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Additional Future Possibilities for Cooperation

In Chapter 4, the joint committees noted that the strategic relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States remains dominated by mutual deterrence, and that the two countries share mutual distrust of one another. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been the goal of both countries to improve the U.S.-Russian relationship to one of partnership. It is difficult to predict when such a transformation will occur; many observers believe it will require several years. In this brief chapter, the joint committees identify a menu of additional cooperative measures on ballistic missile defense (BMD) that would require substantially more mutual trust than currently exists between the governments, but that nevertheless could provide significant advantages to the national security of both countries. These measures have not been analyzed in depth and may be technically challenging.

INTELLIGENCE-BASED INFORMATION EXCHANGES

Thus far in this report, the joint committees have only considered sharing data that could be collected by satellite and radar missile detection and tracking systems. They have not included data or analysis based on other intelligence sources. They note, however, that in November 2015, Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency John Brennan publicly stated that he had been having ongoing conversations on terrorism with “my Russian counterpart” over the last year. He said that the exchange of information “needs to be enhanced,” and added, “I am determined to continue to work with my Russian counterparts, because of the importance that I think we each can bring to this issue, in terms of our insights, our information, our data and sharing.”⁸⁷ Russian-U.S. relations have worsened significantly since these remarks were made, but the statement demonstrates that—if the issue is important enough—cooperation can occur even in challenging strategic circumstances. In principle, it should someday be possible to exchange data on third-country missile threats. Such an exchange would be useful for assessing and improving effectiveness both of nonproliferation measures and of BMD systems.

SHARED GROUND-BASED RADAR EARLY WARNING AND TRACKING DATA

The joint committees examined possible cooperation on constructing and sharing the output of a newly built early warning radar. Such cooperation could improve both Russian and

American ability to defend against a ballistic missile attack from Iran while providing no improvement for either country in defenses against a retaliatory strike from the other. Shared data from such a radar would be especially useful because rather than being redundant, the measurements of the objects of interest would come from different geometric perspectives.

American scientist Dean Wilkening proposed a joint Russian-U.S. ground-based radar project.⁸⁸ In brief, he suggests that a radar system could be jointly constructed and operated in central Russia. Although this idea has technical merit, construction of a joint U.S.-Russian or Russian radar facility on Russian territory would face several political obstacles. Perhaps, then, the United States and the Russian Federation could cooperate on a radar project not on Russian territory—for example, by constructing an offshore platform in the Caspian Sea or the Black Sea to support a radar station. The radar installation could be directed south with an angle and beam width that does not view Russian airspace. While the joint committees concluded such an idea was premature at this time, it may have applicability in the future.

OTHER COOPERATIVE MEASURES

At various times in the past, there have been suggestions for joint observation of U.S. and Russian flight tests of BMD systems using each country’s own existing systems and equipment. Such observations could improve the understanding of the effectiveness of each country’s systems and thus provide assurance that those systems do not threaten strategic stability.

With the increasing importance of space and cyber operations there is a long-term possibility that the two countries may need to deconflict operations to avoid misunderstanding and inadvertent escalation. In the event that they were dealing with a common threat, they might even need to coordinate operations. If and when the strategic relationship permits, the countries could consider establishing a coordination center (perhaps virtual) to pool information and provide a mechanism for coordination or deconfliction.^*

Finally, the discussions on cooperation conducted in the NATO-Russia Council, established in 2002, and the joint exercises, both tabletop and command post, were valuable to both countries in understanding the effectiveness and compatibility of each country’s systems, including command and operational structures, roles, and procedures. When conditions permit, those discussions and exercises should resume.

POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS

The time is not yet ready for official discussions between the two governments of the ideas presented in this chapter. All of them would require a greater degree of mutual trust than now exists between the United States and the Russian Federation. Although beyond what is currently feasible, these measures may warrant consideration in the future should the strategic relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation permit. It may be useful for nongovernmental organizations to examine these ideas in order to assist their governments in considering them if and when political conditions make such steps appropriate.

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^* This idea is based on a suggestion from Russian Academician Sergey M. Rogov, and it has not been elaborated. Some insights concerning the approach may be found in W. L. Ury, 1985, Beyond the Hotline: How Crisis Control Can Prevent Nuclear War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).