Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview (2018)

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11 The CASE™ and TRA research team developed an “incident-based” threat assessment response protocol and evaluation methodology as part of the research project based on an analysis of information collected in the literature review and effective practices found. The detailed proto- col is found in TCRP Research Report 193: Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide. The following sections provide an overview of the key elements of the protocol and evaluation methodology, which include (1) policy and standard operating procedures; (2) reporting process and procedures; (3) threat assessment and response protocols; and (4) follow-up and feedback procedures. Management Policy and Standard Operating Procedures Maintaining an effective assault prevention strategy requires the implementation of policy and SOPs that clearly establish how the transit agency will respond to aggression against opera- tors or other disruptive acts. The policy should be kept up-to-date and must be communicated both internally to employees and externally to passengers and other system users. Assault prevention should be identified by the agency as a matter of priority. Communications must establish that the occurrence of an assault against an operator is a major concern of the transit agency. A company policy for dealing with driver assaults and threatening and/or disrup- tive passengers that is robust and fully endorsed by senior management is a critical component of a preventive strategy. A comprehensive management policy addresses prevention, training and periodic re-training, handling problem passengers, categorizing of incidents, reporting of incidents, the supervisor/ manager’s responsibility, prosecutions, communication, and procedures to be followed. In particular, the policy would include: • “Zero Tolerance” driver assault and unruly passenger policies, • Conditions of carriage, • Alcohol policy/no smoking policy/fare payment policy, • Definition of driver assault (in line with state laws and regulations), • Definition of unruly passenger, and • Standardized definition of threat levels. SOPs would include: • Driver, supervisor, and management duties, • Procedures for unruly passenger prevention, C H A P T E R 3 Threat Assessment Response Protocol Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

12 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview • Procedures for unruly passenger management, • Communication and coordination, • Prevention strategies, and • Post-incident actions. A broad-based set of key questions to ask regarding policy or SOPs can also be found on the FTA website at “Security and Emergency Management Technical Assistance for the Top 50 Transit Agencies.”7 Operator Assault Self-Assessment Checklist • Does the organization have a formal workplace violence policy and does it provide workplace violence training to employees? • Does the organization have a customer service policy governing on-board passenger activities including inappropriate passenger behavior that could cause the organization to refuse passenger service based on safety and security concerns? • Does the organization have a formal transit risk management program that identifies, analyzes, and measures specific risks the organization may face and does it then develop methodologies to avoid, reduce, control, assume, or transfer these specific risks? • Does the organization have a formal driver/operator handbook covering all operational safety and security activities and do employees sign for receipt of this handbook? • Does the organization have specific procedures and guidelines for all transit employees to respond to on-board or in transit facility threats and assaults? • Does the organization have formal procedures and forms to guide employees in handling and documenting transit vehicle incidents (threats or assaults)? • Does the organization have a formal accident/incident investigation process and have managers/supervisors who must report to accident scenes been formally trained on inves- tigation processes? • Does the organization have a formal methodology for determining the risk level of threats and are approaches and/or recommendations for managing risk included? Reporting Process and Procedures Literature review emphasizes the importance of reporting all incidents and threats. Reporting to law enforcement and NTD is required for all assaults, including simple assaults, aggravated assaults, sexual assaults, and homicides. All incidents that result in an arrest are reportable. There are a variety of ways in which assault data are collected and reported. In some transit agencies operator assaults are not tracked separately; they are combined with assaults on passengers. Sig- nificant concerns about underreporting of nonphysical assaults have been raised. Establishing the facts associated with incidences of assault was also identified as critical. This includes the capture of basic data such as (1) frequently occurring assault types, (2) day of the week and time period of occurrence, (3) vehicle type and location, (4) proximate cause, and (5) contributing factors. Survey data found that reports, including all pertinent details of the incident, are typically requested from the operator on the same day. Preventing Workplace Violence: A Union Representative’s Guidebook8 urges workers “to docu- ment all assault incidents, close calls, suspicious persons, and abusive behavior.” The recording 7Accessed at https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/safety/security-and-emergency-management-technical- assistance-top-50. 8American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. (2006). Preventing Workplace Violence: A Union Represen- tative’s Guidebook. Accessed at http://www.afscme.org/news/publications/for-leaders/preventing-workplace-violence-a-union- representatives-guidebook. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Threat Assessment Response Protocol 13 of assaults, verbal abuses, and “near misses” to learn how to prevent similar incidents from recurring can be an administrative control for workplace violence according to the Ameri- can Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. The Amalgamated Transit Union Workplace Violence Fact Sheet also urges the collection of violence data. Threat Assessment and Response Protocols Effective threat assessment consists of two elements: (1) the assessment of the credibility and potential viability of an expression of intent to do harm and (2) an evaluation of the intent and capability of the individual to carry out the threat. The formation of threat assessment teams is a management method used to receive, investi- gate, and respond to reports of threats. Although Preventing Workplace Violence cautions that “management policies to watch out for include threat assessment teams,” the guide continues that an assessment team approach that limits activity to identifying potentially violent situations and recommending procedures for responding to those situations can be effective. For an assessment team to be effective, it should have an equal number of trained managers and union representatives. Such teams should also include mental health professionals. As stated in Preventing Workplace Violence, “without proper training and years of experience in a mental health discipline, lay people are likely to reach wrong conclusions and may put themselves and others at risk in dangerous situations.” Examples of threat assessment or similar tasks forces established to address and reduce assaults on operators are: • The Amtrak Threat Assessment Team (TART) members have varied roles in handling poten- tial workplace violence situations. The role of the TART is to gather information, analyze it, make an assessment regarding the potential for violence, develop a plan to defuse and manage the incident, and respond to the incident’s effect on the workplace. In addition, the TART team meets quarterly to review incidents and statistical reports, discuss how the inci- dents were resolved and identify any trends (Amtrak Involvement in Handling Workplace Violence Incidents9). • The Chicago Transport Authority (CTA) has a bus operator assault committee composed of bus operators, union officials, management, and police. They discuss assault statistics, loca- tions of the assaults, the number of individuals in custody, and the measures being taken to reduce the number of assaults (TCRP Synthesis 93). • The Maryland Transit Authority (MTA) Service Safety Task Force (SSTF), created to tackle the issue of reducing assaults on operators, consists of internal MTA staff and external stake- holders who work together to examine a host of elements intrinsic to the safe operation of any public transportation system including organizational policies, procedures, and processes, engineering and technology factors, human factors, public outreach, community involve- ment, safety and security awareness, recruiting, and training. Their work includes an exami- nation of the organization’s policies, procedures, safety culture, and operating environment. SSTF developed pragmatic solutions, which involved changes to existing procedures; new safety initiatives; technical and engineering solutions; and innovative media and marketing solutions that led to a 40% reduction in aggravated assaults on operators and a significant reduction in associated workers compensations costs (APTA, 2014). 9National Railroad Passenger Corporation. (2008). “Workplace Violence Policy” added to the Policy Resource Booklet for Amtrak Employees, Operations Standards Update. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

14 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: Research Overview Key Questions about Investigation Protocols • Does the organization have a formal accident/incident investigation process? • Have managers/supervisors who must report to accident scenes been formally trained on investigation processes? • Does the organization have a formal methodology for determining the risk level of threats and are approaches and/or recommendations for managing risk included? • Does the agency have a threat assessment team established? • Are there standard forms/checklists to document investigations? • Does manager/supervisor training identify the steps required to conduct the investigation? Examples of investigation protocols and emergency response protocols are shown in Table 3. Agency and Source Response Protocol Amtrak, Workplace Violence Policy When an emergency situation exists call Amtrak Police at: 800- 331-XXXX and/or 911 for immediate service. lf there is an immediate threat of violence, the manager shall: • immediately contact the Amtrak police. • contact the EAP to provide support to the employee. • contact the TART, if necessary, to help coordinate a full response. Société de Transport de Montréal (STM), Sécuribus Program, 2013 Société de Transport de Montréal (STM) has put in place a protocol for intervening in cases of assault. The protocol dictates a rapid response that involves all parties concerned: driver, field supervisor, Bus Control Centre radio operator, inspectors, and so on. A formal procedure was drafted to set out the roles and responsibilities of everyone involved when a driver is assaulted. All buses in the fleet are equipped with an emergency call button that drivers can use to request help. As soon as the call is received, the police, the STM’s Security and Control staff and field supervisors are dispatched to the scene. At the same time, pressing the button turns on the 9-1-1 display on the outside of the bus. If there is a threat to the operator, but there are no weapons involved and no physical contact has occurred, Metro Transit Police (MTP) is dispatched to the scene. If MTP is not available, local police are notified. Metro Transit’s District Supervisor will also respond to check the operator’s welfare when appropriate. Central Ohio Transit Agency (COTA), COTA Short-Range Transit Plan, Section 10—Security and Emergency Services, 2007, 2013 COTA has established an emergency protocol with tools to assist bus operators in events, such as assaults. Destination signs can be activated to read “Emergency, Please Call Police.” Once activated a silent alarm is sent to COTA’s radio control room. There are also emergency alarms on board and a “priority button” on the driver’s radio. The system is monitored by police dispatchers for immediate assistance as needed. San Bernardino Omnitrans, Bus Operation Safety Critical Issues Examination and Model Practices, National Center for Transit Research Report, 2014 San Bernardino Omnitrans emergency communication protocol training covers the use of radios, phones, overt communication tactics, use of alarm buttons, and video indexing. They have also launched a “whistle defense program,” which is completely voluntary. Through this program bus operators are provided safety whistles to alert those in the area that they have an emergency or are in a threatening situation. Table 3. Emergency response protocols. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.

Threat Assessment Response Protocol 15 Agency and Source Response Protocol Minneapolis/St. Paul Metro, Metro Transit Operator Assault Procedure, Section 90, Subsection 03, Document 01; Metro Transit’s Bus Operator’s Rule Book and Guide 5-8 Minneapolis/St. Paul Metro Transit has an established Operator Assault procedure to “ensure the proper response to assaults which occur on Metro Transit buses toward operators…” If there is a threat to the operator, but there are no weapons involved and no physical contact has occurred, Metro Transit Police (MTP) through 5-12, Section 530-538: Metropolitan Council Policy 4-6-1a and 4-9a is dispatched to the scene. If MTP is not available, local police are notified. Metro Transit’s District Supervisor will also respond to check the operator’s welfare when appropriate. Unlawful attacks on an operator that do not include the use of a weapon and do not result in serious or aggravated injury are captured under the category of “Interference with Operator.” These events include simple assaults, minor assaults, assault and battery, injury by culpable negligence, and all attempts to commit these offenses. When these assaults occur, medical personnel are notified and MTP is dispatched. If the MTP is unavailable, local law enforcement is notified. The district supervisor is dispatched to the scene to meet with the operator and the peer support procedure is engaged. In addition, the bus camera video tape is removed for review. If an operator sustains a blow to the neck or head, the operator will be taken off the run. If the injuries do not result in the employee being transported to a medical facility, the operator is transported to the home garage for reporting purposes. The most serious assault events, those that include the use of a weapon or display of a weapon in a threatening manner or if the operator suffers severe or aggravated bodily injury, are categorized as “Aggravated Assault—Serious Incident/Injury.” The responses to aggravated assaults are consistent with those response efforts engaged when there has been an Interference with operator occurrence. Table 3. (Continued). Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 1: Research Overview Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.