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4 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: User Guide Causes of Operator Assault The causes and contributors to operator assaults vary widely. FTA found in an analysis of NTD that the most likely causes of operator assaults are fare disputes (44%), rules disputes (18%), and verbal argu- ment escalation (12%). For agencies operating rail systems, FTA found the most likely causes are rules disputes (35%), followed by waking sleeping patrons (29%), and patrons unhappy with services (10%). TCRP Synthesis 93 confirmed the FTA assessment, concluding that the primary factors contributing to operator assaults were fare enforcement and intoxicated passengers or drug users, followed by rule enforcement other than fare enforcement. National, state, and local data on operator assaults suggest aggravated and simple assault rates change by region, population density, and a variety of other factors. Contributing Factors of Assault ⢠Fare enforcement ⢠Intoxicated passengers or drug users ⢠Other rule enforcement ⢠School/youth-related violence ⢠Individuals with mental illness ⢠Routes operating in high-crime areas ⢠Service problem (delays, service reductions, etc.) ⢠Gang-related violence ⢠Cash transactions Source: TCRP Synthesis 93: Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
5 Transit agencies have many important reasons to develop operator assault risk management strategies that correspond to specific system risks. Limited staff availability and financial resources limit the types and number of approaches that may be implemented. In building a comprehensive strategy toward operator assaults, transit agencies must consider the unique causes and contributors to operator assault experienced by the transit system in question. Transit agencies can face economic loss as the result of operator assaults due to lost work time, damaged employee morale and productivity, increased employee compensation payments, medical expenses, and possible lawsuits and liability costs. A reduction in the number and severity of assaults would provide corresponding economic benefits to an agency. As in any risk analysis approach, trade-offs between capital and operating expenses, risks, costs, and benefits of addressing driver assault risk versus other agency priorities (topics beyond the scope of this research) will need to be made. Managing the risks associated with operator assaults can prove to be intractably challenging. It takes the commitment of significant resources and the development of substantial expertise to establish and maintain an effective prevention program and response capability. For transit agencies the challenge lies in the formulation of a program that both balances and shares respon- sibility among management, operators, union, and the local community. Although there are variations in application, the operator assault risk management process for transit agencies requires consideration and adoption of many of the same risk management principles used in the protection of the agencyâs physical assets. An effective operator assault risk reduction program includes the assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences (TVC analysis)1 in an effort to reduce the number of incidents or mitigate the losses associated with an incident. The risk of driver assault on a given route may be conceptualized as a tripartite functionâthat is, risk is affected by the potential for an assault (threat), the probability that an assault would be successful (vulnerability), and the severity of an assault (consequences). The risk can be dealt with using risk reduction techniques: identifying the vulnerabilities of systems through a vulnerability analysis and eliminating or reducing vulnerabilities and consequences through the use of countermeasures. C H A P T E R 1 Operator Assault Risk Management This section provides a framework for operator assault risk management that outlines the key elements of an effective operator assault risk reduction program: assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences (TVC analysis) associated with an assault event. The framework will help transit agencies understand the role of the various components of the operator assault risk management toolkit described in the User Guide. 1The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS, 2009) calls for infrastructure risks from any scenario to be considered âas a function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat.â The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS, 2013) recommends that risks be assessed in terms threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.