event 2 Zahedan, Iran Rota, Spain 00:00:00 00:23:00
Missile Threat Event 3 Mashhad, Iran Ramstein Air Force Base (AFB), Germany 00:00:00 00:18:00
Missile Threat Event 4
(2 simultaneous threats registered)
Peshawar, Pakistan Moscow, Russia 00:00:00 00:16:00
Musudan-Ri, North Korea Tokyo, Japan 00:00:00 00:08:00
Missile Threat Event 5
(2 simultaneous threats registered)
Peshawar, Pakistan Chelyabinsk, Russia 00:00:00 00:13:00
Musudan-Ri, North Korea Kadena AFB, Japan 00:00:00 00:10:00

SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.

Figures 5-9 and 5-10 show the configuration of the satellites at the beginning of the simulation and the trajectories of each missile threat event. Because of the curvature of the Earth, movement of the Earth, movement of the missile, and movement of the satellites, the number of satellites that have line-of-sight geometry and adequate range to track the attack missile changes over its course of flight. In Figures 5-11 and 5-12, light-blue cones extending from the satellites represent the tracking range and field of view of satellites that have line-of-sight geometry with the threat missiles at a snapshot in time during the missile’s flight.

Image
FIGURE 5-9 Simulation of hypothetical missile launches targeting European and Russian cities, and placement of a simulated nine-satellite constellation.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016, using the software package Systems Tool Kit by Analytical Graphics, Inc.
Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×
Image
FIGURE 5-10 Simulation of hypothetical missile launches in the Asia-Pacific region targeting Japanese cities and military bases, and placement of a hypothetical simulated nine-satellite constellation.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016, using Systems Tool Kit by Analytical Graphics, Inc.
Image
FIGURE 5-11 Snapshot of a hypothetical missile launched from Zahedan, Iran, toward Rota, Spain, being tracked by a simulated nine-satellite tracking constellation.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016, using Systems Tool Kit by Analytical Graphics, Inc.
Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×
Image
FIGURE 5-12 Snapshot of simultaneous hypothetical missile launches (Peshawar, Pakistan, to Moscow, Russia, and Musudan-Ri, North Korea, to Tokyo, Japan) being tracked by a simulated nine-satellite tracking constellation.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016, using Systems Tool Kit by Analytical Graphics, Inc.

Figures 5-13 through 5-17b show the times when the nine-satellite constellation can track a specified simulated missile threat. In Figure 5-13, the hypothetical attack missile (Missile Threat Event 1) is launched at time 00:00:00 from Tabriz, Iran, to London, United Kingdom, and satellite 5 is in range from the beginning of the launch. Satellite 6 is within range less than 30 seconds after launch, and satellite 4 has line-of-sight geometry at approximately 00:02:00 after launch. Three satellites (satellites 4, 5, and 6) are within range from 2 minutes after launch until approximately 00:05:15, when satellite 6 is unable to track the threat missile. Satellite 3 is in range from approximately 00:07:30 to approximately 00:17:00.

The x-axis on each figure begins with the launch time, so in Figure 5-14, the launch occurs at 00:00:00 and satellites 5 and 4 can track the attack missile (Missile Event 2: hypothetical missile launched from Zahedan, Iran, to Rota, Spain). At all times, at least two satellites are able to maintain continuous geometric line-of-sight access to each attack missile, thereby enabling three-dimensional tracking. As noted above, these analyses establish the geometric possibility of detection, but the satellite sensors must also perform in the real world, detecting the missile against other inputs (achieving the requisite signal-to-noise ratio).

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×
Image
FIGURE 5-13 Times from threat missile launch when satellites in a simulated nine-satellite equatorial constellation have line-of-sight geometry with Missile Threat Event 1 (Tabriz, Iran, to London, UK). Launch time is 00:00:00 and impact time is 00:17:00.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Image
FIGURE 5-14 Times when satellites in a nine-satellite equatorial constellation have line-of-sight geometry with Missile Threat Event 2 in Table 5-2 (Zahedan, Iran, to Rota, Spain). Launch time is 00:00:00 and impact time is 00:23:00.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×
Image
FIGURE 5-15 Times when simulated satellites in a nine-satellite equatorial constellation have line-of-sight geometry with Missile Threat Event 3 in Table 5-2 (Mashhad, Iran, to Ramstein AFB, Germany).
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Image
FIGURE 5-16a Times when satellites in a simulated nine-satellite equatorial constellation have line-of-sight geometry with Missile Threat Event 4 in Table 5-2 (Peshawar, Pakistan, to Moscow, Russia). The times when the satellites in the constellation have line-of-sight geometry with the second of the simultaneous simulated missile threats in Missile Threat Event 4 (Musudan-Ri, North Korea, to Tokyo, Japan) are shown in Figure 5-16b.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×
Image
FIGURE 5-16b Times when satellites in a simulated nine-satellite constellation have line-of-sight geometry with Missile Threat Event 4 in Table 5-2 (Musudan-Ri, North Kor ea, to Tokyo, Japan). Times when the satellites in a simulated nine-satellite constellation have line-of-sight geometry with Missile Threat 4 (Peshawar, Pakistan, to Moscow, Russia) are shown in Figure 5-16a.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Image
FIGURE 5-17a Times when satellites in a simulated nine-satellite constellation have line-of-sight geometry with Missile Threat Event 5 (Peshawar, Pakistan, to Chelyabinsk, Russia). The times when the satellites in the constellation have line-of-sight geometry with the second of the simulated simultaneous missile threats in Missile Threat Event 5 (Musudan-Ri, North Korea, to Kadena AFB, Japan) are shown in Figure 5-17b.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.
Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×
Image
FIGURE 5-17b Times when satellites in a simulated nine-satellite constellation have line-of-sight geometry with Missile Threat Event 5 in Table 5-2 (Musudan-Ri, North Korea, to Kadena AFB, Japan). The times when the satellites in a simulated nine-satellite constellation have line-of-sight geometry with the second of the simulated simultaneous missile threats in Missile Threat Event 5 (Peshawar, Pakistan, to Chelyabinsk, Russia) are shown in Figure 5-17a.
SOURCE: Created by J. Sankaran, consultant, 2016.

Impediments to Satellite Information Sharing

There are impediments to either the United States or the Russian Federation sharing information from satellite-based missile early warning systems (such as that described above), including the desire not to reveal specific sensor capabilities, and information on the command and control systems of their satellites. Raw satellite data, directly downlinked to the ground, would possibly contain data from which one may be able to deduce sensitive information such as sensor sensitivity, or the structure of the system algorithms or communications. Thus, sharing of satellite information would most likely require data filtering, inevitably causing some time delay and potentially raising questions about the integrity of the transmitted data. The key questions are the magnitude of such a delay and what effect (at that point in the missile’s flight) that delay would have on the ultimate target prediction accuracy and interceptor firing solution.

It might be possible, though perhaps expensive, to provide only location and initial tracking data, without information on intensity (that is, the strength of the sensor signal, which could reveal sensor sensitivity). Alternatively it might be possible to set a minimum intensity threshold in the data, below which information would be filtered. In either case, modifications would be required to the satellite downlink and processing algorithms. Also, security concerns and data validation would have to be analyzed thoroughly, and a cost-benefit analysis would be required. Ownership of the data may also be an issue for resolution between the United States and the Russian Federation. All of these factors underscore the need for additional analysis by the governments before proceeding with these proposals.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

A POSSIBLE PATH FORWARD

Follow-On to the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) Program

The physics of infrared detection and missile tracking is well known and should not be subject to geopolitical interpretations. It therefore stands to reason that there would be some least-common-denominator set of data that the United States and the Russian Federation could and should share about the signatures of certain objects, and the minimum reaction of each country’s sensors to those objects. To avoid responses to false alarms, it is in the interest of both the United States and the Russian Federation that what one country sees as the signature of a benign object the other does not see as the signature of a threat. To that end, it is worth reconsidering a concept such as the aforementioned RAMOS program—taking into account lessons learned where feasible—wherein the United States and the Russian Federation conducted joint observations of objects and phenomena. While a potential joint satellite might be a useful end goal, it would be logical to consider launching well-defined test objects and viewing well-defined terrestrial events in order to calibrate sensors and share the results. Launches of test objects may include approximations of the designs of particular third-party threats, or they could be jointly designed to systematically and parametrically examine the dimensions and other features of potential threat objects. Calibration of sensors could usefully be based on observations of natural phenomena including differentiations in various landscapes (e.g., mountain ranges), sun glare (e.g., reflections off of water, ice), and abnormalities observed due to weather conditions (e.g., lightning).

Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation Information

The entire premise of the U.S. and Russian anti-ballistic missile programs is not to counter each other’s strategic missile capabilities, but rather to counter the threats arising from increased missile capabilities of proliferant countries. It is imperative that both the United States and the Russian Federation have as much knowledge as possible about those threats. It would help both countries to have some common information on all of those threats worldwide, limited, of course, to information that does not reveal either country’s sensitive sources and methods. Again, there must be a set of information that could be useful and can be shared, and to that end, a regime or protocol by which the two countries could share such information would be helpful to both.

Benefits of Information Sharing for Midcourse Tracking

Although the United States and the Russian Federation have, or will have, capable boost-phase detection and early warning systems, and highly capable radar detection and tracking systems, what has eluded both countries for decades is a capability for adequate midcourse tracking. A satellite system for ballistic-missile tracking, in which both countries are involved from the beginning in the design, construction, and operation of the systems, would thus seem to be in the interest of both countries. The required orbital parameters, sensor sensitivities, and so on, to provide the minimum essential information for both countries would remain to be determined. Any accurate midcourse tracking data would be better than what currently exists.

To be clear, the joint committees do not disagree with the conclusions of the 2012 NRC study on boost-phase missile defense. As is described in the section above titled Midcourse

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

Tracking,* the committee that produced the 2012 report was evaluating the technical competency of PTSS in support of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s missile-defense strategy for the U.S. homeland and regional defense against a defined list of technical parameters. The 2012 committee determined that the PTSS system did not perform as well as promised against the proposed list of technical parameters, particularly on midcourse discrimination between the reentry vehicle and debris or decoys. Nor did it perform as well as cheaper options for obtaining needed tracking for homeland and regional defense.

Conversely, for the current study, the joint committees’ task is to examine missile defense systems planned for deployment against regional threats in combination with the benefits and disadvantages of a range of cooperative opportunities in the context of strategic stability. Ultimately, the joint committees concluded that there are areas of technical cooperation that could benefit both Russian and U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. The joint committees weighed each option by considering whether the option would be militarily beneficial to both countries without providing either country an advantage over the other, and whether the option is technically feasible. Cost was an important factor for the 2012 study. The joint committees did not calculate costs for the current study, but they note that the cost calculations would be different for a jointly deployed satellite system, with major costs shared between the countries.

Could a component of a missile defense system that is not a preferred option in one context be a leading option in another context? In short, yes. The joint committees are not recommending revival of PTSS; rather, the joint committees recommend consideration of a satellite constellation to provide midcourse tracking. An illustration of such a system is provided earlier in this chapter. Recall that some of the chief criticisms of PTSS that led to recommendations against deployment of the system were as follows: (1) In an equatorial orbit, the satellites would have been blind to missiles flying at extreme northern latitudes; (2) with nine satellites, the system could not have provided continuous tracking of missiles across the Northern Hemisphere, as promised; and (3) PTSS sensors were not sensitive enough to distinguish missiles from decoys and debris. The joint committees determined that these criticisms need not be dispositive problems for the hypothetical satellite system analyzed here and the more modest operational goals considered here.

This is not to say that the options proposed here are necessarily the preferred options. The joint committees would hope that a satellite system jointly deployed many years after PTSS was designed could have better capabilities than the parameters of PTSS. However, even the presently assessed capabilities of the illustrative nine-satellite constellation would provide value in the form of earlier measurements of the trajectories of threat objects, enabling earlier launch of interceptors. Whether that value is sufficient to warrant the costs and to undertake the considerable effort to make the joint deployment a reality is worthwhile for the two governments to explore, if they conclude that some form of missile defense cooperation is possible.

JOINT INFORMATION-SHARING CENTER

The foregoing requires continued, consistent, and committed interchange at both a technical and a policy level. To that end, an analogue to the Joint Data Exchange Center mentioned in Chapter 1 of this report offers a useful concept for implementation, as such a center would provide the focus for sharing technical information from existing and new systems. Also, the

___________________

* Please see pages in this report.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

information gleaned from the programs and technical investigations of such a center could inform development of the parameters for potential future operational cooperation.

IMPLEMENTATION

The joint committees have identified several opportunities for missile defense cooperation that have the potential to benefit both the Russian Federation and the United States. If implemented, they would represent enhancements to each country’s capabilities, and would not undermine or limit existing or planned military capabilities. Still, the new capabilities need to offer real benefits to both countries, perhaps including the possibility of being easier or less expensive to implement than the independent programs being planned at present.

Moreover, a cooperative effort is most effectively developed jointly right from the outset, if for no other reason than to establish mutual trust. More pointedly, cooperative planning is needed to ensure that both the United States and the Russian Federation reap benefits and avoid vulnerabilities from the joint activities.

With this in mind, the joint committees propose that a joint U.S.-Russian team of technical and military experts be appointed to more explicitly define the opportunities in missile defense cooperation along the lines identified above (Recommendation 4). Such a team would be tasked with identifying in greater detail the modes of information sharing that would improve both countries’ monitoring and assessments of missile proliferation threats, for example. Thus, it could define the specific characteristics of joint satellite programs, cooperation on midcourse tracking and discrimination, and potential means of sharing from satellite systems whether in real time or near-real-time (prospects for real-time sharing may only be feasible for systems that have been jointly developed and deployed).

If successful, such a team could form the basis for a future Joint Information-Sharing Center. However, the team’s primary function would be to define in specific details the cooperative programs that could be pursued initially, and to prioritize them in terms of benefits, costs, and schedule (i.e., ordering of development). The joint committees suggest that this team might draft potential acquisition programs, including analyses of alternatives, across all areas of potential U.S.-Russian collaboration in missile defense, including additional opportunities beyond those identified in this report.

Suggested Citation:"5 Cooperation on Information Sharing of Satellite and Radar Systems." National Academy of Sciences. 2021. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24964.
×

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×
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As ballistic missile technology proliferates, and as ballistic missile defenses are deployed by both the Russian Federation and the United States, it is increasingly important for these two countries to seek ways to reap the benefits of systems that can protect their own national security interests against limited missile attacks from third countries without undermining the strategic balance that the two governments maintain to ensure stability. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability examines both the technical implications of planned missile defense deployments for Russian and U.S. strategic deterrents and the benefits and disadvantages of a range of options for cooperation on missile defense.

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