National Academies Press: OpenBook

Scientific Communication and National Security (1982)

Chapter: 6 Compilation of Recommendations

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Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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6
COMPILATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapters 4 and 5 set out the Panel’s recommendations and the reasoning behind them. This chapter provides a compilation of our principal recommendations.

CONTROL OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Unrestricted Areas of Research

The Panel recommends that no restrictions of any kind limiting access or communication should be applied to any area of university research, be it basic or applied, unless it involves a technology meeting all of the following criteria:

  • The technology is developing rapidly, and the time from basic science to application is short;

  • The technology has identifiable direct military applications; or it is dual-use and involves process or production-related techniques;

  • Transfer of the technology would give the U.S.S.R. a significant near-term military advantage; and

  • The United States is the only source of information about the technology, or other friendly nations that could also be the source have control systems as secure as ours.

Classification

The Panel recommends that if government-supported research demonstrably will lead to military products in a short time, classifications should be considered. It should be noted that most universities will not undertake classified work, and some will undertake it only in off-campus facilities.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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Gray Areas

The Panel recommends that in the limited number of instances in which all of the above four criteria are met but in which classification is unwarranted, the values of open science can be preserved and the needs of government can be met by written agreements no more restrictive than the following:

  1. Prohibition of direct participation in government-supported research projects by nationals of designated foreign countries, with no attempt made to limit physical access to university space or facilities or enrollment in any classroom course of study. Moreover, where such prohibition has been imposed by visa or contractually agreed upon, it is not inappropriate for government-university contracts to permit the government to ask a university to report those instances coming to the university’s attention in which the stipulated foreign nationals seek participation in any such activities, however supported. It is recognized that some universities will regard such reporting requests as objectionable. Such requests, however, should not require surveillance or monitoring of foreign nationals by the universities.

  2. Submission of stipulated manuscripts simultaneously to the publisher and to the federal agency contract officer, with the federal agency then having 60 days to seek modifications in the manuscript. The review period is not intended to give the government the power to order changes: The right and freedom to publish remain with the university, as they do with all unclassified research. This does not, of course, detract from the government’s ultimate power to classify in accordance with law any research it has supported.

The Panel recommends that in cases where the government places such restrictions on scientific communication through contracts or other written agreements, it should be obligated to record and tabulate the instances of those restrictions on a regular basis.

The provisions of EAR and ITAR should not be invoked to deal with gray areas in government-funded university research.

THE WORKABILITY OF EXPORT CONTROLS ON SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION

Export of Domestically Available Technical Data under ITAR and EAR

The Panel recommends that unclassified information that is available domestically should receive a general license (exemption) from the formal licensing process.

Scope of ITAR and EAR Technical Data Provisions

The Panel recommends that information that is not directly and significantly connected with technology critical to national security

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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should also receive a general license (exemption) from the formal licensing process. The critical technology list approach—if carefully formulated—could serve to define those limited areas where controls are appropriate.

The MCTL

The Panel recommends a drastic streamlining of the MCTL by reducing its overall size to concentrate on technologies that are truly critical to national security. The Panel recommends that items should be removed from the MCTL if they are in one or more of the following categories:

  1. Science and technology whose transfer would not lead to a significant near-term improvement in Soviet defense capability;

  2. Science underlying a mature technology—that is, a technology that is evolving slowly;

  3. Science underlying dual-use technology that is not process-oriented;

  4. Components used in militarily sensitive devices that in themselves are not sensitive.

The Panel recognizes that technology transfer controls may be adopted for reasons other than direct military applicability, e.g., to support foreign or economic policies. When such controls are established, they should use mechanisms other than the MCTL.

Voluntary Controls

The Panel concludes that the voluntary publication control mechanism developed for cryptography is unlikely to be applicable to other research areas that bear on national security. However, the Panel recommends that consideration be given to adopting this mechanism in future cases, if and where the appropriate preconditions exist.

Staffing

The Panel recommends that, despite the severe budgetary restraints now in effect, serious consideration should be given to increased staffing in situations where it can be demonstrated that an agency’s ability to implement, monitor, or enforce regulations, or to give adequate service, is being compromised by lack of a sufficient number of adequately trained people, as for example, in the case of processing visa applications and developing intelligence assessments.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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DATA FOR DECISION MAKING

Assessment Capability

The Panel recommends that the government establish a focal point of expertise in basic science and technology for the purpose of evaluating the costs and benefits of scientific openness with respect to existing or proposed restrictions. There is also a need to assess the standing of the United States in comparison with other nations in specific scientific areas. Decisions on visa policy, exchanges, and export restrictions should be based on advice from such assessments. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has the capability to organize this type of effort and is placed sufficiently high in the government science and technology policy hierarchy to make recommendations on such matters.

Technology Transfers to the Third World

The Panel notes that its deliberations did not extend to the complex issues raised by military-related technology transfer from advanced industrial nations to Third World nations in regionally unstable areas or to those that may be potentially hostile to the United States and its allies. The Panel recommends that this subject receive further attention by the National Academy of Sciences or by other qualified study groups under federal sponsorship.

Review of Scientific Exchange Proposals

The Panel recommends that the intelligence and university communities establish an ongoing effort to raise awareness in the scientific community regarding the problems and costs of technological loss, and in the intelligence community regarding the problems and costs of applying restrictions on academic campuses. The Panel recommends the establishment of an academic advisory group to COMEX that would facilitate more effective communication between the universities and the appropriate federal agencies regarding scientific exchanges.

THE GOVERNMENT-UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP

Government-University Forum

The Panel recommends that the comprehensive forum proposed originally by the National Commission on Research be brought into existence as soon as practicable, under the auspices of the Academy complex. It further recommends that one of the specific standing responsibilities of the forum be discussion of science and technology transfer. The forum should promote exchanges of information and concern among (a) the affected line agencies, namely, the departments of State, Commerce, and

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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Defense, (b) the affected agencies of the intelligence community, (c) the appropriate law enforcement agencies, and (d) representatives of the U.S. scientific community. In the view of the Panel, it is important that the forum meet on a regular basis and that it serve as the basis for the development of less formal and more direct channels of communication and cooperation.

University Involvement in Research Whose Results Will Not Be Disseminated

The Panel recommends that universities should be vigilant when considering whether to accept research programs that may develop information that is not to be made available to the public, lest they compromise the freedom from which they derive their strength.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

Heightened Awareness

The U.S. scientific community should recognize the potential for foreign misuse of exchange programs for intelligence purposes. If scientists in academia or elsewhere become aware of activities that threaten national security, it is appropriate that they voluntarily inform government officials.

Bilateral Intergovernmental Agreements

The Panel urges the administration to become more selective about which programs it chooses to cancel, renew, or allow to expire. These decisions should be made on a substantive basis, and this suggests the need for increased involvement of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy leading to a more comprehensive examination of the costs and benefits of the exchanges.

Inter-Academy Exchanges (NAS-ASUSSR)

The Panel recommends that at least 50 percent of the visitors on both sides of inter-Academy exchanges should be invited by the receiving side, with invitations based on publications and other measures of competence of the visitors. Agreements should contain a clause that would allow cancellation of the program if it is determined that the other side is not sending those agreed upon or abuses the exchange program for intelligence purposes.

International Research and Exchange Board Program

The Panel recommends that (a) some fixed portion of the IREX program be reserved for technical and scientific fields in which the United States

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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and the U.S.S.R. have rough parity; (b) review procedures on the receiving side be enhanced to ensure that only bona fide scholars are sent on the exchanges; (c) all militarily sensitive areas be excluded from the exchanges by formal agreement; and (d) new or expanded procedures be developed to ensure that the program is mutually beneficial.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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ADDITIONAL COMMENT BY HAROLD T.SHAPIRO

While fully concurring with the recommendations of our Panel’s report, I would note that the report takes as a given the overall strategic parameters of current U.S. defense policy, including, for example, general attitudes toward security classification as a means of constraining the flow of science or technology. In the context of the complex set of issues raised both by the nuclear realities of our time and changing economic and scientific relations among nations, this proposition is not self-evident. Analysis of these issues, however, was beyond the scope of this report.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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LIST OF BRIEFERS, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES

Briefers

ARTHUR J.ALEXANDER, Associate Head, Economics Department, The Rand Corporation

BETSY ANDERSON, Consular Officer, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State

LEWIS M.BRANSCOMB, Chief Scientist, IBM Corporation

STEPHEN D.BRYEN, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Economic, Trade and Security Policy, Department of Defense

WILLIAM D.CAREY, Executive Officer, American Association for the Advancement of Science

MICHAEL CIFRINO, Attorney Advisor, Office of the Assistant General Counsel, Department of Defense

W.DONALD COOKE, Vice President for Research, Cornell University

JOHN C.CROWLEY, Director, Federal Relations for Science and Research, Association of American Universities

JAMES DEARLOVE, Chairman, Committee on Exchanges, Technology Transfer Branch; Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense

BOHDAN DENYSYK, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Export Administration, Department of Commerce

ERWIN FRIEDLANDER, Staff Physicist, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

ALBERT GORE, JR., Chairman, Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives

WALTER GRANT, Chief, Technology Transfer Branch of the Nuclear Energy and Applied Science Division, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense

C.DAVID HARTMANN, Executive Secretary, Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee

MARTIN HELLMAN, Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University

CHARLES HORNER, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State

BOBBY RAY INMAN, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency

ERNEST B.JOHNSTON, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

FRANCIS B.KAPPER, Director, Military Technology Sharing, International Programs and Technology, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

MICHAEL LORENZO, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (International Programs and Technology), Department of Defense

MICHAEL B.MARKS, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Department of State

RICHARD F.POST, Deputy Associate Director for Physics, Magnetic Fusion Division, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

FRANK H.T.RHODES, President, Cornell University

RONALD RIVEST, Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

HOWARD E.ROSENBLUM, Deputy Director for Communications Security, National Security Agency

JOSEPH P.SMALDONE, Chief, Arms Licensing Division, Office of Munitions Contol, Department of State

RICHARD SPICER, Intelligence Analyst, Soviet Section, Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

STEPHEN UNGER, Professor, Department of Computer Science, Columbia University

JACK VORONA, Assistant Vice Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence (International), Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense

DAVID A.WILSON, President’s Executive Assistant, University of California

LEO YOUNG, Director for Research and Technical Information, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

Contributors

LAURENCE J.ADAMS, Senior Vice President, Martin Marietta Corporation

WAYNE BERT, Munitions Policy Analyst, International Economic, Trade and Security Policy, Department of Defense

JENNIFER SUE BOND, Program Analyst, National Science Foundation

J.FRED BUCY, President, Texas Instruments, Inc.

ALAN M.CAMPBELL, Executive Secretary, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Committee on Cooperation in Physics, Office of International Affairs, National Academy of Sciences

ROSEMARY CHALK, Program Head for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, American Association for the Advancement of Science

JOHN C.CROWLEY, Director, Federal Relations for Science and Research, Association of American Universities

EDWARD E.DAVID, JR., President, Exxon Research and Engineering Company

CAROLE A.GANZ, International Science Analyst, National Science Foundation

RICHARD L.GARWIN, IBM Fellow, T.J.Watson Research Center, IBM Corporation

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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S.E.GOODMAN, Professor, Department of Information Systems and Decision Sciences, University of Arizona

RUTH GREENSTEIN, Associate General Counsel, Policy, National Science Foundation

WILLIAM C.HITTINGER, Executive Vice President, RCA Corporation

JEANNE E.HUDSON, Special Assistant, Office of the Director, National Science Foundation

JOHN W.KISER III, Kiser Research, Inc.

RICHARD KRASNOW, Congressional Science Fellow

LAWRENCE C.MITCHELL, Staff Director, Office of International Affairs, National Academy of Sciences

MARTIN E.PACKARD, Assistant to the Board Chairman, Varian Associates

THOMAS O.PAINE, Thomas Paine Associates

HAROLD RELYEA, Analyst, Government Division, Congressional Research Service

LEONARD M.RIESER, Chairperson, Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, American Association for the Advancement of Science

IAN M.ROSS, President, Bell Laboratories

ROBERT D.SCHMIDT, Vice Chairman of the Board, Control Data Corporation

ROLAND W.SCHMITT, Vice President, Corporate Research and Development, General Electric Company

MICHAEL A.STROSCIO, Special Assistant to the Director of Research and Technical Information, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

Liaison Representatives

American Academy of Arts and Sciences

HERMAN FESHBACH, Professor, Department of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

American Association for the Advancement of Science

J.THOMAS RATCHFORD, Associate Executive Officer, American Association for the Advancement of Science

American Chemical Society

RAYMOND P.MARIELLA, Executive Director, American Chemical Society

American Geophysical Union

FRED SPILHAUS, Executive Director, American Geophysical Union

American Physical Society

MELVIN B.GOTTLIEB, Science and Public Policy Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

Association of American Universities

THOMAS A.BARTLETT, President, Association of American Universities

Association of American Universities-Department of Defense Forum

DAVID A.WILSON, President’s Executive Assistant, University of California

Department of Commerce

BOHDAN DENYSYK, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Export Administration, Department of Commerce

Department of Defense

STEPHEN D.BRYEN, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Economic, Trade and Security Policy, Department of Defense

FRANCIS B.KAPPER, Director, Military Technology Sharing, International Programs and Technology, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

LEO YOUNG, Director for Research and Technical Information, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

Department of State

MICHAEL B.MARKS, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Department of State

Intelligence Community

JAN P.HERRING, Chairman, Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

BURTON I.EDELSON, Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications, NASA

JACK KERREBROCK, Associate Administrator for Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, NASA

National Science Foundation

DONALD N.LANGENBERG, Deputy Director, National Science Foundation

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

Office of Science and Technology Policy

EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN, Assistant Director for International Affairs, Office of Science and Technology Policy

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

ROBERT P.BRISKMAN, Assistant Vice President, COMSAT General Corporation

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS


AAAS

American Association for the Advancement of Science

AAU

American Association of Universities

ASUSSR

Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.


COCOM

Coordinating Committee for national export controls

COMEX

Committee on Exchanges


DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency


EAA

Export Administration Act

EAR

Export Administration Regulations


IREX

International Research and Exchange Board

ITAR

International Traffic in Arms Regulations


MCTL

Militarily Critical Technologies List


NAS

National Academy of Sciences


OEA

Office of Export Administration

OMC

Office of Munitions Control


PCSG

Public Cryptography Study Group

PRC

People’s Republic of China


TTIC

Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

1. PERSPECTIVES ON THE CURRENT PROBLEM

1.1 Background on East-West science and technology transfer

Bucy, J.Fred. “Technology Transfer and East-West Trade: A Reappraisal,” International Security 5:3 (Winter 1980/81), 132–151. Examines the political, economic, and security dimensions of the U.S. failure to develop a coherent and sound export control policy. Considers also the impact on relations with other Western allies.


Gustafson, Thane. Rand Report. Selling the Russians the Rope? Soviet Technology Policy and U.S. Export Controls. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, April 1981. 77 pp. Aims to take a new and critical look at the objectives and assumptions of U.S. high-technology export-control policy. Describes the main developments in Soviet technology policy over the last 10 years, analyzes the reasons for Soviet technology lag, and draws the implications for U.S. policy.

Gustafson, Thane. “Why Doesn’t Soviet Science Do Better Than It Does?” in Linda L.Lubrano and Susan G.Solomon, eds., The Social Context of Soviet Science (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 31–68. Analyzes the organization, financing, and training of personnel for Soviet science and its attendant strengths and weaknesses.


Kiser, John W. III. Commercial Technology Transfer from Eastern Europe to the United States and Western Europe. Report prepared for the Department of State, Washington, D.C.: Kiser Research, 1980. 115 pp. Considers commercial technology transfer from four East European countries—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland—to the United States and selected Western European countries. The report focuses on benefits derived by the United States, principally from buying licences.

Kiser, John W. III. Report on the Potential for Technology Transfer from the Soviet Union to the United States. Report prepared for the Department of State and the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1977. 168 pp. Examines the premise that the Soviet Union has scientific information and technology available and of use to the West. Establishes a historical record on the sale of Soviet technology.

Kiser, John W. III. “Tapping Eastern Bloc Technology,” Harvard Business Review 60:2 (March–April 1982), 85–93. Suggests the notion of reverse technology transfer from East to West. Points out some of the difficulties of obtaining technology from the Communist world.


National Research Council, Board on International Scientific Exchanges, Commission on International Relations. Review of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Inter-Academy Exchanges and Relations, September 1977. Report of a 2-year study conducted under the chairmanship of Carl Kaysen. Various sections treat the development of the

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

    program, the description of its features, and the status of exchanges in several fields of science. Conclusions are included as to the costs and benefits of scientific exchanges.

National Research Council, Commission on International Relations. Summary Report on the Special Meeting on NAS Relations with the Soviet and East European Scientific Communities and Academies of Sciences, October 28, 1981. 4 pp. This summary report is based on discussions held at NAS at an ad hoc meeting called at the invitation of President Frank Press and chaired by Herbert F.York. The meeting included 22 participants from universities, industry, journalism, and foundations. It considered the impact on East-West scientific interactions of the changed international (and domestic) political and economic environments.

National Research Council, Board on International Scientific Exchanges, Commission on International Relations. Review of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology, May 1977. Evaluates the effectiveness of the Academy-managed exchange agreement with the Soviet Union and makes specific recommendations regarding the terms and arrangements for its continuation.


Relyea, Harold C. “Business, Trade Secrets, and Information Access Policy Developments in Other Countries: An Overview,” Adminstrative Law Review 34:2 (Spring 1982), 315–371. Presents capsule description of existing or emerging policy concerning the right of access to official information or records held by governments in Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Scandanavia. Special consideration is given to the implications for business, commercial records, and trade data. A final section explores the issue of transborder data flows.

Relyea, Harold C. National Security Controls and Scientific Information. Congressional Issue Brief Number IB82083, updated August 18, 1982. 15 pp. Succinct general policy background paper. Bibliography.


Skolnikoff, Eugene B. “Technology Transfer to Other Countries: Life-Threatening or Unimportant?” unpublished, April 22, 1982. This essay by the director of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T., examines the overall question of technology transfers to other countries and assesses the costs and benefits of more stringent control measures.


U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Technology and East-West Trade, Chapter IX, “The East-West Trade Policies of America’s COCOM Allies.” Washington, D.C.: GPO, Nov. 1979. pp. 173–202. Comparative discussion of the trade policies adhered to by the principal Western allies of the United States: West Germany, France, United Kingdom, and Japan. A general background document.


Zaleski, Eugène, and Helgard Wienert. Technology Transfer between East and West. Paris: OECD, 1980. 435 pp. [Washington, D.C: sold by OECD Publications and Information Center.] Topics include: historical perspectives on East-West trade, statistical

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
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    analyses, forms of technology transfer, Eastern and Western policies regarding technology transfer, influence of transfers on Eastern economies, effect of economic factors on transfer, and effect of transfers on Western economies.

1.2 Recent correspondence and speeches

Brady, Lawrence J. “Taking Back the Rope, Technology Transfer and U.S. Security.” Statement before the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, March 29, 1982.


Carey, William D. “Scientific Exchanges and U.S. National Security.” Science 215 (January 8, 1982), 139–141. Letters exchanged by Mr. Carey, Executive Officer and Publisher of Science, and The Honorable Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defense, concerning scientific exchanges, conferences, and the unclassified, open scientific literature.

Carey, William D. “Science and the National Security.” Science 214 (November 6, 1981), 609. Comment on perceived concerns of military officials toward technology transfer.


“High Tech Censorship.” Transcript of the 1982 MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, April 21, 1982. Interview and debate with George Davida (cryptographer), Daniel Schwartz (National Security Counsel), Stephen Bryen (DOD), and William Carey (AAAS).


Inman, Admiral B.R., and William D.Carey. “Classifying Science: A Government Proposal…And a Scientist’s Objection,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 116:6 (February 8, 1982), 10–11. Inman’s address to the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., January 7, 1982; rebutted by Executive Officer of AAAS on subject of science and secrecy.

Inman, Admiral B.R. “National Security and Technical Information.” Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., January 7, 1982. 7 pp. Presented morning session, “Striking a Balance: Scientific Freedom and National Security.”


Kennedy, Donald. Letter on behalf of the Presidents of Cornell University, M.I.T., Cal Tech, the University of California, and Stanford University to Secretaries Malcolm Baldridge, Alexander Haig, and Caspar Weinberger, February 27, 1981.


Press, Frank. Statement before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology and Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology, March 29, 1982.


Weinberger, Caspar W. “Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union,” The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1982. p. 32. Support and explanation of administration views on need for export controls.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

1.3 Government documents

1.3.1 U.S. Congress

Hart, Gary W., U.S. Senator (D-Col). “High Technology Trade Act of 1982,” S. 2356, Congressional Record (Senate, April 1, 1982). 7 pp. Description of a proposed bill that offers a different view concerning how the United States can maintain its technological edge.


U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy. “Hearing on Export Controls for National Security Purposes,” April 14, 1982. Testimony of Lawrence Brady (Commerce), Fred C.Ikle (DOD), Ernest B.Johnston (State), and Edward J. O’Malley (FBI).

1.3.2 Central Intelligence Agency

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. “Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology,” April 1982. 15 pp. Describes the Soviet program to acquire U.S. and Western technology, the acquisition mechanisms used, the spectrum of Western technology that has contributed to Soviet military capability, and the problems of restricting the transfer of Western technological information.

1.3.3 Department of Defense

Lorenzo, Michael, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. “The Role and Responsibilities of Defense Research and Engineering in Export Control.” Statement before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations at hearings on Transfer of United States, High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations. 97th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982. Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, May 11, 1982.


Perle, Richard N. “The Soviet Connection,” Defense 82 (February 1982), 10–15. (Adapted from congressional testimony of November 12, 1981.) Provides a limited (i.e. unclassified) statement of the Defense Department’s concerns about Soviet access to U.S. science and technology.


U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of U.S. Technology, An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology—A DOD Perspective. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976. 39 pp. This is the so-called Bucy report, which examines a number of critical technologies, their impact on U.S. strategic requirements, the mechanisms through which information

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

    about them is transferred, and the current effectiveness of export controls and the COCOM agreement.

U.S. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power. Washington, D.C.: GPO. 99 pp. Chapter VI, “Quest for Technological Superiority,” is a key source for the current administration’s arguments for controlling transfer of technology.

2. MECHANISMS FOR CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

2.1 Classification

Ehlke, Richard C., and Harold C.Relyea. The Freedom of Information Improvements Act of 1981—Proposed Amendments of the Reagan Administration: A Brief Analysis and Commentary. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, January 22, 1982. 81 pp.

Executive Office of the President. Executive Order No. 12065, “National Security Information.” Federal Register 43:128 (June 28, 1978), 28949–28961.


Halperin, Morton H., and Allan Adler. Comment on Draft Executive Order on National Security Information—and related material. February 9, 1982


Office of the Press Secretary, White House. “Executive Order on National Security Information.” April 2, 1982


U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. “Report of the Defense Science Board, Task Force on Secrecy,” July 1, 1970. 12 pp. This is the “Seitz Report,” which considered the matter of classification from several viewpoints but focused primarily on classification of scientific and technical information. It assessed the positive and negative aspects of classification, the types of information that need to be classified, and the length of time classification should be maintained.

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations. Executive Order on Security Classifiation. Washington, D.C.: USCIPO, 1982. 363 pp. Hearing before the English Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, March 10 and May 5, 1982.

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations. “The Government’s Classification of Private Ideas.” 96th Congress, 2d Session, December 22, 1980. 244 pp. U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology testimony concerning the impact of national security considerations on science and technology. Witnesses included Admiral B.R.Inman, Lawrence J. Brady, George Millburn, Frank Press, Robert Corell, Edward Gerjuoy, and John McLucas.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

2.2 Export controls

Conahan, Frank C., Director, International Division, G.A.O. Statement Before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, “The Administration of Export Controls under the Export Administration Act,” April 30, 1981. Hearings on International Affairs Functions of the Treasury and the Export Administration Act. 97th Congress, 1st session. Washington D.C.: GPO, 1982. Provides a critical analysis of the administration of export controls, including the constraints imposed by the necessity to seek compromise within COCOM and the inefficiencies of the bureaucratic review process.


Eagle Research Group, Inc. Report of the United States Munitions List Study, Prepared for the Office of Munitions Control, Department of State, ERG 81–123F1, April 14, 1981. This study was conducted for the State Department for the purpose of providing an analytical input into the final report to be submitted to the Congress on the MCTL as required by the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980.


Gustafson, Thane. “U.S. Export Controls and Soviet Technology,” Technology Review, 85:2 (February/March 1982), 34–35. Examines whether the critical technologies approach can improve the export control system.


International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. “Overview of the Export Administration Program.” October 1981. 17 pp. Provides a short summary of the legislative history, administrative organization, and enforcement procedures relating to the Export Administration Regulations. Also deals with interagency consultation and cooperation.


Legislative History, Export Administration Act of 1981, P.L. 97–145. 12 pp.


Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Initial Militarily Critical Technologies List,” Federal Register 45:192 (October 1, 1980), 65014–65019.


Packard, Martin E., “A Businessman’s View of the Effect of Export Licensing on Technology Transfer to the USSR,” unpublished, 1981. Examines the many sources of technological information and the effectiveness of various control measures. Considers the costs and benefits of export licensing.


U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Transfer of United States Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations. Statement of Fred Asselin, Staff Investigator, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, at hearings held by the subcommittee, May 4, 5, 6, 11 and 12, 1982. 97th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982. 655 pp. This is a report of an investigation conducted by the staff of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee on the effectiveness of the Department of Commerce in enforcing the Export Administration Regulations. It is highly critical of current enforcement practices.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

U.S. Department of State “Proposed Revision of the International International Traffic on Arms Regulations,” Federal Register, 45:246 (December 19, 1980), 83970–83995.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Export Controls: Need to Clarify Policy and Simplify Administration. ID-79–16. Washington, D.C.: GPO, March 1, 1979. 67 pp. This report examines the decision-making apparatus for determining what technology or products must be controlled and the effectiveness of this system. It assesses both domestic and multilateral export control policies, and includes an analysis of COCOM control procedures.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Export Control Regulation Could Be Reduced Without Affecting National Security. ID-82–14. Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 26, 1982. This report examines the process of review for export applications and considers ways in which the process could be streamlined without affecting U.S. national security. The report also discusses inefficiencies in the licensing review process and government efforts to curtail illegal export activity.

U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. Munitions Export Controls Need Improvement. ID-78–62. Washington, D.C.: GPO, April 25, 1979. 48 pp. +7 appendixes. This report recommends ways to improve munitions export controls and to provide assurance that such exports conform to law and authorized munitions export licenses. It examines the workload and licensing procedures employed by the Office of Munitions Control in the State Department.

2.3 Contractual controls in government-funded research

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on University Responsiveness.” January 1982. 14 pp. Prepared at the request of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services. Includes evaluation of the impact of implementation of contractual controls on research dissemination.

2.4 Voluntary restraints

Berry, R.L. “Academic Freedom and Peer Reviews of Research Proposals and Papers,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62:4 (November 1980), 639–646. Advantages and disadvantages of peer reviews, including administrative use for suppression of unpopular proposals and papers as constituting censorship unless justifiable. Bibliography.


Kolata, Gina Bari. “Prior Restraints Recommended,” Science 211 (February 20, 1981), 797. Public Cryptography Study Group’s proposal for voluntary system of prior restraints.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

2.5 Visa control

“New Pressure on Scientific Exchanges,” Science 215 (February 5, 1982), 637–638. Recent administration actions affecting exchanges.

3. INFORMATION RESTRICTIONS AND U.S. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE

AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility National Security and Scientific Communication. Memo, June 1982. 8 pp. A summary of responses received by the Committee to letters from 100 leading American scientists and engineers on the topic of science and secrecy.


Branscomb, Lewis M. Letter to Leonard M.Rieser, Chairman, AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, April 5, 1982. 3 pp. Presents a personal view of the conflict between national security and unclassified research with particular reference to impacts on the university and business communities.


Center for Science and Technology Policy, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University. Current Issues in Export Controls of Technology, Background Information and Summary of Discussion, November 1981. 38 pp. Considers several issues involving the use of export controls to restrict the flow of technology. Presents the results of faculty discussions as to the most critical questions and impacts on university/industrial research program.


Denning, Peter J. “A Scientist’s View of Government Control Over Scientific Publication.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., January 7, 1982.


Gray, Paul E. “Technology Transfer at Issue: The Academic Viewpoint,” IEEE Spectrum (May 1982), 64–68. Delineates the arguments presented to the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense by the group of five university presidents.


National Science Foundation. Foreign Participation in U.S. Science and Engineering Higher Education and Labor Markets, Special Report NSF 81–316. September 1981. Examines the evidence regarding the growth of foreign participation in U.S. science and engineering graduate school programs. Concentrates on graduate training, doctorate production, and postdoctorates.

Nelkin, Dorothy. “Intellectual Property: The Control of Scientific Information,” Science 216 (May 14, 1982), 704–708. A review of diverse situations that have led to disputes and of efforts to establish principles for contolling intellectual property.


Unger, Stephen H. “The Growing Threat of Government Secrecy,” Technology Review (February/March 1982). Background summary paper on expansion of barriers being erected to the free flow of scientific information. Brief Bibliography.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology. Impact of National Security Considerations on Science and Technology. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982. U.S. House, Committee on Government Operations annotation: Based on a study made by the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights. Address the issue of invention secrecy, public cryptography, and atomic energy restricted data.


Wallich, Paul. “Technology Transfer at Issue: The Industry Viewpoint,” IEEE Spectrum (May 1982), 69–73. Identifies the nature of the commercial technology export problem and the position of the private sector.

4. LEGAL ISSUES

Cheh, Mary M. “Government Control of Private Ideas.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., January 8, 1982.


Green, Harold P. “Where the Balance Has Been Struck—Information Control Under the Atomic Energy Act.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., January 7, 1982.

Greenstein, Ruth, “National Security Controls on Scientific Information,” unpublished, 1982. Analyzes the use of export controls to restrict free exchange of scientific information, particularly that which is only indirectly related to controlled hardware. Addresses the question of whether an export control system can be designed that meets national security objectives while maintaining a vital scientific base.


Olson, Theodore B., Office of the Assistant Attorney General. Memorandum on Export Administration Regulations for Henry D. Mitman, Director, Capital Goods Production Materials Divisions, Department of Commerce. July 28, 1981. 6 pp.

Olson, Theodore B., Office of the Assistant Attorney General. Memorandum on Constitutionality of the Proposed Revision of the Technical Data Provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations for William B. Robinson, Office of Munitions Control, Department of State. July 1, 1981. 16 pp.

5. CASE EXAMPLES

5.1 Very high speed integrated circuits (VHSIC)

“Controls Sought on Technology Exports,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 114:7 (February 16, 1981), 85. Defense Department steps to prevent transfer of technology in VHSIC program.


Martin, Jim, “Very High Speed Integrated Circuits—Into the Second Generation, Part 1: The Birth of the Program,” Military Electronics/Countermeasures 7:12 (December 1981), 52–58, 71–73.

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

Martin, Jim, “Very High Speed Integrated Circuits—Into the Second Generation, Part 2: Entering Phase 1,” Military Electronics/Countermeasures 8:1 (January 1982), 60–66.


Sumney, Larry W. Memorandum for VHSIC Program Directors, December 12, 1980. 2 pp. Interim guidance from the Director of DOD VHSIC Program Office concerning the applicability of ITAR and EAR to VHSIC research.


Vanderheiden, Robert M. “VHSIC: Midterm Report on a Dynamic Circuit Program,” Defense Electronics 14:2 (February 1982), 54–62.

5.2 Cryptography

Kahn, David. “Cryptology Goes Public,” Foreign Affairs 58:1 (Fall, 1979), 141–159. Detailed overview of national security and private sector conflict over development of cryptology. NSA activities, communications security, eavesdropping, countermeasures, government regulatory activity, DES, secrecy orders, issues.

Kahn, David. “The Public’s Secrets,” Progressive 44:11 (November 1980), 27–31. Spread of cryptology and concerns of U.S. intelligence agencies regarding national security. Patent secrecy orders, export controls and scientific meetings. Overview of issues.


Schwartz, Daniel C. “Scientific Freedom and National Security—A Case Study of Cryptography.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., January 7, 1982.

5.3 Other scientific and technological areas

Channon, Stanley L. Status and Recommendations for Export Control of Composite Materials Technology, IDA Paper P-1592. 2 Vols. Institute for Defense Analysis, Science and Technology Division, September 1981. 519 pp. This report presents the results of a 27-month study of U.S. and foreign technology in organic matrix, metal-matrix, carbon-carbon, and ceramic-matrix composite materials and a critical review of the relevant U.S. export control regulations. The advantages and disadvantages of export control and the effects of these controls on industrial innovation, academic research, and international technical communications are discussed. Suggested methods for handling proprietary information, emerging technology, and the involvement of foreign nationals in advanced composite materials technology are presented.


Goodman, S.E. Memorandum on U.S. computer export control policies: value conflicts and policy choice. 51 pp. Reviews U.S. export controls for computer products and know-how and examines the policy choices.


“Of Bubbles, Bombs, and Batteries: Secrecy Snafus,” Technology Review 85:2. (February/March 1982), 36–39, 84–85. Review of

Suggested Citation:"6 Compilation of Recommendations." Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 1982. Scientific Communication and National Security. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/253.
×

    recent export actions, including The Progressive case, conferences, and secrecy orders.


“Pajaro Dunes Biotechnology Statement,” Tech Talk (M.I.T.) 26:31 (April 7, 1982), 8. Preliminary consensus position resulting from the Conference on Biotechnology, Pajaro Dunes, California, March 25–27, 1982. The conference was attended by high-level representatives from Stanford, Cal Tech, University of California, Harvard, and M.I.T.

6. WORKING PAPERS OF THE PANEL

[Photocopies of the collected working papers of the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security are available from the National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418.]

Alexander, Arthur J. “Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition.”


Cooke, W.D., Thomas Eisner, Thomas Everhart, Franklin A.Long, Benjamin Widom, and Edward Wolf. “Restrictions on Academic Research and the National Interest.”


Kiser, John W. III. “East-West Technology Transfer.”


Post, Richard F., Melvin B.Gottlieb, and Wolfang K.H.Panofsky. “Comments on Historical Aspects of Classification and Communication in Magnetic Fusion Research.”


Wallerstein, Mitchel B. “The Office of Strategic Information (OSI), U.S. Department of Commerce, 1954–1957.”

Wallerstein, Mitchel B. “The Coordinating Committee for National Export Controls (COCOM),” with Annex by John P.Hardt and Kate S.Tomlinson.

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Next: Appendix A: Memorandum from the Intelligence Subpanel to the Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security »
Scientific Communication and National Security Get This Book
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The military, political, and economic preeminence of the United States during the post-World War II era is based to a substantial degree on its superior rate of achievement in science and technology, as well as on its capacity to translate these achievements into products and processes that contribute to economic prosperity and the national defense. The success of the U.S. scientific enterprise has been facilitated by many factors, important among them the opportunity for American scientists and engineers to pursue their research-and to communicate with each other-in a free and open environment.

During the last two administrations, however, concern has arisen that the characteristically open U.S. scientific community has served as one of the channels through which critical information and know-how are flowing to the Soviet Union and to other potential adversary countries; openness in science is thus perceived to present short-term national security risks in addition to its longer-term national security benefits in improved U.S. military technology.

The Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security was asked to examine the various aspects of the application of controls to scientific communication and to suggest how to balance competing national objectives so as to best serve the general welfare. The Panel held three two-day meetings in Washington at which it was briefed by representatives of the departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and by representatives of the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. The Panel also heard presentations by members of the research community and by university representatives. In addition to these briefings, the Rand Corporation prepared an independent analysis of the transfer of sensitive technology from the United States to the Soviet Union. To determine the views of scientists and administrators at major research universities, the Panel asked a group of faculty members and administrative officials at Cornell University to prepare a paper incorporating their own views and those of counterparts at other universities.

The main thrust of the Panel's findings is completely reflected in this document. However, the Panel has also produced a classified version of the subpanel report based on the secret intelligence information it was given; this statement is available at the Academy to those with the appropriate security clearance.

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