7
Findings and Recommendations
The Findings and Recommendations derived from this report are summarized in this chapter.
Finding 1: Cooperation on information sharing with respect to defense against intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles, properly managed, would provide military benefits to both countries without posing additional threats to strategic stability between the United States and the Russian Federation.
Cooperation in areas of national security must be carefully executed to be constructive and sustainable, but the joint committees emphasize that such cooperation is both feasible in principle and potentially of significant value to enhancing the security of both countries.
Finding 2: The effectiveness of such information sharing can be measured by improved defense against ballistic missile activities of emerging and potential missile programs worldwide.
The countries with ballistic missile programs analyzed as threats to U.S. regional interests and to Russian security in the present study are characterized by a lack of missile program transparency and a lack of understanding about those nations’ policies and motivations, as well as the possibility of future instability. These combined factors make their missile programs potential threats that may not be deterrable by classical means. It is important to recognize that the joint committees’ analysis is based on known missile capabilities. Intent has not been considered, nor has the degree to which the states involved currently pose (or are likely to pose in the future) an actual military threat to the United States or to the Russian Federation. In terms of capabilities, intermediate- and medium-range missiles from any of the states considered in this report could present a physical threat to the territory of the Russian Federation as well as to important U.S. allies and deployed U.S. forces.
Finding 3: When compared with the current situation of no information sharing, cooperation on information sharing would increase the military effectiveness of ballistic missile defense of both countries against the threat of intermediate- and medium-range missiles, thereby improving the security of the Russian Federation and the United States.
Defense against ballistic missiles is technically challenging, especially in the case of medium-range ballistic missiles because of their short flight times. In this context, technical cooperation on ballistic missile defense can help substantially, including in the domain of situational awareness (early warning and tracking) as advocated in this report.
Finding 4: The most feasible approach to information sharing is near-real-time sharing of satellite and ground-based radar system data. These data could come from existing and planned national satellites and ground-based radar systems, as well as from new systems jointly developed and operated. New low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites would be especially useful.
Internal Russian analysis (which has not been reviewed in technical detail by U.S. committee participants) suggests that having such data would reduce the number of interceptors necessary for dealing with small attacks (e.g., up to five attack missiles) against an individual military-industrial center* by about one-half. From the U.S. perspective, information sharing, including data from LEO satellites, could provide many of the benefits promised by the now-cancelled Precision Tracking Space System. A LEO satellite system with a more agile pointing system and moderately capable infrared sensors could provide an earlier firing solution than without such a satellite system, thereby improving effectiveness both in terms of targeting the threat missile and in terms of the area defended.
Finding 5: Ultimately, effective data sharing between the United States and the Russian Federation will almost certainly require a jointly staffed center to exchange data. Steps toward effective data sharing could include establishing, as soon as feasible, the previously agreed-upon Joint Data Exchange Center, using the protocols, procedures, joint operation, and location previously agreed upon. To emphasize that this is part of a phased approach to more extensive information sharing, a new name (such as Joint Information-Sharing Center) would be appropriate.
The purpose of the Joint Information-Sharing Center would be to gain practical experience in implementing data sharing. Such a center would provide a sensible way to create a common information database and would be a first step toward militarily significant information sharing in near-real-time. The center would be tasked with developing the ability for each country to conduct common operations, should relations between them allow it. As those procedures develop, the countries would consider whether the ultimate near-real-time sharing would occur at the Joint Information-Sharing Center or in a separate, newly constructed center.
Finding 6: Additional cooperative activities could provide significant advantages to the national security of both states if and when political conditions allow their consideration.
These measures (identified in Chapter 6 of this report) have not been analyzed in depth and may or may not be technically feasible.
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* Russian ballistic missile defense is structured around the defense of a set of such centers as described in Chapter 3 of this report.
- Intelligence-based information exchange
- Shared ground-based and sea-based radar early warning and tracking data
- Other cooperative measures
- Joint observations of test flights
- Deconfliction of operations
- Coordination of operations to address common threats
- Establishment of a joint coordination center for pooling of information and deconflicting of operations
- Joint tabletop and command-post exercises
Many of these measures would require a greater degree of mutual trust than now exists between the United States and the Russian Federation. Although they are beyond the scope of this report, these measures may deserve consideration in the future.
These findings lead the joint committees to make the following recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The United States and the Russian Federation should establish, as soon as political conditions permit, joint information sharing of missile defense data from satellites and ground-based radar systems through a dedicated information-sharing center.
Concrete steps toward this end could include establishing joint government-to-government policy and technical committees to address policy and technical considerations in implementation of the information sharing advocated here. Such sharing must be carefully managed to protect sensitive information yet allow for the security benefits of cooperation. Specifically, we propose that a joint team of military technical experts be established to explicitly define initial activities that could be pursued cooperatively. In practice, the data selected for sharing would not be raw data, and experts from the United States and the Russian Federation may determine that the sharing of near-real-time data is most feasible.
Recommendation 2: An important early step would be the establishment of a center based on the previously agreed-upon Joint Data Exchange Center, using the protocols, procedures, joint staffing, and location previously agreed upon by the Russian Federation and the United States. In parallel, the two governments should develop procedures for near-real-time sharing of militarily significant data on detecting and tracking of third countries’ ballistic missiles.
Experience gained in past joint efforts should be especially useful as the basis for implementing these recommendations. The government committees associated with the previously agreed-upon Joint Data Exchange Center would be suitable bodies to examine and draw lessons from past experience.
Recommendation 3: Until conditions permit moving forward on the path recommended in this report, the two governments should maintain previously agreed-upon procedures and, where practical, develop facilities under the previously agreed-upon Joint Data Exchange Center, in order to allow rapid implementation at an appropriate time.
Recommendation 4: The two governments should encourage technical, policy, and military experts outside of government to jointly evaluate the additional cooperative activities mentioned in this report to determine which, if any, should be recommended to the two governments for formal evaluation when appropriate.
The Russian Federation and the United States are on a dangerous course, heading into uncharted waters with real potential for misunderstandings and instability. When political conditions allow, the countries should engage in discussions of the new multidimensional strategic stability environment, initiate cooperation in areas that serve both countries’ interests, and begin to rebuild trust and confidence that will serve as the foundation for greater stability.
